Commit Graph

2702 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
James Morris 6e37592900 Merge branch 'upstream' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into for-linus2 2015-11-26 15:04:19 +11:00
David Howells 096fe9eaea KEYS: Fix handling of stored error in a negatively instantiated user key
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area.  A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data.  However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.

The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:

    keyctl request2 user user "" @u
    keyctl add user user "a" @u

which manifests itself as:

	BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
	IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
	PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
	Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
	Modules linked in:
	CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
	Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
	task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
	RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>]  [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
	 [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
	RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0  EFLAGS: 00010246
	RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
	RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
	RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
	R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
	R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
	FS:  0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
	CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
	CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
	Stack:
	 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
	 ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
	 ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
	Call Trace:
	 [<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
	 [<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
	 [<     inline     >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
	 [<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
	 [<     inline     >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
	 [<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
	 [<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185

Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.

A similar bug can be tripped by:

    keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u
    keyctl add trusted user "a" @u

This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-11-25 14:19:47 +11:00
Stephen Smalley f3bef67992 selinux: fix bug in conditional rules handling
commit fa1aa143ac ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
introduced a bug into the handling of conditional rules, skipping the
processing entirely when the caller does not provide an extended
permissions (xperms) structure.  Access checks from userspace using
/sys/fs/selinux/access do not include such a structure since that
interface does not presently expose extended permission information.
As a result, conditional rules were being ignored entirely on userspace
access requests, producing denials when access was allowed by
conditional rules in the policy.  Fix the bug by only skipping
computation of extended permissions in this situation, not the entire
conditional rules processing.

Reported-by: Laurent Bigonville <bigon@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: fixed long lines in patch description]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.3
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-11-24 13:44:32 -05:00
Linus Torvalds 2df4ee78d0 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:

 1) Fix null deref in xt_TEE netfilter module, from Eric Dumazet.

 2) Several spots need to get to the original listner for SYN-ACK
    packets, most spots got this ok but some were not.  Whilst covering
    the remaining cases, create a helper to do this.  From Eric Dumazet.

 3) Missiing check of return value from alloc_netdev() in CAIF SPI code,
    from Rasmus Villemoes.

 4) Don't sleep while != TASK_RUNNING in macvtap, from Vlad Yasevich.

 5) Use after free in mvneta driver, from Justin Maggard.

 6) Fix race on dst->flags access in dst_release(), from Eric Dumazet.

 7) Add missing ZLIB_INFLATE dependency for new qed driver.  From Arnd
    Bergmann.

 8) Fix multicast getsockopt deadlock, from WANG Cong.

 9) Fix deadlock in btusb, from Kuba Pawlak.

10) Some ipv6_add_dev() failure paths were not cleaning up the SNMP6
    counter state.  From Sabrina Dubroca.

11) Fix packet_bind() race, which can cause lost notifications, from
    Francesco Ruggeri.

12) Fix MAC restoration in qlcnic driver during bonding mode changes,
    from Jarod Wilson.

13) Revert bridging forward delay change which broke libvirt and other
    userspace things, from Vlad Yasevich.

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (65 commits)
  Revert "bridge: Allow forward delay to be cfgd when STP enabled"
  bpf_trace: Make dependent on PERF_EVENTS
  qed: select ZLIB_INFLATE
  net: fix a race in dst_release()
  net: mvneta: Fix memory use after free.
  net: Documentation: Fix default value tcp_limit_output_bytes
  macvtap: Resolve possible __might_sleep warning in macvtap_do_read()
  mvneta: add FIXED_PHY dependency
  net: caif: check return value of alloc_netdev
  net: hisilicon: NET_VENDOR_HISILICON should depend on HAS_DMA
  drivers: net: xgene: fix RGMII 10/100Mb mode
  netfilter: nft_meta: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
  net_sched: em_meta: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
  sched: cls_flow: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
  netfilter: xt_owner: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
  smack: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
  net: add skb_to_full_sk() helper and use it in selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid()
  bpf: doc: correct arch list for supported eBPF JIT
  dwc_eth_qos: Delete an unnecessary check before the function call "of_node_put"
  bonding: fix panic on non-ARPHRD_ETHER enslave failure
  ...
2015-11-10 18:11:41 -08:00
Eric Dumazet 8827d90e29 smack: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
This module wants to access sk->sk_security, which is not
available for request sockets.

