diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h
index 6a998598f172..64fb5cbe54fa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
  */
 static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
 {
-	u64 canary;
+	u64 uninitialized_var(canary);
 	u64 tsc;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
@@ -68,8 +68,16 @@ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
 	 * of randomness. The TSC only matters for very early init,
 	 * there it already has some randomness on most systems. Later
 	 * on during the bootup the random pool has true entropy too.
+	 *
+	 * For preempt-rt we need to weaken the randomness a bit, as
+	 * we can't call into the random generator from atomic context
+	 * due to locking constraints. We just leave canary
+	 * uninitialized and use the TSC based randomness on top of
+	 * it.
 	 */
+#ifndef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT_FULL
 	get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary));
+#endif
 	tsc = __native_read_tsc();
 	canary += tsc + (tsc << 32UL);