linux/kernel/futex_compat.c

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 15:07:57 +01:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* linux/kernel/futex_compat.c
*
* Futex compatibililty routines.
*
* Copyright 2006, Red Hat, Inc., Ingo Molnar
*/
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
#include <linux/futex.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
/*
* Fetch a robust-list pointer. Bit 0 signals PI futexes:
*/
static inline int
fetch_robust_entry(compat_uptr_t *uentry, struct robust_list __user **entry,
compat_uptr_t __user *head, unsigned int *pi)
{
if (get_user(*uentry, head))
return -EFAULT;
*entry = compat_ptr((*uentry) & ~1);
*pi = (unsigned int)(*uentry) & 1;
return 0;
}
static void __user *futex_uaddr(struct robust_list __user *entry,
[FUTEX] Fix address computation in compat code. compat_exit_robust_list() computes a pointer to the futex entry in userspace as follows: (void __user *)entry + futex_offset 'entry' is a 'struct robust_list __user *', and 'futex_offset' is a 'compat_long_t' (typically a 's32'). Things explode if the 32-bit sign bit is set in futex_offset. Type promotion sign extends futex_offset to a 64-bit value before adding it to 'entry'. This triggered a problem on sparc64 running 32-bit applications which would lock up a cpu looping forever in the fault handling for the userspace load in handle_futex_death(). Compat userspace runs with address masking (wherein the cpu zeros out the top 32-bits of every effective address given to a memory operation instruction) so the sparc64 fault handler accounts for this by zero'ing out the top 32-bits of the fault address too. Since the kernel properly uses the compat_uptr interfaces, kernel side accesses to compat userspace work too since they will only use addresses with the top 32-bit clear. Because of this compat futex layer bug we get into the following loop when executing the get_user() load near the top of handle_futex_death(): 1) load from address '0xfffffffff7f16bd8', FAULT 2) fault handler clears upper 32-bits, processes fault for address '0xf7f16bd8' which succeeds 3) goto #1 I want to thank Bernd Zeimetz, Josip Rodin, and Fabio Massimo Di Nitto for their tireless efforts helping me track down this bug. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-11-07 06:13:56 +01:00
compat_long_t futex_offset)
{
compat_uptr_t base = ptr_to_compat(entry);
void __user *uaddr = compat_ptr(base + futex_offset);
return uaddr;
}
/*
* Walk curr->robust_list (very carefully, it's a userspace list!)
* and mark any locks found there dead, and notify any waiters.
*
* We silently return on any sign of list-walking problem.
*/
void compat_exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr)
{
struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head = curr->compat_robust_list;
struct robust_list __user *entry, *next_entry, *pending;
unsigned int limit = ROBUST_LIST_LIMIT, pi, pip;
unsigned int uninitialized_var(next_pi);
compat_uptr_t uentry, next_uentry, upending;
compat_long_t futex_offset;
int rc;
futex: runtime enable pi and robust functionality Not all architectures implement futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(). The default implementation returns -ENOSYS, which is currently not handled inside of the futex guts. Futex PI calls and robust list exits with a held futex result in an endless loop in the futex code on architectures which have no support. Fixing up every place where futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() is called would add a fair amount of extra if/else constructs to the already complex code. It is also not possible to disable the robust feature before user space tries to register robust lists. Compile time disabling is not a good idea either, as there are already architectures with runtime detection of futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic support. Detect the functionality at runtime instead by calling cmpxchg_futex_value_locked() with a NULL pointer from the futex initialization code. This is guaranteed to fail, but the call of futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() happens with pagefaults disabled. On architectures, which use the asm-generic implementation or have a runtime CPU feature detection, a -ENOSYS return value disables the PI/robust features. On architectures with a working implementation the call returns -EFAULT and the PI/robust features are enabled. The relevant syscalls return -ENOSYS and the robust list exit code is blocked, when the detection fails. Fixes http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/2/11/149 Originally reported by: Lennart Buytenhek Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Lennert Buytenhek <buytenh@wantstofly.org> Cc: Riku Voipio <riku.voipio@movial.fi> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-24 00:23:57 +01:00
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return;
/*
* Fetch the list head (which was registered earlier, via
* sys_set_robust_list()):
*/
if (fetch_robust_entry(&uentry, &entry, &head->list.next, &pi))
return;
/*
* Fetch the relative futex offset:
*/
if (get_user(futex_offset, &head->futex_offset))
return;
/*
* Fetch any possibly pending lock-add first, and handle it
* if it exists:
*/
if (fetch_robust_entry(&upending, &pending,
&head->list_op_pending, &pip))
return;
next_entry = NULL; /* avoid warning with gcc */
while (entry != (struct robust_list __user *) &head->list) {
/*
* Fetch the next entry in the list before calling
* handle_futex_death:
*/
rc = fetch_robust_entry(&next_uentry, &next_entry,
(compat_uptr_t __user *)&entry->next, &next_pi);
/*
* A pending lock might already be on the list, so
* dont process it twice:
*/
