Commit Graph

1075 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Daniel Borkmann 9b87d46510 net: sctp: fix incorrect type in gfp initializer
This fixes the following sparse warning:

  net/sctp/associola.c:1556:29: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different base types)
  net/sctp/associola.c:1556:29:    expected bool [unsigned] [usertype] preload
  net/sctp/associola.c:1556:29:    got restricted gfp_t

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-06-11 12:23:17 -07:00
Daniel Borkmann a7288c4dd5 net: sctp: improve sctp_select_active_and_retran_path selection
In function sctp_select_active_and_retran_path(), we walk the
transport list in order to look for the two most recently used
ACTIVE transports (trans_pri, trans_sec). In case we didn't find
anything ACTIVE, we currently just camp on a possibly PF or
INACTIVE transport that is primary path; this behavior actually
dates back to linux-history tree of the very early days of
lksctp, and can yield a behavior that chooses suboptimal
transport paths.

Instead, be a bit more clever by reusing and extending the
recently introduced sctp_trans_elect_best() handler. In case
both transports are evaluated to have the same score resulting
from their states, break the tie by looking at: 1) transport
patch error count 2) last_time_heard value from each transport.

This is analogous to Nishida's Quick Failover draft [1],
section 5.1, 3:

  The sender SHOULD avoid data transmission to PF destinations.
  When all destinations are in either PF or Inactive state,
  the sender MAY either move the destination from PF to active
  state (and transmit data to the active destination) or the
  sender MAY transmit data to a PF destination. In the former
  scenario, (i) the sender MUST NOT notify the ULP about the
  state transition, and (ii) MUST NOT clear the destination's
  error counter. It is recommended that the sender picks the
  PF destination with least error count (fewest consecutive
  timeouts) for data transmission. In case of a tie (multiple PF
  destinations with same error count), the sender MAY choose the
  last active destination.

Thus for sctp_select_active_and_retran_path(), we keep track of
the best, if any, transport that is in PF state and in case no
ACTIVE transport has been found (hence trans_{pri,sec} is NULL),
we select the best out of the three: current primary_path and
retran_path as well as a possible PF transport.

The secondary may still camp on the original primary_path as
before. The change in sctp_trans_elect_best() with a more fine
grained tie selection also improves at the same time path selection
for sctp_assoc_update_retran_path() in case of non-ACTIVE states.

  [1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nishida-tsvwg-sctp-failover-05

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-06-11 12:23:17 -07:00
Daniel Borkmann e575235fc6 net: sctp: migrate most recently used transport to ktime
Be more precise in transport path selection and use ktime
helpers instead of jiffies to compare and pick the better
primary and secondary recently used transports. This also
avoids any side-effects during a possible roll-over, and
could lead to better path decision-making.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-06-11 12:23:17 -07:00
Daniel Borkmann b82e8f31ac net: sctp: refactor active path selection
This patch just refactors and moves the code for the active
path selection into its own helper function outside of
sctp_assoc_control_transport() which is already big enough.
No functional changes here.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-06-11 12:23:17 -07:00
Daniel Borkmann 67cb9366ff ktime: add ktime_after and ktime_before helper
Add two minimal helper functions analogous to time_before() and
time_after() that will later on both be needed by SCTP code.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-06-11 12:23:17 -07:00
Tom Herbert 28448b8045 net: Split sk_no_check into sk_no_check_{rx,tx}
Define separate fields in the sock structure for configuring disabling
checksums in both TX and RX-- sk_no_check_tx and sk_no_check_rx.
The SO_NO_CHECK socket option only affects sk_no_check_tx. Also,
removed UDP_CSUM_* defines since they are no longer necessary.

Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-05-23 16:28:53 -04:00
Tom Herbert b26ba202e0 net: Eliminate no_check from protosw
It doesn't seem like an protocols are setting anything other
than the default, and allowing to arbitrarily disable checksums
for a whole protocol seems dangerous. This can be done on a per
socket basis.

Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-05-23 16:28:53 -04:00
WANG Cong c9f2dba61b snmp: fix some left over of snmp stats
Fengguang reported the following sparse warning:

>> net/ipv6/proc.c:198:41: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces)
   net/ipv6/proc.c:198:41:    expected void [noderef] <asn:3>*mib
   net/ipv6/proc.c:198:41:    got void [noderef] <asn:3>**pcpumib

Fixes: commit 698365fa18 (net: clean up snmp stats code)
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-05-14 15:33:47 -04:00
WANG Cong 122ff243f5 ipv4: make ip_local_reserved_ports per netns
ip_local_port_range is already per netns, so should ip_local_reserved_ports
be. And since it is none by default we don't actually need it when we don't
enable CONFIG_SYSCTL.

By the way, rename inet_is_reserved_local_port() to inet_is_local_reserved_port()

Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-05-14 15:31:45 -04:00
WANG Cong 60ff746739 net: rename local_df to ignore_df
As suggested by several people, rename local_df to ignore_df,
since it means "ignore df bit if it is set".

Cc: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-05-12 14:03:41 -04:00
David S. Miller 5f013c9bc7 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
Conflicts:
	drivers/net/ethernet/altera/altera_sgdma.c
	net/netlink/af_netlink.c
	net/sched/cls_api.c
	net/sched/sch_api.c

The netlink conflict dealt with moving to netlink_capable() and
netlink_ns_capable() in the 'net' tree vs. supporting 'tc' operations
in non-init namespaces.  These were simple transformations from
netlink_capable to netlink_ns_capable.

The Altera driver conflict was simply code removal overlapping some
void pointer cast cleanups in net-next.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-05-12 13:19:14 -04:00
wangweidong f66138c847 sctp: add a checking for sctp_sysctl_net_register
When register_net_sysctl failed, we should free the
sysctl_table.

Signed-off-by: Wang Weidong <wangweidong1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-05-09 16:41:09 -04:00
wangweidong eb9f37053d Revert "sctp: optimize the sctp_sysctl_net_register"
This revert commit efb842c45("sctp: optimize the sctp_sysctl_net_register"),
Since it doesn't kmemdup a sysctl_table for init_net, so the
init_net->sctp.sysctl_header->ctl_table_arg points to sctp_net_table
which is a static array pointer. So when doing sctp_sysctl_net_unregister,
it will free sctp_net_table, then we will get a NULL pointer dereference
like that:

[  262.948220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000006c
[  262.948232] IP: [<ffffffff81144b70>] kfree+0x80/0x420
[  262.948260] PGD db80a067 PUD dae12067 PMD 0
[  262.948268] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[  262.948273] Modules linked in: sctp(-) crc32c_generic libcrc32c
...
[  262.948338] task: ffff8800db830190 ti: ffff8800dad00000 task.ti: ffff8800dad00000
[  262.948344] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81144b70>]  [<ffffffff81144b70>] kfree+0x80/0x420
[  262.948353] RSP: 0018:ffff8800dad01d88  EFLAGS: 00010046
[  262.948358] RAX: 0100000000000000 RBX: ffffffffa0227940 RCX: ffffea0000707888
[  262.948363] RDX: ffffea0000707888 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffa0227940
[  262.948369] RBP: ffff8800dad01de8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8800d9e983a9
[  262.948374] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffa0227940
[  262.948380] R13: ffffffff8187cfc0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffff8187da10
[  262.948386] FS:  00007fa2a2658700(0000) GS:ffff880112800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  262.948394] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[  262.948400] CR2: 000000000000006c CR3: 00000000cddc0000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[  262.948410] Stack:
[  262.948413]  ffff8800dad01da8 0000000000000286 0000000020227940 ffffffffa0227940
[  262.948422]  ffff8800dad01dd8 ffffffff811b7fa1 ffffffffa0227940 ffffffffa0227940
[  262.948431]  ffffffff8187d960 ffffffff8187cfc0 ffffffff8187d960 ffffffff8187da10
[  262.948440] Call Trace:
[  262.948457]  [<ffffffff811b7fa1>] ? unregister_sysctl_table+0x51/0xa0
[  262.948476]  [<ffffffffa020d1a1>] sctp_sysctl_net_unregister+0x21/0x30 [sctp]
[  262.948490]  [<ffffffffa020ef6d>] sctp_net_exit+0x12d/0x150 [sctp]
[  262.948512]  [<ffffffff81394f49>] ops_exit_list+0x39/0x60
[  262.948522]  [<ffffffff813951ed>] unregister_pernet_operations+0x3d/0x70
[  262.948530]  [<ffffffff81395292>] unregister_pernet_subsys+0x22/0x40
[  262.948544]  [<ffffffffa020efcc>] sctp_exit+0x3c/0x12d [sctp]
[  262.948562]  [<ffffffff810c5e04>] SyS_delete_module+0x194/0x210
[  262.948577]  [<ffffffff81240fde>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
[  262.948587]  [<ffffffff815217a2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

With this revert, it won't occur the Oops.

