Commit Graph

107 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Ronnie Sahlberg 52baa51d30 cifs: remove coverity warning in calc_lanman_hash
password_with_pad is a fixed size buffer of 16 bytes, it contains a
password string, to be padded with \0 if shorter than 16 bytes
but is just truncated if longer.
It is not, and we do not depend on it to be, nul terminated.

As such, do not use strncpy() to populate this buffer since
the str* prefix suggests that this is a string, which it is not,
and it also confuses coverity causing a false warning.

Detected by CoverityScan CID#113743 ("Buffer not null terminated")

Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
2018-12-23 22:41:26 -06:00
Colin Ian King 5890255b83 cifs: clean up indentation, replace spaces with tab
Trivial fix to clean up indentation, replace spaces with tab

Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
2018-12-23 22:36:09 -06:00
Paulo Alcantara a12d0c590c cifs: Make sure all data pages are signed correctly
Check if every data page is signed correctly in sigining helper.

Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
2018-08-07 14:15:41 -05:00
Arnd Bergmann 95390201e7 cifs: use timespec64 internally
In cifs, the timestamps are stored in memory in the cifs_fattr structure,
which uses the deprecated 'timespec' structure. Now that the VFS code
has moved on to 'timespec64', the next step is to change over the fattr
as well.

This also makes 32-bit and 64-bit systems behave the same way, and
no longer overflow the 32-bit time_t in year 2038.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
2018-08-07 14:15:41 -05:00
Paulo Alcantara 83ffdeadb4 cifs: Fix invalid check in __cifs_calc_signature()
The following check would never evaluate to true:
  > if (i == 0 && iov[0].iov_len <= 4)

Because 'i' always starts at 1.

This patch fixes it and also move the header checks outside the for loop
- which makes more sense.

Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
2018-06-15 19:17:40 -05:00
Ronnie Sahlberg c713c8770f cifs: push rfc1002 generation down the stack
Move the generation of the 4 byte length field down the stack and
generate it immediately before we start writing the data to the socket.

Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2018-06-15 02:38:08 -05:00
Long Li 4c0d2a5a64 CIFS: Pass page offset for calculating signature
When calculating signature for the packet, it needs to read into the
correct page offset for the data.

Signed-off-by: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
2018-06-05 17:44:30 -05:00
Aurelien Aptel 57f933ce9f CIFS: Fix signing for SMB2/3
It seems Ronnie's preamble removal broke signing.

the signing functions are called when:

A) we send a request (to sign it)
B) when we recv a response (to check the signature).

On code path A, the smb2 header is in iov[1] but on code path B, the
smb2 header is in iov[0] (and there's only one vector).

So we have different iov indexes for the smb2 header but the signing
function always use index 1. Fix this by checking the nb of io vectors
in the signing function as a hint.

Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
2018-06-04 19:17:59 -05:00
Gustavo A. R. Silva 70e80655f5 CIFS: fix sha512 check in cifs_crypto_secmech_release
It seems this is a copy-paste error and that the proper variable to use
in this particular case is _sha512_ instead of _md5_.

Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1465358 ("Copy-paste error")
Fixes: 1c6614d229e7 ("CIFS: add sha512 secmech")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2018-04-01 20:24:40 -05:00
Aurelien Aptel 5fcd7f3f96 CIFS: add sha512 secmech
* prepare for SMB3.11 pre-auth integrity
* enable sha512 when SMB311 is enabled in Kconfig
* add sha512 as a soft dependency

Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
2018-04-01 20:24:39 -05:00
Aurelien Aptel 82fb82be05 CIFS: refactor crypto shash/sdesc allocation&free
shash and sdesc and always allocated and freed together.
* abstract this in new functions cifs_alloc_hash() and cifs_free_hash().
* make smb2/3 crypto allocation independent from each other.

Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
2018-04-01 20:24:39 -05:00
Aurelien Aptel 97f4b7276b CIFS: zero sensitive data when freeing
also replaces memset()+kfree() by kzfree().

Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
2018-01-26 17:03:00 -06:00
Deepa Dinamani e37fea58f7 fs: cifs: replace CURRENT_TIME by other appropriate apis
CURRENT_TIME macro is not y2038 safe on 32 bit systems.

The patch replaces all the uses of CURRENT_TIME by current_time() for
filesystem times, and ktime_get_* functions for authentication
timestamps and timezone calculations.

This is also in preparation for the patch that transitions vfs
timestamps to use 64 bit time and hence make them y2038 safe.

CURRENT_TIME macro will be deleted before merging the aforementioned
change.

The inode timestamps read from the server are assumed to have correct
granularity and range.

The patch also assumes that the difference between server and client
times lie in the range INT_MIN..INT_MAX.  This is valid because this is
the difference between current times between server and client, and the
largest timezone difference is in the range of one day.