[FUTEX] Fix address computation in compat code. compat_exit_robust_list() computes a pointer to the futex entry in userspace as follows: (void __user *)entry + futex_offset 'entry' is a 'struct robust_list __user *', and 'futex_offset' is a 'compat_long_t' (typically a 's32'). Things explode if the 32-bit sign bit is set in futex_offset. Type promotion sign extends futex_offset to a 64-bit value before adding it to 'entry'. This triggered a problem on sparc64 running 32-bit applications which would lock up a cpu looping forever in the fault handling for the userspace load in handle_futex_death(). Compat userspace runs with address masking (wherein the cpu zeros out the top 32-bits of every effective address given to a memory operation instruction) so the sparc64 fault handler accounts for this by zero'ing out the top 32-bits of the fault address too. Since the kernel properly uses the compat_uptr interfaces, kernel side accesses to compat userspace work too since they will only use addresses with the top 32-bit clear. Because of this compat futex layer bug we get into the following loop when executing the get_user() load near the top of handle_futex_death(): 1) load from address '0xfffffffff7f16bd8', FAULT 2) fault handler clears upper 32-bits, processes fault for address '0xf7f16bd8' which succeeds 3) goto #1 I want to thank Bernd Zeimetz, Josip Rodin, and Fabio Massimo Di Nitto for their tireless efforts helping me track down this bug. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-11-07 06:13:56 +01:00
if (entry != pending) {
void __user *uaddr = futex_uaddr(entry, futex_offset);
[FUTEX] Fix address computation in compat code. compat_exit_robust_list() computes a pointer to the futex entry in userspace as follows: (void __user *)entry + futex_offset 'entry' is a 'struct robust_list __user *', and 'futex_offset' is a 'compat_long_t' (typically a 's32'). Things explode if the 32-bit sign bit is set in futex_offset. Type promotion sign extends futex_offset to a 64-bit value before adding it to 'entry'. This triggered a problem on sparc64 running 32-bit applications which would lock up a cpu looping forever in the fault handling for the userspace load in handle_futex_death(). Compat userspace runs with address masking (wherein the cpu zeros out the top 32-bits of every effective address given to a memory operation instruction) so the sparc64 fault handler accounts for this by zero'ing out the top 32-bits of the fault address too. Since the kernel properly uses the compat_uptr interfaces, kernel side accesses to compat userspace work too since they will only use addresses with the top 32-bit clear. Because of this compat futex layer bug we get into the following loop when executing the get_user() load near the top of handle_futex_death(): 1) load from address '0xfffffffff7f16bd8', FAULT 2) fault handler clears upper 32-bits, processes fault for address '0xf7f16bd8' which succeeds 3) goto #1 I want to thank Bernd Zeimetz, Josip Rodin, and Fabio Massimo Di Nitto for their tireless efforts helping me track down this bug. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-11-07 06:13:56 +01:00
if (handle_futex_death(uaddr, curr, pi))
return;
}
if (rc)
return;
uentry = next_uentry;
entry = next_entry;
pi = next_pi;
/*
* Avoid excessively long or circular lists:
*/
if (!--limit)
break;
cond_resched();
}
[FUTEX] Fix address computation in compat code. compat_exit_robust_list() computes a pointer to the futex entry in userspace as follows: (void __user *)entry + futex_offset 'entry' is a 'struct robust_list __user *', and 'futex_offset' is a 'compat_long_t' (typically a 's32'). Things explode if the 32-bit sign bit is set in futex_offset. Type promotion sign extends futex_offset to a 64-bit value before adding it to 'entry'. This triggered a problem on sparc64 running 32-bit applications which would lock up a cpu looping forever in the fault handling for the userspace load in handle_futex_death(). Compat userspace runs with address masking (wherein the cpu zeros out the top 32-bits of every effective address given to a memory operation instruction) so the sparc64 fault handler accounts for this by zero'ing out the top 32-bits of the fault address too. Since the kernel properly uses the compat_uptr interfaces, kernel side accesses to compat userspace work too since they will only use addresses with the top 32-bit clear. Because of this compat futex layer bug we get into the following loop when executing the get_user() load near the top of handle_futex_death(): 1) load from address '0xfffffffff7f16bd8', FAULT 2) fault handler clears upper 32-bits, processes fault for address '0xf7f16bd8' which succeeds 3) goto #1 I want to thank Bernd Zeimetz, Josip Rodin, and Fabio Massimo Di Nitto for their tireless efforts helping me track down this bug. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-11-07 06:13:56 +01:00
if (pending) {
void __user *uaddr = futex_uaddr(pending, futex_offset);
handle_futex_death(uaddr, curr, pip);
}
}
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(set_robust_list,
struct compat_robust_list_head __user *, head,
compat_size_t, len)
{
futex: runtime enable pi and robust functionality Not all architectures implement futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(). The default implementation returns -ENOSYS, which is currently not handled inside of the futex guts. Futex PI calls and robust list exits with a held futex result in an endless loop in the futex code on architectures which have no support. Fixing up every place where futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() is called would add a fair amount of extra if/else constructs to the already complex code. It is also not possible to disable the robust feature before user space tries to register robust lists. Compile time disabling is not a good idea either, as there are already architectures with runtime detection of futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic support. Detect the functionality at runtime instead by calling cmpxchg_futex_value_locked() with a NULL pointer from the futex initialization code. This is guaranteed to fail, but the call of futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() happens with pagefaults disabled. On architectures, which use the asm-generic implementation or have a runtime CPU feature detection, a -ENOSYS return value disables the PI/robust features. On architectures with a working implementation the call returns -EFAULT and the PI/robust features are enabled. The relevant syscalls return -ENOSYS and the robust list exit code is blocked, when the detection fails. Fixes http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/2/11/149 Originally reported by: Lennart Buytenhek Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Lennert Buytenhek <buytenh@wantstofly.org> Cc: Riku Voipio <riku.voipio@movial.fi> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-24 00:23:57 +01:00