Fixes: ca6fb06518 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-11-08 20:56:38 -05:00
Eric Dumazet 54abc686c2 net: add skb_to_full_sk() helper and use it in selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid()
Generalize selinux_skb_sk() added in commit 212cd08953
("selinux: fix random read in selinux_ip_postroute_compat()")
so that we can use it other contexts.

Use it right away in selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid()

Fixes: ca6fb06518 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-11-08 20:56:38 -05:00
Mel Gorman 71baba4b92 mm, page_alloc: rename __GFP_WAIT to __GFP_RECLAIM
__GFP_WAIT was used to signal that the caller was in atomic context and
could not sleep.  Now it is possible to distinguish between true atomic
context and callers that are not willing to sleep.  The latter should
clear __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM so kswapd will still wake.  As clearing
__GFP_WAIT behaves differently, there is a risk that people will clear the
wrong flags.  This patch renames __GFP_WAIT to __GFP_RECLAIM to clearly
indicate what it does -- setting it allows all reclaim activity, clearing
them prevents it.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-06 17:50:42 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 1873499e13 Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem update from James Morris:
 "This is mostly maintenance updates across the subsystem, with a
  notable update for TPM 2.0, and addition of Jarkko Sakkinen as a
  maintainer of that"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (40 commits)
  apparmor: clarify CRYPTO dependency
  selinux: Use a kmem_cache for allocation struct file_security_struct
  selinux: ioctl_has_perm should be static
  selinux: use sprintf return value
  selinux: use kstrdup() in security_get_bools()
  selinux: use kmemdup in security_sid_to_context_core()
  selinux: remove pointless cast in selinux_inode_setsecurity()
  selinux: introduce security_context_str_to_sid
  selinux: do not check open perm on ftruncate call
  selinux: change CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE default
  KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data
  KEYS: Provide a script to extract a module signature
  KEYS: Provide a script to extract the sys cert list from a vmlinux file
  keys: Be more consistent in selection of union members used
  certs: add .gitignore to stop git nagging about x509_certificate_list
  KEYS: use kvfree() in add_key
  Smack: limited capability for changing process label
  TPM: remove unnecessary little endian conversion
  vTPM: support little endian guests
  char: Drop owner assignment from i2c_driver
  ...
2015-11-05 15:32:38 -08:00
Eric Dumazet 212cd08953 selinux: fix random read in selinux_ip_postroute_compat()
In commit e446f9dfe1 ("net: synack packets can be attached to request
sockets"), I missed one remaining case of invalid skb->sk->sk_security
access.

Dmitry Vyukov got a KASan report pointing to it.

Add selinux_skb_sk() helper that is responsible to get back to the
listener if skb is attached to a request socket, instead of
duplicating the logic.

Fixes: ca6fb06518 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-11-05 16:45:51 -05:00
David S. Miller b75ec3af27 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net 2015-11-01 00:15:30 -04:00
James Morris ba94c3ff20 Merge tag 'keys-next-20151021' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next 2015-10-23 12:07:52 +11:00
James Morris a47c7a6c8a Merge branch 'upstream' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into next 2015-10-22 11:17:50 +11:00
Arnd Bergmann 083c1290ca apparmor: clarify CRYPTO dependency
The crypto framework can be built as a loadable module, but the
apparmor hash code can only be built-in, which then causes a
link error:

security/built-in.o: In function `aa_calc_profile_hash':
integrity_audit.c:(.text+0x21610): undefined reference to `crypto_shash_update'
security/built-in.o: In function `init_profile_hash':
integrity_audit.c:(.init.text+0xb4c): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_shash'

This changes Apparmor to use 'select CRYPTO' like a lot of other
subsystems do.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-10-22 11:11:28 +11:00
Sangwoo 63205654c0 selinux: Use a kmem_cache for allocation struct file_security_struct
The size of struct file_security_struct is 16byte at my setup.
But, the real allocation size for per each file_security_struct
is 64bytes in my setup that kmalloc min size is 64bytes
because ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN is 64.

This allocation is called every times at file allocation(alloc_file()).
So, the total slack memory size(allocated size - request size)
is increased exponentially.

