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re PR libmudflap/41433 (security: mudflap accepts environment variables if setuid) 

2009-09-22  Frank Ch. Eigler  <fche@redhat.com>

	PR libmudflap/41433
	* mf-runtime.c (__mf_init): Ignore $MUDFLAP_OPTIONS if
	running setuid or setgid.

From-SVN: r152026
This commit is contained in:
Frank Ch. Eigler 2009-09-22 16:17:50 +00:00 committed by Frank Ch. Eigler
parent e0601576f7
commit 5d0001f015
2 changed files with 17 additions and 2 deletions
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6
libmudflap/ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
2009-09-22 Frank Ch. Eigler <fche@redhat.com>
PR libmudflap/41433
* mf-runtime.c (__mf_init): Ignore $MUDFLAP_OPTIONS if
running setuid or setgid.
2009-09-01 Loren J. Rittle <ljrittle@acm.org>
* mf-runtime.c (__mf_init): Support FreeBSD.

13
libmudflap/mf-runtime.c
View File

@ -303,6 +303,14 @@ __mf_set_default_options ()
#ifdef LIBMUDFLAPTH
__mf_opts.thread_stack = 0;
#endif
/* PR41443: Beware that the above flags will be applied to
setuid/setgid binaries, and cannot be overriden with
$MUDFLAP_OPTIONS. So the defaults must be non-exploitable.
Should we consider making the default violation_mode something
harsher than viol_nop? OTOH, glibc's MALLOC_CHECK_ is disabled
by default for these same programs. */
}
static struct mudoption
@ -442,7 +450,7 @@ __mf_usage ()
"This is a %s%sGCC \"mudflap\" memory-checked binary.\n"
"Mudflap is Copyright (C) 2002-2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc.\n"
"\n"
"The mudflap code can be controlled by an environment variable:\n"
"Unless setuid, a program's mudflap options be set by an environment variable:\n"
"\n"
"$ export MUDFLAP_OPTIONS='<options>'\n"
"$ <mudflapped_program>\n"
@ -711,7 +719,8 @@ __mf_init ()
__mf_set_default_options ();
ov = getenv ("MUDFLAP_OPTIONS");
if (getuid () == geteuid () && getgid () == getegid ()) /* PR41433, not setuid */
ov = getenv ("MUDFLAP_OPTIONS");
if (ov)
{
int rc = __mfu_set_options (ov);