2015-04-12 06:55:06 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* linux/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This contains encryption key functions for ext4
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Written by Michael Halcrow, Ildar Muslukhov, and Uday Savagaonkar, 2015.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <keys/user-type.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/random.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <uapi/linux/keyctl.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include "ext4.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "xattr.h"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void derive_crypt_complete(struct crypto_async_request *req, int rc)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ext4_completion_result *ecr = req->data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc == -EINPROGRESS)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ecr->res = rc;
|
|
|
|
complete(&ecr->completion);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* ext4_derive_key_aes() - Derive a key using AES-128-ECB
|
|
|
|
* @deriving_key: Encryption key used for derivatio.
|
|
|
|
* @source_key: Source key to which to apply derivation.
|
|
|
|
* @derived_key: Derived key.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return: Zero on success; non-zero otherwise.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int ext4_derive_key_aes(char deriving_key[EXT4_AES_128_ECB_KEY_SIZE],
|
|
|
|
char source_key[EXT4_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE],
|
|
|
|
char derived_key[EXT4_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE])
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int res = 0;
|
|
|
|
struct ablkcipher_request *req = NULL;
|
|
|
|
DECLARE_EXT4_COMPLETION_RESULT(ecr);
|
|
|
|
struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_ablkcipher *tfm = crypto_alloc_ablkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0,
|
|
|
|
0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
|
|
|
|
res = PTR_ERR(tfm);
|
|
|
|
tfm = NULL;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crypto_ablkcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
|
|
|
|
req = ablkcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
|
|
|
|
if (!req) {
|
|
|
|
res = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ablkcipher_request_set_callback(req,
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
|
|
|
|
derive_crypt_complete, &ecr);
|
|
|
|
res = crypto_ablkcipher_setkey(tfm, deriving_key,
|
|
|
|
EXT4_AES_128_ECB_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
if (res < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
sg_init_one(&src_sg, source_key, EXT4_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
sg_init_one(&dst_sg, derived_key, EXT4_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
ablkcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, &dst_sg,
|
|
|
|
EXT4_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE, NULL);
|
|
|
|
res = crypto_ablkcipher_encrypt(req);
|
|
|
|
if (res == -EINPROGRESS || res == -EBUSY) {
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(req->base.data != &ecr);
|
|
|
|
wait_for_completion(&ecr.completion);
|
|
|
|
res = ecr.res;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
if (req)
|
|
|
|
ablkcipher_request_free(req);
|
|
|
|
if (tfm)
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_ablkcipher(tfm);
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode
This is a pretty massive patch which does a number of different things:
1) The per-inode encryption information is now stored in an allocated
data structure, ext4_crypt_info, instead of directly in the node.
This reduces the size usage of an in-memory inode when it is not
using encryption.
2) We drop the ext4_fname_crypto_ctx entirely, and use the per-inode
encryption structure instead. This remove an unnecessary memory
allocation and free for the fname_crypto_ctx as well as allowing us
to reuse the ctfm in a directory for multiple lookups and file
creations.
3) We also cache the inode's policy information in the ext4_crypt_info
structure so we don't have to continually read it out of the
extended attributes.
4) We now keep the keyring key in the inode's encryption structure
instead of releasing it after we are done using it to derive the
per-inode key. This allows us to test to see if the key has been
revoked; if it has, we prevent the use of the derived key and free
it.
5) When an inode is released (or when the derived key is freed), we
will use memset_explicit() to zero out the derived key, so it's not
left hanging around in memory. This implies that when a user logs
out, it is important to first revoke the key, and then unlink it,
and then finally, to use "echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches" to
release any decrypted pages and dcache entries from the system
caches.
6) All this, and we also shrink the number of lines of code by around
100. :-)
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2015-05-18 19:17:47 +02:00
|
|
|
void ext4_free_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
|
|
|
|
struct ext4_crypt_info *ci = ei->i_crypt_info;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ci)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ci->ci_keyring_key)
|
|
|
|
key_put(ci->ci_keyring_key);
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_ablkcipher(ci->ci_ctfm);
|
|
|
|
memzero_explicit(&ci->ci_raw, sizeof(ci->ci_raw));
|
2015-05-18 19:19:47 +02:00
|
|
|
kmem_cache_free(ext4_crypt_info_cachep, ci);
|
ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode
This is a pretty massive patch which does a number of different things:
1) The per-inode encryption information is now stored in an allocated
data structure, ext4_crypt_info, instead of directly in the node.
