Of the three uses of kref_set in the kernel:
One really should be kref_put as the code is letting go of a
reference,
Two really should be kref_init because the kref is being
initialised.
This suggests that making kref_set available encourages bad code.
So fix the three uses and remove kref_set completely.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
The ACPI dependency moved to the TPM, where it belongs. Although
IMA per-se does not require access to the bios measurement log,
verifying the IMA boot aggregate does, which requires ACPI.
This patch prereq's 'TPM: ACPI/PNP dependency removal'
http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/5/4/378.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Jean-Christophe Dubois <jcd@tribudubois.net>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The ACPI dependency moved to the TPM, where it belongs. Although
IMA per-se does not require access to the bios measurement log,
verifying the IMA boot aggregate does, which requires ACPI.
This patch prereq's 'TPM: ACPI/PNP dependency removal'
http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/5/4/378.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Jean-Christophe Dubois <jcd@tribudubois.net>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
As an example IMA emits a warning when it can't find a TPM chip:
"No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!"
This patch prefaces that message with IMA so we know what subsystem is
bypassing the TPM. Do this for all pr_info and pr_err messages.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
integrity_audit_msg() uses "integrity:" in the audit message. This
violates the (loosely defined) audit system requirements that everything be
a key=value pair and it doesn't provide additional information. This can
be obviously gleaned from the message type. Just drop it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Convert all of the places IMA calls audit_log_format with %s into
audit_log_untrusted_string(). This is going to cause them all to get
quoted, but it should make audit log injection harder.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
IMA policy load parser will reject any policies with a comment. This patch
will allow the parser to just ignore lines which start with a #. This is not
very robust. # can ONLY be used at the very beginning of a line. Inline
comments are not allowed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
IMA parser will fail if whitespace is used in any way other than a single
space. Using a tab or even using 2 spaces in a row will result in a policy
being rejected. This patch makes the kernel ignore whitespace a bit better.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Currently the ima policy load code will print what it doesn't understand
but really I think it should reject any policy it doesn't understand. This
patch makes it so!
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
ima_parse_rule currently sets entry->action = -1 and then later tests
if (entry->action == UNKNOWN). It is true that UNKNOWN == -1 but actually
setting it to UNKNOWN makes a lot more sense in case things change in the
future.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
IMA will accept rules which specify things twice and will only pay
attention to the last one. We should reject such rules.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Currently IMA will only accept one rule per write(). This patch allows IMA to
accept writes which contain multiple rules but only processes one rule per
write. \n is used as the delimiter between rules. IMA will return a short
write indicating that it only accepted up to the first \n.
This allows simple userspace utilities like cat to be used to load an IMA
policy instead of needing a special userspace utility that understood 'one
write per rule'
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
As noted by checkpatch.pl, __func__ should be used instead of gcc
specific __FUNCTION__.
Signed-off-by: H Hartley Sweeten <hsweeten@visionengravers.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
If radix_tree_preload is failed in ima_inode_alloc, we don't need
radix_tree_preload_end because kernel is alread preempt enabled
Signed-off-by: Xiaotian Feng <dfeng@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
With the movement of the ima hooks functions were renamed from *path* to
*file* since they always deal with struct file. This patch renames some of
the ima internal flags to make them consistent with the rest of the code.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
ima_path_check actually deals with files! call it ima_file_check instead.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
ima wants to create an inode information struct (iint) when inodes are
allocated. This means that at least the part of ima which does this
allocation (the allocation is filled with information later) should
before any inodes are created. To accomplish this we split the ima
initialization routine placing the kmem cache allocator inside a
security_initcall() function. Since this makes use of radix trees we also
need to make sure that is initialized before security_initcall().
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The "Untangling ima mess, part 2 with counters" patch messed
up the counters. Based on conversations with Al Viro, this patch
streamlines ima_path_check() by removing the counter maintaince.
The counters are now updated independently, from measuring the file,
in __dentry_open() and alloc_file() by calling ima_counts_get().
ima_path_check() is called from nfsd and do_filp_open().