E.g) Min Kmalloc Size : 64bytes, Unit : bytes
      Allocated Size | Request Size | Slack Size | Allocation Count
    ---------------------------------------------------------------
         770048      |    192512    |   577536   |      12032

At the result, this change reduce memory usage 42bytes per each
file_security_struct

Signed-off-by: Sangwoo <sangwoo2.park@lge.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: removed extra subject prefix]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21 17:44:30 -04:00
Geliang Tang 1d2a168a08 selinux: ioctl_has_perm should be static
Fixes the following sparse warning:

 security/selinux/hooks.c:3242:5: warning: symbol 'ioctl_has_perm' was
 not declared. Should it be static?

Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21 17:44:27 -04:00
Rasmus Villemoes 9529c7886c selinux: use sprintf return value
sprintf returns the number of characters printed (excluding '\0'), so
we can use that and avoid duplicating the length computation.

Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21 17:44:27 -04:00
Rasmus Villemoes 21b76f199e selinux: use kstrdup() in security_get_bools()
This is much simpler.

Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21 17:44:26 -04:00
Rasmus Villemoes aa736c36db selinux: use kmemdup in security_sid_to_context_core()
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21 17:44:26 -04:00
Rasmus Villemoes 20ba96aeeb selinux: remove pointless cast in selinux_inode_setsecurity()
security_context_to_sid() expects a const char* argument, so there's
no point in casting away the const qualifier of value.

Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21 17:44:26 -04:00
Rasmus Villemoes 44be2f65d9 selinux: introduce security_context_str_to_sid
There seems to be a little confusion as to whether the scontext_len
parameter of security_context_to_sid() includes the nul-byte or
not. Reading security_context_to_sid_core(), it seems that the
expectation is that it does not (both the string copying and the test
for scontext_len being zero hint at that).

Introduce the helper security_context_str_to_sid() to do the strlen()
call and fix all callers.

Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21 17:44:25 -04:00
Jeff Vander Stoep 44d37ad360 selinux: do not check open perm on ftruncate call
Use the ATTR_FILE attribute to distinguish between truncate()
and ftruncate() system calls. The two other cases where
do_truncate is called with a filp (and therefore ATTR_FILE is set)
are for coredump files and for open(O_TRUNC). In both of those cases
the open permission has already been checked during file open and
therefore does not need to be repeated.

Commit 95dbf73931 ("SELinux: check OPEN on truncate calls")
fixed a major issue where domains were allowed to truncate files
without the open permission. However, it introduced a new bug where
a domain with the write permission can no longer ftruncate files
without the open permission, even when they receive an already open
file.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21 17:44:25 -04:00
Paul Moore 2a35d196c1 selinux: change CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE default
Change the SELinux checkreqprot default value to 0 so that SELinux
performs access control checking on the actual memory protections
used by the kernel and not those requested by the application.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21 17:44:25 -04:00
David Howells 146aa8b145 KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data
Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk
as it seems pointless to keep them separate.

Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded
user-defined keys.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
2015-10-21 15:18:36 +01:00
Insu Yun 27720e75a7 keys: Be more consistent in selection of union members used
key->description and key->index_key.description are same because
they are unioned. But, for readability, using same name for
duplication and validation seems better.

Signed-off-by: Insu Yun <wuninsu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2015-10-21 15:18:35 +01:00
Geliang Tang d0e0eba043 KEYS: use kvfree() in add_key
There is no need to make a flag to tell that this memory is allocated by
kmalloc or vmalloc. Just use kvfree to free the memory.

Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2015-10-21 15:18:35 +01:00
James Morris 09302fd19e Merge branch 'smack-for-4.4' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next into next 2015-10-21 10:49:29 +11:00
James Morris fbf9826589 Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next 2015-10-20 12:34:04 +11:00
Zbigniew Jasinski 38416e5393 Smack: limited capability for changing process label
This feature introduces new kernel interface:

- <smack_fs>/relabel-self - for setting transition labels list

This list is used to control smack label transition mechanism.
List is set by, and per process. Process can transit to new label only if
label is on the list. Only process with CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability can add
labels to this list. With this list, process can change it's label without
CAP_MAC_ADMIN but only once. After label changing, list is unset.

