2010-03-05 22:44:18 +01:00
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menu "Xen driver support"
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depends on XEN
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2008-04-02 19:54:13 +02:00
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config XEN_BALLOON
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bool "Xen memory balloon driver"
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default y
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help
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The balloon driver allows the Xen domain to request more memory from
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the system to expand the domain's memory allocation, or alternatively
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return unneeded memory to the system.
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2011-07-08 20:26:21 +02:00
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config XEN_SELFBALLOONING
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bool "Dynamically self-balloon kernel memory to target"
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2011-07-30 17:21:09 +02:00
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depends on XEN && XEN_BALLOON && CLEANCACHE && SWAP && XEN_TMEM
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2011-07-08 20:26:21 +02:00
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default n
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help
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Self-ballooning dynamically balloons available kernel memory driven
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by the current usage of anonymous memory ("committed AS") and
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controlled by various sysfs-settable parameters. Configuring
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FRONTSWAP is highly recommended; if it is not configured, self-
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ballooning is disabled by default but can be enabled with the
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'selfballooning' kernel boot parameter. If FRONTSWAP is configured,
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frontswap-selfshrinking is enabled by default but can be disabled
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with the 'noselfshrink' kernel boot parameter; and self-ballooning
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is enabled by default but can be disabled with the 'noselfballooning'
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kernel boot parameter. Note that systems without a sufficiently
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large swap device should not enable self-ballooning.
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2008-04-02 19:54:13 +02:00
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2011-07-26 02:12:06 +02:00
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config XEN_BALLOON_MEMORY_HOTPLUG
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bool "Memory hotplug support for Xen balloon driver"
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default n
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depends on XEN_BALLOON && MEMORY_HOTPLUG
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help
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Memory hotplug support for Xen balloon driver allows expanding memory
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available for the system above limit declared at system startup.
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It is very useful on critical systems which require long
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run without rebooting.
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Memory could be hotplugged in following steps:
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1) dom0: xl mem-max <domU> <maxmem>
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where <maxmem> is >= requested memory size,
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2) dom0: xl mem-set <domU> <memory>
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where <memory> is requested memory size; alternatively memory
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could be added by writing proper value to
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/sys/devices/system/xen_memory/xen_memory0/target or
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/sys/devices/system/xen_memory/xen_memory0/target_kb on dumU,
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3) domU: for i in /sys/devices/system/memory/memory*/state; do \
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[ "`cat "$i"`" = offline ] && echo online > "$i"; done
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Memory could be onlined automatically on domU by adding following line to udev rules:
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SUBSYSTEM=="memory", ACTION=="add", RUN+="/bin/sh -c '[ -f /sys$devpath/state ] && echo online > /sys$devpath/state'"
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In that case step 3 should be omitted.
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2008-04-02 19:54:13 +02:00
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config XEN_SCRUB_PAGES
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bool "Scrub pages before returning them to system"
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depends on XEN_BALLOON
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default y
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help
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Scrub pages before returning them to the system for reuse by
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other domains. This makes sure that any confidential data
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is not accidentally visible to other domains. Is it more
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secure, but slightly less efficient.
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If in doubt, say yes.
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2009-01-08 03:07:11 +01:00
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2009-02-07 04:21:19 +01:00
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config XEN_DEV_EVTCHN
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tristate "Xen /dev/xen/evtchn device"
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default y
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help
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The evtchn driver allows a userspace process to triger event
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channels and to receive notification of an event channel
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firing.
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If in doubt, say yes.
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2009-02-09 21:05:51 +01:00
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config XEN_BACKEND
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2009-03-22 07:29:34 +01:00
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bool "Backend driver support"
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2009-02-09 21:05:51 +01:00
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depends on XEN_DOM0
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default y
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help
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Support for backend device drivers that provide I/O services
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to other virtual machines.
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2009-01-08 03:07:11 +01:00
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config XENFS
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tristate "Xen filesystem"
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default y
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help
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The xen filesystem provides a way for domains to share
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information with each other and with the hypervisor.
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For example, by reading and writing the "xenbus" file, guests
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may pass arbitrary information to the initial domain.
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If in doubt, say yes.