It also did not measure all files that should have been measured.
Reason: ima_path_check() got bogus value passed as mask.
[AV: mea culpa]
[AV: add missing nfsd bits]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Limit the number of imbalance messages to once per filesystem type instead of
once per system boot. (it's actually slightly racy and could give you a
couple per fs, but this isn't a real issue)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Kill the 'update' argument of ima_path_check(), kill
dead code in ima.
Current rules: ima counters are bumped at the same time
when the file switches from put_filp() fodder to fput()
one. Which happens exactly in two places - alloc_file()
and __dentry_open(). Nothing else needs to do that at
all.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
ima_inode_free() has some funky #define just to confuse the crap out of me.
void ima_iint_delete(struct inode *inode)
and then things actually call ima_inode_free() and nothing calls
ima_iint_delete().
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
We currently have a lot of duplicated code around ima file counts. Clean
that all up.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
iints are supposed to be allocated when an inode is allocated (during
security_inode_alloc()) But we have code which will attempt to allocate
an iint during measurement calls. If we couldn't allocate the iint and we
cared, we should have died during security_inode_alloc(). Not make the
code more complex and less efficient.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
ima_inode_alloc returns 0 and 1, but the LSM hooks expects an errno.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
While running fsstress tests on the NFSv4 mounted ext3 and ext4
filesystem, the following call trace was generated on the nfs
server machine.
Replace GFP_KERNEL with GFP_NOFS in ima_iint_insert() to avoid a
potential deadlock.
=================================
[ INFO: inconsistent lock state ]
2.6.31-31.el6.x86_64 #1
---------------------------------
inconsistent {RECLAIM_FS-ON-W} -> {IN-RECLAIM_FS-W} usage.
kswapd2/75 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:
(jbd2_handle){+.+.?.}, at: [<ffffffff811edd5e>] jbd2_journal_start+0xfe/0x13f
{RECLAIM_FS-ON-W} state was registered at:
[<ffffffff81091e40>] mark_held_locks+0x65/0x99
[<ffffffff81091f31>] lockdep_trace_alloc+0xbd/0xf5
[<ffffffff81126fdd>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x40/0x185
[<ffffffff812344d7>] ima_iint_insert+0x3d/0xf1
[<ffffffff812345b0>] ima_inode_alloc+0x25/0x44
[<ffffffff811484ac>] inode_init_always+0xec/0x271
[<ffffffff81148682>] alloc_inode+0x51/0xa1
[<ffffffff81148700>] new_inode+0x2e/0x94
[<ffffffff811b2f08>] ext4_new_inode+0xb8/0xdc9
[<ffffffff811be611>] ext4_create+0xcf/0x175
[<ffffffff8113e2cd>] vfs_create+0x82/0xb8
[<ffffffff8113f337>] do_filp_open+0x32c/0x9ee
[<ffffffff811309b9>] do_sys_open+0x6c/0x12c
[<ffffffff81130adc>] sys_open+0x2e/0x44
[<ffffffff81011e42>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
irq event stamp: 90371
hardirqs last enabled at (90371): [<ffffffff8112708d>]
kmem_cache_alloc+0xf0/0x185
hardirqs last disabled at (90370): [<ffffffff81127026>]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x89/0x185
softirqs last enabled at (89492): [<ffffffff81068ecf>]
__do_softirq+0x1bf/0x1eb
softirqs last disabled at (89477): [<ffffffff8101312c>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
other info that might help us debug this:
2 locks held by kswapd2/75:
#0: (shrinker_rwsem){++++..}, at: [<ffffffff810f98ba>] shrink_slab+0x44/0x177
#1: (&type->s_umount_key#25){++++..}, at: [<ffffffff811450ba>]
Reported-by: Muni P. Beerakam <mbeeraka@in.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Amit K. Arora <amitarora@in.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Based on discussions on LKML and LSM, where there are consecutive
security_ and ima_ calls in the vfs layer, move the ima_ calls to
the existing security_ hooks.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Make all seq_operations structs const, to help mitigate against
revectoring user-triggerable function pointers.
