2005-04-29 17:23:29 +02:00
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/* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
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2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
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* Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
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*
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* Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
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* All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
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* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
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*
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* Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
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*
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* Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
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* especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
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*
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* The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
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* this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
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* okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
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*
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*/
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <asm/atomic.h>
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#include <asm/types.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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2005-05-21 01:15:52 +02:00
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#include <linux/mount.h>
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2005-05-17 13:08:48 +02:00
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#include <linux/socket.h>
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2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
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#include <linux/audit.h>
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#include <linux/personality.h>
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#include <linux/time.h>
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2005-06-21 17:22:01 +02:00
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#include <linux/kthread.h>
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2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
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#include <asm/unistd.h>
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/* 0 = no checking
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1 = put_count checking
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2 = verbose put_count checking
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*/
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#define AUDIT_DEBUG 0
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/* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
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extern int audit_enabled;
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/* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
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* for saving names from getname(). */
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#define AUDIT_NAMES 20
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/* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the
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* audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from
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* path_lookup. */
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#define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
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/* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using
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a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
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the syscall filter. */
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enum audit_state {
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AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context.
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* No syscall-specific audit records can
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* be generated. */
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AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
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* but don't necessarily fill it in at
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* syscall entry time (i.e., filter
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* instead). */
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AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
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* and always fill it in at syscall
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* entry time. This makes a full
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* syscall record available if some
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* other part of the kernel decides it
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* should be recorded. */
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AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context,
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* always fill it in at syscall entry
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* time, and always write out the audit
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* record at syscall exit time. */
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};
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/* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
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* we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
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* pointers at syscall exit time).
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*
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* Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
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struct audit_names {
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const char *name;
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unsigned long ino;
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dev_t dev;
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umode_t mode;
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uid_t uid;
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gid_t gid;
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dev_t rdev;
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2005-06-20 17:11:05 +02:00
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unsigned flags;
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2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
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};
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struct audit_aux_data {
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struct audit_aux_data *next;
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int type;
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};
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#define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
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struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
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struct audit_aux_data d;
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struct ipc_perm p;
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unsigned long qbytes;
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uid_t uid;
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gid_t gid;