This reduces the size usage of an in-memory inode when it is not
using encryption.
2) We drop the ext4_fname_crypto_ctx entirely, and use the per-inode
encryption structure instead. This remove an unnecessary memory
allocation and free for the fname_crypto_ctx as well as allowing us
to reuse the ctfm in a directory for multiple lookups and file
creations.
3) We also cache the inode's policy information in the ext4_crypt_info
structure so we don't have to continually read it out of the
extended attributes.
4) We now keep the keyring key in the inode's encryption structure
instead of releasing it after we are done using it to derive the
per-inode key. This allows us to test to see if the key has been
revoked; if it has, we prevent the use of the derived key and free
it.
5) When an inode is released (or when the derived key is freed), we
will use memset_explicit() to zero out the derived key, so it's not
left hanging around in memory. This implies that when a user logs
out, it is important to first revoke the key, and then unlink it,
and then finally, to use "echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches" to
release any decrypted pages and dcache entries from the system
caches.
6) All this, and we also shrink the number of lines of code by around
100. :-)
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2015-05-18 19:17:47 +02:00
|
|
|
ei->i_crypt_info = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int _ext4_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
|
2015-04-12 06:55:06 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
|
ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode
This is a pretty massive patch which does a number of different things:
1) The per-inode encryption information is now stored in an allocated
data structure, ext4_crypt_info, instead of directly in the node.
This reduces the size usage of an in-memory inode when it is not
using encryption.
2) We drop the ext4_fname_crypto_ctx entirely, and use the per-inode
encryption structure instead. This remove an unnecessary memory
allocation and free for the fname_crypto_ctx as well as allowing us
to reuse the ctfm in a directory for multiple lookups and file
creations.
3) We also cache the inode's policy information in the ext4_crypt_info
structure so we don't have to continually read it out of the
extended attributes.
4) We now keep the keyring key in the inode's encryption structure
instead of releasing it after we are done using it to derive the
per-inode key. This allows us to test to see if the key has been
revoked; if it has, we prevent the use of the derived key and free
it.
5) When an inode is released (or when the derived key is freed), we
will use memset_explicit() to zero out the derived key, so it's not
left hanging around in memory. This implies that when a user logs
out, it is important to first revoke the key, and then unlink it,
and then finally, to use "echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches" to
release any decrypted pages and dcache entries from the system
caches.
6) All this, and we also shrink the number of lines of code by around
100. :-)
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2015-05-18 19:17:47 +02:00
|
|
|
struct ext4_crypt_info *crypt_info;
|
2015-04-12 06:55:06 +02:00
|
|
|
char full_key_descriptor[EXT4_KEY_DESC_PREFIX_SIZE +
|
|
|
|
(EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE * 2) + 1];
|
|
|
|
struct key *keyring_key = NULL;
|
|
|
|
struct ext4_encryption_key *master_key;
|
|
|
|
struct ext4_encryption_context ctx;
|
|
|
|
struct user_key_payload *ukp;
|
2015-04-16 07:56:00 +02:00
|
|
|
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
|
ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode
This is a pretty massive patch which does a number of different things:
1) The per-inode encryption information is now stored in an allocated
data structure, ext4_crypt_info, instead of directly in the node.
This reduces the size usage of an in-memory inode when it is not
using encryption.
2) We drop the ext4_fname_crypto_ctx entirely, and use the per-inode
encryption structure instead. This remove an unnecessary memory
allocation and free for the fname_crypto_ctx as well as allowing us
to reuse the ctfm in a directory for multiple lookups and file
creations.
3) We also cache the inode's policy information in the ext4_crypt_info
structure so we don't have to continually read it out of the
extended attributes.
4) We now keep the keyring key in the inode's encryption structure
instead of releasing it after we are done using it to derive the
per-inode key. This allows us to test to see if the key has been
revoked; if it has, we prevent the use of the derived key and free
it.
5) When an inode is released (or when the derived key is freed), we
will use memset_explicit() to zero out the derived key, so it's not
left hanging around in memory. This implies that when a user logs
out, it is important to first revoke the key, and then unlink it,
and then finally, to use "echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches" to
release any decrypted pages and dcache entries from the system
caches.
6) All this, and we also shrink the number of lines of code by around
100. :-)
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2015-05-18 19:17:47 +02:00
|
|
|
int res;
|
2015-04-12 06:55:06 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2015-05-18 19:19:47 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!ext4_read_workqueue) {
|
|
|
|
res = ext4_init_crypto();
|
|
|
|
if (res)
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode
This is a pretty massive patch which does a number of different things:
1) The per-inode encryption information is now stored in an allocated
data structure, ext4_crypt_info, instead of directly in the node.
