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mac80211: minor code cleanups 

Nothing very interesting, some checkpatch inspired stuff,
some other things.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
This commit is contained in:
Johannes Berg 2008-10-07 12:04:32 +02:00 committed by John W. Linville
parent 36ff382d00
commit c6a1fa12d2
9 changed files with 45 additions and 52 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

6
net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c
View File

@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static ssize_t sta_agg_status_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n DTKN:");
for (i = 0; i < STA_TID_NUM; i++)
p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "%5d",
sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_rx[i]?
sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_rx[i] ?
sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_rx[i]->dialog_token : 0);
p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n TX :");
@ -148,13 +148,13 @@ static ssize_t sta_agg_status_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n DTKN:");
for (i = 0; i < STA_TID_NUM; i++)
p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "%5d",
sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_tx[i]?
sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_tx[i] ?
sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_tx[i]->dialog_token : 0);
p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n SSN :");
for (i = 0; i < STA_TID_NUM; i++)
p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "%5d",
sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_tx[i]?
sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_tx[i] ?
sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_tx[i]->ssn : 0);
p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n");

2
net/mac80211/main.c
View File

@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@ static int __init ieee80211_init(void)
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct ieee80211_tx_info) > sizeof(skb->cb));
BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct ieee80211_tx_info, driver_data) +
IEEE80211_TX_INFO_DRIVER_DATA_SIZE > sizeof(skb->cb));
IEEE80211_TX_INFO_DRIVER_DATA_SIZE > sizeof(skb->cb));
ret = rc80211_minstrel_init();
if (ret)

2
net/mac80211/mesh.c
View File

@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ static void ieee80211_mesh_rx_bcn_presp(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
size_t len,
struct ieee80211_rx_status *rx_status)
{
struct ieee80211_local *local= sdata->local;
struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
struct ieee802_11_elems elems;
struct ieee80211_channel *channel;
u64 supp_rates = 0;

2
net/mac80211/rc80211_pid.h
View File

@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
/* Arithmetic right shift for positive and negative values for ISO C. */
#define RC_PID_DO_ARITH_RIGHT_SHIFT(x, y) \
(x) < 0 ? -((-(x)) >> (y)) : (x) >> (y)
((x) < 0 ? -((-(x)) >> (y)) : (x) >> (y))
enum rc_pid_event_type {
RC_PID_EVENT_TYPE_TX_STATUS,

24
net/mac80211/rx.c
View File

@ -26,10 +26,11 @@
#include "tkip.h"
#include "wme.h"
u8 ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder_buf(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
struct tid_ampdu_rx *tid_agg_rx,
struct sk_buff *skb, u16 mpdu_seq_num,
int bar_req);
static u8 ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder_buf(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
struct tid_ampdu_rx *tid_agg_rx,
struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 mpdu_seq_num,
int bar_req);
/*
* monitor mode reception
*
@ -1988,17 +1989,17 @@ static void __ieee80211_rx_handle_packet(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
static inline int seq_less(u16 sq1, u16 sq2)
{
return (((sq1 - sq2) & SEQ_MASK) > (SEQ_MODULO >> 1));
return ((sq1 - sq2) & SEQ_MASK) > (SEQ_MODULO >> 1);
}
static inline u16 seq_inc(u16 sq)
{
return ((sq + 1) & SEQ_MASK);
return (sq + 1) & SEQ_MASK;
}
static inline u16 seq_sub(u16 sq1, u16 sq2)
{
return ((sq1 - sq2) & SEQ_MASK);
return (sq1 - sq2) & SEQ_MASK;
}
@ -2006,10 +2007,11 @@ static inline u16 seq_sub(u16 sq1, u16 sq2)
* As it function blongs to Rx path it must be called with
* the proper rcu_read_lock protection for its flow.
*/
u8 ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder_buf(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
struct tid_ampdu_rx *tid_agg_rx,
struct sk_buff *skb, u16 mpdu_seq_num,
int bar_req)
static u8 ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder_buf(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
struct tid_ampdu_rx *tid_agg_rx,
struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 mpdu_seq_num,
int bar_req)
{
struct ieee80211_local *local = hw_to_local(hw);
struct ieee80211_rx_status status;

4
net/mac80211/sta_info.c
View File

@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ int sta_info_insert(struct sta_info *sta)
}
if (WARN_ON(compare_ether_addr(sta->sta.addr, sdata->dev->dev_addr) == 0 ||
is_multicast_ether_addr(sta->sta.addr))) {
is_multicast_ether_addr(sta->sta.addr))) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ void ieee80211_sta_expire(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
}
struct ieee80211_sta *ieee80211_find_sta(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
const u8 *addr)
const u8 *addr)
{
struct sta_info *sta = sta_info_get(hw_to_local(hw), addr);

