Commit Graph

20 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Al Viro 35cf7ba0b4 Bury __put_super_and_need_restart()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-05-21 18:31:16 -04:00
Al Viro 47cd813f29 Take vfsmount_lock to fs/internal.h
no more users left outside of fs/*.c (and very few outside of
fs/namespace.c, actually)

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-03-03 14:07:59 -05:00
Al Viro 482928d59d Fix f_flags/f_mode in case of lookup_instantiate_filp() from open(pathname, 3)
Just set f_flags when shoving struct file into nameidata; don't
postpone that until __dentry_open().  do_filp_open() has correct
value; lookup_instantiate_filp() doesn't - we lose the difference
between O_RDWR and 3 by that point.

We still set .intent.open.flags, so no fs code needs to be changed.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-12-22 12:27:34 -05:00
Eric Paris e81e3f4dca fs: move get_empty_filp() deffinition to internal.h
All users outside of fs/ of get_empty_filp() have been removed.  This patch
moves the definition from the include/ directory to internal.h so no new
users crop up and removes the EXPORT_SYMBOL.  I'd love to see open intents
stop using it too, but that's a problem for another day and a smarter
developer!

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-12-16 12:16:45 -05:00
Vegard Nossum eca6f534e6 fs: fix overflow in sys_mount() for in-kernel calls
sys_mount() reads/copies a whole page for its "type" parameter.  When
do_mount_root() passes a kernel address that points to an object which is
smaller than a whole page, copy_mount_options() will happily go past this
memory object, possibly dereferencing "wild" pointers that could be in any
state (hence the kmemcheck warning, which shows that parts of the next
page are not even allocated).

(The likelihood of something going wrong here is pretty low -- first of
all this only applies to kernel calls to sys_mount(), which are mostly
found in the boot code.  Secondly, I guess if the page was not mapped,
exact_copy_from_user() _would_ in fact handle it correctly because of its
access_ok(), etc.  checks.)

But it is much nicer to avoid the dubious reads altogether, by stopping as
soon as we find a NUL byte.  Is there a good reason why we can't do
something like this, using the already existing strndup_from_user()?

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make copy_mount_string() static]
[AV: fix compat mount breakage, which involves undoing akpm's change above]

Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: al <al@dizzy.pdmi.ras.ru>
2009-09-24 08:40:15 -04:00
Al Viro 62c6943b4b Trim a bit of crap from fs.h
do_remount_sb() is fs/internal.h fodder, fsync_no_super() is long gone.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-06-11 21:36:07 -04:00
Jan Kara 5cee5815d1 vfs: Make sys_sync() use fsync_super() (version 4)
It is unnecessarily fragile to have two places (fsync_super() and do_sync())
doing data integrity sync of the filesystem. Alter __fsync_super() to
accommodate needs of both callers and use it. So after this patch
__fsync_super() is the only place where we gather all the calls needed to
properly send all data on a filesystem to disk.

Nice bonus is that we get a complete livelock avoidance and write_supers()
is now only used for periodic writeback of superblocks.

sync_blockdevs() introduced a couple of patches ago is gone now.

[build fixes folded]

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-06-11 21:36:03 -04:00
Jan Kara 5a3e5cb8e0 vfs: Fix sys_sync() and fsync_super() reliability (version 4)
So far, do_sync() called:
  sync_inodes(0);
  sync_supers();
  sync_filesystems(0);
  sync_filesystems(1);
  sync_inodes(1);

This ordering makes it kind of hard for filesystems as sync_inodes(0) need not
submit all the IO (for example it skips inodes with I_SYNC set) so e.g. forcing
transaction to disk in ->sync_fs() is not really enough. Therefore sys_sync has
not been completely reliable on some filesystems (ext3, ext4, reiserfs, ocfs2
and others are hit by this) when racing e.g. with background writeback. A
similar problem hits also other filesystems (e.g. ext2) because of
write_supers() being called before the sync_inodes(1).

Change the ordering of calls in do_sync() - this requires a new function
sync_blockdevs() to preserve the property that block devices are always synced
after write_super() / sync_fs() call.

The same issue is fixed in __fsync_super() function used on umount /
remount read-only.

