77966a0d91
Backported from mainline 2017-07-14 Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com> PR sanitizer/81066 * sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux.h: Cherry-pick upstream r307969. * sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux.cc: Likewise. * sanitizer_common/sanitizer_stoptheworld_linux_libcdep.cc: Likewise. * tsan/tsan_platform_linux.cc: Likewise. From-SVN: r250287
406 lines
13 KiB
C++
406 lines
13 KiB
C++
//===-- tsan_platform_linux.cc --------------------------------------------===//
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//
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// This file is distributed under the University of Illinois Open Source
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// License. See LICENSE.TXT for details.
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//
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//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
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//
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// This file is a part of ThreadSanitizer (TSan), a race detector.
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//
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// Linux- and FreeBSD-specific code.
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//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
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#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_platform.h"
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#if SANITIZER_LINUX || SANITIZER_FREEBSD
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#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common.h"
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#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_libc.h"
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#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux.h"
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#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_platform_limits_posix.h"
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#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_posix.h"
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#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_procmaps.h"
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#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_stoptheworld.h"
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#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_stackdepot.h"
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#include "tsan_platform.h"
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#include "tsan_rtl.h"
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#include "tsan_flags.h"
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <pthread.h>
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#include <signal.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include <sys/mman.h>
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#if SANITIZER_LINUX
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#include <sys/personality.h>
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#include <setjmp.h>
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#endif
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#include <sys/syscall.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <sys/time.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/resource.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <sched.h>
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#include <dlfcn.h>
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#if SANITIZER_LINUX
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#define __need_res_state
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#include <resolv.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef sa_handler
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# undef sa_handler
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#endif
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#ifdef sa_sigaction
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# undef sa_sigaction
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#endif
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#if SANITIZER_FREEBSD
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extern "C" void *__libc_stack_end;
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void *__libc_stack_end = 0;
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#endif
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#if SANITIZER_LINUX && defined(__aarch64__)
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void InitializeGuardPtr() __attribute__((visibility("hidden")));
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#endif
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namespace __tsan {
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#ifdef TSAN_RUNTIME_VMA
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// Runtime detected VMA size.
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uptr vmaSize;
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#endif
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enum {
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MemTotal = 0,
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MemShadow = 1,
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MemMeta = 2,
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MemFile = 3,
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MemMmap = 4,
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MemTrace = 5,
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MemHeap = 6,
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MemOther = 7,
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MemCount = 8,
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};
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void FillProfileCallback(uptr p, uptr rss, bool file,
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uptr *mem, uptr stats_size) {
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mem[MemTotal] += rss;
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if (p >= ShadowBeg() && p < ShadowEnd())
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mem[MemShadow] += rss;
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else if (p >= MetaShadowBeg() && p < MetaShadowEnd())
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mem[MemMeta] += rss;
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#if !SANITIZER_GO
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else if (p >= HeapMemBeg() && p < HeapMemEnd())
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mem[MemHeap] += rss;
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else if (p >= LoAppMemBeg() && p < LoAppMemEnd())
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mem[file ? MemFile : MemMmap] += rss;
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else if (p >= HiAppMemBeg() && p < HiAppMemEnd())
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mem[file ? MemFile : MemMmap] += rss;
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#else
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else if (p >= AppMemBeg() && p < AppMemEnd())
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mem[file ? MemFile : MemMmap] += rss;
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#endif
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else if (p >= TraceMemBeg() && p < TraceMemEnd())
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mem[MemTrace] += rss;
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else
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mem[MemOther] += rss;
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}
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void WriteMemoryProfile(char *buf, uptr buf_size, uptr nthread, uptr nlive) {
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uptr mem[MemCount];
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internal_memset(mem, 0, sizeof(mem[0]) * MemCount);
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__sanitizer::GetMemoryProfile(FillProfileCallback, mem, 7);
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StackDepotStats *stacks = StackDepotGetStats();
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internal_snprintf(buf, buf_size,
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"RSS %zd MB: shadow:%zd meta:%zd file:%zd mmap:%zd"
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" trace:%zd heap:%zd other:%zd stacks=%zd[%zd] nthr=%zd/%zd\n",
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mem[MemTotal] >> 20, mem[MemShadow] >> 20, mem[MemMeta] >> 20,
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mem[MemFile] >> 20, mem[MemMmap] >> 20, mem[MemTrace] >> 20,
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mem[MemHeap] >> 20, mem[MemOther] >> 20,
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stacks->allocated >> 20, stacks->n_uniq_ids,
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nlive, nthread);
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}
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#if SANITIZER_LINUX
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void FlushShadowMemoryCallback(
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const SuspendedThreadsList &suspended_threads_list,
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void *argument) {
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ReleaseMemoryToOS(ShadowBeg(), ShadowEnd() - ShadowBeg());
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}
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#endif
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void FlushShadowMemory() {
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#if SANITIZER_LINUX
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StopTheWorld(FlushShadowMemoryCallback, 0);
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#endif
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}
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#if !SANITIZER_GO
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// Mark shadow for .rodata sections with the special kShadowRodata marker.