Changes in v2:
* use list_for_each_entry instead of _rcu during label write
* added missing description in security/Smack.txt

Changes in v3:
* squashed into one commit

Changes in v4:
* switch from global list to per-task list
* since the per-task list is accessed only by the task itself
  there is no need to use synchronization mechanisms on it

Changes in v5:
* change smackfs interface of relabel-self to the one used for onlycap
  multiple labels are accepted, separated by space, which
  replace the previous list upon write

Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski <z.jasinski@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-10-19 12:06:47 -07:00
David Howells 911b79cde9 KEYS: Don't permit request_key() to construct a new keyring
If request_key() is used to find a keyring, only do the search part - don't
do the construction part if the keyring was not found by the search.  We
don't really want keyrings in the negative instantiated state since the
rejected/negative instantiation error value in the payload is unioned with
keyring metadata.

Now the kernel gives an error:

	request_key("keyring", "#selinux,bdekeyring", "keyring", KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2015-10-19 11:24:51 +01:00
Jarkko Sakkinen 0fe5480303 keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chips
Call tpm_seal_trusted() and tpm_unseal_trusted() for TPM 2.0 chips.
We require explicit 'keyhandle=' option because there's no a fixed
storage root key inside TPM2 chips.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Fuchs <andreas.fuchs@sit.fraunhofer.de>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (on TPM 1.2)
Tested-by: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Kevin Strasser <kevin.strasser@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
2015-10-19 01:01:22 +02:00
Jarkko Sakkinen fe351e8d4e keys, trusted: move struct trusted_key_options to trusted-type.h
Moved struct trusted_key_options to trustes-type.h so that the fields
can be accessed from drivers/char/tpm.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
2015-10-19 01:01:21 +02:00
Pablo Neira Ayuso f0a0a978b6 Merge branch 'master' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next
This merge resolves conflicts with 75aec9df3a ("bridge: Remove
br_nf_push_frag_xmit_sk") as part of Eric Biederman's effort to improve
netns support in the network stack that reached upstream via David's
net-next tree.

Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

Conflicts:
	net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c
2015-10-17 14:28:03 +02:00
Florian Westphal 2ffbceb2b0 netfilter: remove hook owner refcounting
since commit 8405a8fff3 ("netfilter: nf_qeueue: Drop queue entries on
nf_unregister_hook") all pending queued entries are discarded.

So we can simply remove all of the owner handling -- when module is
removed it also needs to unregister all its hooks.

Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-10-16 18:21:39 +02:00
David Howells f05819df10 KEYS: Fix crash when attempt to garbage collect an uninstantiated keyring
The following sequence of commands:

    i=`keyctl add user a a @s`
    keyctl request2 keyring foo bar @t
    keyctl unlink $i @s

tries to invoke an upcall to instantiate a keyring if one doesn't already
exist by that name within the user's keyring set.  However, if the upcall
fails, the code sets keyring->type_data.reject_error to -ENOKEY or some
other error code.  When the key is garbage collected, the key destroy
function is called unconditionally and keyring_destroy() uses list_empty()
on keyring->type_data.link - which is in a union with reject_error.
Subsequently, the kernel tries to unlink the keyring from the keyring names
list - which oopses like this:

	BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
	IP: [<ffffffff8126e051>] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88
	...
	Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector
	...
	RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8126e051>] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88
	RSP: 0018:ffff88003e2f3d30  EFLAGS: 00010203
	RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: ffff88003bf1a900 RCX: 0000000000000000
	RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000003bfc6901 RDI: ffffffff81a73a40
	RBP: ffff88003e2f3d38 R08: 0000000000000152 R09: 0000000000000000
	R10: ffff88003e2f3c18 R11: 000000000000865b R12: ffff88003bf1a900
	R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88003bf1a908 R15: ffff88003e2f4000
	...
	CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000003e3ec000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
	...
	Call Trace:
	 [<ffffffff8126c756>] key_gc_unused_keys.constprop.1+0x5d/0x10f
	 [<ffffffff8126ca71>] key_garbage_collector+0x1fa/0x351
	 [<ffffffff8105ec9b>] process_one_work+0x28e/0x547
	 [<ffffffff8105fd17>] worker_thread+0x26e/0x361
	 [<ffffffff8105faa9>] ? rescuer_thread+0x2a8/0x2a8
	 [<ffffffff810648ad>] kthread+0xf3/0xfb
	 [<ffffffff810647ba>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2
	 [<ffffffff815f2ccf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
	 [<ffffffff810647ba>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2

Note the value in RAX.  This is a 32-bit representation of -ENOKEY.