This is derived from the grsecurity patch, although generated from scratch
because it's simpler than extracting the changes from there.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
- As ima_counts_put() may be called after the inode has been freed,
verify that the inode is not NULL, before dereferencing it.
- Maintain the IMA file counters in may_open() properly, decrementing
any counter increments on subsequent errors.
Reported-by: Ciprian Docan <docan@eden.rutgers.edu>
Reported-by: J.R. Okajima <hooanon05@yahoo.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
ima_counts_get() calls ima_iint_find_insert_get() which takes a reference
to the iint in question, but does not put that reference at the end of the
function. This can lead to a nasty memory leak. Easy enough to reproduce:
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main (void)
{
int i;
void *ptr;
for (i=0; i < 100000; i++) {
ptr = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
if (ptr == MAP_FAILED)
return 2;
munmap(ptr, 4096);
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Hashing files larger than INT_MAX causes process to loop.
Dependent on redefining kernel_read() offset type to loff_t.
(http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13909)
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch fixes an imbalance message as reported by J.R. Okajima.
The IMA file counters are incremented in ima_path_check. If the
actual open fails, such as ETXTBSY, decrement the counters to
prevent unnecessary imbalance messages.
Reported-by: J.R. Okajima <hooanon05@yahoo.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Until we start appraising measurements, the ima_path_check()
return code should always be 0.
- Update the ima_path_check() return code comment
- Instead of the pr_info, audit the dentry_open failure
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
- Add support in ima_path_check() for integrity checking without
incrementing the counts. (Required for nfsd.)
- rename and export opencount_get to ima_counts_get
- replace ima_shm_check calls with ima_counts_get
- export ima_path_check
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
A number of IMA functions only used during init are not marked with __init.
Add those notations so they are freed automatically.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The IMA TCB policy is dangerous. A normal use can use all of a system's
memory (which cannot be freed) simply by building and running lots of
executables. The TCB policy is also nearly useless because logging in as root
often causes a policy violation when dealing with utmp, thus rendering the
measurements meaningless.
There is no good fix for this in the kernel. A full TCB policy would need to
be loaded in userspace using LSM rule matching to get both a protected and
useful system. But, if too little is measured before userspace can load a real
policy one again ends up with a meaningless set of measurements. One option
would be to put the policy load inside the initrd in order to get it early
enough in the boot sequence to be useful, but this runs into trouble with the
LSM. For IMA to measure the LSM policy and the LSM policy loading mechanism
it needs rules to do so, but we already talked about problems with defaulting
to such broad rules....
IMA also depends on the files being measured to be on an FS which implements
and supports i_version. Since the only FS with this support (ext4) doesn't
even use it by default it seems silly to have any IMA rules by default.
This should reduce the performance overhead of IMA to near 0 while still
letting users who choose to configure their machine as such to inclue the
ima_tcb kernel paramenter and get measurements during boot before they can
load a customized, reasonable policy in userspace.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The selinuxfs superblock magic is used inside the IMA code, but is being
defined in two places and could someday get out of sync. This patch moves the
declaration into magic.h so it is only done once.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The IMA default policy measures every single file opened by root. This is
terrible for most users. Consider a system (like mine) with virtual machine
images. When those images are touched (which happens at boot for me) those
images are measured. This is just way too much for the default case.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The IMA policy file does not implement read. Trying to just open/read/close
the file will load a blank policy and you cannot then change the policy
without a reboot. This removes the read permission from the file so one must
at least be attempting to write...
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
If IMA tried to measure a file which was larger than 4G dentry_open would fail
with -EOVERFLOW since IMA wasn't passing O_LARGEFILE. This patch passes
O_LARGEFILE to all IMA opens to avoid this problem.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Currently IMA does not handle failures from dentry_open(). This means that we
leave a pointer set to ERR_PTR(errno) and then try to use it just a few lines
later in fput(). Oops.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Proper invocation of the current credentials is to use current_cred() not
current->cred. This patches makes IMA use the new method.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
NeilBrown