Signed-off-by: Wang Weidong <wangweidong1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-05-09 16:41:08 -04:00
WANG Cong 698365fa18 net: clean up snmp stats code
commit 8f0ea0fe3a (snmp: reduce percpu needs by 50%)
reduced snmp array size to 1, so technically it doesn't have to be
an array any more. What's more, after the following commit:

	commit 933393f58f
	Date:   Thu Dec 22 11:58:51 2011 -0600

	    percpu: Remove irqsafe_cpu_xxx variants

	    We simply say that regular this_cpu use must be safe regardless of
	    preemption and interrupt state.  That has no material change for x86
	    and s390 implementations of this_cpu operations.  However, arches that
	    do not provide their own implementation for this_cpu operations will
	    now get code generated that disables interrupts instead of preemption.

probably no arch wants to have SNMP_ARRAY_SZ == 2. At least after
almost 3 years, no one complains.

So, just convert the array to a single pointer and remove snmp_mib_init()
and snmp_mib_free() as well.

Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-05-07 16:06:05 -04:00
Karl Heiss 8c2eab9097 net: sctp: Don't transition to PF state when transport has exhausted 'Path.Max.Retrans'.
Don't transition to the PF state on every strike after 'Path.Max.Retrans'.
Per draft-ietf-tsvwg-sctp-failover-03 Section 5.1.6:

   Additional (PMR - PFMR) consecutive timeouts on a PF destination
   confirm the path failure, upon which the destination transitions to the
   Inactive state.  As described in [RFC4960], the sender (i) SHOULD notify
   ULP about this state transition, and (ii) transmit heartbeats to the
   Inactive destination at a lower frequency as described in Section 8.3 of
   [RFC4960].

This also prevents sending SCTP_ADDR_UNREACHABLE to the user as the state
bounces between SCTP_INACTIVE and SCTP_PF for each subsequent strike.

Signed-off-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-27 23:41:14 -04:00
Xufeng Zhang 8535087131 sctp: reset flowi4_oif parameter on route lookup
commit 813b3b5db8 (ipv4: Use caller's on-stack flowi as-is
in output route lookups.) introduces another regression which
is very similar to the problem of commit e6b45241c (ipv4: reset
flowi parameters on route connect) wants to fix:
Before we call ip_route_output_key() in sctp_v4_get_dst() to
get a dst that matches a bind address as the source address,
we have already called this function previously and the flowi
parameters have been initialized including flowi4_oif, so when
we call this function again, the process in __ip_route_output_key()
will be different because of the setting of flowi4_oif, and we'll
get a networking device which corresponds to the inputted flowi4_oif
as the output device, this is wrong because we'll never hit this
place if the previously returned source address of dst match one
of the bound addresses.

To reproduce this problem, a vlan setting is enough:
  # ifconfig eth0 up
  # route del default
  # vconfig add eth0 2
  # vconfig add eth0 3
  # ifconfig eth0.2 10.0.1.14 netmask 255.255.255.0
  # route add default gw 10.0.1.254 dev eth0.2
  # ifconfig eth0.3 10.0.0.14 netmask 255.255.255.0
  # ip rule add from 10.0.0.14 table 4
  # ip route add table 4 default via 10.0.0.254 src 10.0.0.14 dev eth0.3
  # sctp_darn -H 10.0.0.14 -P 36422 -h 10.1.4.134 -p 36422 -s -I
You'll detect that all the flow are routed to eth0.2(10.0.1.254).

Signed-off-by: Xufeng Zhang <xufeng.zhang@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-27 19:46:17 -04:00
Neil Horman 8465a5fcd1 sctp: add support for busy polling to sctp protocol
The busy polling socket option adds support for sockets to busy wait on data
arriving on the napi queue from which they have most recently received a frame.
Currently only tcp and udp support this feature, but theres no reason sctp can't
do so as well.  Add it in so appliations can take advantage of it

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-20 18:18:55 -04:00
Vlad Yasevich b14878ccb7 net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint
Currently, it is possible to create an SCTP socket, then switch
auth_enable via sysctl setting to 1 and crash the system on connect:

Oops[#1]:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.14.1-mipsgit-20140415 #1
task: ffffffff8056ce80 ti: ffffffff8055c000 task.ti: ffffffff8055c000
[...]
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8043c4e8>] sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac+0x68/0x80
[<ffffffff8042b300>] sctp_process_init+0x5e0/0x8a4
[<ffffffff8042188c>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x234/0x34c
[<ffffffff804228c8>] sctp_do_sm+0xb4/0x1e8
[<ffffffff80425a08>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1c4/0x214
[<ffffffff8043af68>] sctp_rcv+0x588/0x630
[<ffffffff8043e8e8>] sctp6_rcv+0x10/0x24
[<ffffffff803acb50>] ip6_input+0x2c0/0x440
[<ffffffff8030fc00>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x4a8/0x564
[<ffffffff80310650>] process_backlog+0xb4/0x18c
[<ffffffff80313cbc>] net_rx_action+0x12c/0x210
[<ffffffff80034254>] __do_softirq+0x17c/0x2ac
[<ffffffff800345e0>] irq_exit+0x54/0xb0
[<ffffffff800075a4>] ret_from_irq+0x0/0x4
[<ffffffff800090ec>] rm7k_wait_irqoff+0x24/0x48
[<ffffffff8005e388>] cpu_startup_entry+0xc0/0x148
[<ffffffff805a88b0>] start_kernel+0x37c/0x398
Code: dd0900b8  000330f8  0126302d <dcc60000> 50c0fff1  0047182a  a48306a0
03e00008  00000000
---[ end trace b530b0551467f2fd ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

What happens while auth_enable=0 in that case is, that
ep->auth_hmacs is initialized to NULL in sctp_auth_init_hmacs()
when endpoint is being created.

After that point, if an admin switches over to auth_enable=1,
the machine can crash due to NULL pointer dereference during
reception of an INIT chunk. When we enter sctp_process_init()
via sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() in order to respond to an INIT chunk,
the INIT verification succeeds and while we walk and process
all INIT params via sctp_process_param() we find that
net->sctp.auth_enable is set, therefore do not fall through,
but invoke sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac() instead, and thus,
dereference what we have set to NULL during endpoint
initialization phase.

The fix is to make auth_enable immutable by caching its value
during endpoint initialization, so that its original value is
being carried along until destruction. The bug seems to originate
from the very first days.

Fix in joint work with Daniel Borkmann.

Reported-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Tested-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-18 18:32:00 -04:00
Eric Dumazet b0270e9101 ipv4: add a sock pointer to ip_queue_xmit()
ip_queue_xmit() assumes the skb it has to transmit is attached to an
inet socket. Commit 31c70d5956 ("l2tp: keep original skb ownership")
changed l2tp to not change skb ownership and thus broke this assumption.