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// Accesses to .rodata can't race, so this saves time, memory and trace space.
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static void MapRodata() {
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// First create temp file.
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const char *tmpdir = GetEnv("TMPDIR");
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if (tmpdir == 0)
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tmpdir = GetEnv("TEST_TMPDIR");
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#ifdef P_tmpdir
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if (tmpdir == 0)
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tmpdir = P_tmpdir;
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#endif
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if (tmpdir == 0)
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return;
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char name[256];
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internal_snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s/tsan.rodata.%d",
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tmpdir, (int)internal_getpid());
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uptr openrv = internal_open(name, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0600);
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if (internal_iserror(openrv))
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return;
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internal_unlink(name); // Unlink it now, so that we can reuse the buffer.
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fd_t fd = openrv;
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// Fill the file with kShadowRodata.
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const uptr kMarkerSize = 512 * 1024 / sizeof(u64);
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InternalScopedBuffer<u64> marker(kMarkerSize);
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// volatile to prevent insertion of memset
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for (volatile u64 *p = marker.data(); p < marker.data() + kMarkerSize; p++)
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*p = kShadowRodata;
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internal_write(fd, marker.data(), marker.size());
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// Map the file into memory.
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uptr page = internal_mmap(0, GetPageSizeCached(), PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
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MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, fd, 0);
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if (internal_iserror(page)) {
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internal_close(fd);
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return;
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}
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// Map the file into shadow of .rodata sections.
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MemoryMappingLayout proc_maps(/*cache_enabled*/true);
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uptr start, end, offset, prot;
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// Reusing the buffer 'name'.
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while (proc_maps.Next(&start, &end, &offset, name, ARRAY_SIZE(name), &prot)) {
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if (name[0] != 0 && name[0] != '['
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&& (prot & MemoryMappingLayout::kProtectionRead)
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&& (prot & MemoryMappingLayout::kProtectionExecute)
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&& !(prot & MemoryMappingLayout::kProtectionWrite)
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&& IsAppMem(start)) {
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// Assume it's .rodata
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char *shadow_start = (char*)MemToShadow(start);
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char *shadow_end = (char*)MemToShadow(end);
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for (char *p = shadow_start; p < shadow_end; p += marker.size()) {
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internal_mmap(p, Min<uptr>(marker.size(), shadow_end - p),
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PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, fd, 0);
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}
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}
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}
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internal_close(fd);
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}
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void InitializeShadowMemoryPlatform() {
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MapRodata();
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}
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#endif // #if !SANITIZER_GO
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void InitializePlatformEarly() {
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#ifdef TSAN_RUNTIME_VMA
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vmaSize =
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(MostSignificantSetBitIndex(GET_CURRENT_FRAME()) + 1);
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#if defined(__aarch64__)
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if (vmaSize != 39 && vmaSize != 42 && vmaSize != 48) {
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Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
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Printf("FATAL: Found %d - Supported 39, 42 and 48\n", vmaSize);
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Die();
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}
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#elif defined(__powerpc64__)
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if (vmaSize != 44 && vmaSize != 46) {
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Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
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Printf("FATAL: Found %d - Supported 44 and 46\n", vmaSize);
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Die();
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}
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#endif
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#endif
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}
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void InitializePlatform() {
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DisableCoreDumperIfNecessary();
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// Go maps shadow memory lazily and works fine with limited address space.