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mode_t mode;
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};
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2005-05-17 13:08:48 +02:00
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struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
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struct audit_aux_data d;
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int nargs;
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unsigned long args[0];
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};
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struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
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struct audit_aux_data d;
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int len;
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char a[0];
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};
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2005-05-21 01:15:52 +02:00
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struct audit_aux_data_path {
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struct audit_aux_data d;
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struct dentry *dentry;
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struct vfsmount *mnt;
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};
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2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
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/* The per-task audit context. */
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struct audit_context {
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int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
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enum audit_state state;
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unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
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struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
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uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */
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int major; /* syscall number */
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unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
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int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
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2005-04-29 17:08:28 +02:00
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long return_code;/* syscall return code */
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2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
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int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
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int name_count;
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struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
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2005-05-27 13:17:28 +02:00
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struct dentry * pwd;
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struct vfsmount * pwdmnt;
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2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
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struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
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struct audit_aux_data *aux;
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/* Save things to print about task_struct */
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pid_t pid;
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uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
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gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
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unsigned long personality;
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2005-04-29 17:08:28 +02:00
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int arch;
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2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
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#if AUDIT_DEBUG
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int put_count;
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int ino_count;
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#endif
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};
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/* Public API */
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/* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
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* time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at
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* syscall exit time. */
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2005-06-19 20:35:50 +02:00
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static struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
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LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]),
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LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]),
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LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]),
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LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
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LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
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#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 5
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#error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
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#endif
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};
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2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
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struct audit_entry {
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struct list_head list;
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struct rcu_head rcu;
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struct audit_rule rule;
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};
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2005-05-19 12:23:13 +02:00
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extern int audit_pid;
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2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
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/* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from
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* audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */
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static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b)
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{
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int i;
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if (a->flags != b->flags)
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return 1;
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if (a->action != b->action)
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return 1;
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if (a->field_count != b->field_count)
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return 1;
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for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
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if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i]
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|| a->values[i] != b->values[i])
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return 1;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
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if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