[AV: build fixes]

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-06-11 21:36:03 -04:00
npiggin@suse.de 864d7c4c06 fs: move mark_files_ro into file_table.c
This function walks the s_files lock, and operates primarily on the
files in a superblock, so it better belongs here (eg. see also
fs_may_remount_ro).

[AV: ... and it shouldn't be static after that move]

Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-06-11 21:36:02 -04:00
Al Viro 498052bba5 New locking/refcounting for fs_struct
* all changes of current->fs are done under task_lock and write_lock of
  old fs->lock
* refcount is not atomic anymore (same protection)
* its decrements are done when removing reference from current; at the
  same time we decide whether to free it.
* put_fs_struct() is gone
* new field - ->in_exec.  Set by check_unsafe_exec() if we are trying to do
  execve() and only subthreads share fs_struct.  Cleared when finishing exec
  (success and failure alike).  Makes CLONE_FS fail with -EAGAIN if set.
* check_unsafe_exec() may fail with -EAGAIN if another execve() from subthread
  is in progress.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-03-31 23:00:26 -04:00
Al Viro 3e93cd6718 Take fs_struct handling to new file (fs/fs_struct.c)
Pure code move; two new helper functions for nfsd and daemonize
(unshare_fs_struct() and daemonize_fs_struct() resp.; for now -
the same code as used to be in callers).  unshare_fs_struct()
exported (for nfsd, as copy_fs_struct()/exit_fs() used to be),
copy_fs_struct() and exit_fs() don't need exports anymore.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-03-31 23:00:26 -04:00
Hugh Dickins e426b64c41 fix setuid sometimes doesn't
Joe Malicki reports that setuid sometimes doesn't: very rarely,
a setuid root program does not get root euid; and, by the way,
they have a health check running lsof every few minutes.

Right, check_unsafe_exec() notes whether the files_struct is being
shared by more threads than will get killed by the exec, and if so
sets LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE to make bprm_set_creds() careful about euid.
But /proc/<pid>/fd and /proc/<pid>/fdinfo lookups make transient
use of get_files_struct(), which also raises that sharing count.

There's a rather simple fix for this: exec's check on files->count
has been redundant ever since 2.6.1 made it unshare_files() (except
while compat_do_execve() omitted to do so) - just remove that check.

[Note to -stable: this patch will not apply before 2.6.29: earlier
releases should just remove the files->count line from unsafe_exec().]

Reported-by: Joe Malicki <jmalicki@metacarta.com>
Narrowed-down-by: Michael Itz <mitz@metacarta.com>
Tested-by: Joe Malicki <jmalicki@metacarta.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-28 17:30:00 -07:00
David Howells 0bf2f3aec5 CRED: Fix SUID exec regression
The patch:

	commit a6f76f23d2
	CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials

moved the place in which the 'safeness' of a SUID/SGID exec was performed to
before de_thread() was called.  This means that LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE is now
calculated incorrectly.  This flag is set if any of the usage counts for
fs_struct, files_struct and sighand_struct are greater than 1 at the time the
determination is made.  All of which are true for threads created by the
pthread library.

However, since we wish to make the security calculation before irrevocably
damaging the process so that we can return it an error code in the case where
we decide we want to reject the exec request on this basis, we have to make the
determination before calling de_thread().

So, instead, we count up the number of threads (CLONE_THREAD) that are sharing
our fs_struct (CLONE_FS), files_struct (CLONE_FILES) and sighand_structs
(CLONE_SIGHAND/CLONE_THREAD) with us.  These will be killed by de_thread() and
so can be discounted by check_unsafe_exec().

We do have to be careful because CLONE_THREAD does not imply FS or FILES.

We _assume_ that there will be no extra references to these structs held by the
threads we're going to kill.

This can be tested with the attached pair of programs.  Build the two programs
using the Makefile supplied, and run ./test1 as a non-root user.  If
successful, you should see something like:

	[dhowells@andromeda tmp]$ ./test1
	--TEST1--
	uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043
	exec ./test2
	--TEST2--
	uid=4043, euid=0 suid=0
	SUCCESS - Correct effective user ID

and if unsuccessful, something like:

	[dhowells@andromeda tmp]$ ./test1
	--TEST1--
	uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043
	exec ./test2
	--TEST2--
	uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043
	ERROR - Incorrect effective user ID!