One fix is to add a new 'struct sock *sk' parameter to ip_queue_xmit(),
so that we do not assume skb->sk points to the socket used by l2tp
tunnel.

Fixes: 31c70d5956 ("l2tp: keep original skb ownership")
Reported-by: Zhan Jianyu <nasa4836@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Zhan Jianyu <nasa4836@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-15 12:58:34 -04:00
Daniel Borkmann 362d52040c Revert "net: sctp: Fix a_rwnd/rwnd management to reflect real state of the receiver's buffer"
This reverts commit ef2820a735 ("net: sctp: Fix a_rwnd/rwnd management
to reflect real state of the receiver's buffer") as it introduced a
serious performance regression on SCTP over IPv4 and IPv6, though a not
as dramatic on the latter. Measurements are on 10Gbit/s with ixgbe NICs.

Current state:

[root@Lab200slot2 ~]# iperf3 --sctp -4 -c 192.168.241.3 -V -l 1452 -t 60
iperf version 3.0.1 (10 January 2014)
Linux Lab200slot2 3.14.0 #1 SMP Thu Apr 3 23:18:29 EDT 2014 x86_64
Time: Fri, 11 Apr 2014 17:56:21 GMT
Connecting to host 192.168.241.3, port 5201
      Cookie: Lab200slot2.1397238981.812898.548918
[  4] local 192.168.241.2 port 38616 connected to 192.168.241.3 port 5201
Starting Test: protocol: SCTP, 1 streams, 1452 byte blocks, omitting 0 seconds, 60 second test
[ ID] Interval           Transfer     Bandwidth
[  4]   0.00-1.09   sec  20.8 MBytes   161 Mbits/sec
[  4]   1.09-2.13   sec  10.8 MBytes  86.8 Mbits/sec
[  4]   2.13-3.15   sec  3.57 MBytes  29.5 Mbits/sec
[  4]   3.15-4.16   sec  4.33 MBytes  35.7 Mbits/sec
[  4]   4.16-6.21   sec  10.4 MBytes  42.7 Mbits/sec
[  4]   6.21-6.21   sec  0.00 Bytes    0.00 bits/sec
[  4]   6.21-7.35   sec  34.6 MBytes   253 Mbits/sec
[  4]   7.35-11.45  sec  22.0 MBytes  45.0 Mbits/sec
[  4]  11.45-11.45  sec  0.00 Bytes    0.00 bits/sec
[  4]  11.45-11.45  sec  0.00 Bytes    0.00 bits/sec
[  4]  11.45-11.45  sec  0.00 Bytes    0.00 bits/sec
[  4]  11.45-12.51  sec  16.0 MBytes   126 Mbits/sec
[  4]  12.51-13.59  sec  20.3 MBytes   158 Mbits/sec
[  4]  13.59-14.65  sec  13.4 MBytes   107 Mbits/sec
[  4]  14.65-16.79  sec  33.3 MBytes   130 Mbits/sec
[  4]  16.79-16.79  sec  0.00 Bytes    0.00 bits/sec
[  4]  16.79-17.82  sec  5.94 MBytes  48.7 Mbits/sec
(etc)

[root@Lab200slot2 ~]#  iperf3 --sctp -6 -c 2001:db8:0:f101::1 -V -l 1400 -t 60
iperf version 3.0.1 (10 January 2014)
Linux Lab200slot2 3.14.0 #1 SMP Thu Apr 3 23:18:29 EDT 2014 x86_64
Time: Fri, 11 Apr 2014 19:08:41 GMT
Connecting to host 2001:db8:0:f101::1, port 5201
      Cookie: Lab200slot2.1397243321.714295.2b3f7c
[  4] local 2001:db8:0:f101::2 port 55804 connected to 2001:db8:0:f101::1 port 5201
Starting Test: protocol: SCTP, 1 streams, 1400 byte blocks, omitting 0 seconds, 60 second test
[ ID] Interval           Transfer     Bandwidth
[  4]   0.00-1.00   sec   169 MBytes  1.42 Gbits/sec
[  4]   1.00-2.00   sec   201 MBytes  1.69 Gbits/sec
[  4]   2.00-3.00   sec   188 MBytes  1.58 Gbits/sec
[  4]   3.00-4.00   sec   174 MBytes  1.46 Gbits/sec
[  4]   4.00-5.00   sec   165 MBytes  1.39 Gbits/sec
[  4]   5.00-6.00   sec   199 MBytes  1.67 Gbits/sec
[  4]   6.00-7.00   sec   163 MBytes  1.36 Gbits/sec
[  4]   7.00-8.00   sec   174 MBytes  1.46 Gbits/sec
[  4]   8.00-9.00   sec   193 MBytes  1.62 Gbits/sec
[  4]   9.00-10.00  sec   196 MBytes  1.65 Gbits/sec
[  4]  10.00-11.00  sec   157 MBytes  1.31 Gbits/sec
[  4]  11.00-12.00  sec   175 MBytes  1.47 Gbits/sec
[  4]  12.00-13.00  sec   192 MBytes  1.61 Gbits/sec
[  4]  13.00-14.00  sec   199 MBytes  1.67 Gbits/sec
(etc)

After patch:

[root@Lab200slot2 ~]#  iperf3 --sctp -4 -c 192.168.240.3 -V -l 1452 -t 60
iperf version 3.0.1 (10 January 2014)
Linux Lab200slot2 3.14.0+ #1 SMP Mon Apr 14 12:06:40 EDT 2014 x86_64
Time: Mon, 14 Apr 2014 16:40:48 GMT
Connecting to host 192.168.240.3, port 5201
      Cookie: Lab200slot2.1397493648.413274.65e131
[  4] local 192.168.240.2 port 50548 connected to 192.168.240.3 port 5201
Starting Test: protocol: SCTP, 1 streams, 1452 byte blocks, omitting 0 seconds, 60 second test
[ ID] Interval           Transfer     Bandwidth
[  4]   0.00-1.00   sec   240 MBytes  2.02 Gbits/sec
[  4]   1.00-2.00   sec   239 MBytes  2.01 Gbits/sec
[  4]   2.00-3.00   sec   240 MBytes  2.01 Gbits/sec
[  4]   3.00-4.00   sec   239 MBytes  2.00 Gbits/sec
[  4]   4.00-5.00   sec   245 MBytes  2.05 Gbits/sec
[  4]   5.00-6.00   sec   240 MBytes  2.01 Gbits/sec
[  4]   6.00-7.00   sec   240 MBytes  2.02 Gbits/sec
[  4]   7.00-8.00   sec   239 MBytes  2.01 Gbits/sec

With the reverted patch applied, the SCTP/IPv4 performance is back
to normal on latest upstream for IPv4 and IPv6 and has same throughput
as 3.4.2 test kernel, steady and interval reports are smooth again.

Fixes: ef2820a735 ("net: sctp: Fix a_rwnd/rwnd management to reflect real state of the receiver's buffer")
Reported-by: Peter Butler <pbutler@sonusnet.com>
Reported-by: Dongsheng Song <dongsheng.song@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Tested-by: Peter Butler <pbutler@sonusnet.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Matija Glavinic Pecotic <matija.glavinic-pecotic.ext@nsn.com>
Cc: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@nsn.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-14 16:26:48 -04:00
David S. Miller 676d23690f net: Fix use after free by removing length arg from sk_data_ready callbacks.
Several spots in the kernel perform a sequence like:

	skb_queue_tail(&sk->s_receive_queue, skb);
	sk->sk_data_ready(sk, skb->len);

But at the moment we place the SKB onto the socket receive queue it
can be consumed and freed up.  So this skb->len access is potentially
to freed up memory.