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return 1;
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return 0;
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}
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/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
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* audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
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* audit_netlink_sem. */
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2005-06-19 20:35:50 +02:00
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static inline void audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
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struct list_head *list)
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2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
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{
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2005-06-19 20:35:50 +02:00
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if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
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entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
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2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
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list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
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} else {
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list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
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}
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}
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static void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head)
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{
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struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
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kfree(e);
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}
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/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
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* audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
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* audit_netlink_sem. */
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static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
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struct list_head *list)
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{
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struct audit_entry *e;
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/* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
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* deletion routine. */
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list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) {
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if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) {
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list_del_rcu(&e->list);
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call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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2005-06-19 20:35:50 +02:00
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return -ENOENT; /* No matching rule */
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2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
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}
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/* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called during
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* AUDIT_ADD. */
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static int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
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{
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int i;
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if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER
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&& s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE
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&& s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
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return -1;
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if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
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return -1;
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2005-06-19 20:35:50 +02:00
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if ((s->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
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return -1;
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2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
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d->flags = s->flags;
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d->action = s->action;
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d->field_count = s->field_count;
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for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) {
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d->fields[i] = s->fields[i];
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d->values[i] = s->values[i];
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}
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for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i];
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return 0;
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}
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2005-06-21 17:22:01 +02:00
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static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest)
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{
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int pid, seq;
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int *dest = _dest;
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struct audit_entry *entry;
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int i;
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pid = dest[0];
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seq = dest[1];
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kfree(dest);
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down(&audit_netlink_sem);
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/* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
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always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */
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for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
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list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_filter_list[i], list)
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audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
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&entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
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}
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audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
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up(&audit_netlink_sem);
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return 0;
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}
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2005-04-29 17:27:17 +02:00
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int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
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uid_t loginuid)
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2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
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{
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struct audit_entry *entry;
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2005-06-21 17:22:01 +02:00