This reduces the size usage of an in-memory inode when it is not
using encryption.
2) We drop the ext4_fname_crypto_ctx entirely, and use the per-inode
encryption structure instead. This remove an unnecessary memory
allocation and free for the fname_crypto_ctx as well as allowing us
to reuse the ctfm in a directory for multiple lookups and file
creations.
3) We also cache the inode's policy information in the ext4_crypt_info
structure so we don't have to continually read it out of the
extended attributes.
4) We now keep the keyring key in the inode's encryption structure
instead of releasing it after we are done using it to derive the
per-inode key. This allows us to test to see if the key has been
revoked; if it has, we prevent the use of the derived key and free
it.
5) When an inode is released (or when the derived key is freed), we
will use memset_explicit() to zero out the derived key, so it's not
left hanging around in memory. This implies that when a user logs
out, it is important to first revoke the key, and then unlink it,
and then finally, to use "echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches" to
release any decrypted pages and dcache entries from the system
caches.
6) All this, and we also shrink the number of lines of code by around
100. :-)
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2015-05-18 19:17:47 +02:00
|
|
|
if (ei->i_crypt_info) {
|
|
|
|
if (!ei->i_crypt_info->ci_keyring_key ||
|
|
|
|
key_validate(ei->i_crypt_info->ci_keyring_key) == 0)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ext4_free_encryption_info(inode);
|
2015-04-12 06:55:06 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode
This is a pretty massive patch which does a number of different things:
1) The per-inode encryption information is now stored in an allocated
data structure, ext4_crypt_info, instead of directly in the node.
This reduces the size usage of an in-memory inode when it is not
using encryption.
2) We drop the ext4_fname_crypto_ctx entirely, and use the per-inode
encryption structure instead. This remove an unnecessary memory
allocation and free for the fname_crypto_ctx as well as allowing us
to reuse the ctfm in a directory for multiple lookups and file
creations.
3) We also cache the inode's policy information in the ext4_crypt_info
structure so we don't have to continually read it out of the
extended attributes.
4) We now keep the keyring key in the inode's encryption structure
instead of releasing it after we are done using it to derive the
per-inode key. This allows us to test to see if the key has been
revoked; if it has, we prevent the use of the derived key and free
it.
5) When an inode is released (or when the derived key is freed), we
will use memset_explicit() to zero out the derived key, so it's not
left hanging around in memory. This implies that when a user logs
out, it is important to first revoke the key, and then unlink it,
and then finally, to use "echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches" to
release any decrypted pages and dcache entries from the system
caches.
6) All this, and we also shrink the number of lines of code by around
100. :-)
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2015-05-18 19:17:47 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
res = ext4_xattr_get(inode, EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_ENCRYPTION,
|
|
|
|
EXT4_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT,
|
|
|
|
&ctx, sizeof(ctx));
|
|
|
|
if (res < 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (!DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi))
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
|
|
|
ctx.contents_encryption_mode = EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS;
|
|
|
|
ctx.filenames_encryption_mode =
|
|
|
|
EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS;
|
|
|
|
ctx.flags = 0;
|
|
|
|
} else if (res != sizeof(ctx))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2015-04-12 06:55:06 +02:00
|
|
|
res = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-05-18 19:19:47 +02:00
|
|
|
crypt_info = kmem_cache_alloc(ext4_crypt_info_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
|
ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode
This is a pretty massive patch which does a number of different things:
1) The per-inode encryption information is now stored in an allocated
data structure, ext4_crypt_info, instead of directly in the node.
This reduces the size usage of an in-memory inode when it is not
using encryption.
2) We drop the ext4_fname_crypto_ctx entirely, and use the per-inode
encryption structure instead. This remove an unnecessary memory
allocation and free for the fname_crypto_ctx as well as allowing us
to reuse the ctfm in a directory for multiple lookups and file
creations.
3) We also cache the inode's policy information in the ext4_crypt_info
structure so we don't have to continually read it out of the
extended attributes.
4) We now keep the keyring key in the inode's encryption structure
instead of releasing it after we are done using it to derive the
per-inode key. This allows us to test to see if the key has been
revoked; if it has, we prevent the use of the derived key and free
it.