The solution is to only call ->destroy() if the key was successfully
instantiated.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
2015-10-15 17:21:37 +01:00
Eric Dumazet e446f9dfe1 net: synack packets can be attached to request sockets
selinux needs few changes to accommodate fact that SYNACK messages
can be attached to a request socket, lacking sk_security pointer

(Only syncookies are still attached to a TCP_LISTEN socket)

Adds a new sk_listener() helper, and use it in selinux and sch_fq

Fixes: ca6fb06518 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported by: kernel test robot <ying.huang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-11 05:05:06 -07:00
Roman Kubiak 8da4aba5bf Smack: pipefs fix in smack_d_instantiate
This fix writes the task label when
smack_d_instantiate is called, before the
label of the superblock was written on the
pipe's inode.

Signed-off-by: Roman Kubiak <r.kubiak@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-10-09 15:13:41 -07:00
José Bollo d21b7b049c Smack: Minor initialisation improvement
This change has two goals:
 - delay the setting of 'smack_enabled' until
   it will be really effective
 - ensure that smackfs is valid only if 'smack_enabled'
   is set (it is already the case in smack_netfilter.c)

Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@iot.bzh>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-10-09 15:13:24 -07:00
Geliang Tang 8b549ef42a smack: smk_ipv6_port_list should be static
Fixes the following sparse warning:

 security/smack/smack_lsm.c:55:1: warning: symbol 'smk_ipv6_port_list'
 was not declared. Should it be static?

Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-10-09 15:13:08 -07:00
Lukasz Pawelczyk 5f2bfe2f1d Smack: fix a NULL dereference in wrong smack_import_entry() usage
'commit e774ad683f ("smack: pass error code through pointers")'
made this function return proper error codes instead of NULL. Reflect that.

This is a fix for a NULL dereference introduced in
'commit 21abb1ec41 ("Smack: IPv6 host labeling")'

echo "$SOME_IPV6_ADDR \"test" > /smack/ipv6host
  (this should return EINVAL, it doesn't)
cat /smack/ipv6host
  (derefences 0x000a)

Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-10-09 15:12:46 -07:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 72e1eed8ab integrity: prevent loading untrusted certificates on the IMA trusted keyring
If IMA_LOAD_X509 is enabled, either directly or indirectly via
IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT, certificates are loaded onto the IMA
trusted keyring by the kernel via key_create_or_update(). When
the KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED flag is provided, certificates are loaded
without first verifying the certificate is properly signed by a
trusted key on the system keyring.  This patch removes the
KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED flag.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Cc:  <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.19+
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-10-09 15:31:18 -04:00
David S. Miller f6d3125fa3 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
Conflicts:
	net/dsa/slave.c

net/dsa/slave.c simply had overlapping changes.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-02 07:21:25 -07:00
David S. Miller 4963ed48f2 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
Conflicts:
	net/ipv4/arp.c

The net/ipv4/arp.c conflict was one commit adding a new
local variable while another commit was deleting one.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-09-26 16:08:27 -07:00
David Howells 94c4554ba0 KEYS: Fix race between key destruction and finding a keyring by name
There appears to be a race between:

 (1) key_gc_unused_keys() which frees key->security and then calls
     keyring_destroy() to unlink the name from the name list

 (2) find_keyring_by_name() which calls key_permission(), thus accessing
     key->security, on a key before checking to see whether the key usage is 0
     (ie. the key is dead and might be cleaned up).

Fix this by calling ->destroy() before cleaning up the core key data -
including key->security.

Reported-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2015-09-25 16:30:08 +01:00
Eric W. Biederman 06198b34a3 netfilter: Pass priv instead of nf_hook_ops to netfilter hooks
Only pass the void *priv parameter out of the nf_hook_ops.  That is
all any of the functions are interested now, and by limiting what is
passed it becomes simpler to change implementation details.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-09-18 22:00:16 +02:00
Linus Torvalds 1b3dfde386 Merge branch 'core-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull RCU fix from Ingo Molnar:
 "Fix a false positive warning"

* 'core-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  security/device_cgroup: Fix RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN() condition
2015-09-17 08:44:27 -07:00
Ingo Molnar 31409c9764 Merge branch 'for-mingo' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulmck/linux-rcu into core/urgent
Pull RCU fix from Paul E. McKenney, fixing an inverted RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN() condition.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-09-12 10:26:24 +02:00
Kirill A. Shutemov 7cbea8dc01 mm: mark most vm_operations_struct const
With two exceptions (drm/qxl and drm/radeon) all vm_operations_struct
structs should be constant.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 13:29:01 -07:00
Linus Torvalds b793c005ce Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

   - PKCS#7 support added to support signed kexec, also utilized for
     module signing.  See comments in 3f1e1bea.