All cifs timestamps currently use timespec representation internally.
Authentication and timezone timestamps can also be transitioned into
using timespec64 when all other timestamps for cifs is transitioned to
use timespec64.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1491613030-11599-4-git-send-email-deepa.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-05-08 17:15:15 -07:00
Pavel Shilovsky 026e93dc0a CIFS: Encrypt SMB3 requests before sending
This change allows to encrypt packets if it is required by a server
for SMB sessions or tree connections.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
2017-02-01 16:46:36 -06:00
Pavel Shilovsky 738f9de5cd CIFS: Send RFC1001 length in a separate iov
In order to simplify further encryption support we need to separate
RFC1001 length and SMB2 header when sending a request. Put the length
field in iov[0] and the rest of the packet into following iovs.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
2017-02-01 16:46:35 -06:00
Germano Percossi 395664439c Fix default behaviour for empty domains and add domainauto option
With commit 2b149f119 many things have been fixed/introduced.
However, the default behaviour for RawNTLMSSP authentication
seems to be wrong in case the domain is not passed on the command line.

The main points (see below) of the patch are:
 - It alignes behaviour with Windows clients
 - It fixes backward compatibility
 - It fixes UPN

I compared this behavour with the one from a Windows 10 command line
client. When no domains are specified on the command line, I traced
the packets and observed that the client does send an empty
domain to the server.
In the linux kernel case, the empty domain is replaced by the
primary domain communicated by the SMB server.
This means that, if the credentials are valid against the local server
but that server is part of a domain, then the kernel module will
ask to authenticate against that domain and we will get LOGON failure.

I compared the packet trace from the smbclient when no domain is passed
and, in that case, a default domain from the client smb.conf is taken.
Apparently, connection succeeds anyway, because when the domain passed
is not valid (in my case WORKGROUP), then the local one is tried and
authentication succeeds. I tried with any kind of invalid domain and
the result was always a connection.

So, trying to interpret what to do and picking a valid domain if none
is passed, seems the wrong thing to do.
To this end, a new option "domainauto" has been added in case the
user wants a mechanism for guessing.

Without this patch, backward compatibility also is broken.
With kernel 3.10, the default auth mechanism was NTLM.
One of our testing servers accepted NTLM and, because no
domains are passed, authentication was local.

Moving to RawNTLMSSP forced us to change our command line
to add a fake domain to pass to prevent this mechanism to kick in.

For the same reasons, UPN is broken because the domain is specified
in the username.
The SMB server will work out the domain from the UPN and authenticate
against the right server.
Without the patch, though, given the domain is empty, it gets replaced
with another domain that could be the wrong one for the authentication.

Signed-off-by: Germano Percossi <germano.percossi@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2016-12-15 01:42:38 -06:00
Sachin Prabhu 5f4b55699a CIFS: Fix BUG() in calc_seckey()
Andy Lutromirski's new virtually mapped kernel stack allocations moves
kernel stacks the vmalloc area. This triggers the bug
 kernel BUG at ./include/linux/scatterlist.h:140!
at calc_seckey()->sg_init()

Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
2016-11-28 23:08:52 -06:00
Rabin Vincent bd975d1eea cifs: fix crash due to race in hmac(md5) handling
The secmech hmac(md5) structures are present in the TCP_Server_Info
struct and can be shared among multiple CIFS sessions.  However, the
server mutex is not currently held when these structures are allocated
and used, which can lead to a kernel crashes, as in the scenario below:

mount.cifs(8) #1				mount.cifs(8) #2

Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated?
// false

						Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated?
						// false

secmech.hmacmd = crypto_alloc_shash..
secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc..
sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm = &secmec.hmacmd;

						secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc
						// sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm
						// not yet assigned

crypto_shash_update()
 deref NULL sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm

 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000030
 epc   : 8027ba34 crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158
 ra    : 8020f2e8 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84
 Call Trace:
  crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158
  setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84
  build_ntlmssp_auth_blob+0xbc/0x34c
  sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate+0xac/0x248
  CIFS_SessSetup+0xf0/0x178
  cifs_setup_session+0x4c/0x84
  cifs_get_smb_ses+0x2c8/0x314
  cifs_mount+0x38c/0x76c
  cifs_do_mount+0x98/0x440
  mount_fs+0x20/0xc0
  vfs_kern_mount+0x58/0x138
  do_mount+0x1e8/0xccc
  SyS_mount+0x88/0xd4
  syscall_common+0x30/0x54

Fix this by locking the srv_mutex around the code which uses these
hmac(md5) structures.  All the other secmech algos already have similar
locking.