5) When an inode is released (or when the derived key is freed), we
will use memset_explicit() to zero out the derived key, so it's not
left hanging around in memory. This implies that when a user logs
out, it is important to first revoke the key, and then unlink it,
and then finally, to use "echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches" to
release any decrypted pages and dcache entries from the system
caches.
6) All this, and we also shrink the number of lines of code by around
100. :-)
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2015-05-18 19:17:47 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!crypt_info)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-05-01 22:56:50 +02:00
|
|
|
ei->i_crypt_policy_flags = ctx.flags;
|
ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode
This is a pretty massive patch which does a number of different things:
1) The per-inode encryption information is now stored in an allocated
data structure, ext4_crypt_info, instead of directly in the node.
This reduces the size usage of an in-memory inode when it is not
using encryption.
2) We drop the ext4_fname_crypto_ctx entirely, and use the per-inode
encryption structure instead. This remove an unnecessary memory
allocation and free for the fname_crypto_ctx as well as allowing us
to reuse the ctfm in a directory for multiple lookups and file
creations.
3) We also cache the inode's policy information in the ext4_crypt_info
structure so we don't have to continually read it out of the
extended attributes.
4) We now keep the keyring key in the inode's encryption structure
instead of releasing it after we are done using it to derive the
per-inode key. This allows us to test to see if the key has been
revoked; if it has, we prevent the use of the derived key and free
it.
5) When an inode is released (or when the derived key is freed), we
will use memset_explicit() to zero out the derived key, so it's not
left hanging around in memory. This implies that when a user logs
out, it is important to first revoke the key, and then unlink it,
and then finally, to use "echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches" to
release any decrypted pages and dcache entries from the system
caches.
6) All this, and we also shrink the number of lines of code by around
100. :-)
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2015-05-18 19:17:47 +02:00
|
|
|
crypt_info->ci_flags = ctx.flags;
|
|
|
|
crypt_info->ci_data_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode;
|
|
|
|
crypt_info->ci_filename_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode;
|
|
|
|
crypt_info->ci_ctfm = NULL;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(crypt_info->ci_master_key, ctx.master_key_descriptor,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(crypt_info->ci_master_key));
|
2015-04-16 07:56:00 +02:00
|
|
|
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
|
2015-05-18 19:16:47 +02:00
|
|
|
crypt_info->ci_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode;
|
2015-04-16 07:56:00 +02:00
|
|
|
else if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
|
2015-05-18 19:16:47 +02:00
|
|
|
crypt_info->ci_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode;
|
2015-04-16 07:56:00 +02:00
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR "ext4 crypto: Unsupported inode type.\n");
|
|
|
|
BUG();
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-05-18 19:16:47 +02:00
|
|
|
crypt_info->ci_size = ext4_encryption_key_size(crypt_info->ci_mode);
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(!crypt_info->ci_size);
|
2015-04-16 07:56:00 +02:00
|
|
|
if (DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi)) {
|
2015-05-18 19:16:47 +02:00
|
|
|
memset(crypt_info->ci_raw, 0x42, EXT4_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE);
|
2015-04-16 07:56:00 +02:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-04-12 06:55:06 +02:00
|
|
|
memcpy(full_key_descriptor, EXT4_KEY_DESC_PREFIX,
|
|
|
|
EXT4_KEY_DESC_PREFIX_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
sprintf(full_key_descriptor + EXT4_KEY_DESC_PREFIX_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
"%*phN", EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
ctx.master_key_descriptor);
|
|
|
|
full_key_descriptor[EXT4_KEY_DESC_PREFIX_SIZE +
|
|
|
|
(2 * EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE)] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
keyring_key = request_key(&key_type_logon, full_key_descriptor, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(keyring_key)) {
|
|
|
|
res = PTR_ERR(keyring_key);
|
|
|
|
keyring_key = NULL;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon);
|
|
|
|
ukp = ((struct user_key_payload *)keyring_key->payload.data);
|
|
|
|
if (ukp->datalen != sizeof(struct ext4_encryption_key)) {
|
|
|
|
res = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
master_key = (struct ext4_encryption_key *)ukp->data;
|
|
|
|
BUILD_BUG_ON(EXT4_AES_128_ECB_KEY_SIZE !=
|
|
|
|
EXT4_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(master_key->size != EXT4_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE);
|
2015-05-18 19:16:47 +02:00
|
|
|
res = ext4_derive_key_aes(ctx.nonce, master_key->raw,
|
|
|
|
crypt_info->ci_raw);
|
2015-04-12 06:55:06 +02:00
|
|
|
out:
|
ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode
This is a pretty massive patch which does a number of different things:
1) The per-inode encryption information is now stored in an allocated
data structure, ext4_crypt_info, instead of directly in the node.
