Commit Graph

572 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
James Morris f65cc104c4 Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next 2017-04-19 22:00:15 +10:00
Mat Martineau 2b6aa412ff KEYS: Use structure to capture key restriction function and data
Replace struct key's restrict_link function pointer with a pointer to
the new struct key_restriction. The structure contains pointers to the
restriction function as well as relevant data for evaluating the
restriction.

The garbage collector checks restrict_link->keytype when key types are
unregistered. Restrictions involving a removed key type are converted
to use restrict_link_reject so that restrictions cannot be removed by
unregistering key types.

Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
2017-04-04 14:10:10 -07:00
Mikhail Kurinnoi 3dd0c8d065 ima: provide ">" and "<" operators for fowner/uid/euid rules.
For now we have only "=" operator for fowner/uid/euid rules. This
patch provide two more operators - ">" and "<" in order to make
fowner/uid/euid rules more flexible.

Examples of usage.

 Appraise all files owned by special and system users (SYS_UID_MAX 999):
    appraise fowner<1000
 Don't appraise files owned by normal users (UID_MIN 1000):
    dont_appraise fowner>999
 Appraise all files owned by users with UID 1000-1010:
    dont_appraise fowner>1010
    appraise fowner>999

Changelog v3:
- Removed code duplication in ima_parse_rule().
- Fix ima_policy_show() - (Mimi)

Changelog v2:
- Fixed default policy rules.

Signed-off-by: Mikhail Kurinnoi <viewizard@viewizard.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 115 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 87 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
2017-03-13 07:01:24 -04:00
Daniel Glöckner 1ac202e978 ima: accept previously set IMA_NEW_FILE
Modifying the attributes of a file makes ima_inode_post_setattr reset
the IMA cache flags. So if the file, which has just been created,
is opened a second time before the first file descriptor is closed,
verification fails since the security.ima xattr has not been written
yet. We therefore have to look at the IMA_NEW_FILE even if the file
already existed.

With this patch there should no longer be an error when cat tries to
open testfile:

$ rm -f testfile
$ ( echo test >&3 ; touch testfile ; cat testfile ) 3>testfile

A file being new is no reason to accept that it is missing a digital
signature demanded by the policy.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Glöckner <dg@emlix.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-03-07 07:06:10 -05:00
James Morris bad4417b69 integrity: mark default IMA rules as __ro_after_init
The default IMA rules are loaded during init and then do not
change, so mark them as __ro_after_init.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-03-06 19:08:57 -05:00
Ingo Molnar 50d34394ce sched/headers: Prepare to remove the <linux/magic.h> include from <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
Update files that depend on the magic.h inclusion.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-02 08:42:40 +01:00
Lans Zhang 20f482ab9e ima: allow to check MAY_APPEND
Otherwise some mask and inmask tokens with MAY_APPEND flag may not work
as expected.

Signed-off-by: Lans Zhang <jia.zhang@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-01-27 14:17:21 -05:00
Mimi Zohar bc15ed663e ima: fix ima_d_path() possible race with rename
On failure to return a pathname from ima_d_path(), a pointer to
dname is returned, which is subsequently used in the IMA measurement
list, the IMA audit records, and other audit logging.  Saving the
pointer to dname for later use has the potential to race with rename.

Intead of returning a pointer to dname on failure, this patch returns
a pointer to a copy of the filename.

Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2017-01-27 14:16:02 -05:00
Andreas Steffen 98e1d55d03 ima: platform-independent hash value
For remote attestion it is important for the ima measurement values to
be platform-independent.  Therefore integer fields to be hashed must be
converted to canonical format.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480554346-29071-11-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Sklar <sklar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-12-20 09:48:46 -08:00
Mimi Zohar d68a6fe9fc ima: define a canonical binary_runtime_measurements list format
The IMA binary_runtime_measurements list is currently in platform native
format.

To allow restoring a measurement list carried across kexec with a
different endianness than the targeted kernel, this patch defines
little-endian as the canonical format.  For big endian systems wanting
to save/restore the measurement list from a system with a different
endianness, a new boot command line parameter named "ima_canonical_fmt"
is defined.

Considerations: use of the "ima_canonical_fmt" boot command line option
will break existing userspace applications on big endian systems
expecting the binary_runtime_measurements list to be in platform native
format.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480554346-29071-10-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org>
Cc: Josh Sklar <sklar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-12-20 09:48:45 -08:00
Mimi Zohar c7d0936770 ima: support restoring multiple template formats
The configured IMA measurement list template format can be replaced at
runtime on the boot command line, including a custom template format.
This patch adds support for restoring a measuremement list containing
multiple builtin/custom template formats.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480554346-29071-9-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org>
Cc: Josh Sklar <sklar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-12-20 09:48:45 -08:00
Mimi Zohar 3f23d624de ima: store the builtin/custom template definitions in a list
The builtin and single custom templates are currently stored in an
array.  In preparation for being able to restore a measurement list
containing multiple builtin/custom templates, this patch stores the
builtin and custom templates as a linked list.  This will permit
defining more than one custom template per boot.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480554346-29071-8-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org>
Cc: Josh Sklar <sklar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-12-20 09:48:45 -08:00
Mimi Zohar 7b8589cc29 ima: on soft reboot, save the measurement list
The TPM PCRs are only reset on a hard reboot.  In order to validate a
TPM's quote after a soft reboot (eg.  kexec -e), the IMA measurement
list of the running kernel must be saved and restored on boot.

This patch uses the kexec buffer passing mechanism to pass the
serialized IMA binary_runtime_measurements to the next kernel.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480554346-29071-7-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org>
Cc: Josh Sklar <sklar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-12-20 09:48:44 -08:00
Mimi Zohar d158847ae8 ima: maintain memory size needed for serializing the measurement list
In preparation for serializing the binary_runtime_measurements, this
patch maintains the amount of memory required.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480554346-29071-5-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org>
Cc: Josh Sklar <sklar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-12-20 09:48:44 -08:00
Mimi Zohar dcfc56937b ima: permit duplicate measurement list entries
Measurements carried across kexec need to be added to the IMA
measurement list, but should not prevent measurements of the newly
booted kernel from being added to the measurement list.  This patch adds
support for allowing duplicate measurements.

The "boot_aggregate" measurement entry is the delimiter between soft
boots.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480554346-29071-4-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org>
Cc: Josh Sklar <sklar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-12-20 09:48:43 -08:00
Mimi Zohar 94c3aac567 ima: on soft reboot, restore the measurement list
The TPM PCRs are only reset on a hard reboot.  In order to validate a
TPM's quote after a soft reboot (eg.  kexec -e), the IMA measurement
list of the running kernel must be saved and restored on boot.  This
patch restores the measurement list.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480554346-29071-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org>
Cc: Josh Sklar <sklar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-12-20 09:48:43 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 412ac77a9d Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
 "After a lot of discussion and work we have finally reachanged a basic
  understanding of what is necessary to make unprivileged mounts safe in
  the presence of EVM and IMA xattrs which the last commit in this
  series reflects. While technically it is a revert the comments it adds
  are important for people not getting confused in the future. Clearing
  up that confusion allows us to seriously work on unprivileged mounts
  of fuse in the next development cycle.

  The rest of the fixes in this set are in the intersection of user
  namespaces, ptrace, and exec. I started with the first fix which
  started a feedback cycle of finding additional issues during review
  and fixing them. Culiminating in a fix for a bug that has been present
  since at least Linux v1.0.

  Potentially these fixes were candidates for being merged during the rc
  cycle, and are certainly backport candidates but enough little things
  turned up during review and testing that I decided they should be
  handled as part of the normal development process just to be certain
  there were not any great surprises when it came time to backport some
  of these fixes"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  Revert "evm: Translate user/group ids relative to s_user_ns when computing HMAC"
  exec: Ensure mm->user_ns contains the execed files
  ptrace: Don't allow accessing an undumpable mm
  ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP
  mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace permission checks
2016-12-14 14:09:48 -08:00
Eric W. Biederman 19339c2516 Revert "evm: Translate user/group ids relative to s_user_ns when computing HMAC"
This reverts commit 0b3c9761d1.

Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> writes:
> All right, I think 0b3c9761d1 should be
> reverted then. EVM is a machine-local integrity mechanism, and so it
> makes sense that the signature would be based on the kernel's notion of
> the uid and not the filesystem's.

I added a commment explaining why the EVM hmac needs to be in the
kernel's notion of uid and gid, not the filesystems to prevent
remounting the filesystem and gaining unwaranted trust in files.

Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-12-02 20:58:41 -06:00
Seth Forshee b4bfec7f4a security/integrity: Harden against malformed xattrs
In general the handling of IMA/EVM xattrs is good, but I found
a few locations where either the xattr size or the value of the
type field in the xattr are not checked. Add a few simple checks
to these locations to prevent malformed or malicious xattrs from
causing problems.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-11-13 22:50:11 -05:00
Mimi Zohar 064be15c52 ima: include the reason for TPM-bypass mode
This patch includes the reason for going into TPM-bypass mode
and not using the TPM.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar (zohar@linux.vnet.ibm>
2016-11-13 22:50:09 -05:00
Mimi Zohar f5acb3dcba Revert "ima: limit file hash setting by user to fix and log modes"
Userspace applications have been modified to write security xattrs,
but they are not context aware.  In the case of security.ima, the
security xattr can be either a file hash or a file signature.
Permitting writing one, but not the other requires the application to
be context aware.

In addition, userspace applications might write files to a staging
area, which might not be in policy, and then change some file metadata
(eg. owner) making it in policy.  As a result, these files are not
labeled properly.

This reverts commit c68ed80c97, which
prevents writing file hashes as security.ima xattrs.

Requested-by: Patrick Ohly <patrick.ohly@intel.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-11-13 22:50:09 -05:00
Eric Richter 9a11a18902 ima: fix memory leak in ima_release_policy
When the "policy" securityfs file is opened for read, it is opened as a
sequential file. However, when it is eventually released, there is no
cleanup for the sequential file, therefore some memory is leaked.

This patch adds a call to seq_release() in ima_release_policy() to clean up
the memory when the file is opened for read.

Fixes: 80eae209d6 IMA: allow reading back the current policy
Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-11-13 22:50:08 -05:00
Linus Torvalds 97d2116708 Merge branch 'work.xattr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs xattr updates from Al Viro:
 "xattr stuff from Andreas

  This completes the switch to xattr_handler ->get()/->set() from
  ->getxattr/->setxattr/->removexattr"

* 'work.xattr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  vfs: Remove {get,set,remove}xattr inode operations
  xattr: Stop calling {get,set,remove}xattr inode operations
  vfs: Check for the IOP_XATTR flag in listxattr
  xattr: Add __vfs_{get,set,remove}xattr helpers
  libfs: Use IOP_XATTR flag for empty directory handling
  vfs: Use IOP_XATTR flag for bad-inode handling
  vfs: Add IOP_XATTR inode operations flag
  vfs: Move xattr_resolve_name to the front of fs/xattr.c
  ecryptfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers
  sockfs: Get rid of getxattr iop
  sockfs: getxattr: Fail with -EOPNOTSUPP for invalid attribute names
  kernfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers
  hfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers
  jffs2: Remove jffs2_{get,set,remove}xattr macros
  xattr: Remove unnecessary NULL attribute name check
2016-10-10 17:11:50 -07:00
Andreas Gruenbacher 5d6c31910b xattr: Add __vfs_{get,set,remove}xattr helpers
Right now, various places in the kernel check for the existence of
getxattr, setxattr, and removexattr inode operations and directly call
those operations.  Switch to helper functions and test for the IOP_XATTR
flag instead.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-10-07 20:10:44 -04:00
Miklos Szeredi e71b9dff06 ima: use file_dentry()
Ima tries to call ->setxattr() on overlayfs dentry after having locked
underlying inode, which results in a deadlock.

Reported-by: Krisztian Litkey <kli@iki.fi>
Fixes: 4bacc9c923 ("overlayfs: Make f_path always point to the overlay and f_inode to the underlay")
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-09-16 12:44:20 +02:00
Linus Torvalds 7a1e8b80fb Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

   - TPM core and driver updates/fixes
   - IPv6 security labeling (CALIPSO)
   - Lots of Apparmor fixes
   - Seccomp: remove 2-phase API, close hole where ptrace can change
     syscall #"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (156 commits)
  apparmor: fix SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT parameter handling
  tpm: Add TPM 2.0 support to the Nuvoton i2c driver (NPCT6xx family)
  tpm: Factor out common startup code
  tpm: use devm_add_action_or_reset
  tpm2_i2c_nuvoton: add irq validity check
  tpm: read burstcount from TPM_STS in one 32-bit transaction
  tpm: fix byte-order for the value read by tpm2_get_tpm_pt
  tpm_tis_core: convert max timeouts from msec to jiffies
  apparmor: fix arg_size computation for when setprocattr is null terminated
  apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
  apparmor: do not expose kernel stack
  apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked
  apparmor: fix oops in profile_unpack() when policy_db is not present
  apparmor: don't check for vmalloc_addr if kvzalloc() failed
  apparmor: add missing id bounds check on dfa verification
  apparmor: allow SYS_CAP_RESOURCE to be sufficient to prlimit another task
  apparmor: use list_next_entry instead of list_entry_next
  apparmor: fix refcount race when finding a child profile
  apparmor: fix ref count leak when profile sha1 hash is read
  apparmor: check that xindex is in trans_table bounds
  ...
2016-07-29 17:38:46 -07:00
Seth Forshee 0b3c9761d1 evm: Translate user/group ids relative to s_user_ns when computing HMAC
The EVM HMAC should be calculated using the on disk user and
group ids, so the k[ug]ids in the inode must be translated
relative to the s_user_ns of the inode's super block.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-07-05 15:13:10 -05:00
Eric Richter 544e1cea03 ima: extend the measurement entry specific pcr
Extend the PCR supplied as a parameter, instead of assuming that the
measurement entry uses the default configured PCR.

Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-06-30 01:14:22 -04:00
Eric Richter a422638d49 ima: change integrity cache to store measured pcr
IMA avoids re-measuring files by storing the current state as a flag in
the integrity cache. It will then skip adding a new measurement log entry
if the cache reports the file as already measured.

If a policy measures an already measured file to a new PCR, the measurement
will not be added to the list. This patch implements a new bitfield for
specifying which PCR the file was measured into, rather than if it was
measured.

Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-06-30 01:14:22 -04:00
Eric Richter 67696f6d79 ima: redefine duplicate template entries
Template entry duplicates are prevented from being added to the
measurement list by checking a hash table that contains the template
entry digests. However, the PCR value is not included in this comparison,
so duplicate template entry digests with differing PCRs may be dropped.

This patch redefines duplicate template entries as template entries with
the same digest and same PCR values.

Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-06-30 01:14:21 -04:00
Eric Richter 5f6f027b50 ima: change ima_measurements_show() to display the entry specific pcr
IMA assumes that the same default Kconfig PCR is extended for each
entry. This patch replaces the default configured PCR with the policy
defined PCR.

Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-06-30 01:14:21 -04:00
Eric Richter 14b1da85bb ima: include pcr for each measurement log entry
The IMA measurement list entries include the Kconfig defined PCR value.
This patch defines a new ima_template_entry field for including the PCR
as specified in the policy rule.

Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-06-30 01:14:21 -04:00
Eric Richter 725de7fabb ima: extend ima_get_action() to return the policy pcr
Different policy rules may extend different PCRs. This patch retrieves
the specific PCR for the matched rule.  Subsequent patches will include
the rule specific PCR in the measurement list and extend the appropriate
PCR.

Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-06-30 01:14:20 -04:00
Eric Richter 0260643ce8 ima: add policy support for extending different pcrs
This patch defines a new IMA measurement policy rule option "pcr=",
which allows extending different PCRs on a per rule basis. For example,
the system independent files could extend the default IMA Kconfig
specified PCR, while the system dependent files could extend a different
PCR.

The following is an example of this usage with an SELinux policy; the
rule would extend PCR 11 with system configuration files:

  measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ obj_type=system_conf_t pcr=11

Changelog v3:
- FIELD_SIZEOF returns bytes, not bits. Fixed INVALID_PCR

Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-06-30 01:14:20 -04:00
Eric Richter 96d450bbec integrity: add measured_pcrs field to integrity cache
To keep track of which measurements have been extended to which PCRs, this
patch defines a new integrity_iint_cache field named measured_pcrs. This
field is a bitmask of the PCRs measured. Each bit corresponds to a PCR
index. For example, bit 10 corresponds to PCR 10.

Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-06-30 01:14:19 -04:00
Andy Shevchenko b8b572789c security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c: use %pU to output UUID in printable format
Instead of open coded variant re-use extension that vsprintf.c provides
us for ages.

Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-20 17:58:30 -07:00
Linus Torvalds f4f27d0028 Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

   - A new LSM, "LoadPin", from Kees Cook is added, which allows forcing
     of modules and firmware to be loaded from a specific device (this
     is from ChromeOS, where the device as a whole is verified
     cryptographically via dm-verity).

     This is disabled by default but can be configured to be enabled by
     default (don't do this if you don't know what you're doing).

   - Keys: allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key.
     Lots of general fixes and updates.

   - SELinux: add restrictions for loading of kernel modules via
     finit_module().  Distinguish non-init user namespace capability
     checks.  Apply execstack check on thread stacks"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (48 commits)
  LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG
  Yama: use atomic allocations when reporting
  seccomp: Fix comment typo
  ima: add support for creating files using the mknodat syscall
  ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattr
  vfs: forbid write access when reading a file into memory
  fs: fix over-zealous use of "const"
  selinux: apply execstack check on thread stacks
  selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks
  LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions
  fs: define a string representation of the kernel_read_file_id enumeration
  Yama: consolidate error reporting
  string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_file
  string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_cmdline
  string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable
  selinux: check ss_initialized before revalidating an inode label
  selinux: delay inode label lookup as long as possible
  selinux: don't revalidate an inode's label when explicitly setting it
  selinux: Change bool variable name to index.
  KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command
  ...
2016-05-19 09:21:36 -07:00
Linus Torvalds c52b76185b Merge branch 'work.const-path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull 'struct path' constification update from Al Viro:
 "'struct path' is passed by reference to a bunch of Linux security
  methods; in theory, there's nothing to stop them from modifying the
  damn thing and LSM community being what it is, sooner or later some
  enterprising soul is going to decide that it's a good idea.

  Let's remove the temptation and constify all of those..."

* 'work.const-path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  constify ima_d_path()
  constify security_sb_pivotroot()
  constify security_path_chroot()
  constify security_path_{link,rename}
  apparmor: remove useless checks for NULL ->mnt
  constify security_path_{mkdir,mknod,symlink}
  constify security_path_{unlink,rmdir}
  apparmor: constify common_perm_...()
  apparmor: constify aa_path_link()
  apparmor: new helper - common_path_perm()
  constify chmod_common/security_path_chmod
  constify security_sb_mount()
  constify chown_common/security_path_chown
  tomoyo: constify assorted struct path *
  apparmor_path_truncate(): path->mnt is never NULL
  constify vfs_truncate()
  constify security_path_truncate()
  [apparmor] constify struct path * in a bunch of helpers
2016-05-17 14:41:03 -07:00
Al Viro 0e0162bb8c Merge branch 'ovl-fixes' into for-linus
Backmerge to resolve a conflict in ovl_lookup_real();
"ovl_lookup_real(): use lookup_one_len_unlocked()" instead,
but it was too late in the cycle to rebase.
2016-05-17 02:17:59 -04:00
James Morris 0250abcd72 Merge tag 'keys-next-20160505' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next 2016-05-06 09:29:00 +10:00
David Howells d55201ce08 Merge branch 'keys-trust' into keys-next
Here's a set of patches that changes how certificates/keys are determined
to be trusted.  That's currently a two-step process:

 (1) Up until recently, when an X.509 certificate was parsed - no matter
     the source - it was judged against the keys in .system_keyring,
     assuming those keys to be trusted if they have KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED set
     upon them.

     This has just been changed such that any key in the .ima_mok keyring,
     if configured, may also be used to judge the trustworthiness of a new
     certificate, whether or not the .ima_mok keyring is meant to be
     consulted for whatever process is being undertaken.

     If a certificate is determined to be trustworthy, KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED
     will be set upon a key it is loaded into (if it is loaded into one),
     no matter what the key is going to be loaded for.

 (2) If an X.509 certificate is loaded into a key, then that key - if
     KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED gets set upon it - can be linked into any keyring
     with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY set upon it.  This was meant to be the
     system keyring only, but has been extended to various IMA keyrings.
     A user can at will link any key marked KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED into any
     keyring marked KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY if the relevant permissions masks
     permit it.

These patches change that:

 (1) Trust becomes a matter of consulting the ring of trusted keys supplied
     when the trust is evaluated only.

 (2) Every keyring can be supplied with its own manager function to
     restrict what may be added to that keyring.  This is called whenever a
     key is to be linked into the keyring to guard against a key being
     created in one keyring and then linked across.

     This function is supplied with the keyring and the key type and
     payload[*] of the key being linked in for use in its evaluation.  It
     is permitted to use other data also, such as the contents of other
     keyrings such as the system keyrings.

     [*] The type and payload are supplied instead of a key because as an
         optimisation this function may be called whilst creating a key and
         so may reject the proposed key between preparse and allocation.

 (3) A default manager function is provided that permits keys to be
     restricted to only asymmetric keys that are vouched for by the
     contents of the system keyring.

     A second manager function is provided that just rejects with EPERM.

 (4) A key allocation flag, KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, is made available
     so that the kernel can initialise keyrings with keys that form the
     root of the trust relationship.

 (5) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY are removed, along with
     key_preparsed_payload::trusted.

This change also makes it possible in future for userspace to create a private
set of trusted keys and then to have it sealed by setting a manager function
where the private set is wholly independent of the kernel's trust
relationships.

Further changes in the set involve extracting certain IMA special keyrings
and making them generally global:

 (*) .system_keyring is renamed to .builtin_trusted_keys and remains read
     only.  It carries only keys built in to the kernel.  It may be where
     UEFI keys should be loaded - though that could better be the new
     secondary keyring (see below) or a separate UEFI keyring.

 (*) An optional secondary system keyring (called .secondary_trusted_keys)
     is added to replace the IMA MOK keyring.

     (*) Keys can be added to the secondary keyring by root if the keys can
         be vouched for by either ring of system keys.

 (*) Module signing and kexec only use .builtin_trusted_keys and do not use
     the new secondary keyring.

 (*) Config option SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS now depends on ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE as
     that's the only type currently permitted on the system keyrings.

 (*) A new config option, IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY,
     is provided to allow keys to be added to IMA keyrings, subject to the
     restriction that such keys are validly signed by a key already in the
     system keyrings.

     If this option is enabled, but secondary keyrings aren't, additions to
     the IMA keyrings will be restricted to signatures verifiable by keys in
     the builtin system keyring only.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-05-04 17:20:20 +01:00
Mimi Zohar cf90ea9340 ima: fix the string representation of the LSM/IMA hook enumeration ordering
This patch fixes the string representation of the LSM/IMA hook enumeration
ordering used for displaying the IMA policy.

Fixes: d9ddf077bb ("ima: support for kexec image and initramfs")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-05-04 18:46:00 +10:00
Mimi Zohar 05d1a717ec ima: add support for creating files using the mknodat syscall
Commit 3034a14 "ima: pass 'opened' flag to identify newly created files"
stopped identifying empty files as new files.  However new empty files
can be created using the mknodat syscall.  On systems with IMA-appraisal
enabled, these empty files are not labeled with security.ima extended
attributes properly, preventing them from subsequently being opened in
order to write the file data contents.  This patch defines a new hook
named ima_post_path_mknod() to mark these empty files, created using
mknodat, as new in order to allow the file data contents to be written.

In addition, files with security.ima xattrs containing a file signature
are considered "immutable" and can not be modified.  The file contents
need to be written, before signing the file.  This patch relaxes this
requirement for new files, allowing the file signature to be written
before the file contents.

Changelog:
- defer identifying files with signatures stored as security.ima
  (based on Dmitry Rozhkov's comments)
- removing tests (eg. dentry, dentry->d_inode, inode->i_size == 0)
  (based on Al's review)

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <<viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Tested-by: Dmitry Rozhkov <dmitry.rozhkov@linux.intel.com>
2016-05-01 09:23:52 -04:00
Mimi Zohar 42a4c60319 ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattr
Changing file metadata (eg. uid, guid) could result in having to
re-appraise a file's integrity, but does not change the "new file"
status nor the security.ima xattr.  The IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO and
IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED flags are policy rule specific.  This patch
only resets these flags, not the IMA_NEW_FILE or IMA_DIGSIG flags.

With this patch, changing the file timestamp will not remove the
file signature on new files.

Reported-by: Dmitry Rozhkov <dmitry.rozhkov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Rozhkov <dmitry.rozhkov@linux.intel.com>
2016-05-01 09:23:52 -04:00
Andreas Ziegler 93da17b185 security: integrity: Remove select to deleted option PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA
Commit d43de6c780 ("akcipher: Move the RSA DER encoding check to
the crypto layer") removed the Kconfig option PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA,
but forgot to remove a 'select' to this option in the definition of
INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS.

Let's remove the select, as it's ineffective now.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Ziegler <andreas.ziegler@fau.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-12 19:54:58 +01:00
David Howells 56104cf2b8 IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok
Add a config option (IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY)
that, when enabled, allows keys to be added to the IMA keyrings by
userspace - with the restriction that each must be signed by a key in the
system trusted keyrings.

EPERM will be returned if this option is disabled, ENOKEY will be returned if
no authoritative key can be found and EKEYREJECTED will be returned if the
signature doesn't match.  Other errors such as ENOPKG may also be returned.

If this new option is enabled, the builtin system keyring is searched, as is
the secondary system keyring if that is also enabled.  Intermediate keys
between the builtin system keyring and the key being added can be added to
the secondary keyring (which replaces .ima_mok) to form a trust chain -
provided they are also validly signed by a key in one of the trusted keyrings.

The .ima_mok keyring is then removed and the IMA blacklist keyring gets its
own config option (IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING).

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-04-11 22:49:15 +01:00
David Howells 77f68bac94 KEYS: Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED
Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED as they're no longer
meaningful.  Also we can drop the trusted flag from the preparse structure.

Given this, we no longer need to pass the key flags through to
restrict_link().

Further, we can now get rid of keyring_restrict_trusted_only() also.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11 22:44:15 +01:00
David Howells a511e1af8b KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link()
Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to
__key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to
to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not.

What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring.

Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that
point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted
keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the
trustworthiness of a new key.

With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the
trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through
one of the contained keys.

Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant
trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically
grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could
be secondarily linked.

To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source
must now be retained.  For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the
AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data.


If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted()
resolves to restrict_link_reject().  The integrity digital signature code
still works correctly with this as it was previously using
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there
is no system keyring against which trust can be determined.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11 22:43:43 +01:00
David Howells 5ac7eace2d KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyring
Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be
vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary.  This can be used to
block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which
the signature verification fails.  It could also be used to provide
blacklisting.

This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE.

To this end:

 (1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to
     the vetting function.  This is called as:

	int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring,
			     const struct key_type *key_type,
			     unsigned long key_flags,
			     const union key_payload *key_payload),

     where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and
     key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be
     AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED.

     [*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when
     	 KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed.

     The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an
     error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the
     link.

     The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set
     through keyring_alloc().

     Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this
     method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function
     is called.

 (2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added.  This can be passed to
     key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the
     restriction check.

 (3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed.  The entire contents of a keyring
     with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by
     virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted.

 (4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be
     used to set restrict_link in the new key.  This ensures that the
     pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window
     of unrestrictedness.  Normally this argument will be NULL.

 (5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added.  It
     should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of
     setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring.  This will be replaced in
     a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for
     authoritative keys.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-04-11 22:37:37 +01:00
Al Viro ce23e64013 ->getxattr(): pass dentry and inode as separate arguments
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-04-11 00:48:00 -04:00
Al Viro fc64005c93 don't bother with ->d_inode->i_sb - it's always equal to ->d_sb
... and neither can ever be NULL

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-04-10 17:11:51 -04:00
Al Viro 81cd8896a6 constify ima_d_path()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-28 00:47:52 -04:00
Linus Torvalds bb7aeae3d6 Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
 "There are a bunch of fixes to the TPM, IMA, and Keys code, with minor
  fixes scattered across the subsystem.

