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tcp: syncookies: reduce cookie lifetime to 128 seconds 

We currently accept cookies that were created less than 4 minutes ago
(ie, cookies with counter delta 0-3).  Combined with the 8 mss table
values, this yields 32 possible values (out of 2**32) that will be valid.

Reducing the lifetime to < 2 minutes halves the guessing chance while
still providing a large enough period.

While at it, get rid of jiffies value -- they overflow too quickly on
32 bit platforms.

getnstimeofday is used to create a counter that increments every 64s.
perf shows getnstimeofday cost is negible compared to sha_transform;
normal tcp initial sequence number generation uses getnstimeofday, too.

Reported-by: Jakob Lell <jakob@jakoblell.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This commit is contained in:
Florian Westphal 2013-09-20 22:32:55 +02:00 committed by David S. Miller
parent 61f860c356
commit 8c27bd75f0
3 changed files with 35 additions and 38 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

18
include/net/tcp.h
View File

@ -481,6 +481,24 @@ int __cookie_v4_check(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th,
struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct ip_options *opt);
#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
#include <linux/ktime.h>
/* Syncookies use a monotonic timer which increments every 64 seconds.
* This counter is used both as a hash input and partially encoded into
* the cookie value. A cookie is only validated further if the delta
* between the current counter value and the encoded one is less than this,
* i.e. a sent cookie is valid only at most for 128 seconds (or less if
* the counter advances immediately after a cookie is generated).
*/
#define MAX_SYNCOOKIE_AGE 2
static inline u32 tcp_cookie_time(void)
{
struct timespec now;
getnstimeofday(&now);
return now.tv_sec >> 6; /* 64 seconds granularity */
}
u32 __cookie_v4_init_sequence(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th,
u16 *mssp);
__u32 cookie_v4_init_sequence(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, __u16 *mss);

31
net/ipv4/syncookies.c
View File

@ -89,8 +89,7 @@ __u32 cookie_init_timestamp(struct request_sock *req)
static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport,
__be16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 count,
__u32 data)
__be16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 data)
{
/*
* Compute the secure sequence number.
@ -102,7 +101,7 @@ static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport,
* As an extra hack, we add a small "data" value that encodes the
* MSS into the second hash value.
*/
u32 count = tcp_cookie_time();
return (cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) +
sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS) +
((cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count, 1) + data)
@ -114,22 +113,21 @@ static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport,
* If the syncookie is bad, the data returned will be out of
* range. This must be checked by the caller.
*
* The count value used to generate the cookie must be within
* "maxdiff" if the current (passed-in) "count". The return value
* is (__u32)-1 if this test fails.
* The count value used to generate the cookie must be less than
* MAX_SYNCOOKIE_AGE minutes in the past.
* The return value (__u32)-1 if this test fails.
*/
static __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, __be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
__be16 sport, __be16 dport, __u32 sseq,
__u32 count, __u32 maxdiff)
__be16 sport, __be16 dport, __u32 sseq)
{
__u32 diff;
u32 diff, count = tcp_cookie_time();
/* Strip away the layers from the cookie */
cookie -= cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + sseq;
/* Cookie is now reduced to (count * 2^24) ^ (hash % 2^24) */
diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32) - 1 >> COOKIEBITS);
if (diff >= maxdiff)
if (diff >= MAX_SYNCOOKIE_AGE)
return (__u32)-1;
return (cookie -
@ -173,7 +171,7 @@ u32 __cookie_v4_init_sequence(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th,
return secure_tcp_syn_cookie(iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
th->source, th->dest, ntohl(th->seq),
jiffies / (HZ * 60), mssind);
mssind);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cookie_v4_init_sequence);
@ -188,13 +186,6 @@ __u32 cookie_v4_init_sequence(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, __u16 *mssp)
return __cookie_v4_init_sequence(iph, th, mssp);
}
/*
* This (misnamed) value is the age of syncookie which is permitted.
* Its ideal value should be dependent on TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT and
* sysctl_tcp_retries1. It's a rather complicated formula (exponential
* backoff) to compute at runtime so it's currently hardcoded here.
*/
#define COUNTER_TRIES 4
/*
* Check if a ack sequence number is a valid syncookie.
* Return the decoded mss if it is, or 0 if not.
@ -204,9 +195,7 @@ int __cookie_v4_check(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th,
{
__u32 seq = ntohl(th->seq) - 1;
__u32 mssind = check_tcp_syn_cookie(cookie, iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
th->source, th->dest, seq,
jiffies / (HZ * 60),
COUNTER_TRIES);
th->source, th->dest, seq);
return mssind < ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) ? msstab[mssind] : 0;
}

24
net/ipv6/syncookies.c
View File

@ -36,14 +36,6 @@ static __u16 const msstab[] = {
9000 - 60,
};
/*
* This (misnamed) value is the age of syncookie which is permitted.
* Its ideal value should be dependent on TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT and
* sysctl_tcp_retries1. It's a rather complicated formula (exponential
* backoff) to compute at runtime so it's currently hardcoded here.
*/
#define COUNTER_TRIES 4
static inline struct sock *get_cookie_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req,
struct dst_entry *dst)
@ -86,8 +78,9 @@ static u32 cookie_hash(const struct in6_addr *saddr, const struct in6_addr *dadd
static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(const struct in6_addr *saddr,
const struct in6_addr *daddr,
__be16 sport, __be16 dport, __u32 sseq,
__u32 count, __u32 data)
__u32 data)
{
u32 count = tcp_cookie_time();
return (cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) +
sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS) +
((cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count, 1) + data)
@ -96,15 +89,14 @@ static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(const struct in6_addr *saddr,
static __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, const struct in6_addr *saddr,
const struct in6_addr *daddr, __be16 sport,
__be16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 count,
__u32 maxdiff)
__be16 dport, __u32 sseq)
{
__u32 diff;
__u32 diff, count = tcp_cookie_time();
cookie -= cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + sseq;
diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32) -1 >> COOKIEBITS);
if (diff >= maxdiff)
if (diff >= MAX_SYNCOOKIE_AGE)
return (__u32)-1;
return (cookie -
@ -125,8 +117,7 @@ u32 __cookie_v6_init_sequence(const struct ipv6hdr *iph,
*mssp = msstab[mssind];
return secure_tcp_syn_cookie(&iph->saddr, &iph->daddr, th->source,
th->dest, ntohl(th->seq),
jiffies / (HZ * 60), mssind);
th->dest, ntohl(th->seq), mssind);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cookie_v6_init_sequence);
@ -146,8 +137,7 @@ int __cookie_v6_check(const struct ipv6hdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th,
{
__u32 seq = ntohl(th->seq) - 1;
__u32 mssind = check_tcp_syn_cookie(cookie, &iph->saddr, &iph->daddr,
th->source, th->dest, seq,
jiffies / (HZ * 60), COUNTER_TRIES);
th->source, th->dest, seq);
return mssind < ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) ? msstab[mssind] : 0;
}