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struct task_struct *tsk;
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int *dest;
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2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
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int err = 0;
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2005-06-19 20:35:50 +02:00
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unsigned listnr;
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2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
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switch (type) {
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case AUDIT_LIST:
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2005-06-21 17:22:01 +02:00
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/* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
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* the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
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* auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
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* happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
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* trying to _send_ the stuff */
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dest = kmalloc(2 * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!dest)
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return -ENOMEM;
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dest[0] = pid;
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dest[1] = seq;
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tsk = kthread_run(audit_list_rules, dest, "audit_list_rules");
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if (IS_ERR(tsk)) {
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kfree(dest);
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err = PTR_ERR(tsk);
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2005-06-19 20:35:50 +02:00
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}
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2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
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break;
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case AUDIT_ADD:
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if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL)))
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return -ENOMEM;
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if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, data)) {
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kfree(entry);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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2005-06-19 20:35:50 +02:00
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|
|
listnr = entry->rule.flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
|
|
|
|
audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
|
2005-06-22 16:04:33 +02:00
|
|
|
audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
|
2005-05-23 22:35:28 +02:00
|
|
|
"auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid);
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_DEL:
|
2005-06-19 20:35:50 +02:00
|
|
|
listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
|
|
|
|
if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
|
|
|
|
if (!err)
|
2005-06-22 16:04:33 +02:00
|
|
|
audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
|
2005-06-19 20:35:50 +02:00
|
|
|
"auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid);
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
|
|
|
|
* otherwise. */
|
|
|
|
static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
|
|
|
|
struct audit_rule *rule,
|
|
|
|
struct audit_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
enum audit_state *state)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i, j;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
|
|
|
|
u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
|
|
|
|
u32 value = rule->values[i];
|
|
|
|
int result = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (field) {
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_PID:
|
|
|
|
result = (tsk->pid == value);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_UID:
|
|
|
|
result = (tsk->uid == value);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_EUID:
|
|
|
|
result = (tsk->euid == value);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_SUID:
|
|
|
|
result = (tsk->suid == value);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_FSUID:
|
|
|
|
result = (tsk->fsuid == value);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_GID:
|
|
|
|
result = (tsk->gid == value);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_EGID:
|
|
|
|
result = (tsk->egid == value);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_SGID:
|
|
|
|
result = (tsk->sgid == value);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_FSGID:
|
|
|
|
result = (tsk->fsgid == value);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_PERS:
|
|
|
|
result = (tsk->personality == value);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2005-04-29 17:08:28 +02:00
|
|
|
case AUDIT_ARCH:
|
|
|
|
if (ctx)
|
|
|
|
result = (ctx->arch == value);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_EXIT:
|
|
|
|
if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
|
|
|
|
result = (ctx->return_code == value);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
|
|
|
|
if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
|
2005-04-29 17:08:28 +02:00
|
|
|
result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
|
|
|
|
if (ctx) {
|
|
|
|
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
|
|
|
|
if (MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
|
|
|
|
++result;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
|
|
|
|
if (ctx) {
|
|
|
|
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
|
|
|
|
if (MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
|
|
|
|
++result;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_INODE:
|
|
|
|
if (ctx) {
|
|
|
|
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->names[j].ino == value) {
|
|
|
|
++result;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
|
|
|
|
result = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx)
|
|
|
|
result = (ctx->loginuid == value);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_ARG0:
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_ARG1:
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_ARG2:
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_ARG3:
|
|
|
|
if (ctx)
|
|
|
|
result = (ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0]==value);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
|
|
|
|
result = !result;
|
|
|
|
if (!result)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (rule->action) {
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
|
|
|
|
* completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
|
|
|
|
* structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct audit_entry *e;
|
|
|
|
enum audit_state state;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
2005-06-19 20:35:50 +02:00
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
return state;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
|
|
|
|
* audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
|
2005-05-13 19:35:15 +02:00
|
|
|
* also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
* record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
|
|
|
|
struct audit_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
struct list_head *list)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct audit_entry *e;
|
|
|
|
enum audit_state state;
|
|
|
|
int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
|
|
|
|
int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-20 17:07:33 +02:00
|
|
|
if (audit_pid && ctx->pid == audit_pid)
|
|
|
|
return AUDIT_DISABLED;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
|
|
|
|
if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
|
|
|
|
&& audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