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return -ENOSYS;
if (unlikely(len != sizeof(*head)))
return -EINVAL;
current->compat_robust_list = head;
return 0;
}
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid,
compat_uptr_t __user *, head_ptr,
compat_size_t __user *, len_ptr)
{
struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head;
unsigned long ret;
struct task_struct *p;
futex: runtime enable pi and robust functionality Not all architectures implement futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(). The default implementation returns -ENOSYS, which is currently not handled inside of the futex guts. Futex PI calls and robust list exits with a held futex result in an endless loop in the futex code on architectures which have no support. Fixing up every place where futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() is called would add a fair amount of extra if/else constructs to the already complex code. It is also not possible to disable the robust feature before user space tries to register robust lists. Compile time disabling is not a good idea either, as there are already architectures with runtime detection of futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic support. Detect the functionality at runtime instead by calling cmpxchg_futex_value_locked() with a NULL pointer from the futex initialization code. This is guaranteed to fail, but the call of futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() happens with pagefaults disabled. On architectures, which use the asm-generic implementation or have a runtime CPU feature detection, a -ENOSYS return value disables the PI/robust features. On architectures with a working implementation the call returns -EFAULT and the PI/robust features are enabled. The relevant syscalls return -ENOSYS and the robust list exit code is blocked, when the detection fails. Fixes http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/2/11/149 Originally reported by: Lennart Buytenhek Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Lennert Buytenhek <buytenh@wantstofly.org> Cc: Riku Voipio <riku.voipio@movial.fi> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-24 00:23:57 +01:00
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return -ENOSYS;
rcu_read_lock();
ret = -ESRCH;
if (!pid)
p = current;
else {
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (!p)
goto err_unlock;
}
ret = -EPERM;
ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its credentials. To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g. in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set. The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its privileges, e.g. by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass. While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access check is reused for things in procfs. In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely on ptrace access checks: /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in this scenario: lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar drwx------ root root /root drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file, this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access (through /proc/$pid/cwd). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning] Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-01-21 00:00:04 +01:00
if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
goto err_unlock;
head = p->compat_robust_list;
rcu_read_unlock();
if (put_user(sizeof(*head), len_ptr))
return -EFAULT;
return put_user(ptr_to_compat(head), head_ptr);
err_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE6(futex, u32 __user *, uaddr, int, op, u32, val,
struct compat_timespec __user *, utime, u32 __user *, uaddr2,
u32, val3)
{
struct timespec ts;
ktime_t t, *tp = NULL;
int val2 = 0;
int cmd = op & FUTEX_CMD_MASK;
if (utime && (cmd == FUTEX_WAIT || cmd == FUTEX_LOCK_PI ||
cmd == FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET ||
cmd == FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI)) {
compat: Get rid of (get|put)_compat_time(val|spec) We have two APIs for compatiblity timespec/val, with confusingly similar names. compat_(get|put)_time(val|spec) *do* handle the case where COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME is set, whereas (get|put)_compat_time(val|spec) do not. This is an accident waiting to happen. Clean it up by favoring the full-service version; the limited version is replaced with double-underscore versions static to kernel/compat.c. A common pattern is to convert a struct timespec to kernel format in an allocation on the user stack. Unfortunately it is open-coded in several places. Since this allocation isn't actually needed if COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME is true (since user format == kernel format) encapsulate that whole pattern into the function compat_convert_timespec(). An equivalent function should be written for struct timeval if it is needed in the future. Finally, get rid of compat_(get|put)_timeval_convert(): each was only used once, and the latter was not even doing what the function said (no conversion actually was being done.) Moving the conversion into compat_sys_settimeofday() itself makes the code much more similar to sys_settimeofday() itself. v3: Remove unused compat_convert_timeval(). v2: Drop bogus "const" in the destination argument for compat_convert_time*(). Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <m.chehab@samsung.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com> Cc: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Tested-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
2014-02-02 03:54:11 +01:00
if (compat_get_timespec(&ts, utime))
return -EFAULT;
if (!timespec_valid(&ts))
return -EINVAL;
t = timespec_to_ktime(ts);
if (cmd == FUTEX_WAIT)
t = ktime_add_safe(ktime_get(), t);
tp = &t;
}
if (cmd == FUTEX_REQUEUE || cmd == FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE ||
cmd == FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI || cmd == FUTEX_WAKE_OP)
val2 = (int) (unsigned long) utime;
return do_futex(uaddr, op, val, tp, uaddr2, val2, val3);
}