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config XEN_COMPAT_XENFS
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bool "Create compatibility mount point /proc/xen"
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depends on XENFS
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default y
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help
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The old xenstore userspace tools expect to find "xenbus"
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under /proc/xen, but "xenbus" is now found at the root of the
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xenfs filesystem. Selecting this causes the kernel to create
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2009-01-26 11:12:25 +01:00
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the compatibility mount point /proc/xen if it is running on
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2009-01-08 03:07:11 +01:00
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a xen platform.
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If in doubt, say yes.
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2009-03-10 22:39:59 +01:00
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config XEN_SYS_HYPERVISOR
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bool "Create xen entries under /sys/hypervisor"
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2010-03-05 22:44:18 +01:00
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depends on SYSFS
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2009-03-10 22:39:59 +01:00
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select SYS_HYPERVISOR
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default y
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help
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Create entries under /sys/hypervisor describing the Xen
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hypervisor environment. When running native or in another
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virtual environment, /sys/hypervisor will still be present,
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2010-03-05 22:44:18 +01:00
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but will have no xen contents.
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2009-02-09 21:05:51 +01:00
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config XEN_XENBUS_FRONTEND
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2011-01-14 03:46:48 +01:00
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tristate
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2010-12-14 19:40:46 +01:00
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config XEN_GNTDEV
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tristate "userspace grant access device driver"
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depends on XEN
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2011-02-10 13:08:21 +01:00
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default m
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2010-12-14 19:40:46 +01:00
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select MMU_NOTIFIER
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help
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Allows userspace processes to use grants.
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2010-12-10 15:39:15 +01:00
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2011-02-07 23:23:05 +01:00
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config XEN_GRANT_DEV_ALLOC
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tristate "User-space grant reference allocator driver"
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depends on XEN
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2011-02-10 13:08:21 +01:00
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default m
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2011-02-07 23:23:05 +01:00
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help
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Allows userspace processes to create pages with access granted
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to other domains. This can be used to implement frontend drivers
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or as part of an inter-domain shared memory channel.
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2010-05-17 18:08:21 +02:00
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config XEN_PLATFORM_PCI
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tristate "xen platform pci device driver"
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2011-01-12 18:58:06 +01:00
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depends on XEN_PVHVM && PCI
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2010-05-17 18:08:21 +02:00
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default m
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help
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Driver for the Xen PCI Platform device: it is responsible for
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initializing xenbus and grant_table when running in a Xen HVM
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domain. As a consequence this driver is required to run any Xen PV
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frontend on Xen HVM.
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2010-08-12 18:09:41 +02:00
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2010-05-11 16:05:49 +02:00
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config SWIOTLB_XEN
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def_bool y
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2010-10-08 17:06:20 +02:00
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depends on PCI
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select SWIOTLB
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2010-05-11 16:05:49 +02:00
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2011-06-17 23:06:20 +02:00
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config XEN_TMEM
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bool
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default y if (CLEANCACHE || FRONTSWAP)
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help
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Shim to interface in-kernel Transcendent Memory hooks
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(e.g. cleancache and frontswap) to Xen tmem hypercalls.
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xen/pciback: xen pci backend driver.
This is the host side counterpart to the frontend driver in
drivers/pci/xen-pcifront.c. The PV protocol is also implemented by
frontend drivers in other OSes too, such as the BSDs.
The PV protocol is rather simple. There is page shared with the guest,
which has the 'struct xen_pci_sharedinfo' embossed in it. The backend
has a thread that is kicked every-time the structure is changed and
based on the operation field it performs specific tasks:
XEN_PCI_OP_conf_[read|write]:
Read/Write 0xCF8/0xCFC filtered data. (conf_space*.c)
Based on which field is probed, we either enable/disable the PCI
device, change power state, read VPD, etc. The major goal of this
call is to provide a Physical IRQ (PIRQ) to the guest.
The PIRQ is Xen hypervisor global IRQ value irrespective of the IRQ
is tied in to the IO-APIC, or is a vector. For GSI type
interrupts, the PIRQ==GSI holds. For MSI/MSI-X the
PIRQ value != Linux IRQ number (thought PIRQ==vector).
Please note, that with Xen, all interrupts (except those level shared ones)
are injected directly to the guest - there is no host interaction.
