KVM: x86: Refactor prefix decoding to prevent Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
commit 125ffc5e0a
upstream.
This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in
vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(), vmx_read_guest_seg_base(),
vmx_read_guest_seg_limit() and vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(). When
invoked from emulation, these functions contain index computations
based on the (attacker-influenced) segment value. Using constants
prevents the attack.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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@ -5212,16 +5212,28 @@ int x86_decode_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void *insn, int insn_len)
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ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes ^ 6;
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break;
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case 0x26: /* ES override */
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has_seg_override = true;
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ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_ES;
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break;
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case 0x2e: /* CS override */
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has_seg_override = true;
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ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_CS;
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break;
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case 0x36: /* SS override */
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has_seg_override = true;
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ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_SS;
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break;
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case 0x3e: /* DS override */
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has_seg_override = true;
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ctxt->seg_override = (ctxt->b >> 3) & 3;
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ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_DS;
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break;
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case 0x64: /* FS override */
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has_seg_override = true;
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ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_FS;
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break;
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case 0x65: /* GS override */
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has_seg_override = true;
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ctxt->seg_override = ctxt->b & 7;
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ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_GS;
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break;
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case 0x40 ... 0x4f: /* REX */
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if (mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
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