Furthermore, the skb->len can be modified by the consumer so it is
possible that the value isn't accurate.

And finally, no actual implementation of this callback actually uses
the length argument.  And since nobody actually cared about it's
value, lots of call sites pass arbitrary values in such as '0' and
even '1'.

So just remove the length argument from the callback, that way there
is no confusion whatsoever and all of these use-after-free cases get
fixed as a side effect.

Based upon a patch by Eric Dumazet and his suggestion to audit this
issue tree-wide.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-11 16:15:36 -04:00
Daniel Borkmann 1e1cdf8ac7 net: sctp: test if association is dead in sctp_wake_up_waiters
In function sctp_wake_up_waiters(), we need to involve a test
if the association is declared dead. If so, we don't have any
reference to a possible sibling association anymore and need
to invoke sctp_write_space() instead, and normally walk the
socket's associations and notify them of new wmem space. The
reason for special casing is that otherwise, we could run
into the following issue when a sctp_primitive_SEND() call
from sctp_sendmsg() fails, and tries to flush an association's
outq, i.e. in the following way:

sctp_association_free()
`-> list_del(&asoc->asocs)         <-- poisons list pointer
    asoc->base.dead = true
    sctp_outq_free(&asoc->outqueue)
    `-> __sctp_outq_teardown()
     `-> sctp_chunk_free()
      `-> consume_skb()
       `-> sctp_wfree()
        `-> sctp_wake_up_waiters() <-- dereferences poisoned pointers
                                       if asoc->ep->sndbuf_policy=0

Therefore, only walk the list in an 'optimized' way if we find
that the current association is still active. We could also use
list_del_init() in addition when we call sctp_association_free(),
but as Vlad suggests, we want to trap such bugs and thus leave
it poisoned as is.

Why is it safe to resolve the issue by testing for asoc->base.dead?
Parallel calls to sctp_sendmsg() are protected under socket lock,
that is lock_sock()/release_sock(). Only within that path under
lock held, we're setting skb/chunk owner via sctp_set_owner_w().
Eventually, chunks are freed directly by an association still
under that lock. So when traversing association list on destruction
time from sctp_wake_up_waiters() via sctp_wfree(), a different
CPU can't be running sctp_wfree() while another one calls
sctp_association_free() as both happens under the same lock.
Therefore, this can also not race with setting/testing against
asoc->base.dead as we are guaranteed for this to happen in order,
under lock. Further, Vlad says: the times we check asoc->base.dead
is when we've cached an association pointer for later processing.
In between cache and processing, the association may have been
freed and is simply still around due to reference counts. We check
asoc->base.dead under a lock, so it should always be safe to check
and not race against sctp_association_free(). Stress-testing seems
fine now, too.

Fixes: cd253f9f357d ("net: sctp: wake up all assocs if sndbuf policy is per socket")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-09 12:37:49 -04:00
Daniel Borkmann 52c35befb6 net: sctp: wake up all assocs if sndbuf policy is per socket
SCTP charges chunks for wmem accounting via skb->truesize in
sctp_set_owner_w(), and sctp_wfree() respectively as the
reverse operation. If a sender runs out of wmem, it needs to
wait via sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(), and gets woken up by a call
to __sctp_write_space() mostly via sctp_wfree().

__sctp_write_space() is being called per association. Although
we assign sk->sk_write_space() to sctp_write_space(), which
is then being done per socket, it is only used if send space
is increased per socket option (SO_SNDBUF), as SOCK_USE_WRITE_QUEUE
is set and therefore not invoked in sock_wfree().

Commit 4c3a5bdae2 ("sctp: Don't charge for data in sndbuf
again when transmitting packet") fixed an issue where in case
sctp_packet_transmit() manages to queue up more than sndbuf
bytes, sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() will never be woken up again
unless it is interrupted by a signal. However, a still
remaining issue is that if net.sctp.sndbuf_policy=0, that is
accounting per socket, and one-to-many sockets are in use,
the reclaimed write space from sctp_wfree() is 'unfairly'
handed back on the server to the association that is the lucky
one to be woken up again via __sctp_write_space(), while
the remaining associations are never be woken up again
(unless by a signal).

The effect disappears with net.sctp.sndbuf_policy=1, that
is wmem accounting per association, as it guarantees a fair
share of wmem among associations.

Therefore, if we have reclaimed memory in case of per socket
accounting, wake all related associations to a socket in a
fair manner, that is, traverse the socket association list
starting from the current neighbour of the association and
issue a __sctp_write_space() to everyone until we end up
waking ourselves. This guarantees that no association is
preferred over another and even if more associations are
taken into the one-to-many session, all receivers will get
messages from the server and are not stalled forever on
high load. This setting still leaves the advantage of per
socket accounting in touch as an association can still use
up global limits if unused by others.

Fixes: 4eb701dfc6 ("[SCTP] Fix SCTP sendbuffer accouting.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-08 13:06:07 -04:00
David S. Miller 85dcce7a73 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
Conflicts:
	drivers/net/usb/r8152.c
	drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c

Both the r8152 and netback conflicts were simple overlapping
changes.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-03-14 22:31:55 -04:00
Daniel Borkmann 433131ba03 net: sctp: remove NULL check in sctp_assoc_update_retran_path
This is basically just to let Coverity et al shut up. Remove an
unneeded NULL check in sctp_assoc_update_retran_path().

It is safe to remove it, because in sctp_assoc_update_retran_path()
we iterate over the list of transports, our own transport which is
asoc->peer.retran_path included. In the iteration, we skip the
list head element and transports in state SCTP_UNCONFIRMED.

Such transports came from peer addresses received in INIT/INIT-ACK
address parameters. They are not yet confirmed by a heartbeat and
not available for data transfers.

We know however that in the list of transports, even if it contains
such elements, it at least contains our asoc->peer.retran_path as
well, so even if next to that element, we only encounter
SCTP_UNCONFIRMED transports, we are always going to fall back to
asoc->peer.retran_path through sctp_trans_elect_best(), as that is
for sure not SCTP_UNCONFIRMED as per fbdf501c93 ("sctp: Do no
select unconfirmed transports for retransmissions").

Whenever we call sctp_trans_elect_best() it will give us a non-NULL
element back, and therefore when we break out of the loop, we are
guaranteed to have a non-NULL transport pointer, and can remove
the NULL check.

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-03-13 13:23:52 -04:00
Daniel Borkmann c485658bae net: sctp: fix skb leakage in COOKIE ECHO path of chunk->auth_chunk
While working on ec0223ec48 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to
verify if we/peer is AUTH capable"), we noticed that there's a skb
memory leakage in the error path.

Running the same reproducer as in ec0223ec48 and by unconditionally
jumping to the error label (to simulate an error condition) in
sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() receive path lets kmemleak detector bark about
the unfreed chunk->auth_chunk skb clone:

Unreferenced object 0xffff8800b8f3a000 (size 256):
  comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294769856 (age 110.757s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    89 ab 75 5e d4 01 58 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ..u^..X.........
  backtrace:
    [<ffffffff816660be>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
    [<ffffffff8119f328>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x210
    [<ffffffff81566929>] skb_clone+0x49/0xb0
    [<ffffffffa0467459>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1d9/0x230 [sctp]
    [<ffffffffa046fdbc>] sctp_inq_push+0x4c/0x70 [sctp]
    [<ffffffffa047e8de>] sctp_rcv+0x82e/0x9a0 [sctp]
    [<ffffffff815abd38>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xa8/0x210
    [<ffffffff815a64af>] nf_reinject+0xbf/0x180
    [<ffffffffa04b4762>] nfqnl_recv_verdict+0x1d2/0x2b0 [nfnetlink_queue]
    [<ffffffffa04aa40b>] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x14b/0x250 [nfnetlink]
    [<ffffffff815a3269>] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa9/0xc0
    [<ffffffffa04aa7cf>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x23f/0x408 [nfnetlink]
    [<ffffffff815a2bd8>] netlink_unicast+0x168/0x250
    [<ffffffff815a2fa1>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2e1/0x3f0
    [<ffffffff8155cc6b>] sock_sendmsg+0x8b/0xc0
    [<ffffffff8155d449>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x369/0x380

What happens is that commit bbd0d59809 clones the skb containing
the AUTH chunk in sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv() when having the edge case
that an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO chunks to be authenticated:

  ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
  <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
  ------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ECHO ---------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------

When we enter sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() and before we actually get to
the point where we process (and subsequently free) a non-NULL
chunk->auth_chunk, we could hit the "goto nomem_init" path from
an error condition and thus leave the cloned skb around w/o
freeing it.

