diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index 84c192da3e0b..1e334b248ff6 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -288,6 +288,9 @@ int bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *progs,
 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
 DECLARE_PER_CPU(int, bpf_prog_active);
 
+extern const struct file_operations bpf_map_fops;
+extern const struct file_operations bpf_prog_fops;
+
 #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _name) \
 	extern const struct bpf_prog_ops _name ## _prog_ops; \
 	extern const struct bpf_verifier_ops _name ## _verifier_ops;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 5cb56d06b48d..323be2473c4b 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ static ssize_t bpf_dummy_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
-static const struct file_operations bpf_map_fops = {
+const struct file_operations bpf_map_fops = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
 	.show_fdinfo	= bpf_map_show_fdinfo,
 #endif
@@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ static void bpf_prog_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *filp)
 }
 #endif
 
-static const struct file_operations bpf_prog_fops = {
+const struct file_operations bpf_prog_fops = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
 	.show_fdinfo	= bpf_prog_show_fdinfo,
 #endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 12cf7de8cbed..2e3a627fc0b1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1815,6 +1815,10 @@ static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 	return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid);
+#endif
+
 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
    access an inode in a given way.  Check access to the
    descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
@@ -1845,6 +1849,12 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 			goto out;
 	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+	rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+#endif
+
 	/* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
 	rc = 0;
 	if (av)
@@ -2165,6 +2175,12 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
 			return rc;
 	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+	rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+#endif
+
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
 
@@ -6288,6 +6304,39 @@ static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
 	return av;
 }
 
+/* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
+ * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf
+ * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
+ * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
+ * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
+ * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
+ * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
+ */
+static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid)
+{
+	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+	struct bpf_prog *prog;
+	struct bpf_map *map;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
+		map = file->private_data;
+		bpfsec = map->security;
+		ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+				   bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	} else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
+		prog = file->private_data;
+		bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
+		ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+				   BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
 {
 	u32 sid = current_sid();