The non-root user ID you see will depend on the user you run as.

[test1.c]
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <pthread.h>

static void *thread_func(void *arg)
{
	while (1) {}
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	pthread_t tid;
	uid_t uid, euid, suid;

	printf("--TEST1--\n");
	getresuid(&uid, &euid, &suid);
	printf("uid=%d, euid=%d suid=%d\n", uid, euid, suid);

	if (pthread_create(&tid, NULL, thread_func, NULL) < 0) {
		perror("pthread_create");
		exit(1);
	}

	printf("exec ./test2\n");
	execlp("./test2", "test2", NULL);
	perror("./test2");
	_exit(1);
}

[test2.c]
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	uid_t uid, euid, suid;

	getresuid(&uid, &euid, &suid);
	printf("--TEST2--\n");
	printf("uid=%d, euid=%d suid=%d\n", uid, euid, suid);

	if (euid != 0) {
		fprintf(stderr, "ERROR - Incorrect effective user ID!\n");
		exit(1);
	}
	printf("SUCCESS - Correct effective user ID\n");
	exit(0);
}

[Makefile]
CFLAGS = -D_GNU_SOURCE -Wall -Werror -Wunused
all: test1 test2

test1: test1.c
	gcc $(CFLAGS) -o test1 test1.c -lpthread

test2: test2.c
	gcc $(CFLAGS) -o test2 test2.c
	sudo chown root.root test2
	sudo chmod +s test2

Reported-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-07 08:46:18 +11:00
David Howells a6f76f23d2 CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials
Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set
up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point
of no return.

This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.

This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:

 (1) execve().

     The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part,
     replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred).  This means that
     all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point
     of no return with no possibility of failure.

     I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with:

	cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective)

     but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1
     (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd
     be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()).

     The following sequence of events now happens:

     (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is
     	 locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of
     	 creds that we make.

     (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current
     	 task's credentials and prepare it.  This copy is then assigned to
     	 bprm->cred.

  	 This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free()
     	 unnecessary, and so they've been removed.

     (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately
     	 after (a) rather than later on in the code.  The result is stored in
     	 bprm->unsafe for future reference.

     (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times.

     	 (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds
     	     attached to bprm->cred.  Personality bit clearance is recorded,
     	     but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet
     	     fail.

         (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds().  This should
	     calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred.

	     This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of
	     security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed).
	     Anything that might fail must be done at this point.

         (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1.

	     bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security
	     calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes.  This allows SELinux
	     in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and
	     not on the interpreter.

     (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution.  This
     	 performs the following steps with regard to credentials:

	 (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that
	     may not be covered by commit_creds().

         (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from
             (c.i).

     (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the
     	 new credentials.  This performs the following steps with regard to
     	 credentials:

         (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security
             requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that
             must be done before the credentials are changed.

	     This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and
	     security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed.
	     This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail
	     must have been done in (c.ii).

         (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single
             assignment (more or less).  Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable
             should be part of struct creds.

	 (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing
	     PTRACE_ATTACH to take place.

         (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding
             are now immutable.

         (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security
             alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed.
             SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers.

     (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds()
     	 to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock
     	 cred_replace_mutex.  No changes to the credentials will have been
     	 made.

 (2) LSM interface.

     A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:

     (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security()
     (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security()

     	 Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those.

     (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
     (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds()

     	 Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(),
     	 security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds().

     (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security()

     	 Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds().

     (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds()

     	 New.  The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up
     	 as appropriate.  bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the
     	 second and subsequent calls.

     (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds()
     (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds()

     	 New.  Apply the security effects of the new credentials.  This
     	 includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux.  This function may not
     	 fail.  When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied
     	 to the process; when the latter is called, they have.

 	 The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not.

 (3) SELinux.

     SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
     interface changes mentioned above:

     (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using
     	 the credentials-under-construction approach.

     (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on
     	 to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open().