The fix is to centrally free such clones in sctp_chunk_destroy()
handler that is invoked from sctp_chunk_free() after all refs have
dropped; and also move both kfree_skb(chunk->auth_chunk) there,
so that chunk->auth_chunk is either NULL (since sctp_chunkify()
allocs new chunks through kmem_cache_zalloc()) or non-NULL with
a valid skb pointer. chunk->skb and chunk->auth_chunk are the
only skbs in the sctp_chunk structure that need to be handeled.

While at it, we should use consume_skb() for both. It is the same
as dev_kfree_skb() but more appropriately named as we are not
a device but a protocol. Also, this effectively replaces the
kfree_skb() from both invocations into consume_skb(). Functions
are the same only that kfree_skb() assumes that the frame was
being dropped after a failure (e.g. for tools like drop monitor),
usage of consume_skb() seems more appropriate in function
sctp_chunk_destroy() though.

Fixes: bbd0d59809 ("[SCTP]: Implement the receive and verification of AUTH chunk")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <yasevich@gmail.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-03-05 20:40:25 -05:00
David S. Miller 67ddc87f16 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
Conflicts:
	drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/recv.c
	drivers/net/wireless/mwifiex/pcie.c
	net/ipv6/sit.c

The SIT driver conflict consists of a bug fix being done by hand
in 'net' (missing u64_stats_init()) whilst in 'net-next' a helper
was created (netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats()) which takes care of this.

The two wireless conflicts were overlapping changes.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-03-05 20:32:02 -05:00
Daniel Borkmann ec0223ec48 net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if we/peer is AUTH capable
RFC4895 introduced AUTH chunks for SCTP; during the SCTP
handshake RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO are negotiated (CHUNKS
being optional though):

  ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
  <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------

A special case is when an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO
chunks to be authenticated:

  ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
  <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
  ------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ECHO ---------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------

RFC4895, section 6.3. Receiving Authenticated Chunks says:

  The receiver MUST use the HMAC algorithm indicated in
  the HMAC Identifier field. If this algorithm was not
  specified by the receiver in the HMAC-ALGO parameter in
  the INIT or INIT-ACK chunk during association setup, the
  AUTH chunk and all the chunks after it MUST be discarded
  and an ERROR chunk SHOULD be sent with the error cause
  defined in Section 4.1. [...] If no endpoint pair shared
  key has been configured for that Shared Key Identifier,
  all authenticated chunks MUST be silently discarded. [...]

  When an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO chunks to be
  authenticated, some special procedures have to be followed
  because the reception of a COOKIE-ECHO chunk might result
  in the creation of an SCTP association. If a packet arrives
  containing an AUTH chunk as a first chunk, a COOKIE-ECHO
  chunk as the second chunk, and possibly more chunks after
  them, and the receiver does not have an STCB for that
  packet, then authentication is based on the contents of
  the COOKIE-ECHO chunk. In this situation, the receiver MUST
  authenticate the chunks in the packet by using the RANDOM
  parameters, CHUNKS parameters and HMAC_ALGO parameters
  obtained from the COOKIE-ECHO chunk, and possibly a local
  shared secret as inputs to the authentication procedure
  specified in Section 6.3. If authentication fails, then
  the packet is discarded. If the authentication is successful,
  the COOKIE-ECHO and all the chunks after the COOKIE-ECHO
  MUST be processed. If the receiver has an STCB, it MUST
  process the AUTH chunk as described above using the STCB
  from the existing association to authenticate the
  COOKIE-ECHO chunk and all the chunks after it. [...]

Commit bbd0d59809 introduced the possibility to receive
and verification of AUTH chunk, including the edge case for
authenticated COOKIE-ECHO. On reception of COOKIE-ECHO,
the function sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() handles processing,
unpacks and creates a new association if it passed sanity
checks and also tests for authentication chunks being
present. After a new association has been processed, it
invokes sctp_process_init() on the new association and
walks through the parameter list it received from the INIT
chunk. It checks SCTP_PARAM_RANDOM, SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO
and SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS, and copies them into asoc->peer
meta data (peer_random, peer_hmacs, peer_chunks) in case
sysctl -w net.sctp.auth_enable=1 is set. If in INIT's
SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_EXT parameter SCTP_CID_AUTH is set,
peer_random != NULL and peer_hmacs != NULL the peer is to be
assumed asoc->peer.auth_capable=1, in any other case
asoc->peer.auth_capable=0.

Now, if in sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() chunk->auth_chunk is
available, we set up a fake auth chunk and pass that on to
sctp_sf_authenticate(), which at latest in
sctp_auth_calculate_hmac() reliably dereferences a NULL pointer
at position 0..0008 when setting up the crypto key in
crypto_hash_setkey() by using asoc->asoc_shared_key that is
NULL as condition key_id == asoc->active_key_id is true if
the AUTH chunk was injected correctly from remote. This
happens no matter what net.sctp.auth_enable sysctl says.

The fix is to check for net->sctp.auth_enable and for
asoc->peer.auth_capable before doing any operations like
sctp_sf_authenticate() as no key is activated in
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() for each case.

Now as RFC4895 section 6.3 states that if the used HMAC-ALGO
passed from the INIT chunk was not used in the AUTH chunk, we
SHOULD send an error; however in this case it would be better
to just silently discard such a maliciously prepared handshake
as we didn't even receive a parameter at all. Also, as our
endpoint has no shared key configured, section 6.3 says that
MUST silently discard, which we are doing from now onwards.

Before calling sctp_sf_pdiscard(), we need not only to free
the association, but also the chunk->auth_chunk skb, as
commit bbd0d59809 created a skb clone in that case.

I have tested this locally by using netfilter's nfqueue and
re-injecting packets into the local stack after maliciously
modifying the INIT chunk (removing RANDOM; HMAC-ALGO param)
and the SCTP packet containing the COOKIE_ECHO (injecting
AUTH chunk before COOKIE_ECHO). Fixed with this patch applied.

Fixes: bbd0d59809 ("[SCTP]: Implement the receive and verification of AUTH chunk")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <yasevich@gmail.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-03-03 16:39:36 -05:00
Daniel Borkmann 4c47af4d5e net: sctp: rework multihoming retransmission path selection to rfc4960
Problem statement: 1) both paths (primary path1 and alternate
path2) are up after the association has been established i.e.,
HB packets are normally exchanged, 2) path2 gets inactive after
path_max_retrans * max_rto timed out (i.e. path2 is down completely),
3) now, if a transmission times out on the only surviving/active
path1 (any ~1sec network service impact could cause this like
a channel bonding failover), then the retransmitted packets are
sent over the inactive path2; this happens with partial failover
and without it.

Besides not being optimal in the above scenario, a small failure
or timeout in the only existing path has the potential to cause
long delays in the retransmission (depending on RTO_MAX) until
the still active path is reselected. Further, when the T3-timeout
occurs, we have active_patch == retrans_path, and even though the
timeout occurred on the initial transmission of data, not a
retransmit, we end up updating retransmit path.