  IMA now requires signed policy, and that policy is also now measured
  and appraised"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (67 commits)
  X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enum
  akcipher: Move the RSA DER encoding check to the crypto layer
  crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad
  sign-file: fix build with CMS support disabled
  MAINTAINERS: update tpmdd urls
  MODSIGN: linux/string.h should be #included to get memcpy()
  certs: Fix misaligned data in extra certificate list
  X.509: Handle midnight alternative notation in GeneralizedTime
  X.509: Support leap seconds
  Handle ISO 8601 leap seconds and encodings of midnight in mktime64()
  X.509: Fix leap year handling again
  PKCS#7: fix unitialized boolean 'want'
  firmware: change kernel read fail to dev_dbg()
  KEYS: Use the symbol value for list size, updated by scripts/insert-sys-cert
  KEYS: Reserve an extra certificate symbol for inserting without recompiling
  modsign: hide openssl output in silent builds
  tpm_tis: fix build warning with tpm_tis_resume
  ima: require signed IMA policy
  ima: measure and appraise the IMA policy itself
  ima: load policy using path
  ...
2016-03-17 11:33:45 -07:00
James Morris 88a1b564a2 Merge tag 'keys-next-20160303' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next 2016-03-04 11:39:53 +11:00
David Howells 4e8ae72a75 X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enum
Make the identifier public key and digest algorithm fields text instead of
enum.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-03-03 21:49:27 +00:00
David Howells d43de6c780 akcipher: Move the RSA DER encoding check to the crypto layer
Move the RSA EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding from the asymmetric-key public_key
subtype to the rsa crypto module's pkcs1pad template.  This means that the
public_key subtype no longer has any dependencies on public key type.

To make this work, the following changes have been made:

 (1) The rsa pkcs1pad template is now used for RSA keys.  This strips off the
     padding and returns just the message hash.

 (2) In a previous patch, the pkcs1pad template gained an optional second
     parameter that, if given, specifies the hash used.  We now give this,
     and pkcs1pad checks the encoded message E(M) for the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5
     encoding and verifies that the correct digest OID is present.

 (3) The crypto driver in crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c is now reduced to
     something that doesn't care about what the encryption actually does
     and and has been merged into public_key.c.

 (4) CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA is gone.  Module signing must set
     CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA=y instead.

Thoughts:

 (*) Should the encoding style (eg. raw, EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5) also be passed to
     the padding template?  Should there be multiple padding templates
     registered that share most of the code?

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-03-03 21:49:27 +00:00
Mimi Zohar 95ee08fa37 ima: require signed IMA policy
Require the IMA policy to be signed when additional rules can be added.

v1:
- initialize the policy flag
- include IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY in the policy flag

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
2016-02-21 09:34:23 -05:00
Mimi Zohar 19f8a84713 ima: measure and appraise the IMA policy itself
Add support for measuring and appraising the IMA policy itself.

Changelog v4:
- use braces on both if/else branches, even if single line on one of the
branches - Dmitry
- Use the id mapping - Dmitry

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
2016-02-21 09:34:22 -05:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 7429b09281 ima: load policy using path
We currently cannot do appraisal or signature vetting of IMA policies
since we currently can only load IMA policies by writing the contents
of the policy directly in, as follows:

cat policy-file > <securityfs>/ima/policy

If we provide the kernel the path to the IMA policy so it can load
the policy itself it'd be able to later appraise or vet the file
signature if it has one.  This patch adds support to load the IMA
policy with a given path as follows:

echo /etc/ima/ima_policy > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy

Changelog v4+:
- moved kernel_read_file_from_path() error messages to callers
v3:
- moved kernel_read_file_from_path() to a separate patch
v2:
- after re-ordering the patches, replace calling integrity_kernel_read()
  to read the file with kernel_read_file_from_path() (Mimi)
- Patch description re-written by Luis R. Rodriguez

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-02-21 09:34:05 -05:00
Mimi Zohar d9ddf077bb ima: support for kexec image and initramfs
Add IMA policy support for measuring/appraising the kexec image and
initramfs. Two new IMA policy identifiers KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK and
KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK are defined.

Example policy rules:
measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig
measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
appraise func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK appraise_type=imasig

Moving the enumeration to the vfs layer simplified the patches, allowing
the IMA changes, for the most part, to be separated from the other
changes.  Unfortunately, passing either a kernel_read_file_id or a
ima_hooks enumeration within IMA is messy.

Option 1: duplicate kernel_read_file enumeration in ima_hooks

enum kernel_read_file_id {
	...
        READING_KEXEC_IMAGE,
        READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS,
        READING_MAX_ID

enum ima_hooks {
	...
	KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
	KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK

Option 2: define ima_hooks as extension of kernel_read_file
eg: enum ima_hooks {
        FILE_CHECK = READING_MAX_ID,
        MMAP_CHECK,

In order to pass both kernel_read_file_id and ima_hooks values, we
would need to specify a struct containing a union.

struct caller_id {
        union {
                enum ima_hooks func_id;
                enum kernel_read_file_id read_id;
        };
};

Option 3: incorportate the ima_hooks enumeration into kernel_read_file_id,
perhaps changing the enumeration name.

For now, duplicate the new READING_KEXEC_IMAGE/INITRAMFS in the ima_hooks.

Changelog v4:
- replaced switch statement with a kernel_read_file_id to an ima_hooks
id mapping array - Dmitry
- renamed ima_hook tokens KEXEC_CHECK and INITRAMFS_CHECK to
KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK and KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK respectively - Dave Young

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
2016-02-21 09:06:16 -05:00
Mimi Zohar c6af8efe97 ima: remove firmware and module specific cached status info
Each time a file is read by the kernel, the file should be re-measured and
the file signature re-appraised, based on policy.  As there is no need to
preserve the status information, this patch replaces the firmware and
module specific cache status with a generic one named read_file.

This change simplifies adding support for other files read by the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
2016-02-21 09:06:13 -05:00
Mimi Zohar a1db742094 module: replace copy_module_from_fd with kernel version
Replace copy_module_from_fd() with kernel_read_file_from_fd().

Although none of the upstreamed LSMs define a kernel_module_from_file
hook, IMA is called, based on policy, to prevent unsigned kernel modules
from being loaded by the original kernel module syscall and to
measure/appraise signed kernel modules.

The security function security_kernel_module_from_file() was called prior
to reading a kernel module.  Preventing unsigned kernel modules from being
loaded by the original kernel module syscall remains on the pre-read
kernel_read_file() security hook.  Instead of reading the kernel module
twice, once for measuring/appraising and again for loading the kernel
module, the signature validation is moved to the kernel_post_read_file()
security hook.

This patch removes the security_kernel_module_from_file() hook and security
call.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2016-02-21 09:06:12 -05:00
Mimi Zohar 39eeb4fb97 security: define kernel_read_file hook
The kernel_read_file security hook is called prior to reading the file
into memory.

Changelog v4+:
- export security_kernel_read_file()

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2016-02-21 09:06:09 -05:00
Mimi Zohar e40ba6d56b firmware: replace call to fw_read_file_contents() with kernel version
Replace the fw_read_file_contents with kernel_file_read_from_path().

Although none of the upstreamed LSMs define a kernel_fw_from_file hook,
IMA is called by the security function to prevent unsigned firmware from
being loaded and to measure/appraise signed firmware, based on policy.

Instead of reading the firmware twice, once for measuring/appraising the
firmware and again for reading the firmware contents into memory, the
kernel_post_read_file() security hook calculates the file hash based on
the in memory file buffer.  The firmware is read once.

This patch removes the LSM kernel_fw_from_file() hook and security call.

Changelog v4+:
- revert dropped buf->size assignment - reported by Sergey Senozhatsky
v3:
- remove kernel_fw_from_file hook
- use kernel_file_read_from_path() - requested by Luis
v2:
- reordered and squashed firmware patches
- fix MAX firmware size (Kees Cook)

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
2016-02-21 09:03:44 -05:00
Mimi Zohar cf22221786 ima: define a new hook to measure and appraise a file already in memory
This patch defines a new IMA hook ima_post_read_file() for measuring
and appraising files read by the kernel. The caller loads the file into
memory before calling this function, which calculates the hash followed by
the normal IMA policy based processing.

Changelog v5:
- fail ima_post_read_file() if either file or buf is NULL
v3:
- rename ima_hash_and_process_file() to ima_post_read_file()

v1:
- split patch

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
2016-02-20 22:35:08 -05:00
Mimi Zohar 98304bcf71 ima: calculate the hash of a buffer using aynchronous hash(ahash)
Setting up ahash has some overhead.  Only use ahash to calculate the
hash of a buffer, if the buffer is larger than ima_ahash_minsize.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
2016-02-18 17:14:44 -05:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 11d7646df8 ima: provide buffer hash calculation function
This patch provides convenient buffer hash calculation function.

Changelog v3:
- fix while hash calculation - Dmitry
v1:
- rewrite to support loff_t sized buffers - Mimi
  (based on Fenguang Wu's testing)

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-02-18 17:14:28 -05:00
Mimi Zohar 4ad87a3d74 ima: use "ima_hooks" enum as function argument
Cleanup the function arguments by using "ima_hooks" enumerator as needed.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
2016-02-18 17:13:58 -05:00
Mimi Zohar b5269ab3e2 ima: refactor ima_policy_show() to display "ima_hooks" rules
Define and call a function to display the "ima_hooks" rules.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
2016-02-18 17:13:56 -05:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 1525b06d99 ima: separate 'security.ima' reading functionality from collect
Instead of passing pointers to pointers to ima_collect_measurent() to
read and return the 'security.ima' xattr value, this patch moves the
functionality to the calling process_measurement() to directly read
the xattr and pass only the hash algo to the ima_collect_measurement().

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-02-18 17:13:32 -05:00
Tadeusz Struk eb5798f2e2 integrity: convert digsig to akcipher api
Convert asymmetric_verify to akcipher api.

Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-02-18 14:52:32 +00:00
Ryan Ware 613317bd21 EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons
This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085.  The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12.  This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().

Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo <xiaofei.rex.guo@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware <ware@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-02-12 18:36:47 +11:00
David Howells 50d35015ff KEYS: CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS is no longer an option
CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS is no longer an option as /proc/keys is now
mandatory if the keyrings facility is enabled (it's used by libkeyutils in
userspace).

The defconfig references were removed with:

	perl -p -i -e 's/CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS=y\n//' \
	    `git grep -l CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS=y`

and the integrity Kconfig fixed by hand.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Andreas Ziegler <andreas.ziegler@fau.de>
cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
2016-02-10 10:13:27 +00:00
Colin Ian King c75d8e96f3 IMA: fix non-ANSI declaration of ima_check_policy()
ima_check_policy() has no parameters, so use the normal void
parameter convention to make it match the prototype in the header file
security/integrity/ima/ima.h

Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-02-08 18:17:38 -05:00
Al Viro 5955102c99 wrappers for ->i_mutex access
parallel to mutex_{lock,unlock,trylock,is_locked,lock_nested},
inode_foo(inode) being mutex_foo(&inode->i_mutex).

Please, use those for access to ->i_mutex; over the coming cycle
->i_mutex will become rwsem, with ->lookup() done with it held
only shared.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-01-22 18:04:28 -05:00
Linus Torvalds 5807fcaa9b Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:

 - EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel
   (EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring.

 - Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for
   sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks.

 - Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2.

 - Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA.

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits)
  selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix
  KEYS: refcount bug fix
  ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking
  IMA: policy can be updated zero times
  selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
  selinux: export validatetrans decisions
  gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid
  selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels
  security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels
  selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security
  security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const
  security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const
  selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security
  keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy
  keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips
  keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options
  tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions
  tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing
  tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup
  tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code
  ...
2016-01-17 19:13:15 -08:00
Al Viro cc4e719e83 fix the leak in integrity_read_file()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-01-04 10:28:19 -05:00
Petko Manolov 6427e6c71c ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking
There is no need to hold the ima_write_mutex for so long.  We only need it
around ima_parse_add_rule().

Changelog:
- The return path now takes into account failed kmalloc() call.

Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-01-03 13:22:38 -05:00
Sasha Levin 0112721df4 IMA: policy can be updated zero times
Commit "IMA: policy can now be updated multiple times" assumed that the
policy would be updated at least once.

If there are zero updates, the temporary list head object will get added
to the policy list, and later dereferenced as an IMA policy object, which
means that invalid memory will be accessed.

Changelog:
- Move list_empty() test to ima_release_policy(), before audit msg - Mimi

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-12-24 18:56:45 -05:00
Paul Gortmaker 92cc916638 security/integrity: make ima/ima_mok.c explicitly non-modular
The Kconfig currently controlling compilation of this code is:

ima/Kconfig:config IMA_MOK_KEYRING
ima/Kconfig: bool "Create IMA machine owner keys (MOK) and blacklist keyrings"

...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone.

Lets remove the couple of traces of modularity so that when reading the
driver there is no doubt it really is builtin-only.

Since module_init translates to device_initcall in the non-modular
case, the init ordering remains unchanged with this commit.

Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-ima-user@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-12-15 10:01:43 -05:00
Mimi Zohar 6ad6afa146 ima: update appraise flags after policy update completes
While creating a temporary list of new rules, the ima_appraise flag is
updated, but not reverted on failure to append the new rules to the
existing policy.  This patch defines temp_ima_appraise flag.  Only when
the new rules are appended to the policy is the flag updated.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
2015-12-15 10:01:43 -05:00
Mimi Zohar 501f1bde66 IMA: prevent keys on the .ima_blacklist from being removed
Set the KEY_FLAGS_KEEP on the .ima_blacklist to prevent userspace
from removing keys from the keyring.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-12-15 10:01:43 -05:00
Petko Manolov 80eae209d6 IMA: allow reading back the current IMA policy
It is often useful to be able to read back the IMA policy.  It is
even more important after introducing CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY.
This option allows the root user to see the current policy rules.

Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski <z.jasinski@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-12-15 10:01:43 -05:00
Petko Manolov 41c89b64d7 IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings
This option creates IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings.  IMA MOK is an
intermediate keyring that sits between .system and .ima keyrings,
effectively forming a simple CA hierarchy.  To successfully import a key
into .ima_mok it must be signed by a key which CA is in .system keyring.
On turn any key that needs to go in .ima keyring must be signed by CA in
either .system or .ima_mok keyrings. IMA MOK is empty at kernel boot.