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// Unlimited stack is not a problem as well, because the executable
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// is not compiled with -pie.
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if (!SANITIZER_GO) {
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bool reexec = false;
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// TSan doesn't play well with unlimited stack size (as stack
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// overlaps with shadow memory). If we detect unlimited stack size,
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// we re-exec the program with limited stack size as a best effort.
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if (StackSizeIsUnlimited()) {
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const uptr kMaxStackSize = 32 * 1024 * 1024;
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VReport(1, "Program is run with unlimited stack size, which wouldn't "
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"work with ThreadSanitizer.\n"
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"Re-execing with stack size limited to %zd bytes.\n",
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kMaxStackSize);
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SetStackSizeLimitInBytes(kMaxStackSize);
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reexec = true;
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}
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if (!AddressSpaceIsUnlimited()) {
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Report("WARNING: Program is run with limited virtual address space,"
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" which wouldn't work with ThreadSanitizer.\n");
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Report("Re-execing with unlimited virtual address space.\n");
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SetAddressSpaceUnlimited();
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reexec = true;
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}
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#if SANITIZER_LINUX && defined(__aarch64__)
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// After patch "arm64: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS." is introduced in
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// linux kernel, the random gap between stack and mapped area is increased
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// from 128M to 36G on 39-bit aarch64. As it is almost impossible to cover
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// this big range, we should disable randomized virtual space on aarch64.
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int old_personality = personality(0xffffffff);
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if (old_personality != -1 && (old_personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) == 0) {
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VReport(1, "WARNING: Program is run with randomized virtual address "
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"space, which wouldn't work with ThreadSanitizer.\n"
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"Re-execing with fixed virtual address space.\n");
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CHECK_NE(personality(old_personality | ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE), -1);
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reexec = true;
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}
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// Initialize the guard pointer used in {sig}{set,long}jump.
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InitializeGuardPtr();
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#endif
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if (reexec)
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ReExec();
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}
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#if !SANITIZER_GO
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CheckAndProtect();
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InitTlsSize();
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#endif
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}
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#if !SANITIZER_GO
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// Extract file descriptors passed to glibc internal __res_iclose function.
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// This is required to properly "close" the fds, because we do not see internal
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// closes within glibc. The code is a pure hack.
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int ExtractResolvFDs(void *state, int *fds, int nfd) {
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#if SANITIZER_LINUX && !SANITIZER_ANDROID
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int cnt = 0;
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struct __res_state *statp = (struct __res_state*)state;
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for (int i = 0; i < MAXNS && cnt < nfd; i++) {
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if (statp->_u._ext.nsaddrs[i] && statp->_u._ext.nssocks[i] != -1)
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fds[cnt++] = statp->_u._ext.nssocks[i];
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}
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return cnt;
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#else
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return 0;
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#endif
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}
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// Extract file descriptors passed via UNIX domain sockets.
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// This is requried to properly handle "open" of these fds.
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// see 'man recvmsg' and 'man 3 cmsg'.
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int ExtractRecvmsgFDs(void *msgp, int *fds, int nfd) {
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int res = 0;
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msghdr *msg = (msghdr*)msgp;
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struct cmsghdr *cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(msg);
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for (; cmsg; cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(msg, cmsg)) {
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if (cmsg->cmsg_level != SOL_SOCKET || cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_RIGHTS)
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continue;
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int n = (cmsg->cmsg_len - CMSG_LEN(0)) / sizeof(fds[0]);
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for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) {
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fds[res++] = ((int*)CMSG_DATA(cmsg))[i];
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if (res == nfd)
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return res;
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}
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}
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return res;
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}
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// Note: this function runs with async signals enabled,
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// so it must not touch any tsan state.