RFC4960, section 6.4. "Multi-Homed SCTP Endpoints" states under
6.4.1. "Failover from an Inactive Destination Address" the
following:

  Some of the transport addresses of a multi-homed SCTP endpoint
  may become inactive due to either the occurrence of certain
  error conditions (see Section 8.2) or adjustments from the
  SCTP user.

  When there is outbound data to send and the primary path
  becomes inactive (e.g., due to failures), or where the SCTP
  user explicitly requests to send data to an inactive
  destination transport address, before reporting an error to
  its ULP, the SCTP endpoint should try to send the data to an
  alternate __active__ destination transport address if one
  exists.

  When retransmitting data that timed out, if the endpoint is
  multihomed, it should consider each source-destination address
  pair in its retransmission selection policy. When retransmitting
  timed-out data, the endpoint should attempt to pick the most
  divergent source-destination pair from the original
  source-destination pair to which the packet was transmitted.

  Note: Rules for picking the most divergent source-destination
  pair are an implementation decision and are not specified
  within this document.

So, we should first reconsider to take the current active
retransmission transport if we cannot find an alternative
active one. If all of that fails, we can still round robin
through unkown, partial failover, and inactive ones in the
hope to find something still suitable.

Commit 4141ddc02a ("sctp: retran_path update bug fix") broke
that behaviour by selecting the next inactive transport when
no other active transport was found besides the current assoc's
peer.retran_path. Before commit 4141ddc02a, we would have
traversed through the list until we reach our peer.retran_path
again, and in case that is still in state SCTP_ACTIVE, we would
take it and return. Only if that is not the case either, we
take the next inactive transport.

Besides all that, another issue is that transports in state
SCTP_UNKNOWN could be preferred over transports in state
SCTP_ACTIVE in case a SCTP_ACTIVE transport appears after
SCTP_UNKNOWN in the transport list yielding a weaker transport
state to be used in retransmission.

This patch mostly reverts 4141ddc02a, but also rewrites
this function to introduce more clarity and strictness into
the code. A strict priority of transport states is enforced
in this patch, hence selection is active > unkown > partial
failover > inactive.

Fixes: 4141ddc02a ("sctp: retran_path update bug fix")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Gui Jianfeng <guijianfeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <yasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-02-22 00:26:05 -05:00
Matija Glavinic Pecotic 7cce3b7568 net: sctp: Potentially-Failed state should not be reached from unconfirmed state
In current implementation it is possible to reach PF state from unconfirmed.
We can interpret sctp-failover-02 in a way that PF state is meant to be reached
only from active state, in the end, this is when entering PF state makes sense.
Here are few quotes from sctp-failover-02, but regardless of these, same
understanding can be reached from whole section 5:

Section 5.1, quickfailover guide:
    "The PF state is an intermediate state between Active and Failed states."

    "Each time the T3-rtx timer expires on an active or idle
    destination, the error counter of that destination address will
    be incremented.  When the value in the error counter exceeds
    PFMR, the endpoint should mark the destination transport address as PF."

There are several concrete reasons for such interpretation. For start, rfc4960
does not take into concern quickfailover algorithm. Therefore, quickfailover
must comply to 4960. Point where this compliance can be argued is following
behavior:
When PF is entered, association overall error counter is incremented for each
missed HB. This is contradictory to rfc4960, as address, while in unconfirmed
state, is subjected to probing, and while it is probed, it should not increment
association overall error counter. This has as a consequence that we might end
up in situation in which we drop association due path failure on unconfirmed
address, in case we have wrong configuration in a way:
Association.Max.Retrans == Path.Max.Retrans.

Another reason is that entering PF from unconfirmed will cause a loss of address
confirmed event when address is once (if) confirmed. This is fine from failover
guide point of view, but it is not consistent with behavior preceding failover
implementation and recommendation from 4960:

5.4.  Path Verification
   Whenever a path is confirmed, an indication MAY be given to the upper
   layer.

Signed-off-by: Matija Glavinic Pecotic <matija.glavinic-pecotic.ext@nsn.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-02-20 13:24:56 -05:00
David S. Miller 1e8d6421cf Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
Conflicts:
	drivers/net/bonding/bond_3ad.h
	drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c

Two minor conflicts in bonding, both of which were overlapping
changes.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-02-19 01:24:22 -05:00
Daniel Borkmann ffd5939381 net: sctp: fix sctp_connectx abi for ia32 emulation/compat mode
SCTP's sctp_connectx() abi breaks for 64bit kernels compiled with 32bit
emulation (e.g. ia32 emulation or x86_x32). Due to internal usage of
'struct sctp_getaddrs_old' which includes a struct sockaddr pointer,
sizeof(param) check will always fail in kernel as the structure in
64bit kernel space is 4bytes larger than for user binaries compiled
in 32bit mode. Thus, applications making use of sctp_connectx() won't
be able to run under such circumstances.

Introduce a compat interface in the kernel to deal with such
situations by using a 'struct compat_sctp_getaddrs_old' structure
where user data is copied into it, and then sucessively transformed
into a 'struct sctp_getaddrs_old' structure with the help of
compat_ptr(). That fixes sctp_connectx() abi without any changes
needed in user space, and lets the SCTP test suite pass when compiled
in 32bit and run on 64bit kernels.

Fixes: f9c67811eb ("sctp: Fix regression introduced by new sctp_connectx api")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-02-18 16:06:48 -05:00
Matija Glavinic Pecotic ef2820a735 net: sctp: Fix a_rwnd/rwnd management to reflect real state of the receiver's buffer
Implementation of (a)rwnd calculation might lead to severe performance issues
and associations completely stalling. These problems are described and solution
is proposed which improves lksctp's robustness in congestion state.

1) Sudden drop of a_rwnd and incomplete window recovery afterwards

Data accounted in sctp_assoc_rwnd_decrease takes only payload size (sctp data),
but size of sk_buff, which is blamed against receiver buffer, is not accounted
in rwnd. Theoretically, this should not be the problem as actual size of buffer
is double the amount requested on the socket (SO_RECVBUF). Problem here is
that this will have bad scaling for data which is less then sizeof sk_buff.
E.g. in 4G (LTE) networks, link interfacing radio side will have a large portion
of traffic of this size (less then 100B).

An example of sudden drop and incomplete window recovery is given below. Node B
exhibits problematic behavior. Node A initiates association and B is configured
to advertise rwnd of 10000. A sends messages of size 43B (size of typical sctp
message in 4G (LTE) network). On B data is left in buffer by not reading socket
in userspace.

Lets examine when we will hit pressure state and declare rwnd to be 0 for
scenario with above stated parameters (rwnd == 10000, chunk size == 43, each
chunk is sent in separate sctp packet)

Logic is implemented in sctp_assoc_rwnd_decrease:

socket_buffer (see below) is maximum size which can be held in socket buffer
(sk_rcvbuf). current_alloced is amount of data currently allocated (rx_count)

A simple expression is given for which it will be examined after how many
packets for above stated parameters we enter pressure state:

We start by condition which has to be met in order to enter pressure state:

	socket_buffer < currently_alloced;

currently_alloced is represented as size of sctp packets received so far and not
yet delivered to userspace. x is the number of chunks/packets (since there is no
bundling, and each chunk is delivered in separate packet, we can observe each
chunk also as sctp packet, and what is important here, having its own sk_buff):

	socket_buffer < x*each_sctp_packet;

each_sctp_packet is sctp chunk size + sizeof(struct sk_buff). socket_buffer is
twice the amount of initially requested size of socket buffer, which is in case
of sctp, twice the a_rwnd requested:

	2*rwnd < x*(payload+sizeof(struc sk_buff));

sizeof(struct sk_buff) is 190 (3.13.0-rc4+). Above is stated that rwnd is 10000
and each payload size is 43