IMA blacklist keyring contains all revoked IMA keys.  It is consulted
before any other keyring.  If the search is successful the requested
operation is rejected and error is returned to the caller.

Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-12-15 10:01:43 -05:00
Petko Manolov 38d859f991 IMA: policy can now be updated multiple times
The new rules get appended to the original policy, forming a queue.
The new rules are first added to a temporary list, which on error
get released without disturbing the normal IMA operations.  On
success both lists (the current policy and the new rules) are spliced.

IMA policy reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous compared to
writes, the match code is RCU protected.  The updater side also does
list splice in RCU manner.

Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-12-15 10:01:43 -05:00
Arnd Bergmann 05d3884b1e evm: EVM_LOAD_X509 depends on EVM
The newly added EVM_LOAD_X509 code can be configured even if
CONFIG_EVM is disabled, but that causes a link error:

security/built-in.o: In function `integrity_load_keys':
digsig_asymmetric.c:(.init.text+0x400): undefined reference to `evm_load_x509'

This adds a Kconfig dependency to ensure it is only enabled when
CONFIG_EVM is set as well.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Fixes: 2ce523eb89 ("evm: load x509 certificate from the kernel")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-12-15 09:57:21 -05:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 523b74b16b evm: reset EVM status when file attributes change
The EVM verification status is cached in iint->evm_status and if it
was successful, never re-verified again when IMA passes the 'iint' to
evm_verifyxattr().

When file attributes or extended attributes change, we may wish to
re-verify EVM integrity as well.  For example, after setting a digital
signature we may need to re-verify the signature and update the
iint->flags that there is an EVM signature.

This patch enables that by resetting evm_status to INTEGRITY_UKNOWN
state.

Changes in v2:
* Flag setting moved to EVM layer

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-12-15 09:56:57 -05:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 7626676320 evm: provide a function to set the EVM key from the kernel
A crypto HW kernel module can possibly initialize the EVM key from the
kernel __init code to enable EVM before calling the 'init' process.
This patch provides a function evm_set_key() to set the EVM key
directly without using the KEY subsystem.

Changes in v4:
* kernel-doc style for evm_set_key

Changes in v3:
* error reporting moved to evm_set_key
* EVM_INIT_HMAC moved to evm_set_key
* added bitop to prevent key setting race

Changes in v2:
* use size_t for key size instead of signed int
* provide EVM_MAX_KEY_SIZE macro in <linux/evm.h>
* provide EVM_MIN_KEY_SIZE macro in <linux/evm.h>

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-12-15 08:53:36 -05:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 26ddabfe96 evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is loaded
In order to enable EVM before starting the 'init' process,
evm_initialized needs to be non-zero.  Previously non-zero indicated
that the HMAC key was loaded.  When EVM loads the X509 before calling
'init', with this patch it is now possible to enable EVM to start
signature based verification.

This patch defines bits to enable EVM if a key of any type is loaded.

Changes in v3:
* print error message if key is not set

Changes in v2:
* EVM_STATE_KEY_SET replaced by EVM_INIT_HMAC
* EVM_STATE_X509_SET replaced by EVM_INIT_X509

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-12-15 08:50:48 -05:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 2ce523eb89 evm: load an x509 certificate from the kernel
This patch defines a configuration option and the evm_load_x509() hook
to load an X509 certificate onto the EVM trusted kernel keyring.

Changes in v4:
* Patch description updated

Changes in v3:
* Removed EVM_X509_PATH definition. CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH is used
  directly.

Changes in v2:
* default key patch changed to /etc/keys

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-12-15 08:31:19 -05:00
Dmitry Kasatkin f4dc37785e integrity: define '.evm' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring
Require all keys added to the EVM keyring be signed by an
existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring.

This patch also switches IMA to use integrity_init_keyring().

Changes in v3:
* Added 'init_keyring' config based variable to skip initializing
  keyring instead of using  __integrity_init_keyring() wrapper.
* Added dependency back to CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING

Changes in v2:
* Replace CONFIG_EVM_TRUSTED_KEYRING with IMA and EVM common
  CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING configuration option
* Deprecate CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING but keep it for config
  file compatibility. (Mimi Zohar)

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-11-23 14:30:02 -05:00
Mel Gorman 71baba4b92 mm, page_alloc: rename __GFP_WAIT to __GFP_RECLAIM
__GFP_WAIT was used to signal that the caller was in atomic context and
could not sleep.  Now it is possible to distinguish between true atomic
context and callers that are not willing to sleep.  The latter should
clear __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM so kswapd will still wake.  As clearing
__GFP_WAIT behaves differently, there is a risk that people will clear the
wrong flags.  This patch renames __GFP_WAIT to __GFP_RECLAIM to clearly
indicate what it does -- setting it allows all reclaim activity, clearing
them prevents it.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-06 17:50:42 -08:00
David Howells 146aa8b145 KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data
Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk
as it seems pointless to keep them separate.

Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded
user-defined keys.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
2015-10-21 15:18:36 +01:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 72e1eed8ab integrity: prevent loading untrusted certificates on the IMA trusted keyring
If IMA_LOAD_X509 is enabled, either directly or indirectly via
IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT, certificates are loaded onto the IMA
trusted keyring by the kernel via key_create_or_update(). When
the KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED flag is provided, certificates are loaded
without first verifying the certificate is properly signed by a
trusted key on the system keyring.  This patch removes the
KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED flag.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Cc:  <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.19+
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-10-09 15:31:18 -04:00
Linus Torvalds 02201e3f1b Minor merge needed, due to function move.
Main excitement here is Peter Zijlstra's lockless rbtree optimization to
 speed module address lookup.  He found some abusers of the module lock
 doing that too.
 
 A little bit of parameter work here too; including Dan Streetman's breaking
 up the big param mutex so writing a parameter can load another module (yeah,
 really).  Unfortunately that broke the usual suspects, !CONFIG_MODULES and
 !CONFIG_SYSFS, so those fixes were appended too.
 
 Cheers,
 Rusty.
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Merge tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux

Pull module updates from Rusty Russell:
 "Main excitement here is Peter Zijlstra's lockless rbtree optimization
  to speed module address lookup.  He found some abusers of the module
  lock doing that too.

  A little bit of parameter work here too; including Dan Streetman's
  breaking up the big param mutex so writing a parameter can load
  another module (yeah, really).  Unfortunately that broke the usual
  suspects, !CONFIG_MODULES and !CONFIG_SYSFS, so those fixes were
  appended too"

* tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux: (26 commits)
  modules: only use mod->param_lock if CONFIG_MODULES
  param: fix module param locks when !CONFIG_SYSFS.
  rcu: merge fix for Convert ACCESS_ONCE() to READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE()
  module: add per-module param_lock
  module: make perm const
  params: suppress unused variable error, warn once just in case code changes.
  modules: clarify CONFIG_MODULE_COMPRESS help, suggest 'N'.
  kernel/module.c: avoid ifdefs for sig_enforce declaration
  kernel/workqueue.c: remove ifdefs over wq_power_efficient
  kernel/params.c: export param_ops_bool_enable_only
  kernel/params.c: generalize bool_enable_only
  kernel/module.c: use generic module param operaters for sig_enforce
  kernel/params: constify struct kernel_param_ops uses
  sysfs: tightened sysfs permission checks
  module: Rework module_addr_{min,max}
  module: Use __module_address() for module_address_lookup()
  module: Make the mod_tree stuff conditional on PERF_EVENTS || TRACING
  module: Optimize __module_address() using a latched RB-tree
  rbtree: Implement generic latch_tree
  seqlock: Introduce raw_read_seqcount_latch()
  ...
2015-07-01 10:49:25 -07:00
Mimi Zohar 24fd03c876 ima: update builtin policies
This patch defines a builtin measurement policy "tcb", similar to the
existing "ima_tcb", but with additional rules to also measure files
based on the effective uid and to measure files opened with the "read"
mode bit set (eg. read, read-write).

Changing the builtin "ima_tcb" policy could potentially break existing
users.  Instead of defining a new separate boot command line option each
time the builtin measurement policy is modified, this patch defines a
single generic boot command line option "ima_policy=" to specify the
builtin policy and deprecates the use of the builtin ima_tcb policy.

[The "ima_policy=" boot command line option is based on Roberto Sassu's
"ima: added new policy type exec" patch.]

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein <gw@idfusion.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2015-06-16 08:18:45 -04:00
Mimi Zohar 4351c294b8 ima: extend "mask" policy matching support
The current "mask" policy option matches files opened as MAY_READ,
MAY_WRITE, MAY_APPEND or MAY_EXEC.  This patch extends the "mask"
option to match files opened containing one of these modes.  For
example, "mask=^MAY_READ" would match files opened read-write.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein <gw@idfusion.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2015-06-16 08:18:44 -04:00
Mimi Zohar 139069eff7 ima: add support for new "euid" policy condition
The new "euid" policy condition measures files with the specified
effective uid (euid).  In addition, for CAP_SETUID files it measures
files with the specified uid or suid.

Changelog:
- fixed checkpatch.pl warnings
- fixed avc denied {setuid} messages - based on Roberto's feedback

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein <gw@idfusion.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2015-06-16 08:18:43 -04:00
Mimi Zohar 45b26133b9 ima: fix ima_show_template_data_ascii()
This patch fixes a bug introduced in "4d7aeee ima: define new template
ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng".

Changelog:
- change int to uint32 (Roberto Sassu's suggestion)

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <rsassu@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.13
2015-06-16 08:18:21 -04:00
Luis R. Rodriguez 9c27847dda kernel/params: constify struct kernel_param_ops uses
Most code already uses consts for the struct kernel_param_ops,
sweep the kernel for the last offending stragglers. Other than
include/linux/moduleparam.h and kernel/params.c all other changes
were generated with the following Coccinelle SmPL patch. Merge
conflicts between trees can be handled with Coccinelle.

In the future git could get Coccinelle merge support to deal with
patch --> fail --> grammar --> Coccinelle --> new patch conflicts
automatically for us on patches where the grammar is available and
the patch is of high confidence. Consider this a feature request.

Test compiled on x86_64 against:

	* allnoconfig
	* allmodconfig
	* allyesconfig

@ const_found @
identifier ops;
@@

const struct kernel_param_ops ops = {
};

@ const_not_found depends on !const_found @
identifier ops;
@@

-struct kernel_param_ops ops = {
+const struct kernel_param_ops ops = {
};

Generated-by: Coccinelle SmPL
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: cocci@systeme.lip6.fr
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2015-05-28 11:32:10 +09:30
Roberto Sassu 8d94eb9b5c ima: pass iint to ima_add_violation()
This patch adds the iint associated to the current inode as a new
parameter of ima_add_violation(). The passed iint is always not NULL
if a violation is detected. This modification will be used to determine
the inode for which there is a violation.

Since the 'd' and 'd-ng' template field init() functions were detecting
a violation from the value of the iint pointer, they now check the new
field 'violation', added to the 'ima_event_data' structure.

Changelog:
 - v1:
   - modified an old comment (Roberto Sassu)

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <rsassu@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-05-21 13:59:29 -04:00
Roberto Sassu 23b5741932 ima: wrap event related data to the new ima_event_data structure
All event related data has been wrapped into the new 'ima_event_data'
structure. The main benefit of this patch is that a new information
can be made available to template fields initialization functions
by simply adding a new field to the new structure instead of modifying
the definition of those functions.

Changelog:
 - v2:
   - f_dentry replaced with f_path.dentry (Roberto Sassu)
   - removed declaration of temporary variables in template field functions
     when possible (suggested by Dmitry Kasatkin)

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <rsassu@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-05-21 13:59:28 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 9d03a721a3 integrity: add validity checks for 'path' parameter
This patch adds validity checks for 'path' parameter and
makes it const.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-05-21 13:59:28 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 7c51bb00c4 evm: fix potential race when removing xattrs
EVM needs to be atomically updated when removing xattrs.
Otherwise concurrent EVM verification may fail in between.
This patch fixes by moving i_mutex unlocking after calling
EVM hook. fsnotify_xattr() is also now called while locked
the same way as it is done in __vfs_setxattr_noperm.

Changelog:
- remove unused 'inode' variable.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-05-21 13:28:47 -04:00
Mimi Zohar 5101a1850b evm: labeling pseudo filesystems exception
To prevent offline stripping of existing file xattrs and relabeling of
them at runtime, EVM allows only newly created files to be labeled.  As
pseudo filesystems are not persistent, stripping of xattrs is not a
concern.

Some LSMs defer file labeling on pseudo filesystems.  This patch
permits the labeling of existing files on pseudo files systems.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-05-21 13:28:47 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin a18d0cbfab ima: remove definition of IMA_X509_PATH
CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH is always defined.  This patch removes the
IMA_X509_PATH definition and uses CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-05-21 13:28:47 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin c68ed80c97 ima: limit file hash setting by user to fix and log modes
File hashes are automatically set and updated and should not be
manually set. This patch limits file hash setting to fix and log
modes.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-05-21 13:28:46 -04:00
Mimi Zohar cd025f7f94 ima: do not measure or appraise the NSFS filesystem
Include don't appraise or measure rules for the NSFS filesystem
in the builtin ima_tcb and ima_appraise_tcb policies.

Changelog:
- Update documentation

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.19
2015-05-21 13:28:41 -04:00
Roberto Sassu 6438de9f3f ima: skip measurement of cgroupfs files and update documentation
This patch adds a rule in the default measurement policy to skip inodes
in the cgroupfs filesystem. Measurements for this filesystem can be
avoided, as all the digests collected have the same value of the digest of
an empty file.

Furthermore, this patch updates the documentation of IMA policies in
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy to make it consistent with
the policies set in security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <rsassu@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-05-21 13:27:19 -04:00
Dan Carpenter 5577857f8e ima: cleanup ima_init_policy() a little
It's a bit easier to read this if we split it up into two for loops.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-05-13 06:07:19 -04:00
David Howells c6f493d631 VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations
most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would
go to, i.e. d_backing_inode()

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-04-15 15:06:56 -04:00
Linus Torvalds b11a278397 Merge branch 'kconfig' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mmarek/kbuild
Pull kconfig updates from Michal Marek:
 "Yann E Morin was supposed to take over kconfig maintainership, but
  this hasn't happened.  So I'm sending a few kconfig patches that I
  collected:

   - Fix for missing va_end in kconfig
   - merge_config.sh displays used if given too few arguments
   - s/boolean/bool/ in Kconfig files for consistency, with the plan to
     only support bool in the future"

* 'kconfig' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mmarek/kbuild:
  kconfig: use va_end to match corresponding va_start
  merge_config.sh: Display usage if given too few arguments
  kconfig: use bool instead of boolean for type definition attributes
2015-02-19 10:36:45 -08:00
David Howells 11cd64a234 ima: /proc/keys is now mandatory
/proc/keys is now mandatory and its config option no longer exists, so it
doesn't need selecting.

