sctp: fix the processing for COOKIE_ECHO chunk

[ Upstream commit a64b341b8695e1c744dd972b39868371b4f68f83 ]

1. In closed state: in sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce():

  When asoc is NULL, making packet for abort will use chunk's vtag
  in sctp_ootb_pkt_new(). But when asoc exists, vtag from the chunk
  should be verified before using peer.i.init_tag to make packet
  for abort in sctp_ootb_pkt_new(), and just discard it if vtag is
  not correct.

2. In the other states: in sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook():

  asoc always exists, but duplicate cookie_echo's vtag will be
  handled by sctp_tietags_compare() and then take actions, so before
  that we only verify the vtag for the abort sent for invalid chunk
  length.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Xin Long 2021-10-20 07:42:44 -04:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 5fe74d5e4d
commit d6470c2200
1 changed files with 10 additions and 4 deletions

View File

@ -697,6 +697,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net,
struct sock *sk;
int error = 0;
if (asoc && !sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* If the packet is an OOTB packet which is temporarily on the
* control endpoint, respond with an ABORT.
*/
@ -711,7 +714,8 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net,
* in sctp_unpack_cookie().
*/
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
/* If the endpoint is not listening or if the number of associations
* on the TCP-style socket exceed the max backlog, respond with an
@ -2141,9 +2145,11 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook(
* enough for the chunk header. Cookie length verification is
* done later.
*/
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) {
if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc))
asoc = NULL;
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
/* "Decode" the chunk. We have no optional parameters so we
* are in good shape.