	20000 < x(43+190);

	x > 20000/233;

	x ~> 84;

After ~84 messages, pressure state is entered and 0 rwnd is advertised while
received 84*43B ~= 3612B sctp data. This is why external observer notices sudden
drop from 6474 to 0, as it will be now shown in example:

IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 1875509148] [rwnd: 81920] [OS: 10] [MIS: 65535] [init TSN: 1096057017]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 3198966556] [rwnd: 10000] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10] [init TSN: 902132839]
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [COOKIE ECHO]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [COOKIE ACK]
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 1096057017] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 0] [PPID 0x18]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057017] [a_rwnd 9957] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 1096057018] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 1] [PPID 0x18]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057018] [a_rwnd 9957] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 1096057019] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 2] [PPID 0x18]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057019] [a_rwnd 9914] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
<...>
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 1096057098] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 81] [PPID 0x18]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057098] [a_rwnd 6517] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 1096057099] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 82] [PPID 0x18]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057099] [a_rwnd 6474] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 1096057100] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 83] [PPID 0x18]

--> Sudden drop

IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057100] [a_rwnd 0] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]

At this point, rwnd_press stores current rwnd value so it can be later restored
in sctp_assoc_rwnd_increase. This however doesn't happen as condition to start
slowly increasing rwnd until rwnd_press is returned to rwnd is never met. This
condition is not met since rwnd, after it hit 0, must first reach rwnd_press by
adding amount which is read from userspace. Let us observe values in above
example. Initial a_rwnd is 10000, pressure was hit when rwnd was ~6500 and the
amount of actual sctp data currently waiting to be delivered to userspace
is ~3500. When userspace starts to read, sctp_assoc_rwnd_increase will be blamed
only for sctp data, which is ~3500. Condition is never met, and when userspace
reads all data, rwnd stays on 3569.

IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057100] [a_rwnd 1505] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057100] [a_rwnd 3010] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 1096057101] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 84] [PPID 0x18]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057101] [a_rwnd 3569] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]

--> At this point userspace read everything, rwnd recovered only to 3569

IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 1096057102] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 85] [PPID 0x18]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057102] [a_rwnd 3569] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]

Reproduction is straight forward, it is enough for sender to send packets of
size less then sizeof(struct sk_buff) and receiver keeping them in its buffers.

2) Minute size window for associations sharing the same socket buffer

In case multiple associations share the same socket, and same socket buffer
(sctp.rcvbuf_policy == 0), different scenarios exist in which congestion on one
of the associations can permanently drop rwnd of other association(s).

Situation will be typically observed as one association suddenly having rwnd
dropped to size of last packet received and never recovering beyond that point.
Different scenarios will lead to it, but all have in common that one of the
associations (let it be association from 1)) nearly depleted socket buffer, and
the other association blames socket buffer just for the amount enough to start
the pressure. This association will enter pressure state, set rwnd_press and
announce 0 rwnd.
When data is read by userspace, similar situation as in 1) will occur, rwnd will
increase just for the size read by userspace but rwnd_press will be high enough
so that association doesn't have enough credit to reach rwnd_press and restore
to previous state. This case is special case of 1), being worse as there is, in
the worst case, only one packet in buffer for which size rwnd will be increased.
Consequence is association which has very low maximum rwnd ('minute size', in
our case down to 43B - size of packet which caused pressure) and as such
unusable.

Scenario happened in the field and labs frequently after congestion state (link
breaks, different probabilities of packet drop, packet reordering) and with
scenario 1) preceding. Here is given a deterministic scenario for reproduction:

>From node A establish two associations on the same socket, with rcvbuf_policy
being set to share one common buffer (sctp.rcvbuf_policy == 0). On association 1
repeat scenario from 1), that is, bring it down to 0 and restore up. Observe
scenario 1). Use small payload size (here we use 43). Once rwnd is 'recovered',
bring it down close to 0, as in just one more packet would close it. This has as
a consequence that association number 2 is able to receive (at least) one more
packet which will bring it in pressure state. E.g. if association 2 had rwnd of
10000, packet received was 43, and we enter at this point into pressure,
rwnd_press will have 9957. Once payload is delivered to userspace, rwnd will
increase for 43, but conditions to restore rwnd to original state, just as in
1), will never be satisfied.

--> Association 1, between A.y and B.12345

IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 836880897] [rwnd: 10000] [OS: 10] [MIS: 65535] [init TSN: 4032536569]
IP B.12345 > A.55915: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 2873310749] [rwnd: 81920] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10] [init TSN: 3799315613]
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [COOKIE ECHO]
IP B.12345 > A.55915: sctp (1) [COOKIE ACK]

--> Association 2, between A.z and B.12346

IP A.55915 > B.12346: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 534798321] [rwnd: 10000] [OS: 10] [MIS: 65535] [init TSN: 2099285173]
IP B.12346 > A.55915: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 516668823] [rwnd: 81920] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10] [init TSN: 3676403240]
IP A.55915 > B.12346: sctp (1) [COOKIE ECHO]
IP B.12346 > A.55915: sctp (1) [COOKIE ACK]

--> Deplete socket buffer by sending messages of size 43B over association 1

IP B.12345 > A.55915: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3799315613] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 0] [PPID 0x18]
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315613] [a_rwnd 9957] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]

<...>

IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315696] [a_rwnd 6388] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP B.12345 > A.55915: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3799315697] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 84] [PPID 0x18]
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315697] [a_rwnd 6345] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]

--> Sudden drop on 1

IP B.12345 > A.55915: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3799315698] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 85] [PPID 0x18]
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315698] [a_rwnd 0] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]

--> Here userspace read, rwnd 'recovered' to 3698, now deplete again using
    association 1 so there is place in buffer for only one more packet

IP B.12345 > A.55915: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3799315799] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 186] [PPID 0x18]
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315799] [a_rwnd 86] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP B.12345 > A.55915: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3799315800] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 187] [PPID 0x18]
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315800] [a_rwnd 43] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]

--> Socket buffer is almost depleted, but there is space for one more packet,
    send them over association 2, size 43B

IP B.12346 > A.55915: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3676403240] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 0] [PPID 0x18]
IP A.55915 > B.12346: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3676403240] [a_rwnd 0] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]

--> Immediate drop

IP A.60995 > B.12346: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 387491510] [a_rwnd 0] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]

--> Read everything from the socket, both association recover up to maximum rwnd
    they are capable of reaching, note that association 1 recovered up to 3698,
    and association 2 recovered only to 43

IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315800] [a_rwnd 1548] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315800] [a_rwnd 3053] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP B.12345 > A.55915: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3799315801] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 188] [PPID 0x18]
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315801] [a_rwnd 3698] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP B.12346 > A.55915: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3676403241] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 1] [PPID 0x18]
IP A.55915 > B.12346: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3676403241] [a_rwnd 43] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]

A careful reader might wonder why it is necessary to reproduce 1) prior
reproduction of 2). It is simply easier to observe when to send packet over
association 2 which will push association into the pressure state.

Proposed solution:

Both problems share the same root cause, and that is improper scaling of socket
buffer with rwnd. Solution in which sizeof(sk_buff) is taken into concern while
calculating rwnd is not possible due to fact that there is no linear
relationship between amount of data blamed in increase/decrease with IP packet
in which payload arrived. Even in case such solution would be followed,
complexity of the code would increase. Due to nature of current rwnd handling,
slow increase (in sctp_assoc_rwnd_increase) of rwnd after pressure state is
entered is rationale, but it gives false representation to the sender of current
buffer space. Furthermore, it implements additional congestion control mechanism
which is defined on implementation, and not on standard basis.