Reported-by: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-02-02 13:19:48 +11:00
Christoph Jaeger 6341e62b21 kconfig: use bool instead of boolean for type definition attributes
Support for keyword 'boolean' will be dropped later on.

No functional change.

Reference: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1418003065.git.cj@linux.com
Signed-off-by: Christoph Jaeger <cj@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
2015-01-07 13:08:04 +01:00
James Morris d0bffab043 Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into for-linus 2014-12-16 12:49:10 +11:00
Linus Torvalds 67e2c38838 Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
 "In terms of changes, there's general maintenance to the Smack,
  SELinux, and integrity code.

  The IMA code adds a new kconfig option, IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT,
  which allows IMA appraisal to require signatures.  Support for reading
  keys from rootfs before init is call is also added"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits)
  selinux: Remove security_ops extern
  security: smack: fix out-of-bounds access in smk_parse_smack()
  VFS: refactor vfs_read()
  ima: require signature based appraisal
  integrity: provide a hook to load keys when rootfs is ready
  ima: load x509 certificate from the kernel
  integrity: provide a function to load x509 certificate from the kernel
  integrity: define a new function integrity_read_file()
  Security: smack: replace kzalloc with kmem_cache for inode_smack
  Smack: Lock mode for the floor and hat labels
  ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt
  ima: allocate field pointers array on demand in template_desc_init_fields()
  ima: don't allocate a copy of template_fmt in template_desc_init_fields()
  ima: display template format in meas. list if template name length is zero
  ima: added error messages to template-related functions
  ima: use atomic bit operations to protect policy update interface
  ima: ignore empty and with whitespaces policy lines
  ima: no need to allocate entry for comment
  ima: report policy load status
  ima: use path names cache
  ...
2014-12-14 20:36:37 -08:00
Al Viro ba00410b81 Merge branch 'iov_iter' into for-next 2014-12-08 20:39:29 -05:00
Michael Ellerman 63a0eb7891 ima: Fix build failure on powerpc when TCG_IBMVTPM dependencies are not met
On powerpc we can end up with IMA=y and PPC_PSERIES=n which leads to:

 warning: (IMA) selects TCG_IBMVTPM which has unmet direct dependencies (TCG_TPM && PPC_PSERIES)
  tpm_ibmvtpm.c:(.text+0x14f3e8): undefined reference to `.plpar_hcall_norets'

I'm not sure why IMA needs to select those user-visible symbols, but if
it must then the simplest fix is to just express the proper dependencies
on the select.

Tested-by: Hon Ching (Vicky) Lo <lo1@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-12-06 21:50:37 -05:00
Al Viro b583043e99 kill f_dentry uses
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-11-19 13:01:25 -05:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 6fb5032ebb VFS: refactor vfs_read()
integrity_kernel_read() duplicates the file read operations code
in vfs_read(). This patch refactors vfs_read() code creating a
helper function __vfs_read(). It is used by both vfs_read() and
integrity_kernel_read().

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-11-17 23:14:22 -05:00
Dmitry Kasatkin c57782c13e ima: require signature based appraisal
This patch provides CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT kernel configuration
option to force IMA appraisal using signatures. This is useful, when EVM
key is not initialized yet and we want securely initialize integrity or
any other functionality.

It forces embedded policy to require signature. Signed initialization
script can initialize EVM key, update the IMA policy and change further
requirement of everything to be signed.

Changes in v3:
* kernel parameter fixed to configuration option in the patch description

Changes in v2:
* policy change of this patch separated from the key loading patch

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-11-17 23:12:01 -05:00
Dmitry Kasatkin c9cd2ce2bc integrity: provide a hook to load keys when rootfs is ready
Keys can only be loaded once the rootfs is mounted. Initcalls
are not suitable for that. This patch defines a special hook
to load the x509 public keys onto the IMA keyring, before
attempting to access any file. The keys are required for
verifying the file's signature. The hook is called after the
root filesystem is mounted and before the kernel calls 'init'.

Changes in v3:
* added more explanation to the patch description (Mimi)

Changes in v2:
* Hook renamed as 'integrity_load_keys()' to handle both IMA and EVM
  keys by integrity subsystem.
* Hook patch moved after defining loading functions

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-11-17 23:12:01 -05:00
Dmitry Kasatkin fd5f4e9054 ima: load x509 certificate from the kernel
Define configuration option to load X509 certificate into the
IMA trusted kernel keyring. It implements ima_load_x509() hook
to load X509 certificate into the .ima trusted kernel keyring
from the root filesystem.

Changes in v3:
* use ima_policy_flag in ima_get_action()
  ima_load_x509 temporarily clears ima_policy_flag to disable
  appraisal to load key. Use it to skip appraisal rules.
* Key directory path changed to /etc/keys (Mimi)
* Expand IMA_LOAD_X509 Kconfig help

Changes in v2:
* added '__init'
* use ima_policy_flag to disable appraisal to load keys

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-11-17 23:12:00 -05:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 65d543b233 integrity: provide a function to load x509 certificate from the kernel
Provide the function to load x509 certificates from the kernel into the
integrity kernel keyring.

Changes in v2:
* configuration option removed
* function declared as '__init'

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-11-17 23:11:59 -05:00
Dmitry Kasatkin e3c4abbfa9 integrity: define a new function integrity_read_file()
This patch defines a new function called integrity_read_file()
to read file from the kernel into a buffer. Subsequent patches
will read a file containing the public keys and load them onto
the IMA keyring.

This patch moves and renames ima_kernel_read(), the non-security
checking version of kernel_read(), to integrity_kernel_read().

Changes in v3:
* Patch descriptions improved (Mimi)
* Add missing cast (kbuild test robot)

Changes in v2:
* configuration option removed
* function declared as '__init'

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-11-17 23:09:18 -05:00
James Morris 6c880ad51b Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into for-linus 2014-10-29 15:03:54 +11:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 3b1deef6b1 evm: check xattr value length and type in evm_inode_setxattr()
evm_inode_setxattr() can be called with no value. The function does not
check the length so that following command can be used to produce the
kernel oops: setfattr -n security.evm FOO. This patch fixes it.

Changes in v3:
* there is no reason to return different error codes for EVM_XATTR_HMAC
  and non EVM_XATTR_HMAC. Remove unnecessary test then.

Changes in v2:
* testing for validity of xattr type

[ 1106.396921] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
[ 1106.398192] IP: [<ffffffff812af7b8>] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48
[ 1106.399244] PGD 29048067 PUD 290d7067 PMD 0
[ 1106.399953] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 1106.400020] Modules linked in: bridge stp llc evdev serio_raw i2c_piix4 button fuse
[ 1106.400020] CPU: 0 PID: 3635 Comm: setxattr Not tainted 3.16.0-kds+ #2936
[ 1106.400020] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[ 1106.400020] task: ffff8800291a0000 ti: ffff88002917c000 task.ti: ffff88002917c000
[ 1106.400020] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812af7b8>]  [<ffffffff812af7b8>] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48
[ 1106.400020] RSP: 0018:ffff88002917fd50  EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 1106.400020] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88002917fdf8 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 1106.400020] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff818136d3 RDI: ffff88002917fdf8
[ 1106.400020] RBP: ffff88002917fd68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000003ec1df
[ 1106.400020] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8800438a0a00
[ 1106.400020] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 1106.400020] FS:  00007f7dfa7d7740(0000) GS:ffff88005da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1106.400020] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1106.400020] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000003763e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 1106.400020] Stack:
[ 1106.400020]  ffff8800438a0a00 ffff88002917fdf8 0000000000000000 ffff88002917fd98
[ 1106.400020]  ffffffff812a1030 ffff8800438a0a00 ffff88002917fdf8 0000000000000000
[ 1106.400020]  0000000000000000 ffff88002917fde0 ffffffff8116d08a ffff88002917fdc8
[ 1106.400020] Call Trace:
[ 1106.400020]  [<ffffffff812a1030>] security_inode_setxattr+0x5d/0x6a
[ 1106.400020]  [<ffffffff8116d08a>] vfs_setxattr+0x6b/0x9f
[ 1106.400020]  [<ffffffff8116d1e0>] setxattr+0x122/0x16c
[ 1106.400020]  [<ffffffff811687e8>] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45
[ 1106.400020]  [<ffffffff8114d011>] ? __sb_start_write+0x10f/0x143
[ 1106.400020]  [<ffffffff811687e8>] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45
[ 1106.400020]  [<ffffffff811687c0>] ? __mnt_want_write+0x48/0x4f
[ 1106.400020]  [<ffffffff8116d3e6>] SyS_setxattr+0x6e/0xb0
[ 1106.400020]  [<ffffffff81529da9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 1106.400020] Code: c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 55 49 89 d5 41 54 49 89 fc 53 48 89 f3 48 c7 c6 d3 36 81 81 48 89 df e8 18 22 04 00 85 c0 75 07 <41> 80 7d 00 02 74 0d 48 89 de 4c 89 e7 e8 5a fe ff ff eb 03 83
[ 1106.400020] RIP  [<ffffffff812af7b8>] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48
[ 1106.400020]  RSP <ffff88002917fd50>
[ 1106.400020] CR2: 0000000000000000
[ 1106.428061] ---[ end trace ae08331628ba3050 ]---

Reported-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-10-28 10:06:31 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin a48fda9de9 ima: check xattr value length and type in the ima_inode_setxattr()
ima_inode_setxattr() can be called with no value. Function does not
check the length so that following command can be used to produce
kernel oops: setfattr -n security.ima FOO. This patch fixes it.

Changes in v3:
* for stable reverted "allow setting hash only in fix or log mode"
  It will be a separate patch.

Changes in v2:
* testing validity of xattr type
* allow setting hash only in fix or log mode (Mimi)

[  261.562522] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
[  261.564109] IP: [<ffffffff812af272>] ima_inode_setxattr+0x3e/0x5a
[  261.564109] PGD 3112f067 PUD 42965067 PMD 0
[  261.564109] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[  261.564109] Modules linked in: bridge stp llc evdev serio_raw i2c_piix4 button fuse
[  261.564109] CPU: 0 PID: 3299 Comm: setxattr Not tainted 3.16.0-kds+ #2924
[  261.564109] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[  261.564109] task: ffff8800428c2430 ti: ffff880042be0000 task.ti: ffff880042be0000
[  261.564109] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812af272>]  [<ffffffff812af272>] ima_inode_setxattr+0x3e/0x5a
[  261.564109] RSP: 0018:ffff880042be3d50  EFLAGS: 00010246
[  261.564109] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000015
[  261.564109] RDX: 0000001500000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8800375cc600
[  261.564109] RBP: ffff880042be3d68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004d6256
[  261.564109] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88002149ba00
[  261.564109] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  261.564109] FS:  00007f6c1e219740(0000) GS:ffff88005da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  261.564109] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  261.564109] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000003b35a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[  261.564109] Stack:
[  261.564109]  ffff88002149ba00 ffff880042be3df8 0000000000000000 ffff880042be3d98
[  261.564109]  ffffffff812a101b ffff88002149ba00 ffff880042be3df8 0000000000000000
[  261.564109]  0000000000000000 ffff880042be3de0 ffffffff8116d08a ffff880042be3dc8
[  261.564109] Call Trace:
[  261.564109]  [<ffffffff812a101b>] security_inode_setxattr+0x48/0x6a
[  261.564109]  [<ffffffff8116d08a>] vfs_setxattr+0x6b/0x9f
[  261.564109]  [<ffffffff8116d1e0>] setxattr+0x122/0x16c
[  261.564109]  [<ffffffff811687e8>] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45
[  261.564109]  [<ffffffff8114d011>] ? __sb_start_write+0x10f/0x143
[  261.564109]  [<ffffffff811687e8>] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45
[  261.564109]  [<ffffffff811687c0>] ? __mnt_want_write+0x48/0x4f
[  261.564109]  [<ffffffff8116d3e6>] SyS_setxattr+0x6e/0xb0
[  261.564109]  [<ffffffff81529da9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[  261.564109] Code: 48 89 f7 48 c7 c6 58 36 81 81 53 31 db e8 73 27 04 00 85 c0 75 28 bf 15 00 00 00 e8 8a a5 d9 ff 84 c0 75 05 83 cb ff eb 15 31 f6 <41> 80 7d 00 03 49 8b 7c 24 68 40 0f 94 c6 e8 e1 f9 ff ff 89 d8
[  261.564109] RIP  [<ffffffff812af272>] ima_inode_setxattr+0x3e/0x5a
[  261.564109]  RSP <ffff880042be3d50>
[  261.564109] CR2: 0000000000000000
[  261.599998] ---[ end trace 39a89a3fc267e652 ]---

Reported-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-10-28 10:03:49 -04:00
Behan Webster 357aabed62 security, crypto: LLVMLinux: Remove VLAIS from ima_crypto.c
Replaced the use of a Variable Length Array In Struct (VLAIS) with a C99
compliant equivalent. This patch allocates the appropriate amount of memory
using a char array using the SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK macro.

The new code can be compiled with both gcc and clang.

Signed-off-by: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Charlebois <charlebm@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan-Simon Möller <dl9pf@gmx.de>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de
2014-10-14 10:51:24 +02:00
Roberto Sassu c2426d2ad5 ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt
This patch allows users to provide a custom template format through the
new kernel command line parameter 'ima_template_fmt'. If the supplied
format is not valid, IMA uses the default template descriptor.

Changelog:
 - v3:
   - added check for 'fields' and 'num_fields' in
     template_desc_init_fields() (suggested by Mimi Zohar)

 - v2:
   - using template_desc_init_fields() to validate a format string
     (Roberto Sassu)
   - updated documentation by stating that only the chosen template
     descriptor is initialized (Roberto Sassu)

 - v1:
   - simplified code of ima_template_fmt_setup()
     (Roberto Sassu, suggested by Mimi Zohar)

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-10-13 08:39:02 -04:00
Roberto Sassu 1bd7face74 ima: allocate field pointers array on demand in template_desc_init_fields()
The allocation of a field pointers array is moved at the end of
template_desc_init_fields() and done only if the value of the 'fields'
and 'num_fields' parameters is not NULL. For just validating a template
format string, retrieved template field pointers are placed in a temporary
array.