26
net/mac80211/wep.c
View File

@ -49,17 +49,19 @@ void ieee80211_wep_free(struct ieee80211_local *local)
crypto_free_blkcipher(local->wep_rx_tfm);
}
static inline int ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(u32 iv, int keylen)
static inline bool ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(u32 iv, int keylen)
{
/* Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir have reported weaknesses in the
/*
* Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir have reported weaknesses in the
* key scheduling algorithm of RC4. At least IVs (KeyByte + 3,
* 0xff, N) can be used to speedup attacks, so avoid using them. */
* 0xff, N) can be used to speedup attacks, so avoid using them.
*/
if ((iv & 0xff00) == 0xff00) {
u8 B = (iv >> 16) & 0xff;
if (B >= 3 && B < 3 + keylen)
return 1;
return true;
}
return 0;
return false;
}
@ -268,7 +270,7 @@ int ieee80211_wep_decrypt(struct ieee80211_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb,
}
u8 * ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key)
bool ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key)
{
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
unsigned int hdrlen;
@ -276,16 +278,13 @@ u8 * ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key)
u32 iv;
if (!ieee80211_has_protected(hdr->frame_control))
return NULL;
return false;
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
ivpos = skb->data + hdrlen;
iv = (ivpos[0] << 16) | (ivpos[1] << 8) | ivpos[2];
if (ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(iv, key->conf.keylen))
return ivpos;
return NULL;
return ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(iv, key->conf.keylen);
}
ieee80211_rx_result
@ -329,6 +328,8 @@ static int wep_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_wep_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
int i;
ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
if (wep_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->skb) < 0) {
@ -337,9 +338,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_wep_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
}
if (tx->extra_frag) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < tx->num_extra_frag; i++) {
if (wep_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]) < 0) {
if (wep_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i])) {
I802_DEBUG_INC(tx->local->
tx_handlers_drop_wep);
return TX_DROP;

2
net/mac80211/wep.h
View File

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ int ieee80211_wep_encrypt(struct ieee80211_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct ieee80211_key *key);
int ieee80211_wep_decrypt(struct ieee80211_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct ieee80211_key *key);
u8 *ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key);
bool ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key);
ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_crypto_wep_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx);

29
net/mac80211/wpa.c
View File

@ -49,8 +49,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
!(tx->flags & IEEE80211_TX_FRAGMENTED) &&
!(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) &&
!wpa_test) {
/* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for Michael MIC
*/
/* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for MMIC */
return TX_CONTINUE;
}
@ -67,8 +66,6 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
#else
authenticator = 1;
#endif
/* At this point we know we're using ALG_TKIP. To get the MIC key
* we now will rely on the offset from the ieee80211_key_conf::key */
key_offset = authenticator ?
NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY :
NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY;
@ -91,9 +88,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
int authenticator = 1, wpa_test = 0;
/*
* No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it
*/
/* No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it */
if (rx->status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED)
return RX_CONTINUE;
@ -115,8 +110,6 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
#else
authenticator = 1;
#endif
/* At this point we know we're using ALG_TKIP. To get the MIC key
* we now will rely on the offset from the ieee80211_key_conf::key */
key_offset = authenticator ?
NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY :
NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY;
@ -201,6 +194,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
int i;
ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
@ -208,9 +202,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
return TX_DROP;
if (tx->extra_frag) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < tx->num_extra_frag; i++) {
if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]) < 0)
if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]))
return TX_DROP;
}
}
@ -348,7 +341,7 @@ static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id)
}
static inline int ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
{
pn[0] = hdr[7];
pn[1] = hdr[6];
@ -356,7 +349,6 @@ static inline int ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
pn[3] = hdr[4];
pn[4] = hdr[1];
pn[5] = hdr[0];
return (hdr[3] >> 6) & 0x03;
}
@ -371,7 +363,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
if ((tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) &&
!(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) {
/* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for CCMP "
/* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for CCMP
* header or MIC fields */
info->control.hw_key = &tx->key->conf;
return 0;
@ -424,6 +416,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
int i;
ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
@ -431,9 +424,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
return TX_DROP;
if (tx->extra_frag) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < tx->num_extra_frag; i++) {
if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]) < 0)
if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]))
return TX_DROP;
}
}
@ -465,7 +457,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
(rx->status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED))
return RX_CONTINUE;
(void) ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[rx->queue], CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) {
key->u.ccmp.replays++;
@ -480,9 +472,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
key->u.ccmp.tfm, key->u.ccmp.rx_crypto_buf,
skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN, data_len,
skb->data + skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN,
skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN)) {
skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
}
memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[rx->queue], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);