Proposed solution simplifies whole algorithm having on mind definition from rfc:

o  Receiver Window (rwnd): This gives the sender an indication of the space
   available in the receiver's inbound buffer.

Core of the proposed solution is given with these lines:

sctp_assoc_rwnd_update:
	if ((asoc->base.sk->sk_rcvbuf - rx_count) > 0)
		asoc->rwnd = (asoc->base.sk->sk_rcvbuf - rx_count) >> 1;
	else
		asoc->rwnd = 0;

We advertise to sender (half of) actual space we have. Half is in the braces
depending whether you would like to observe size of socket buffer as SO_RECVBUF
or twice the amount, i.e. size is the one visible from userspace, that is,
from kernelspace.
In this way sender is given with good approximation of our buffer space,
regardless of the buffer policy - we always advertise what we have. Proposed
solution fixes described problems and removes necessity for rwnd restoration
algorithm. Finally, as proposed solution is simplification, some lines of code,
along with some bytes in struct sctp_association are saved.

Version 2 of the patch addressed comments from Vlad. Name of the function is set
to be more descriptive, and two parts of code are changed, in one removing the
superfluous call to sctp_assoc_rwnd_update since call would not result in update
of rwnd, and the other being reordering of the code in a way that call to
sctp_assoc_rwnd_update updates rwnd. Version 3 corrected change introduced in v2
in a way that existing function is not reordered/copied in line, but it is
correctly called. Thanks Vlad for suggesting.

Signed-off-by: Matija Glavinic Pecotic <matija.glavinic-pecotic.ext@nsn.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@nsn.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-02-17 00:16:56 -05:00
stephen hemminger 2045ceaed4 net: remove unnecessary return's
One of my pet coding style peeves is the practice of
adding extra return; at the end of function.
Kill several instances of this in network code.

I suppose some coccinelle wizardy could do this automatically.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-02-13 18:33:38 -05:00
wangweidong efb842c45e sctp: optimize the sctp_sysctl_net_register
Here, when the net is init_net, we needn't to kmemdup the ctl_table
again. So add a check for net. Also we can save some memory.

Signed-off-by: Wang Weidong <wangweidong1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-02-13 17:08:29 -05:00
wangweidong 22a1f5140e sctp: fix a missed .data initialization
As commit 3c68198e75111a90("sctp: Make hmac algorithm selection for
 cookie generation dynamic"), we miss the .data initialization.
If we don't use the net_namespace, the problem that parts of the
sysctl configuration won't be isolation and won't occur.

In sctp_sysctl_net_register(), we register the sysctl for each
net, in the for(), we use the 'table[i].data' as check condition, so
when the 'i' is the index of sctp_hmac_alg, the data is NULL, then
break. So add the .data initialization.

Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Wang Weidong <wangweidong1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-02-13 17:08:29 -05:00
Matija Glavinic Pecotic 661dbf3412 net: sctp: fix initialization of local source address on accepted ipv6 sockets
commit 	efe4208f47f907b86f528788da711e8ab9dea44d:
'ipv6: make lookups simpler and faster' broke initialization of local source
address on accepted ipv6 sockets. Before the mentioned commit receive address
was copied along with the contents of ipv6_pinfo in sctp_v6_create_accept_sk.
Now when it is moved, it has to be copied separately.

This also fixes lksctp's ipv6 regression in a sense that test_getname_v6, TC5 -
'getsockname on a connected server socket' now passes.

Signed-off-by: Matija Glavinic Pecotic <matija.glavinic-pecotic.ext@nsn.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-02-06 21:18:06 -08:00
wangweidong 5bc1d1b4a2 sctp: remove macros sctp_bh_[un]lock_sock
Redefined bh_[un]lock_sock to sctp_bh[un]lock_sock for user
space friendly code which we haven't use in years, so removing them.

Signed-off-by: Wang Weidong <wangweidong1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-21 18:41:36 -08:00
wangweidong 048ed4b626 sctp: remove macros sctp_{lock|release}_sock
Redefined {lock|release}_sock to sctp_{lock|release}_sock for user space friendly
code which we haven't use in years, so removing them.

Signed-off-by: Wang Weidong <wangweidong1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-21 18:41:36 -08:00
wangweidong 387602dfdc sctp: remove macros sctp_write_[un]_lock
Redefined write_[un]lock to sctp_write_[un]lock for user space
friendly code which we haven't use in years, so removing them.

Signed-off-by: Wang Weidong <wangweidong1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-21 18:40:41 -08:00
wangweidong 3c8e43ba9f sctp: remove macros sctp_spin_[un]lock
Redefined spin_[un]lock to sctp_spin_[un]lock for user space friendly
code which we haven't use in years, so removing them.

Signed-off-by: Wang Weidong <wangweidong1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-21 18:40:41 -08:00
wangweidong 79b91130a2 sctp: remove macros sctp_local_bh_{disable|enable}
Redefined local_bh_{disable|enable} to sctp_local_bh_{disable|enable}
for user space friendly code which we haven't use in years, so removing them.

Signed-off-by: Wang Weidong <wangweidong1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-21 18:40:40 -08:00
wangweidong abfce3ef58 sctp: remove the unnecessary assignment
When go the right path, the status is 0, no need to assign it again.
So just remove the assignment.

Signed-off-by: Wang Weidong <wangweidong1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-16 17:31:49 -08:00
wangweidong 0ea5e4df7b sctp: create helper function to enable|disable sackdelay
add sctp_spp_sackdelay_{enable|disable} helper function for
avoiding code duplication.

Signed-off-by: Wang Weidong <wangweidong1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-15 16:47:48 -08:00
Dan Carpenter 0e864b21e5 sctp: remove a redundant NULL check
It confuses Smatch when we check "sinit" for NULL and then non-NULL and
that causes a false positive warning later.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-14 18:18:22 -08:00
Aruna-Hewapathirane 63862b5bef net: replace macros net_random and net_srandom with direct calls to prandom
This patch removes the net_random and net_srandom macros and replaces
them with direct calls to the prandom ones. As new commits only seem to
use prandom_u32 there is no use to keep them around.
This change makes it easier to grep for users of prandom_u32.

Signed-off-by: Aruna-Hewapathirane <aruna.hewapathirane@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-14 15:15:25 -08:00
stephen hemminger 6daaf0de2f sctp: make sctp_addto_chunk_fixed local
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-13 14:42:30 -08:00
Hannes Frederic Sowa 8ed1dc44d3 ipv4: introduce hardened ip_no_pmtu_disc mode
This new ip_no_pmtu_disc mode only allowes fragmentation-needed errors
to be honored by protocols which do more stringent validation on the
ICMP's packet payload. This knob is useful for people who e.g. want to
run an unmodified DNS server in a namespace where they need to use pmtu
for TCP connections (as they are used for zone transfers or fallback
for requests) but don't want to use possibly spoofed UDP pmtu information.

Currently the whitelisted protocols are TCP, SCTP and DCCP as they check
if the returned packet is in the window or if the association is valid.

Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: John Heffner <johnwheffner@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-13 11:22:55 -08:00
David S. Miller 56a4342dfe Merge branch 'master' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
Conflicts:
	drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_sriov_pf.c
	net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c
	net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c

ipv6 tunnel statistic bug fixes conflicting with consolidation into
generic sw per-cpu net stats.

qlogic conflict between queue counting bug fix and the addition
of multiple MAC address support.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-06 17:37:45 -05:00
Neil Horman f916ec9608 sctp: Add process name and pid to deprecation warnings
Recently I updated the sctp socket option deprecation warnings to be both a bit
more clear and ratelimited to prevent user processes from spamming the log file.
Ben Hutchings suggested that I add the process name and pid to these warnings so
that users can tell who is responsible for using the deprecated apis.  This
patch accomplishes that.

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
CC: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-03 19:36:46 -05:00