Changelog:
 - v3:
   - do not check in this patch if 'fields' and 'num_fields' are NULL
     (suggested by Mimi Zohar)

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-10-13 08:39:02 -04:00
Roberto Sassu 9f3166b8ca ima: don't allocate a copy of template_fmt in template_desc_init_fields()
This patch removes the allocation of a copy of 'template_fmt', needed for
iterating over all fields in the passed template format string. The removal
was possible by replacing strcspn(), which modifies the passed string,
with strchrnul(). The currently processed template field is copied in
a temporary variable.

The purpose of this change is use template_desc_init_fields() in two ways:
for just validating a template format string (the function should work
if called by a setup function, when memory cannot be allocated), and for
actually initializing a template descriptor. The implementation of this
feature will be complete with the next patch.

Changelog:
 - v3:
   - added 'goto out' in template_desc_init_fields() to free allocated
     memory if a template field length is not valid (suggested by
     Mimi Zohar)

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-10-13 08:39:01 -04:00
Roberto Sassu 7dbdb4206b ima: display template format in meas. list if template name length is zero
With the introduction of the 'ima_template_fmt' kernel cmdline parameter,
a user can define a new template descriptor with custom format. However,
in this case, userspace tools will be unable to parse the measurements
list because the new template is unknown. For this reason, this patch
modifies the current IMA behavior to display in the list the template
format instead of the name (only if the length of the latter is zero)
so that a tool can extract needed information if it can handle listed
fields.

This patch also correctly displays the error log message in
ima_init_template() if the selected template cannot be initialized.

Changelog:
 - v3:
   - check the first byte of 'e->template_desc->name' instead of using
     strlen() in ima_fs.c (suggested by Mimi Zohar)

 - v2:
   - print the template format in ima_init_template(), if the selected
     template is custom (Roberto Sassu)

 - v1:
   - fixed patch description (Roberto Sassu, suggested by Mimi Zohar)
   - set 'template_name' variable in ima_fs.c only once
     (Roberto Sassu, suggested by Mimi Zohar)

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-10-13 08:39:01 -04:00
Roberto Sassu 71fed2eee0 ima: added error messages to template-related functions
This patch adds some error messages to inform users about the following
events: template descriptor not found, invalid template descriptor,
template field not found and template initialization failed.

Changelog:
 - v2:
   - display an error message if the format string contains too many
     fields (Roberto Sassu)

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-10-13 08:39:01 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 0716abbb58 ima: use atomic bit operations to protect policy update interface
The current implementation uses an atomic counter to provide exclusive
access to the sysfs 'policy' entry to update the IMA policy. While it is
highly unlikely, the usage of a counter might potentially allow another
process to overflow the counter, open the interface and insert additional
rules into the policy being loaded.

This patch replaces using an atomic counter with atomic bit operations
which is more reliable and a widely used method to provide exclusive access.

As bit operation keep the interface locked after successful update, it makes
it unnecessary to verify if the default policy was set or not during parsing
and interface closing. This patch also removes that code.

Changes in v3:
* move audit log message to ima_relead_policy() to report successful and
  unsuccessful result
* unnecessary comment removed

Changes in v2:
* keep interface locked after successful policy load as in original design
* remove sysfs entry as in original design

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-10-11 23:33:02 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 7178784f0a ima: ignore empty and with whitespaces policy lines
Empty policy lines cause parsing failures which is, especially
for new users, hard to spot. This patch prevents it.

Changes in v2:
* strip leading blanks and tabs in rules to prevent parsing failures

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-10-11 23:29:19 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 272a6e90ff ima: no need to allocate entry for comment
If a rule is a comment, there is no need to allocate an entry.
Move the checking for comments before allocating the entry.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-10-11 23:28:07 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 78bb5d0b4f ima: report policy load status
Audit messages are rate limited, often causing the policy update
info to not be visible.  Report policy loading status also using
pr_info.

Changes in v2:
* reporting moved to ima_release_policy to notice parsing errors
* reporting both completed and failed status

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-10-11 23:25:25 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 456f5fd3f6 ima: use path names cache
__getname() uses slab allocation which is faster than kmalloc.
Make use of it.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-10-07 14:32:54 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin c2baec7ffa evm: skip replacing EVM signature with HMAC on read-only filesystem
If filesystem is mounted read-only or file is immutable, updating
xattr will fail. This is a usual case during early boot until
filesystem is remount read-write. This patch verifies conditions
to skip unnecessary attempt to calculate HMAC and set xattr.

Changes in v2:
* indention changed according to Lindent (requested by Mimi)

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-10-07 14:32:53 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin d16a8585d3 integrity: add missing '__init' keyword for integrity_init_keyring()
integrity_init_keyring() is used only from kernel '__init'
functions. Add it there as well.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-10-07 14:32:53 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 0f34a0060a ima: check ima_policy_flag in the ima_file_free() hook
This patch completes the switching to the 'ima_policy_flag' variable
in the checks at the beginning of IMA functions, starting with the
commit a756024e.

Checking 'iint_initialized' is completely unnecessary, because
S_IMA flag is unset if iint was not allocated. At the same time
the integrity cache is allocated with SLAB_PANIC and the kernel will
panic if the allocation fails during kernel initialization. So on
a running system iint_initialized is always true and can be removed.

Changes in v3:
* not limiting test to IMA_APPRAISE (spotted by Roberto Sassu)

Changes in v2:
* 'iint_initialized' removal patch merged to this patch (requested
   by Mimi)

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
2014-10-07 14:32:52 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 594081ee71 integrity: do zero padding of the key id
Latest KEYS code return error if hexadecimal string length id odd.
Fix it.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2014-10-06 17:33:27 +01:00
Roberto Sassu 1b68bdf9cd ima: detect violations for mmaped files
This patch fixes the detection of the 'open_writers' violation for mmaped
files.

before) an 'open_writers' violation is detected if the policy contains
        a rule with the criteria: func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ

after) an 'open_writers' violation is detected if the current event
       matches one of the policy rules.

With the old behaviour, the 'open_writers' violation is not detected
in the following case:

policy:
measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC

steps:
1) open a shared library for writing
2) execute a binary that links that shared library
3) during the binary execution, modify the shared library and save
   the change

result:
the 'open_writers' violation measurement is not present in the IMA list.

Only binaries executed are protected from writes. For libraries mapped
in memory there is the flag MAP_DENYWRITE for this purpose, but according
to the output of 'man mmap', the mmap flag is ignored.

Since ima_rdwr_violation_check() is now called by process_measurement()
the information about if the inode must be measured is already provided
by ima_get_action(). Thus the unnecessary function ima_must_measure()
has been removed.

Changes in v3 (Dmitry Kasatkin):
- Violation for MMAP_CHECK function are verified since this patch
- Changed patch description a bit

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-09-18 10:04:12 -04:00
Roberto Sassu f7a859ff73 ima: fix race condition on ima_rdwr_violation_check and process_measurement
This patch fixes a race condition between two functions that try to access
the same inode. Since the i_mutex lock is held and released separately
in the two functions, there may be the possibility that a violation is
not correctly detected.

Suppose there are two processes, A (reader) and B (writer), if the
following sequence happens:

A: ima_rdwr_violation_check()
B: ima_rdwr_violation_check()
B: process_measurement()
B: starts writing the inode
A: process_measurement()

the ToMToU violation (a reader may be accessing a content different from
that measured, due to a concurrent modification by a writer) will not be
detected. To avoid this issue, the violation check and the measurement
must be done atomically.

This patch fixes the problem by moving the violation check inside
process_measurement() when the i_mutex lock is held. Differently from
the old code, the violation check is executed also for the MMAP_CHECK
hook (other than for FILE_CHECK). This allows to detect ToMToU violations
that are possible because shared libraries can be opened for writing
while they are in use (according to the output of 'man mmap', the mmap()
flag MAP_DENYWRITE is ignored).

Changes in v5 (Roberto Sassu):
* get iint if action is not zero
* exit process_measurement() after the violation check if action is zero
* reverse order process_measurement() exit cleanup (Mimi)

Changes in v4 (Dmitry Kasatkin):
* iint allocation is done before calling ima_rdrw_violation_check()
  (Suggested-by Mimi)
* do not check for violations if the policy does not contain 'measure'
  rules (done by Roberto Sassu)

Changes in v3 (Dmitry Kasatkin):
* no violation checking for MMAP_CHECK function in this patch
* remove use of filename from violation
* removes checking if ima is enabled from ima_rdrw_violation_check
* slight style change

Suggested-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-09-18 10:03:55 -04:00
Roberto Sassu a756024efe ima: added ima_policy_flag variable
This patch introduces the new variable 'ima_policy_flag', whose bits
are set depending on the action of the current policy rules. Only the
flags IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE and IMA_AUDIT are set.

The new variable will be used to improve performance by skipping the
unnecessary execution of IMA code if the policy does not contain rules
with the above actions.

Changes in v6 (Roberto Sassu)
* do not check 'ima_initialized' before calling ima_update_policy_flag()
  in ima_update_policy() (suggested by Dmitry)
* calling ima_update_policy_flag() moved to init_ima to co-locate with
  ima_initialized (Dmitry)
* add/revise comments (Mimi)

Changes in v5 (Roberto Sassu)
* reset IMA_APPRAISE flag in 'ima_policy_flag' if 'ima_appraise' is set
  to zero (reported by Dmitry)
* update 'ima_policy_flag' only if IMA initialization is successful
  (suggested by Mimi and Dmitry)
* check 'ima_policy_flag' instead of 'ima_initialized'
  (suggested by Mimi and Dmitry)

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-09-17 16:39:36 -04:00
Roberto Sassu be39ffc2fe ima: return an error code from ima_add_boot_aggregate()
This patch modifies ima_add_boot_aggregate() to return an error code.
This way we can determine if all the initialization procedures have
been executed successfully.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-09-17 16:15:42 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 2faa6ef3b2 ima: provide 'ima_appraise=log' kernel option
The kernel boot parameter "ima_appraise" currently defines 'off',
'enforce' and 'fix' modes.  When designing a policy and labeling
the system, access to files are either blocked in the default
'enforce' mode or automatically fixed in the 'fix' mode.  It is
beneficial to be able to run the system in a logging only mode,
without fixing it, in order to properly analyze the system. This
patch adds a 'log' mode to run the system in a permissive mode and
log the appraisal results.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-09-17 16:14:23 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 31b70f6632 ima: move keyring initialization to ima_init()
ima_init() is used as a single place for all initializations.
Experimental keyring patches used the 'late_initcall' which was
co-located with the late_initcall(init_ima). When the late_initcall
for the keyring initialization was abandoned, initialization moved
to init_ima, though it would be more logical to move it to ima_init,
where the rest of the initialization is done. This patch moves the
keyring initialization to ima_init() as a preparatory step for
loading the keys which will be added to ima_init() in following
patches.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-09-17 16:10:59 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin a2d61ed525 integrity: make integrity files as 'integrity' module
The kernel print macros use the KBUILD_MODNAME, which is initialized
to the module name. The current integrity/Makefile makes every file
as its own module, so pr_xxx messages are prefixed with the file name
instead of the module.  Similar to the evm/Makefile and ima/Makefile,
this patch fixes the integrity/Makefile to use the single name
'integrity'.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-09-09 10:28:58 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 7ef84e65ec integrity: base integrity subsystem kconfig options on integrity
The integrity subsystem has lots of options and takes more than
half of the security menu.  This patch consolidates the options
under "integrity", which are hidden if not enabled.  This change
does not affect existing configurations.  Re-configuration is not
needed.

Changes v4:
- no need to change "integrity subsystem" to menuconfig as
options are hidden, when not enabled. (Mimi)
- add INTEGRITY Kconfig help description

Changes v3:
- dependency to INTEGRITY removed when behind 'if INTEGRITY'

Changes v2:
- previous patch moved integrity out of the 'security' menu.
  This version keeps integrity as a security option (Mimi).

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-09-09 10:28:56 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 1ae8f41c23 integrity: move asymmetric keys config option
For better visual appearance it is better to co-locate
asymmetric key options together with signature support.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-09-09 10:28:55 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin b4148db517 ima: initialize only required template
IMA uses only one template. This patch initializes only required
template to avoid unnecessary memory allocations.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-09-09 10:28:54 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 17f4bad3ab ima: remove usage of filename parameter
In all cases except ima_bprm_check() the filename was not defined
and ima_d_path() was used to find the full path.  Unfortunately,
the bprm filename is a relative pathname (eg. ./<dir>/filename).

ima_bprm_check() selects between bprm->interp and bprm->filename.
The following dump demonstrates the differences between using
filename and interp.

bprm->filename
 filename: ./foo.sh, pathname: /root/bin/foo.sh
 filename: ./foo.sh, pathname: /bin/dash

bprm->interp
 filename: ./foo.sh, pathname: /root/bin/foo.sh
 filename: /bin/sh, pathname: /bin/dash

In both cases the pathnames are currently the same.  This patch
removes usage of filename and interp in favor of d_absolute_path.

Changes v3:
- 11 extra bytes for "deleted" not needed (Mimi)
- purpose "replace relative bprm filename with full pathname" (Mimi)

Changes v2:
- use d_absolute_path() instead of d_path to work in chroot environments.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-09-09 10:28:52 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 86f2bc0249 ima: remove unnecessary appraisal test
ima_get_action() sets the "action" flags based on policy.
Before collecting, measuring, appraising, or auditing the
file, the "action" flag is updated based on the cached
iint->flags.

This patch removes the subsequent unnecessary appraisal
test in ima_appraise_measurement().