return state;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-22 15:56:47 +02:00
|
|
|
int audit_filter_user(int pid, int type)
|
2005-06-19 20:35:50 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-06-22 15:56:47 +02:00
|
|
|
struct task_struct *tsk;
|
2005-06-19 20:35:50 +02:00
|
|
|
struct audit_entry *e;
|
|
|
|
enum audit_state state;
|
2005-06-22 15:56:47 +02:00
|
|
|
int ret = 1;
|
2005-06-19 20:35:50 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-22 15:56:47 +02:00
|
|
|
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
|
|
|
|
tsk = find_task_by_pid(pid);
|
|
|
|
if (tsk)
|
|
|
|
get_task_struct(tsk);
|
|
|
|
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!tsk)
|
|
|
|
return -ESRCH;
|
2005-06-20 17:07:33 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-19 20:35:50 +02:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
|
|
|
|
if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
|
2005-06-22 15:56:47 +02:00
|
|
|
if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2005-06-19 20:35:50 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
2005-06-22 15:56:47 +02:00
|
|
|
put_task_struct(tsk);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-19 20:35:50 +02:00
|
|
|
return 1; /* Audit by default */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
/* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
|
|
|
|
static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
|
|
|
|
int return_valid,
|
|
|
|
int return_code)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (likely(!context))
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
context->return_valid = return_valid;
|
|
|
|
context->return_code = return_code;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) {
|
|
|
|
enum audit_state state;
|
2005-06-19 20:35:50 +02:00
|
|
|
state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
|
|
|
|
context->auditable = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
context->pid = tsk->pid;
|
|
|
|
context->uid = tsk->uid;
|
|
|
|
context->gid = tsk->gid;
|
|
|
|
context->euid = tsk->euid;
|
|
|
|
context->suid = tsk->suid;
|
|
|
|
context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
|
|
|
|
context->egid = tsk->egid;
|
|
|
|
context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
|
|
|
|
context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
|
|
|
|
context->personality = tsk->personality;
|
|
|
|
tsk->audit_context = NULL;
|
|
|
|
return context;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
|
|
|
|
if (context->auditable
|
|
|
|
||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
|
|
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR "audit.c:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
|
|
|
|
" name_count=%d put_count=%d"
|
|
|
|
" ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
|
|
|
|
__LINE__,
|
|
|
|
context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
|
|
|
|
context->name_count, context->put_count,
|
|
|
|
context->ino_count);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
|
|
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
|
|
|
|
context->names[i].name,
|
|
|
|
context->names[i].name);
|
|
|
|
dump_stack();
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if AUDIT_DEBUG
|
|
|
|
context->put_count = 0;
|
|
|
|
context->ino_count = 0;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
|
|
|
|
if (context->names[i].name)
|
|
|
|
__putname(context->names[i].name);
|
|
|
|
context->name_count = 0;
|
2005-05-27 13:17:28 +02:00
|
|
|
if (context->pwd)
|
|
|
|
dput(context->pwd);
|
|
|
|
if (context->pwdmnt)
|
|
|
|
mntput(context->pwdmnt);
|
|
|
|
context->pwd = NULL;
|
|
|
|
context->pwdmnt = NULL;
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct audit_aux_data *aux;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while ((aux = context->aux)) {
|
2005-05-21 01:15:52 +02:00
|
|
|
if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) {
|
|
|
|
struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
|
|
|
|
dput(axi->dentry);
|
|
|
|
mntput(axi->mnt);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
context->aux = aux->next;
|
|
|
|
kfree(aux);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
|
|
|
|
enum audit_state state)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
|
|
|
|
context->state = state;
|
|
|
|
context->loginuid = loginuid;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct audit_context *context;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
audit_zero_context(context, state);
|
|
|
|
return context;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
|
|
|
|
* if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
|
|
|
|
* specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
|
|
|
|
* needed. */
|
|
|
|
int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct audit_context *context;
|
|
|
|
enum audit_state state;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (likely(!audit_enabled))
|
|
|
|
return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
|
|
|
|
if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
|
|
|
|
audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Preserve login uid */
|
|
|
|
context->loginuid = -1;
|
|
|
|
if (current->audit_context)
|
|
|
|
context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tsk->audit_context = context;
|
|
|
|
set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct audit_context *previous;
|
|
|
|
int count = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
|
|
previous = context->previous;
|
|
|
|
if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
|
|
|
|
++count;
|
|
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
|
|
|
|
" freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
|
|
|
|
context->serial, context->major,
|
|
|
|
context->name_count, count);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
audit_free_names(context);
|
|
|
|
audit_free_aux(context);
|
|
|
|
kfree(context);
|
|
|
|
context = previous;
|
|
|
|
} while (context);
|
|
|
|
if (count >= 10)
|
|
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-18 19:47:35 +02:00
|
|
|
static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
|
|
|
|
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
|
|
|
|
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
get_task_comm(name, current);
|
2005-05-23 22:57:41 +02:00
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
|
|
|
|
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
|
2005-04-18 19:47:35 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mm)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
|
|
|
|
vma = mm->mmap;
|
|
|
|
while (vma) {
|
|
|
|
if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
|
|
|
|
vma->vm_file) {
|
|
|
|
audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
|
|
|
|
vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
|
|
|
|
vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vma = vma->vm_next;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
struct audit_buffer *ab;
|
2005-05-26 13:04:57 +02:00
|
|
|
struct audit_aux_data *aux;
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-22 16:04:33 +02:00
|
|
|
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!ab)
|
|
|
|
return; /* audit_panic has been called */
|
2005-05-23 22:35:28 +02:00
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
|
|
|
|
context->arch, context->major);
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
|
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
|
|
|
|
if (context->return_valid)
|
2005-04-29 17:08:28 +02:00
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
|
|
|
|
(context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
|
|
|
|
context->return_code);
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab,
|
|
|
|
" a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
|
2005-05-21 01:22:31 +02:00
|
|
|
" pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
|
|
|
|
" euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
|
|
|
|
" egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u",
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
context->argv[0],
|
|
|
|
context->argv[1],
|
|
|
|
context->argv[2],
|
|
|
|
context->argv[3],
|