XEN_PCI_OP_[enable|disable]_msi[|x] (pciback_ops.c)
Enables/disables the MSI/MSI-X capability of the device. These operations
setup the MSI/MSI-X vectors for the guest and pass them to the frontend.
When the device is activated, the interrupts are directly injected in the
guest without involving the host.
XEN_PCI_OP_aer_[detected|resume|mmio|slotreset]: In case of failure,
perform the appropriate AER commands on the guest. Right now that is
a cop-out - we just kill the guest.
Besides implementing those commands, it can also
- hide a PCI device from the host. When booting up, the user can specify
xen-pciback.hide=(1:0:0)(BDF..) so that host does not try to use the
device.
The driver was lifted from linux-2.6.18.hg tree and fixed up
so that it could compile under v3.0. Per suggestion from Jesse Barnes
moved the driver to drivers/xen/xen-pciback.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2009-10-13 23:22:20 +02:00
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config XEN_PCIDEV_BACKEND
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tristate "Xen PCI-device backend driver"
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depends on PCI && X86 && XEN
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depends on XEN_BACKEND
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2011-07-11 22:49:41 +02:00
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default m
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xen/pciback: xen pci backend driver.
This is the host side counterpart to the frontend driver in
drivers/pci/xen-pcifront.c. The PV protocol is also implemented by
frontend drivers in other OSes too, such as the BSDs.
The PV protocol is rather simple. There is page shared with the guest,
which has the 'struct xen_pci_sharedinfo' embossed in it. The backend
has a thread that is kicked every-time the structure is changed and
based on the operation field it performs specific tasks:
XEN_PCI_OP_conf_[read|write]:
Read/Write 0xCF8/0xCFC filtered data. (conf_space*.c)
Based on which field is probed, we either enable/disable the PCI
device, change power state, read VPD, etc. The major goal of this
call is to provide a Physical IRQ (PIRQ) to the guest.
The PIRQ is Xen hypervisor global IRQ value irrespective of the IRQ
is tied in to the IO-APIC, or is a vector. For GSI type
interrupts, the PIRQ==GSI holds. For MSI/MSI-X the
PIRQ value != Linux IRQ number (thought PIRQ==vector).
Please note, that with Xen, all interrupts (except those level shared ones)
are injected directly to the guest - there is no host interaction.
XEN_PCI_OP_[enable|disable]_msi[|x] (pciback_ops.c)
Enables/disables the MSI/MSI-X capability of the device. These operations
setup the MSI/MSI-X vectors for the guest and pass them to the frontend.
When the device is activated, the interrupts are directly injected in the
guest without involving the host.
XEN_PCI_OP_aer_[detected|resume|mmio|slotreset]: In case of failure,
perform the appropriate AER commands on the guest. Right now that is
a cop-out - we just kill the guest.
Besides implementing those commands, it can also
- hide a PCI device from the host. When booting up, the user can specify
xen-pciback.hide=(1:0:0)(BDF..) so that host does not try to use the
device.
The driver was lifted from linux-2.6.18.hg tree and fixed up
so that it could compile under v3.0. Per suggestion from Jesse Barnes
moved the driver to drivers/xen/xen-pciback.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2009-10-13 23:22:20 +02:00
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help
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The PCI device backend driver allows the kernel to export arbitrary
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PCI devices to other guests. If you select this to be a module, you
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will need to make sure no other driver has bound to the device(s)
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you want to make visible to other guests.
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2011-07-11 22:49:41 +02:00
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The parameter "passthrough" allows you specify how you want the PCI
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devices to appear in the guest. You can choose the default (0) where
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PCI topology starts at 00.00.0, or (1) for passthrough if you want
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the PCI devices topology appear the same as in the host.
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xen/pciback: xen pci backend driver.
This is the host side counterpart to the frontend driver in
drivers/pci/xen-pcifront.c. The PV protocol is also implemented by
frontend drivers in other OSes too, such as the BSDs.
