iscsi-target: Reject mutual authentication with reflected CHAP_C
commit 1d2b60a554
upstream.
This patch adds an explicit check in chap_server_compute_md5() to ensure
the CHAP_C value received from the initiator during mutual authentication
does not match the original CHAP_C provided by the target.
This is in line with RFC-3720, section 8.2.1:
Originators MUST NOT reuse the CHAP challenge sent by the Responder
for the other direction of a bidirectional authentication.
Responders MUST check for this condition and close the iSCSI TCP
connection if it occurs.
Reported-by: Tejas Vaykole <tejas.vaykole@calsoftinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
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@ -313,6 +313,16 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5(
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pr_err("Unable to convert incoming challenge\n");
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goto out;
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}
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/*
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* During mutual authentication, the CHAP_C generated by the
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* initiator must not match the original CHAP_C generated by
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* the target.
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*/
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if (!memcmp(challenge_binhex, chap->challenge, CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH)) {
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pr_err("initiator CHAP_C matches target CHAP_C, failing"
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" login attempt\n");
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goto out;
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}
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/*
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* Generate CHAP_N and CHAP_R for mutual authentication.
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*/
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