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-09-09 10:28:51 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin e4a9c51965 ima: add missing '__init' keywords
Add missing keywords to the function definition to cleanup
to discard initialization code.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-09-09 10:28:50 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 3a8a2eadc4 ima: remove unnecessary extra variable
'function' variable value can be changed instead of
allocating extra '_func' variable.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-09-09 10:28:48 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin f68c05f4d2 ima: simplify conditional statement to improve performance
Precede bit testing before string comparison makes code
faster. Also refactor statement as a single line pointer
assignment. Logic is following: we set 'xattr_ptr' to read
xattr value when we will do appraisal or in any case when
measurement template is other than 'ima'.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-09-09 10:28:47 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 65d98f3be2 integrity: remove declaration of non-existing functions
Commit f381c27 "integrity: move ima inode integrity data management"
(re)moved few functions but left their declarations in header files.
This patch removes them and also removes duplicated declaration of
integrity_iint_find().

Commit c7de7ad "ima: remove unused cleanup functions".  This patch
removes these definitions as well.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-09-09 10:28:46 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin d9a2e5d788 integrity: prevent flooding with 'Request for unknown key'
If file has IMA signature, IMA in enforce mode, but key is missing
then file access is blocked and single error message is printed.

If IMA appraisal is enabled in fix mode, then system runs as usual
but might produce tons of 'Request for unknown key' messages.

This patch switches 'pr_warn' to 'pr_err_ratelimited'.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-09-09 10:28:44 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 3034a14682 ima: pass 'opened' flag to identify newly created files
Empty files and missing xattrs do not guarantee that a file was
just created.  This patch passes FILE_CREATED flag to IMA to
reliably identify new files.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>  3.14+
2014-09-09 10:28:43 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 3dcbad52cf evm: properly handle INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS EVM status
Unless an LSM labels a file during d_instantiate(), newly created
files are not labeled with an initial security.evm xattr, until
the file closes.  EVM, before allowing a protected, security xattr
to be written, verifies the existing 'security.evm' value is good.
For newly created files without a security.evm label, this
verification prevents writing any protected, security xattrs,
until the file closes.

Following is the example when this happens:
fd = open("foo", O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, 0644);
setxattr("foo", "security.SMACK64", value, sizeof(value), 0);
close(fd);

While INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS status is handled in other places, such
as evm_inode_setattr(), it does not handle it in all cases in
evm_protect_xattr().  By limiting the use of INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS to
newly created files, we can now allow setting "protected" xattrs.

Changelog:
- limit the use of INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS to IMA identified new files

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>  3.14+
2014-09-09 10:26:10 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin b151d6b00b ima: provide flag to identify new empty files
On ima_file_free(), newly created empty files are not labeled with
an initial security.ima value, because the iversion did not change.
Commit dff6efc "fs: fix iversion handling" introduced a change in
iversion behavior.  To verify this change use the shell command:

  $ (exec >foo)
  $ getfattr -h -e hex -d -m security foo

This patch defines the IMA_NEW_FILE flag.  The flag is initially
set, when IMA detects that a new file is created, and subsequently
checked on the ima_file_free() hook to set the initial security.ima
value.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>  3.14+
2014-09-08 17:38:57 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 1f1009791b evm: prevent passing integrity check if xattr read fails
This patch fixes a bug, where evm_verify_hmac() returns INTEGRITY_PASS
if inode->i_op->getxattr() returns an error in evm_find_protected_xattrs.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
2014-09-08 17:36:10 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin e7d021e283 evm: fix checkpatch warnings
This patch fixes checkpatch 'return' warnings introduced with commit
9819cf2 "checkpatch: warn on unnecessary void function return statements".

Use scripts/checkpatch.pl --file security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
to produce the warnings.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-09-02 17:03:37 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 27cd1fc3ae ima: fix fallback to use new_sync_read()
3.16 commit aad4f8bb42
'switch simple generic_file_aio_read() users to ->read_iter()'
replaced ->aio_read with ->read_iter in most of the file systems
and introduced new_sync_read() as a replacement for do_sync_read().

Most of file systems set '->read' and ima_kernel_read is not affected.
When ->read is not set, this patch adopts fallback call changes from the
vfs_read.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>  3.16+
2014-09-02 17:03:36 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 23c19e2ca7 ima: prevent buffer overflow in ima_alloc_tfm()
This patch fixes the case where the file's signature/hash xattr contains
an invalid hash algorithm.  Although we can not verify the xattr, we still
need to measure the file.  Use the default IMA hash algorithm.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-09-02 17:03:36 -04:00
Mimi Zohar 9a8d289fbc ima: fix ima_alloc_atfm()
The patch 3bcced39ea7d: "ima: use ahash API for file hash
calculation" from Feb 26, 2014, leads to the following static checker
warning:

security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c:204 ima_alloc_atfm()
         error: buffer overflow 'hash_algo_name' 17 <= 17

Unlike shash tfm memory, which is allocated on initialization, the
ahash tfm memory allocation is deferred until needed.

This patch fixes the case where ima_ahash_tfm has not yet been
allocated and the file's signature/hash xattr contains an invalid hash
algorithm.  Although we can not verify the xattr, we still need to
measure the file.  Use the default IMA hash algorithm.

Changelog:
- set valid algo before testing tfm - based on Dmitry's comment

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
2014-09-02 17:03:35 -04:00
Mimi Zohar 5a9196d715 ima: add support for measuring and appraising firmware
The "security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook" patch defined a
new security hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built
into the kernel.

This patch defines ima_fw_from_file(), which is called from the new
security hook, to measure and/or appraise the loaded firmware's
integrity.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2014-07-25 11:47:46 -07:00
Mimi Zohar 7d2ce2320e ima: define '.ima' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring
Require all keys added to the IMA keyring be signed by an
existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring.

Changelog v6:
- remove ifdef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING in C code - Dmitry
- update Kconfig dependency and help
- select KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS - Dmitry

Changelog v5:
- Move integrity_init_keyring() to init_ima() - Dmitry
- reset keyring[id] on failure - Dmitry

Changelog v1:
- don't link IMA trusted keyring to user keyring

Changelog:
- define stub integrity_init_keyring() function (reported-by Fengguang Wu)
- differentiate between regular and trusted keyring names.
- replace printk with pr_info (D. Kasatkin)
- only make the IMA keyring a trusted keyring (reported-by D. Kastatkin)
- define stub integrity_init_keyring() definition based on
  CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE, not CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS.
  (reported-by Jim Davis)

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2014-07-17 09:35:17 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 32c2e6752f ima: provide double buffering for hash calculation
The asynchronous hash API allows initiating a hash calculation and
then performing other tasks, while waiting for the hash calculation
to complete.

This patch introduces usage of double buffering for simultaneous
hashing and reading of the next chunk of data from storage.

Changes in v3:
- better comments

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-07-17 09:35:11 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 6edf7a8926 ima: introduce multi-page collect buffers
Use of multiple-page collect buffers reduces:
1) the number of block IO requests
2) the number of asynchronous hash update requests

Second is important for HW accelerated hashing, because significant
amount of time is spent for preparation of hash update operation,
which includes configuring acceleration HW, DMA engine, etc...
Thus, HW accelerators are more efficient when working on large
chunks of data.

This patch introduces usage of multi-page collect buffers. Buffer size
can be specified using 'ahash_bufsize' module parameter. Default buffer
size is 4096 bytes.

Changes in v3:
- kernel parameter replaced with module parameter

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-07-17 09:35:11 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 3bcced39ea ima: use ahash API for file hash calculation
Async hash API allows the use of HW acceleration for hash calculation.
It may give significant performance gain and/or reduce power consumption,
which might be very beneficial for battery powered devices.

This patch introduces hash calculation using ahash API. ahash performance
depends on the data size and the particular HW. Depending on the specific
system, shash performance may be better.

This patch defines 'ahash_minsize' module parameter, which is used to
define the minimal file size to use with ahash.  If this minimum file size
is not set or the file is smaller than defined by the parameter, shash will
be used.

Changes in v3:
- kernel parameter replaced with module parameter
- pr_crit replaced with pr_crit_ratelimited
- more comment changes - Mimi

Changes in v2:
- ima_ahash_size became as ima_ahash
- ahash pre-allocation moved out from __init code to be able to use
  ahash crypto modules. Ahash allocated once on the first use.
- hash calculation falls back to shash if ahash allocation/calculation fails
- complex initialization separated from variable declaration
- improved comments

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-07-17 09:35:10 -04:00
Richard Guy Briggs 7e9001f663 audit: fix dangling keywords in integrity ima message output
Replace spaces in op keyword labels in log output since userspace audit tools
can't parse orphaned keywords.

Reported-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-07-17 09:35:10 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 209b43ca64 ima: delay template descriptor lookup until use
process_measurement() always calls ima_template_desc_current(),
including when an IMA policy has not been defined.

This patch delays template descriptor lookup until action is
determined.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-07-17 09:35:09 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 2c50b96482 ima: remove unnecessary i_mutex locking from ima_rdwr_violation_check()
Before 2.6.39 inode->i_readcount was maintained by IMA. It was not atomic
and protected using spinlock. For 2.6.39, i_readcount was converted to
atomic and maintaining was moved VFS layer. Spinlock for some unclear
reason was replaced by i_mutex.

After analyzing the code, we came to conclusion that i_mutex locking is
unnecessary, especially when an IMA policy has not been defined.

This patch removes i_mutex locking from ima_rdwr_violation_check().

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-07-17 09:35:09 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 0430e49b6e ima: introduce ima_kernel_read()
Commit 8aac62706 "move exit_task_namespaces() outside of exit_notify"
introduced the kernel opps since the kernel v3.10, which happens when
Apparmor and IMA-appraisal are enabled at the same time.

----------------------------------------------------------------------
[  106.750167] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
0000000000000018
[  106.750221] IP: [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
[  106.750241] PGD 0
[  106.750254] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[  106.750272] Modules linked in: cuse parport_pc ppdev bnep rfcomm
bluetooth rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl nfs lockd sunrpc
fscache dm_crypt intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp
kvm_intel snd_hda_codec_hdmi kvm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul
ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 glue_helper lrw gf128mul
ablk_helper cryptd snd_hda_codec_realtek dcdbas snd_hda_intel
snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_page_alloc snd_seq_midi
snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi psmouse snd_seq microcode serio_raw
snd_timer snd_seq_device snd soundcore video lpc_ich coretemp mac_hid lp
parport mei_me mei nbd hid_generic e1000e usbhid ahci ptp hid libahci
pps_core
[  106.750658] CPU: 6 PID: 1394 Comm: mysqld Not tainted 3.13.0-rc7-kds+ #15
[  106.750673] Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 9010/0M9KCM, BIOS A08
09/19/2012
[  106.750689] task: ffff8800de804920 ti: ffff880400fca000 task.ti:
ffff880400fca000
[  106.750704] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811ec7da>]  [<ffffffff811ec7da>]
our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
[  106.750725] RSP: 0018:ffff880400fcba60  EFLAGS: 00010286
[  106.750738] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000100 RCX:
ffff8800d51523e7
[  106.750764] RDX: ffffffffffffffea RSI: ffff880400fcba34 RDI:
ffff880402d20020
[  106.750791] RBP: ffff880400fcbae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09:
0000000000000001
[  106.750817] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12:
ffff8800d5152300
[  106.750844] R13: ffff8803eb8df510 R14: ffff880400fcbb28 R15:
ffff8800d51523e7
[  106.750871] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88040d200000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  106.750910] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  106.750935] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000001c0e000 CR4:
00000000001407e0
[  106.750962] Stack:
[  106.750981]  ffffffff813434eb ffff880400fcbb20 ffff880400fcbb18
0000000000000000
[  106.751037]  ffff8800de804920 ffffffff8101b9b9 0001800000000000
0000000000000100
[  106.751093]  0000010000000000 0000000000000002 000000000000000e
ffff8803eb8df500
[  106.751149] Call Trace:
[  106.751172]  [<ffffffff813434eb>] ? aa_path_name+0x2ab/0x430
[  106.751199]  [<ffffffff8101b9b9>] ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
[  106.751225]  [<ffffffff8134a68d>] aa_path_perm+0x7d/0x170
[  106.751250]  [<ffffffff8101b945>] ? native_sched_clock+0x15/0x80
[  106.751276]  [<ffffffff8134aa73>] aa_file_perm+0x33/0x40
[  106.751301]  [<ffffffff81348c5e>] common_file_perm+0x8e/0xb0
[  106.751327]  [<ffffffff81348d78>] apparmor_file_permission+0x18/0x20
[  106.751355]  [<ffffffff8130c853>] security_file_permission+0x23/0xa0
[  106.751382]  [<ffffffff811c77a2>] rw_verify_area+0x52/0xe0
[  106.751407]  [<ffffffff811c789d>] vfs_read+0x6d/0x170
[  106.751432]  [<ffffffff811cda31>] kernel_read+0x41/0x60
[  106.751457]  [<ffffffff8134fd45>] ima_calc_file_hash+0x225/0x280
[  106.751483]  [<ffffffff8134fb52>] ? ima_calc_file_hash+0x32/0x280
[  106.751509]  [<ffffffff8135022d>] ima_collect_measurement+0x9d/0x160
[  106.751536]  [<ffffffff810b552d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[  106.751562]  [<ffffffff8134f07c>] ? ima_file_free+0x6c/0xd0
[  106.751587]  [<ffffffff81352824>] ima_update_xattr+0x34/0x60
[  106.751612]  [<ffffffff8134f0d0>] ima_file_free+0xc0/0xd0
[  106.751637]  [<ffffffff811c9635>] __fput+0xd5/0x300
[  106.751662]  [<ffffffff811c98ae>] ____fput+0xe/0x10
[  106.751687]  [<ffffffff81086774>] task_work_run+0xc4/0xe0
[  106.751712]  [<ffffffff81066fad>] do_exit+0x2bd/0xa90
[  106.751738]  [<ffffffff8173c958>] ? retint_swapgs+0x13/0x1b
[  106.751763]  [<ffffffff8106780c>] do_group_exit+0x4c/0xc0
[  106.751788]  [<ffffffff81067894>] SyS_exit_group+0x14/0x20
[  106.751814]  [<ffffffff8174522d>] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f
[  106.751839] Code: c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 e8 22 fe ff ff 5d c3
0f 1f 44 00 00 55 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 c9 00 00 48 8b 80 28 06 00 00 48 89
e5 5d <48> 8b 40 18 48 39 87 c0 00 00 00 0f 94 c0 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00
[  106.752185] RIP  [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
[  106.752214]  RSP <ffff880400fcba60>
[  106.752236] CR2: 0000000000000018
[  106.752258] ---[ end trace 3c520748b4732721 ]---
----------------------------------------------------------------------

The reason for the oops is that IMA-appraisal uses "kernel_read()" when
file is closed. kernel_read() honors LSM security hook which calls
Apparmor handler, which uses current->nsproxy->mnt_ns. The 'guilty'
commit changed the order of cleanup code so that nsproxy->mnt_ns was
not already available for Apparmor.