This reduces the size usage of an in-memory inode when it is not
using encryption.
2) We drop the ext4_fname_crypto_ctx entirely, and use the per-inode
encryption structure instead. This remove an unnecessary memory
allocation and free for the fname_crypto_ctx as well as allowing us
to reuse the ctfm in a directory for multiple lookups and file
creations.
3) We also cache the inode's policy information in the ext4_crypt_info
structure so we don't have to continually read it out of the
extended attributes.
4) We now keep the keyring key in the inode's encryption structure
instead of releasing it after we are done using it to derive the
per-inode key. This allows us to test to see if the key has been
revoked; if it has, we prevent the use of the derived key and free
it.
5) When an inode is released (or when the derived key is freed), we
will use memset_explicit() to zero out the derived key, so it's not
left hanging around in memory. This implies that when a user logs
out, it is important to first revoke the key, and then unlink it,
and then finally, to use "echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches" to
release any decrypted pages and dcache entries from the system
caches.
6) All this, and we also shrink the number of lines of code by around
100. :-)
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2015-05-18 19:17:47 +02:00
|
|
|
if (res < 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (res == -ENOKEY)
|
|
|
|
res = 0;
|
2015-05-18 19:19:47 +02:00
|
|
|
kmem_cache_free(ext4_crypt_info_cachep, crypt_info);
|
ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode
This is a pretty massive patch which does a number of different things:
1) The per-inode encryption information is now stored in an allocated
data structure, ext4_crypt_info, instead of directly in the node.
This reduces the size usage of an in-memory inode when it is not
using encryption.
2) We drop the ext4_fname_crypto_ctx entirely, and use the per-inode
encryption structure instead. This remove an unnecessary memory
allocation and free for the fname_crypto_ctx as well as allowing us
to reuse the ctfm in a directory for multiple lookups and file
creations.
3) We also cache the inode's policy information in the ext4_crypt_info
structure so we don't have to continually read it out of the
extended attributes.
4) We now keep the keyring key in the inode's encryption structure
instead of releasing it after we are done using it to derive the
per-inode key. This allows us to test to see if the key has been
revoked; if it has, we prevent the use of the derived key and free
it.
5) When an inode is released (or when the derived key is freed), we
will use memset_explicit() to zero out the derived key, so it's not
left hanging around in memory. This implies that when a user logs
out, it is important to first revoke the key, and then unlink it,
and then finally, to use "echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches" to
release any decrypted pages and dcache entries from the system
caches.
6) All this, and we also shrink the number of lines of code by around
100. :-)
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2015-05-18 19:17:47 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ei->i_crypt_info = crypt_info;
|
|
|
|
crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = keyring_key;
|
|
|
|
keyring_key = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-04-12 06:55:06 +02:00
|
|
|
if (keyring_key)
|
|
|
|
key_put(keyring_key);
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int ext4_has_encryption_key(struct inode *inode)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
|
|
|
|
|
ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode
This is a pretty massive patch which does a number of different things:
1) The per-inode encryption information is now stored in an allocated
data structure, ext4_crypt_info, instead of directly in the node.
This reduces the size usage of an in-memory inode when it is not
using encryption.
2) We drop the ext4_fname_crypto_ctx entirely, and use the per-inode
encryption structure instead. This remove an unnecessary memory
allocation and free for the fname_crypto_ctx as well as allowing us
to reuse the ctfm in a directory for multiple lookups and file
creations.
3) We also cache the inode's policy information in the ext4_crypt_info
structure so we don't have to continually read it out of the
extended attributes.
4) We now keep the keyring key in the inode's encryption structure
instead of releasing it after we are done using it to derive the
per-inode key. This allows us to test to see if the key has been
revoked; if it has, we prevent the use of the derived key and free
it.
5) When an inode is released (or when the derived key is freed), we
will use memset_explicit() to zero out the derived key, so it's not
left hanging around in memory. This implies that when a user logs
out, it is important to first revoke the key, and then unlink it,
and then finally, to use "echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches" to
release any decrypted pages and dcache entries from the system
caches.
6) All this, and we also shrink the number of lines of code by around
100. :-)
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2015-05-18 19:17:47 +02:00
|
|
|
return (ei->i_crypt_info != NULL);
|
2015-04-12 06:55:06 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|