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Bluetooth: Fix ignoring unknown SMP authentication requirement bits 

The SMP specification states that we should ignore any unknown bits from
the authentication requirement. We already have a define for masking out
unknown bits but we haven't used it in all places so far. This patch
adds usage of the AUTH_REQ_MASK to all places that need it and ensures
that we don't pass unknown bits onward to other functions.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
This commit is contained in:
Johan Hedberg 2014-09-10 17:37:42 -07:00 committed by Marcel Holtmann
parent 3a7dbfb8ff
commit c05b9339c8
1 changed files with 13 additions and 9 deletions
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22
net/bluetooth/smp.c
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@ -949,8 +949,11 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (!smp)
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
/* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
(req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
(auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
SMP_DISALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ);
@ -959,9 +962,6 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
/* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
auth = req->auth_req;
sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level)
conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
@ -1024,6 +1024,8 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
/* If we need MITM check that it can be acheived */
if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
u8 method;
@ -1044,7 +1046,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
*/
smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
auth = (req->auth_req | rsp->auth_req);
auth |= req->auth_req;
ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability);
if (ret)
@ -1160,7 +1162,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
struct smp_chan *smp;
u8 sec_level;
u8 sec_level, auth;
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
@ -1170,7 +1172,9 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(rp->auth_req);
auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level))
return 0;
@ -1185,13 +1189,13 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags) &&
(rp->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
(auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, rp->auth_req);
build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth);
smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));