|
|
|
context->name_count,
|
|
|
|
context->pid,
|
|
|
|
context->loginuid,
|
|
|
|
context->uid,
|
|
|
|
context->gid,
|
|
|
|
context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
|
|
|
|
context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid);
|
2005-04-18 19:47:35 +02:00
|
|
|
audit_log_task_info(ab);
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
audit_log_end(ab);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-05-26 13:04:57 +02:00
|
|
|
for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
|
2005-05-13 19:17:42 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-22 16:04:33 +02:00
|
|
|
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!ab)
|
|
|
|
continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (aux->type) {
|
2005-05-13 19:17:42 +02:00
|
|
|
case AUDIT_IPC: {
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
|
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab,
|
2005-05-21 01:22:31 +02:00
|
|
|
" qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x",
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
|
2005-05-17 13:08:48 +02:00
|
|
|
break; }
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux;
|
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs);
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++)
|
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]);
|
|
|
|
break; }
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: {
|
|
|
|
struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
|
|
|
|
audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
|
|
|
|
break; }
|
2005-05-21 01:15:52 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: {
|
|
|
|
struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
|
|
|
|
audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt);
|
|
|
|
break; }
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
audit_log_end(ab);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-05-27 13:17:28 +02:00
|
|
|
if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
|
2005-06-22 16:04:33 +02:00
|
|
|
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
|
2005-05-27 13:17:28 +02:00
|
|
|
if (ab) {
|
|
|
|
audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
|
|
|
|
audit_log_end(ab);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
|
2005-06-22 16:04:33 +02:00
|
|
|
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!ab)
|
|
|
|
continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
|
2005-05-27 13:17:28 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
|
2005-04-29 16:54:44 +02:00
|
|
|
if (context->names[i].name) {
|
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
|
|
|
|
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-20 17:11:05 +02:00
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " flags=%x\n", context->names[i].flags);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
if (context->names[i].ino != (unsigned long)-1)
|
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
|
2005-05-21 01:22:31 +02:00
|
|
|
" ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
context->names[i].ino,
|
|
|
|
MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
|
|
|
|
MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
|
|
|
|
context->names[i].mode,
|
|
|
|
context->names[i].uid,
|
|
|
|
context->names[i].gid,
|
|
|
|
MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
|
|
|
|
MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
|
|
|
|
audit_log_end(ab);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Free a per-task audit context. Called from copy_process and
|
|
|
|
* __put_task_struct. */
|
|
|
|
void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct audit_context *context;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
task_lock(tsk);
|
|
|
|
context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
task_unlock(tsk);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (likely(!context))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
|
|
|
|
* function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. */
|
2005-06-20 17:07:33 +02:00
|
|
|
if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
audit_log_exit(context);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
audit_free_context(context);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
|
|
|
|
* audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
|
|
|
|
* filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
|
|
|
|
* per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
|
|
|
|
* then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
|
|
|
|
* will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
|
|
|
|
* be written). */
|
2005-04-29 17:08:28 +02:00
|
|
|
void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
|
|
|
|
enum audit_state state;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(!context);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This happens only on certain architectures that make system
|
|
|
|
* calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
|
|
|
|
* with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
|
|
|
|
* architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
|
|
|
|
* got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* i386 no
|
|
|
|
* x86_64 no
|
|
|
|
* ppc64 yes (see arch/ppc64/kernel/misc.S)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
|
|
|
|
* (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (context->in_syscall) {
|
|
|
|
struct audit_context *newctx;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if defined(__NR_vm86) && defined(__NR_vm86old)
|
|
|
|
/* vm86 mode should only be entered once */
|
|
|
|
if (major == __NR_vm86 || major == __NR_vm86old)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if AUDIT_DEBUG
|
|
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR
|
|
|
|
"audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
|
|
|
|
" entering syscall=%d\n",
|
|
|
|
context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
|
|
|
|
if (newctx) {
|
|
|
|
newctx->previous = context;
|
|
|
|
context = newctx;
|
|
|
|
tsk->audit_context = newctx;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
|
|
|
|
* can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
|
|
|
|
* will be lost). The only other alternative is
|
|
|
|
* to abandon auditing. */
|
|
|
|
audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!audit_enabled)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-29 17:08:28 +02:00
|
|
|
context->arch = arch;
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
context->major = major;
|
|
|
|
context->argv[0] = a1;
|
|
|
|
context->argv[1] = a2;
|
|
|
|
context->argv[2] = a3;
|
|
|
|
context->argv[3] = a4;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
state = context->state;
|
|
|
|
if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT)
|
2005-06-19 20:35:50 +02:00
|
|
|
state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
context->serial = audit_serial();
|
|
|
|
context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
|
|
|
|
context->in_syscall = 1;
|
|
|
|
context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
|
|
|
|
* auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
|
|
|
|
* filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
|
|
|
|
* message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
|
|
|
|
* free the names stored from getname(). */
|
2005-04-29 17:08:28 +02:00
|
|
|
void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct audit_context *context;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
get_task_struct(tsk);
|
|
|
|
task_lock(tsk);
|
2005-04-29 17:08:28 +02:00
|
|
|
context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
task_unlock(tsk);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have
|
|
|
|
* called __put_task_struct. */
|
|
|
|
if (likely(!context))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-20 17:07:33 +02:00
|
|
|
if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
audit_log_exit(context);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
context->in_syscall = 0;
|
|
|
|
context->auditable = 0;
|
2005-04-29 17:08:28 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
if (context->previous) {
|
|
|
|
struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
|
|
|
|
context->previous = NULL;
|
|
|
|
audit_free_context(context);
|
|
|
|
tsk->audit_context = new_context;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
audit_free_names(context);
|
|
|
|
audit_free_aux(context);
|
|
|
|
audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
|
|
|
|
tsk->audit_context = context;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
put_task_struct(tsk);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Add a name to the list. Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). */
|
|
|
|
void audit_getname(const char *name)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!context->in_syscall) {
|
|
|
|
#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
|
|
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
|
|
|
|
__FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
|
|
|
|
dump_stack();
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
|
|
|
|
context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
|
|
|
|
context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
|
|
|
|
++context->name_count;
|
2005-05-27 13:17:28 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!context->pwd) {
|
|
|
|
read_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
|
|
|
|
context->pwd = dget(current->fs->pwd);
|
|
|
|
context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt);
|
|
|
|
read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Intercept a putname request. Called from
|
|
|
|
* include/linux/fs.h:putname(). If we have stored the name from
|
|
|
|
* getname in the audit context, then we delay the putname until syscall
|
|
|
|
* exit. */
|
|
|
|
void audit_putname(const char *name)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(!context);
|
|
|
|
if (!context->in_syscall) {
|
|
|
|
#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
|
|
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
|
|
|
|
__FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
|
|
|
|
if (context->name_count) {
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
|
|
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
|
|
|
|
context->names[i].name,
|
|
|
|
context->names[i].name);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
__putname(name);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if AUDIT_DEBUG
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
++context->put_count;
|
|
|
|
if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
|
|
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
|
|
|
|
" in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
|
|
|
|
" put_count=%d\n",
|
|
|
|
__FILE__, __LINE__,
|
|
|
|
context->serial, context->major,
|
|
|
|
context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
|
|
|
|
context->put_count);
|
|
|
|
dump_stack();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Store the inode and device from a lookup. Called from
|
|
|
|
* fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). */
|
2005-06-20 17:11:05 +02:00
|
|
|
void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int idx;
|
|
|
|
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!context->in_syscall)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (context->name_count
|
|
|
|
&& context->names[context->name_count-1].name
|
|
|
|
&& context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
|
|
|
|
idx = context->name_count - 1;
|
|
|
|
else if (context->name_count > 1
|
|
|
|
&& context->names[context->name_count-2].name
|
|
|
|
&& context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
|
|
|
|
idx = context->name_count - 2;
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
/* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
|
|
|
|
* associated name? */
|
|
|
|
if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
idx = context->name_count++;
|
|
|
|
context->names[idx].name = NULL;
|
|
|
|
#if AUDIT_DEBUG
|
|
|
|
++context->ino_count;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-20 17:11:05 +02:00
|
|
|
context->names[idx].flags = flags;
|
|
|
|
context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
|
|
|
|
context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
|
|
|
|
context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
|
|
|
|
context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
|
|
|
|
context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
|
|
|
|
context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-05-21 22:08:09 +02:00
|
|
|
void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
|
|
|
|
struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-05-21 22:08:09 +02:00
|
|
|
t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
|
|
|
|
t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
|
|
|
|
*serial = ctx->serial;
|
|
|
|
ctx->auditable = 1;
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-29 18:30:07 +02:00
|
|
|
int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-04-29 18:30:07 +02:00
|
|
|
if (task->audit_context) {
|
2005-05-13 19:17:42 +02:00
|
|
|
struct audit_buffer *ab;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-22 16:04:33 +02:00
|
|
|
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
|
2005-05-13 19:17:42 +02:00
|
|
|
if (ab) {
|
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
|
2005-05-21 01:22:31 +02:00
|
|
|
"old auid=%u new auid=%u",
|
2005-05-13 19:17:42 +02:00
|
|
|
task->pid, task->uid,
|
|
|
|
task->audit_context->loginuid, loginuid);
|
|
|
|
audit_log_end(ab);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-29 18:30:07 +02:00
|
|
|
task->audit_context->loginuid = loginuid;
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
|
|
|
|
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (likely(!context))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!ax)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ax->qbytes = qbytes;
|
|
|
|
ax->uid = uid;
|
|
|
|
ax->gid = gid;
|
|
|
|
ax->mode = mode;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-05-13 19:17:42 +02:00
|
|
|
ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
|
2005-04-17 00:20:36 +02:00
|
|
|
ax->d.next = context->aux;
|
|
|
|
context->aux = (void *)ax;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-05-06 13:38:39 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-05-17 13:08:48 +02:00
|
|
|
int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
|
|
|
|
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (likely(!context))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!ax)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ax->nargs = nargs;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
|
|
|
|
ax->d.next = context->aux;
|
|
|
|
context->aux = (void *)ax;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
|
|
|
|
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (likely(!context))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!ax)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ax->len = len;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
|
|
|
|
ax->d.next = context->aux;
|
|
|
|
context->aux = (void *)ax;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-05-21 01:15:52 +02:00
|
|
|
int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
|
|
|
|
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (likely(!context))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
|
|
|
|
if (!ax)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ax->dentry = dget(dentry);
|
|
|
|
ax->mnt = mntget(mnt);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH;
|
|
|
|
ax->d.next = context->aux;
|
|
|
|
context->aux = (void *)ax;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-05-06 13:38:39 +02:00
|
|
|
void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
|
|
|
|
extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->pid == audit_pid)) {
|
|
|
|
if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP) {
|
|
|
|
struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
|
|
|
|
audit_sig_pid = current->pid;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx)
|
|
|
|
audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
audit_sig_uid = current->uid;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|