The PV protocol is rather simple. There is page shared with the guest,
which has the 'struct xen_pci_sharedinfo' embossed in it. The backend
has a thread that is kicked every-time the structure is changed and
based on the operation field it performs specific tasks:
XEN_PCI_OP_conf_[read|write]:
Read/Write 0xCF8/0xCFC filtered data. (conf_space*.c)
Based on which field is probed, we either enable/disable the PCI
device, change power state, read VPD, etc. The major goal of this
call is to provide a Physical IRQ (PIRQ) to the guest.
The PIRQ is Xen hypervisor global IRQ value irrespective of the IRQ
is tied in to the IO-APIC, or is a vector. For GSI type
interrupts, the PIRQ==GSI holds. For MSI/MSI-X the
PIRQ value != Linux IRQ number (thought PIRQ==vector).
Please note, that with Xen, all interrupts (except those level shared ones)
are injected directly to the guest - there is no host interaction.
XEN_PCI_OP_[enable|disable]_msi[|x] (pciback_ops.c)
Enables/disables the MSI/MSI-X capability of the device. These operations
setup the MSI/MSI-X vectors for the guest and pass them to the frontend.
When the device is activated, the interrupts are directly injected in the
guest without involving the host.
XEN_PCI_OP_aer_[detected|resume|mmio|slotreset]: In case of failure,
perform the appropriate AER commands on the guest. Right now that is
a cop-out - we just kill the guest.
Besides implementing those commands, it can also
- hide a PCI device from the host. When booting up, the user can specify
xen-pciback.hide=(1:0:0)(BDF..) so that host does not try to use the
device.
The driver was lifted from linux-2.6.18.hg tree and fixed up
so that it could compile under v3.0. Per suggestion from Jesse Barnes
moved the driver to drivers/xen/xen-pciback.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2009-10-13 23:22:20 +02:00
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2011-07-11 22:49:41 +02:00
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The "hide" parameter (only applicable if backend driver is compiled
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into the kernel) allows you to bind the PCI devices to this module
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from the default device drivers. The argument is the list of PCI BDFs:
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xen-pciback.hide=(03:00.0)(04:00.0)
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xen/pciback: xen pci backend driver.
This is the host side counterpart to the frontend driver in
drivers/pci/xen-pcifront.c. The PV protocol is also implemented by
frontend drivers in other OSes too, such as the BSDs.
The PV protocol is rather simple. There is page shared with the guest,
which has the 'struct xen_pci_sharedinfo' embossed in it. The backend
has a thread that is kicked every-time the structure is changed and
based on the operation field it performs specific tasks:
XEN_PCI_OP_conf_[read|write]:
Read/Write 0xCF8/0xCFC filtered data. (conf_space*.c)
Based on which field is probed, we either enable/disable the PCI
device, change power state, read VPD, etc. The major goal of this
call is to provide a Physical IRQ (PIRQ) to the guest.
The PIRQ is Xen hypervisor global IRQ value irrespective of the IRQ
is tied in to the IO-APIC, or is a vector. For GSI type
interrupts, the PIRQ==GSI holds. For MSI/MSI-X the
PIRQ value != Linux IRQ number (thought PIRQ==vector).
Please note, that with Xen, all interrupts (except those level shared ones)
are injected directly to the guest - there is no host interaction.
XEN_PCI_OP_[enable|disable]_msi[|x] (pciback_ops.c)
Enables/disables the MSI/MSI-X capability of the device. These operations
setup the MSI/MSI-X vectors for the guest and pass them to the frontend.
When the device is activated, the interrupts are directly injected in the
guest without involving the host.
XEN_PCI_OP_aer_[detected|resume|mmio|slotreset]: In case of failure,
perform the appropriate AER commands on the guest. Right now that is
a cop-out - we just kill the guest.
Besides implementing those commands, it can also
- hide a PCI device from the host. When booting up, the user can specify
xen-pciback.hide=(1:0:0)(BDF..) so that host does not try to use the
device.
The driver was lifted from linux-2.6.18.hg tree and fixed up
so that it could compile under v3.0. Per suggestion from Jesse Barnes
moved the driver to drivers/xen/xen-pciback.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2009-10-13 23:22:20 +02:00
|
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|
2011-07-11 22:49:41 +02:00
|
|
|
If in doubt, say m.
|
2010-03-05 22:44:18 +01:00
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endmenu
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