Discussion about the issue with Al Viro and Eric W. Biederman suggested
that kernel_read() is too high-level for IMA. Another issue, except
security checking, that was identified is mandatory locking. kernel_read
honors it as well and it might prevent IMA from calculating necessary hash.
It was suggested to use simplified version of the function without security
and locking checks.

This patch introduces special version ima_kernel_read(), which skips security
and mandatory locking checking. It prevents the kernel oops to happen.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Suggested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
2014-06-12 17:58:08 -04:00
Mimi Zohar 2fb1c9a4f2 evm: prohibit userspace writing 'security.evm' HMAC value
Calculating the 'security.evm' HMAC value requires access to the
EVM encrypted key.  Only the kernel should have access to it.  This
patch prevents userspace tools(eg. setfattr, cp --preserve=xattr)
from setting/modifying the 'security.evm' HMAC value directly.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
2014-06-12 17:58:07 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 14503eb994 ima: check inode integrity cache in violation check
When IMA did not support ima-appraisal, existance of the S_IMA flag
clearly indicated that the file was measured. With IMA appraisal S_IMA
flag indicates that file was measured and/or appraised. Because of
this, when measurement is not enabled by the policy, violations are
still reported.

To differentiate between measurement and appraisal policies this
patch checks the inode integrity cache flags.  The IMA_MEASURED
flag indicates whether the file was actually measured, while the
IMA_MEASURE flag indicates whether the file should be measured.
Unfortunately, the IMA_MEASURED flag is reset to indicate the file
needs to be re-measured.  Thus, this patch checks the IMA_MEASURE
flag.

This patch limits the false positive violation reports, but does
not fix it entirely.  The IMA_MEASURE/IMA_MEASURED flags are
indications that, at some point in time, the file opened for read
was in policy, but might not be in policy now (eg. different uid).
Other changes would be needed to further limit false positive
violation reports.

Changelog:
- expanded patch description based on conversation with Roberto (Mimi)

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-06-12 17:58:07 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin b882fae2d3 ima: prevent unnecessary policy checking
ima_rdwr_violation_check is called for every file openning.
The function checks the policy even when violation condition
is not met. It causes unnecessary policy checking.

This patch does policy checking only if violation condition is met.

Changelog:
- check writecount is greater than zero (Mimi)

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-06-12 17:58:06 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 3e38df56e6 evm: provide option to protect additional SMACK xattrs
Newer versions of SMACK introduced following security xattrs:
SMACK64EXEC, SMACK64TRANSMUTE and SMACK64MMAP.

To protect these xattrs, this patch includes them in the HMAC
calculation.  However, for backwards compatibility with existing
labeled filesystems, including these xattrs needs to be
configurable.

Changelog:
- Add SMACK dependency on new option (Mimi)

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-06-12 17:58:06 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin d3b3367948 evm: replace HMAC version with attribute mask
Using HMAC version limits the posibility to arbitrarily add new
attributes such as SMACK64EXEC to the hmac calculation.

This patch replaces hmac version with attribute mask.
Desired attributes can be enabled with configuration parameter.
It allows to build kernels which works with previously labeled
filesystems.

Currently supported attribute is 'fsuuid' which is equivalent of
the former version 2.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-06-12 17:58:06 -04:00
Mimi Zohar 060bdebfb0 ima: prevent new digsig xattr from being replaced
Even though a new xattr will only be appraised on the next access,
set the DIGSIG flag to prevent a signature from being replaced with
a hash on file close.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-06-12 17:58:05 -04:00
Linus Torvalds fad0701eaa Merge branch 'serge-next-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security
Pull security layer updates from Serge Hallyn:
 "This is a merge of James Morris' security-next tree from 3.14 to
  yesterday's master, plus four patches from Paul Moore which are in
  linux-next, plus one patch from Mimi"

* 'serge-next-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security:
  ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag
  selinux: conditionally reschedule in hashtab_insert while loading selinux policy
  selinux: conditionally reschedule in mls_convert_context while loading selinux policy
  selinux: reject setexeccon() on MNT_NOSUID applications with -EACCES
  selinux:  Report permissive mode in avc: denied messages.
  Warning in scanf string typing
  Smack: Label cgroup files for systemd
  Smack: Verify read access on file open - v3
  security: Convert use of typedef ctl_table to struct ctl_table
  Smack: bidirectional UDS connect check
  Smack: Correctly remove SMACK64TRANSMUTE attribute
  SMACK: Fix handling value==NULL in post setxattr
  bugfix patch for SMACK
  Smack: adds smackfs/ptrace interface
  Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack
  Smack: fix the subject/object order in smack_ptrace_traceme()
  Minor improvement of 'smack_sb_kern_mount'
  smack: fix key permission verification
  KEYS: Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h
2014-06-10 10:05:36 -07:00
Mimi Zohar f9b2a735bd ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag
Files are measured or appraised based on the IMA policy.  When a
file, in policy, is opened with the O_DIRECT flag, a deadlock
occurs.

The first attempt at resolving this lockdep temporarily removed the
O_DIRECT flag and restored it, after calculating the hash.  The
second attempt introduced the O_DIRECT_HAVELOCK flag. Based on this
flag, do_blockdev_direct_IO() would skip taking the i_mutex a second
time.  The third attempt, by Dmitry Kasatkin, resolves the i_mutex
locking issue, by re-introducing the IMA mutex, but uncovered
another problem.  Reading a file with O_DIRECT flag set, writes
directly to userspace pages.  A second patch allocates a user-space
like memory.  This works for all IMA hooks, except ima_file_free(),
which is called on __fput() to recalculate the file hash.

Until this last issue is addressed, do not 'collect' the
measurement for measuring, appraising, or auditing files opened
with the O_DIRECT flag set.  Based on policy, permit or deny file
access.  This patch defines a new IMA policy rule option named
'permit_directio'.  Policy rules could be defined, based on LSM
or other criteria, to permit specific applications to open files
with the O_DIRECT flag set.

Changelog v1:
- permit or deny file access based IMA policy rules

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
2014-06-03 14:21:50 -05:00
Linus Torvalds 5166701b36 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "The first vfs pile, with deep apologies for being very late in this
  window.

  Assorted cleanups and fixes, plus a large preparatory part of iov_iter
  work.  There's a lot more of that, but it'll probably go into the next
  merge window - it *does* shape up nicely, removes a lot of
  boilerplate, gets rid of locking inconsistencie between aio_write and
  splice_write and I hope to get Kent's direct-io rewrite merged into
  the same queue, but some of the stuff after this point is having
  (mostly trivial) conflicts with the things already merged into
  mainline and with some I want more testing.

  This one passes LTP and xfstests without regressions, in addition to
  usual beating.  BTW, readahead02 in ltp syscalls testsuite has started
  giving failures since "mm/readahead.c: fix readahead failure for
  memoryless NUMA nodes and limit readahead pages" - might be a false
  positive, might be a real regression..."

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
  missing bits of "splice: fix racy pipe->buffers uses"
  cifs: fix the race in cifs_writev()
  ceph_sync_{,direct_}write: fix an oops on ceph_osdc_new_request() failure
  kill generic_file_buffered_write()
  ocfs2_file_aio_write(): switch to generic_perform_write()
  ceph_aio_write(): switch to generic_perform_write()
  xfs_file_buffered_aio_write(): switch to generic_perform_write()
  export generic_perform_write(), start getting rid of generic_file_buffer_write()
  generic_file_direct_write(): get rid of ppos argument
  btrfs_file_aio_write(): get rid of ppos
  kill the 5th argument of generic_file_buffered_write()
  kill the 4th argument of __generic_file_aio_write()
  lustre: don't open-code kernel_recvmsg()
  ocfs2: don't open-code kernel_recvmsg()
  drbd: don't open-code kernel_recvmsg()
  constify blk_rq_map_user_iov() and friends
  lustre: switch to kernel_sendmsg()
  ocfs2: don't open-code kernel_sendmsg()
  take iov_iter stuff to mm/iov_iter.c
  process_vm_access: tidy up a bit
  ...
2014-04-12 14:49:50 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 0b747172dc Merge git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit
Pull audit updates from Eric Paris.

* git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit: (28 commits)
  AUDIT: make audit_is_compat depend on CONFIG_AUDIT_COMPAT_GENERIC
  audit: renumber AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE into the 1300 range
  audit: do not cast audit_rule_data pointers pointlesly
  AUDIT: Allow login in non-init namespaces
  audit: define audit_is_compat in kernel internal header
  kernel: Use RCU_INIT_POINTER(x, NULL) in audit.c
  sched: declare pid_alive as inline
  audit: use uapi/linux/audit.h for AUDIT_ARCH declarations
  syscall_get_arch: remove useless function arguments
  audit: remove stray newline from audit_log_execve_info() audit_panic() call
  audit: remove stray newlines from audit_log_lost messages
  audit: include subject in login records
  audit: remove superfluous new- prefix in AUDIT_LOGIN messages
  audit: allow user processes to log from another PID namespace
  audit: anchor all pid references in the initial pid namespace
  audit: convert PPIDs to the inital PID namespace.
  pid: get pid_t ppid of task in init_pid_ns
  audit: rename the misleading audit_get_context() to audit_take_context()
  audit: Add generic compat syscall support
  audit: Add CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
  ...
2014-04-12 12:38:53 -07:00
Al Viro 627bf81ac6 get rid of pointless checks for NULL ->i_op
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-04-01 23:19:16 -04:00
Richard Guy Briggs f1dc4867ff audit: anchor all pid references in the initial pid namespace
Store and log all PIDs with reference to the initial PID namespace and
use the access functions task_pid_nr() and task_tgid_nr() for task->pid
and task->tgid.

Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
(informed by ebiederman's c776b5d2)
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
2014-03-20 10:11:55 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin a3aef94b31 evm: enable key retention service automatically
If keys are not enabled, EVM is not visible in the configuration menu.
It may be difficult to figure out what to do unless you really know.
Other subsystems as NFS, CIFS select keys automatically. This patch does
the same.

This patch also removes '(TRUSTED_KEYS=y || TRUSTED_KEYS=n)' dependency,
which is unnecessary. EVM does not depend on trusted keys, but on
encrypted keys. evm.h provides compile time dependency.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-03-07 12:15:49 -05:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 1d91ac6213 ima: skip memory allocation for empty files
Memory allocation is unnecessary for empty files.
This patch calculates the hash without memory allocation.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-03-07 12:15:48 -05:00
Dmitry Kasatkin e0420039b6 evm: EVM does not use MD5
EVM does not use MD5 HMAC. Selection of CRYPTO_MD5 can be safely removed.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-03-07 12:15:47 -05:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 61997c4383 ima: return d_name.name if d_path fails
This is a small refactoring so ima_d_path() returns dentry name
if path reconstruction fails. It simplifies callers actions
and removes code duplication.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-03-07 12:15:46 -05:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 2bb930abcf integrity: fix checkpatch errors
Between checkpatch changes (eg. sizeof) and inconsistencies between
Lindent and checkpatch, unfixed checkpatch errors make it difficult
to see new errors. This patch fixes them. Some lines with over 80 chars
remained unchanged to improve code readability.

The "extern" keyword is removed from internal evm.h to make it consistent
with internal ima.h.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-03-07 12:15:45 -05:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 09b1148ef5 ima: fix erroneous removal of security.ima xattr
ima_inode_post_setattr() calls ima_must_appraise() to check if the
file needs to be appraised. If it does not then it removes security.ima
xattr. With original policy matching code it might happen that even
file needs to be appraised with FILE_CHECK hook, it might not be
for POST_SETATTR hook. 'security.ima' might be erronously removed.

This patch treats POST_SETATTR as special wildcard function and will
cause ima_must_appraise() to be true if any of the hooks rules matches.
security.ima will not be removed if any of the hooks would require
appraisal.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-03-07 12:15:44 -05:00
Joe Perches 20ee451f5a security: integrity: Use a more current logging style
Convert printks to pr_<level>.
Add pr_fmt.
Remove embedded prefixes.

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-03-07 12:15:21 -05:00
Roberto Sassu e3b64c268b ima: reduce memory usage when a template containing the n field is used
Before this change, to correctly calculate the template digest for the
'ima' template, the event name field (id: 'n') length was set to the fixed
size of 256 bytes.

This patch reduces the length of the event name field to the string
length incremented of one (to make room for the termination character '\0')
and handles the specific case of the digest calculation for the 'ima'
template directly in ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm().

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-03-07 11:32:30 -05:00
Roberto Sassu c019e307ad ima: restore the original behavior for sending data with ima template
With the new template mechanism introduced in IMA since kernel 3.13,
the format of data sent through the binary_runtime_measurements interface
is slightly changed. Now, for a generic measurement, the format of
template data (after the template name) is:

template_len | field1_len | field1 | ... | fieldN_len | fieldN

In addition, fields containing a string now include the '\0' termination
character.

Instead, the format for the 'ima' template should be:

SHA1 digest | event name length | event name

It must be noted that while in the IMA 3.13 code 'event name length' is
'IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1' (256 bytes), so that the template digest
is calculated correctly, and 'event name' contains '\0', in the pre 3.13
code 'event name length' is exactly the string length and 'event name'
does not contain the termination character.

The patch restores the behavior of the IMA code pre 3.13 for the 'ima'
template so that legacy userspace tools obtain a consistent behavior
when receiving data from the binary_runtime_measurements interface
regardless of which kernel version is used.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.3.13: 3ce1217 ima: define template fields library
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-03-07 11:32:29 -05:00
Tetsuo Handa 73a6b44a00 Integrity: Pass commname via get_task_comm()
When we pass task->comm to audit_log_untrustedstring(), we need to pass it
via get_task_comm() because task->comm can be changed to contain untrusted
string by other threads after audit_log_untrustedstring() confirmed that
task->comm does not contain untrusted string.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-03-07 11:32:28 -05:00
Mimi Zohar 52a1328484 ima: use static const char array definitions
A const char pointer allocates memory for a pointer as well as for
a string,  This patch replaces a number of the const char pointers
throughout IMA, with a static const char array.

Suggested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2014-03-07 11:30:36 -05:00