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:24 +11:00
Al Viro 6d59e7f582 [PATCH] move a bunch of declarations to fs/internal.h
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-21 23:11:01 -04:00
Christoph Hellwig 6272e26679 cleanup compat ioctl handling
Merge all compat ioctl handling into compat_ioctl.c instead of splitting it
over compat.c and compat_ioctl.c.  This also allows to get rid of ioctl32.h

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Looks-good-to: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 11:15:09 -07:00
Andrew Morton 5e6d12b2c8 [PATCH] CONFIG_BLOCK internal.h cleanups
- forward declare struct superblock
- use inlines, not macros

Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2006-09-30 20:52:32 +02:00
David Howells 9361401eb7 [PATCH] BLOCK: Make it possible to disable the block layer [try #6]
Make it possible to disable the block layer.  Not all embedded devices require
it, some can make do with just JFFS2, NFS, ramfs, etc - none of which require
the block layer to be present.

This patch does the following:

 (*) Introduces CONFIG_BLOCK to disable the block layer, buffering and blockdev
     support.

 (*) Adds dependencies on CONFIG_BLOCK to any configuration item that controls
     an item that uses the block layer.  This includes:

     (*) Block I/O tracing.

     (*) Disk partition code.

     (*) All filesystems that are block based, eg: Ext3, ReiserFS, ISOFS.

     (*) The SCSI layer.  As far as I can tell, even SCSI chardevs use the
     	 block layer to do scheduling.  Some drivers that use SCSI facilities -
     	 such as USB storage - end up disabled indirectly from this.

     (*) Various block-based device drivers, such as IDE and the old CDROM
     	 drivers.

     (*) MTD blockdev handling and FTL.

     (*) JFFS - which uses set_bdev_super(), something it could avoid doing by
     	 taking a leaf out of JFFS2's book.

 (*) Makes most of the contents of linux/blkdev.h, linux/buffer_head.h and
     linux/elevator.h contingent on CONFIG_BLOCK being set.  sector_div() is,
     however, still used in places, and so is still available.

 (*) Also made contingent are the contents of linux/mpage.h, linux/genhd.h and
     parts of linux/fs.h.

 (*) Makes a number of files in fs/ contingent on CONFIG_BLOCK.

 (*) Makes mm/bounce.c (bounce buffering) contingent on CONFIG_BLOCK.

 (*) set_page_dirty() doesn't call __set_page_dirty_buffers() if CONFIG_BLOCK
     is not enabled.

 (*) fs/no-block.c is created to hold out-of-line stubs and things that are
     required when CONFIG_BLOCK is not set:

     (*) Default blockdev file operations (to give error ENODEV on opening).

 (*) Makes some /proc changes:

     (*) /proc/devices does not list any blockdevs.

     (*) /proc/diskstats and /proc/partitions are contingent on CONFIG_BLOCK.

 (*) Makes some compat ioctl handling contingent on CONFIG_BLOCK.

 (*) If CONFIG_BLOCK is not defined, makes sys_quotactl() return -ENODEV if
     given command other than Q_SYNC or if a special device is specified.

 (*) In init/do_mounts.c, no reference is made to the blockdev routines if
     CONFIG_BLOCK is not defined.  This does not prohibit NFS roots or JFFS2.

 (*) The bdflush, ioprio_set and ioprio_get syscalls can now be absent (return
     error ENOSYS by way of cond_syscall if so).

 (*) The seclvl_bd_claim() and seclvl_bd_release() security calls do nothing if
     CONFIG_BLOCK is not set, since they can't then happen.

Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2006-09-30 20:52:31 +02:00
David Howells 7b0de42d7c [PATCH] BLOCK: Remove dependence on existence of blockdev_superblock [try #6]
Move blockdev_superblock extern declaration from fs/fs-writeback.c to a
headerfile and remove the dependence on it by wrapping it in a macro.

Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2006-09-30 20:52:26 +02:00
David Howells 07f3f05c1e [PATCH] BLOCK: Move extern declarations out of fs/*.c into header files [try #6]
Create a new header file, fs/internal.h, for common definitions local to the
sources in the fs/ directory.

Move extern definitions that should be in header files from fs/*.c to
fs/internal.h or other main header files where they span directories.

Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2006-09-30 20:52:18 +02:00