     ** NOTE: this requires linking against the OpenSSL library, which
        must be installed, e.g.  the openssl-devel on Fedora **

   - Smack
      - add IPv6 host labeling; ignore labels on kernel threads
      - support smack labeling mounts which use binary mount data

   - SELinux:
      - add ioctl whitelisting (see
        http://kernsec.org/files/lss2015/vanderstoep.pdf)
      - fix mprotect PROT_EXEC regression caused by mm change

   - Seccomp:
      - add ptrace options for suspend/resume"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (57 commits)
  PKCS#7: Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use them
  Documentation/Changes: Now need OpenSSL devel packages for module signing
  scripts: add extract-cert and sign-file to .gitignore
  modsign: Handle signing key in source tree
  modsign: Use if_changed rule for extracting cert from module signing key
  Move certificate handling to its own directory
  sign-file: Fix warning about BIO_reset() return value
  PKCS#7: Add MODULE_LICENSE() to test module
  Smack - Fix build error with bringup unconfigured
  sign-file: Document dependency on OpenSSL devel libraries
  PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type
  KEYS: Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7
  PKCS#7: Improve and export the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoder
  modsign: Use extract-cert to process CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS
  extract-cert: Cope with multiple X.509 certificates in a single file
  sign-file: Generate CMS message as signature instead of PKCS#7
  PKCS#7: Support CMS messages also [RFC5652]
  X.509: Change recorded SKID & AKID to not include Subject or Issuer
  PKCS#7: Check content type and versions
  MAINTAINERS: The keyrings mailing list has moved
  ...
2015-09-08 12:41:25 -07:00
Kees Cook a068acf2ee fs: create and use seq_show_option for escaping
Many file systems that implement the show_options hook fail to correctly
escape their output which could lead to unescaped characters (e.g.  new
lines) leaking into /proc/mounts and /proc/[pid]/mountinfo files.  This
could lead to confusion, spoofed entries (resulting in things like
systemd issuing false d-bus "mount" notifications), and who knows what
else.  This looks like it would only be the root user stepping on
themselves, but it's possible weird things could happen in containers or
in other situations with delegated mount privileges.

Here's an example using overlay with setuid fusermount trusting the
contents of /proc/mounts (via the /etc/mtab symlink).  Imagine the use
of "sudo" is something more sneaky:

  $ BASE="ovl"
  $ MNT="$BASE/mnt"
  $ LOW="$BASE/lower"
  $ UP="$BASE/upper"
  $ WORK="$BASE/work/ 0 0
  none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000"
  $ mkdir -p "$LOW" "$UP" "$WORK"
  $ sudo mount -t overlay -o "lowerdir=$LOW,upperdir=$UP,workdir=$WORK" none /mnt
  $ cat /proc/mounts
  none /root/ovl/mnt overlay rw,relatime,lowerdir=ovl/lower,upperdir=ovl/upper,workdir=ovl/work/ 0 0
  none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000 0 0
  $ fusermount -u /proc
  $ cat /proc/mounts
  cat: /proc/mounts: No such file or directory

This fixes the problem by adding new seq_show_option and
seq_show_option_n helpers, and updating the vulnerable show_option
handlers to use them as needed.  Some, like SELinux, need to be open
coded due to unusual existing escape mechanisms.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add lost chunk, per Kees]
[keescook@chromium.org: seq_show_option should be using const parameters]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: J. R. Okajima <hooanon05g@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-04 16:54:41 -07:00
Andy Lutomirski 746bf6d642 capabilities: add a securebit to disable PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE
Per Andrew Morgan's request, add a securebit to allow admins to disable
PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE.  This securebit will prevent processes from adding
capabilities to their ambient set.

For simplicity, this disables PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE entirely rather than
just disabling setting previously cleared bits.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com>
Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>
Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-04 16:54:41 -07:00