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int call_pthread_cancel_with_cleanup(int(*fn)(void *c, void *m,
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void *abstime), void *c, void *m, void *abstime,
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void(*cleanup)(void *arg), void *arg) {
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// pthread_cleanup_push/pop are hardcore macros mess.
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// We can't intercept nor call them w/o including pthread.h.
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int res;
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pthread_cleanup_push(cleanup, arg);
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res = fn(c, m, abstime);
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pthread_cleanup_pop(0);
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return res;
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}
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#endif
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#if !SANITIZER_GO
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void ReplaceSystemMalloc() { }
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#endif
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#if !SANITIZER_GO
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#if SANITIZER_ANDROID
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#if defined(__aarch64__)
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# define __get_tls() \
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({ void** __val; __asm__("mrs %0, tpidr_el0" : "=r"(__val)); __val; })
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#elif defined(__x86_64__)
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# define __get_tls() \
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({ void** __val; __asm__("mov %%fs:0, %0" : "=r"(__val)); __val; })
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#else
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#error unsupported architecture
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#endif
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// On Android, __thread is not supported. So we store the pointer to ThreadState
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// in TLS_SLOT_TSAN, which is the tls slot allocated by Android bionic for tsan.
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static const int TLS_SLOT_TSAN = 8;
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// On Android, one thread can call intercepted functions after
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// DestroyThreadState(), so add a fake thread state for "dead" threads.
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static ThreadState *dead_thread_state = nullptr;
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ThreadState *cur_thread() {
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ThreadState* thr = (ThreadState*)__get_tls()[TLS_SLOT_TSAN];
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if (thr == nullptr) {
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__sanitizer_sigset_t emptyset;
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internal_sigfillset(&emptyset);
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__sanitizer_sigset_t oldset;
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CHECK_EQ(0, internal_sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &emptyset, &oldset));
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thr = reinterpret_cast<ThreadState*>(__get_tls()[TLS_SLOT_TSAN]);
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if (thr == nullptr) {
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thr = reinterpret_cast<ThreadState*>(MmapOrDie(sizeof(ThreadState),
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"ThreadState"));
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__get_tls()[TLS_SLOT_TSAN] = thr;
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if (dead_thread_state == nullptr) {
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dead_thread_state = reinterpret_cast<ThreadState*>(
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MmapOrDie(sizeof(ThreadState), "ThreadState"));
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dead_thread_state->fast_state.SetIgnoreBit();
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dead_thread_state->ignore_interceptors = 1;
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dead_thread_state->is_dead = true;
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*const_cast<int*>(&dead_thread_state->tid) = -1;
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CHECK_EQ(0, internal_mprotect(dead_thread_state, sizeof(ThreadState),
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PROT_READ));
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}
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}
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CHECK_EQ(0, internal_sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oldset, nullptr));
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}
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return thr;
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}
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void cur_thread_finalize() {
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__sanitizer_sigset_t emptyset;
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internal_sigfillset(&emptyset);
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__sanitizer_sigset_t oldset;
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CHECK_EQ(0, internal_sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &emptyset, &oldset));
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ThreadState* thr = (ThreadState*)__get_tls()[TLS_SLOT_TSAN];
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if (thr != dead_thread_state) {
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__get_tls()[TLS_SLOT_TSAN] = dead_thread_state;
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UnmapOrDie(thr, sizeof(ThreadState));
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}
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CHECK_EQ(0, internal_sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oldset, nullptr));
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}
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#endif // SANITIZER_ANDROID
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#endif // if !SANITIZER_GO
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} // namespace __tsan
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#endif // SANITIZER_LINUX || SANITIZER_FREEBSD
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