Fixes: 95dc8dd14e ("Limit allocation of crypto mechanisms to dialect which requires")
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabinv@axis.com>
Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2016-07-20 03:03:27 -05:00
Al Viro 16c568efff cifs: merge the hash calculation helpers
three practically identical copies...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-28 14:05:27 -04:00
Linus Torvalds 70477371dc Merge branch 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu:
 "Here is the crypto update for 4.6:

  API:
   - Convert remaining crypto_hash users to shash or ahash, also convert
     blkcipher/ablkcipher users to skcipher.
   - Remove crypto_hash interface.
   - Remove crypto_pcomp interface.
   - Add crypto engine for async cipher drivers.
   - Add akcipher documentation.
   - Add skcipher documentation.

  Algorithms:
   - Rename crypto/crc32 to avoid name clash with lib/crc32.
   - Fix bug in keywrap where we zero the wrong pointer.

  Drivers:
   - Support T5/M5, T7/M7 SPARC CPUs in n2 hwrng driver.
   - Add PIC32 hwrng driver.
   - Support BCM6368 in bcm63xx hwrng driver.
   - Pack structs for 32-bit compat users in qat.
   - Use crypto engine in omap-aes.
   - Add support for sama5d2x SoCs in atmel-sha.
   - Make atmel-sha available again.
   - Make sahara hashing available again.
   - Make ccp hashing available again.
   - Make sha1-mb available again.
   - Add support for multiple devices in ccp.
   - Improve DMA performance in caam.
   - Add hashing support to rockchip"

* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (116 commits)
  crypto: qat - remove redundant arbiter configuration
  crypto: ux500 - fix checks of error code returned by devm_ioremap_resource()
  crypto: atmel - fix checks of error code returned by devm_ioremap_resource()
  crypto: qat - Change the definition of icp_qat_uof_regtype
  hwrng: exynos - use __maybe_unused to hide pm functions
  crypto: ccp - Add abstraction for device-specific calls
  crypto: ccp - CCP versioning support
  crypto: ccp - Support for multiple CCPs
  crypto: ccp - Remove check for x86 family and model
  crypto: ccp - memset request context to zero during import
  lib/mpi: use "static inline" instead of "extern inline"
  lib/mpi: avoid assembler warning
  hwrng: bcm63xx - fix non device tree compatibility
  crypto: testmgr - allow rfc3686 aes-ctr variants in fips mode.
  crypto: qat - The AE id should be less than the maximal AE number
  lib/mpi: Endianness fix
  crypto: rockchip - add hash support for crypto engine in rk3288
  crypto: xts - fix compile errors
  crypto: doc - add skcipher API documentation
  crypto: doc - update AEAD AD handling
  ...
2016-03-17 11:22:54 -07:00
Anton Protopopov 4b550af519 cifs: fix erroneous return value
The setup_ntlmv2_rsp() function may return positive value ENOMEM instead
of -ENOMEM in case of kmalloc failure.

Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov <a.s.protopopov@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2016-02-10 18:23:31 -06:00
Herbert Xu 9651ddbac8 cifs: Use skcipher
This patch replaces uses of blkcipher with skcipher.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-01-27 20:35:53 +08:00
Peter Seiderer 98ce94c8df cifs: use server timestamp for ntlmv2 authentication
Linux cifs mount with ntlmssp against an Mac OS X (Yosemite
10.10.5) share fails in case the clocks differ more than +/-2h:

digest-service: digest-request: od failed with 2 proto=ntlmv2
digest-service: digest-request: kdc failed with -1561745592 proto=ntlmv2

Fix this by (re-)using the given server timestamp for the
ntlmv2 authentication (as Windows 7 does).

A related problem was also reported earlier by Namjae Jaen (see below):

Windows machine has extended security feature which refuse to allow
authentication when there is time difference between server time and
client time when ntlmv2 negotiation is used. This problem is prevalent
in embedded enviornment where system time is set to default 1970.

Modern servers send the server timestamp in the TargetInfo Av_Pair
structure in the challenge message [see MS-NLMP 2.2.2.1]
In [MS-NLMP 3.1.5.1.2] it is explicitly mentioned that the client must
use the server provided timestamp if present OR current time if it is
not

Reported-by: Namjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
2015-09-22 15:24:02 -05:00
Steve French 8b7a454443 CIFS: session servername can't be null
remove impossible check

Pointed out by Coverity (CID 115422)

Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
2015-04-01 00:01:47 -05:00
Steve French b693855fe6 Allow conversion of characters in Mac remap range. Part 1
This allows directory listings to Mac to display filenames
correctly which have been created with illegal (to Windows)
characters in their filename. It does not allow
converting the other direction yet ie opening files with
these characters (followon patch).

There are seven reserved characters that need to be remapped when
mounting to Windows, Mac (or any server without Unix Extensions) which
are valid in POSIX but not in the other OS.

: \ < > ? * |

We used the normal UCS-2 remap range for this in order to convert this
to/from UTF8 as did Windows Services for Unix (basically add 0xF000 to
any of the 7 reserved characters), at least when the "mapchars" mount
option was specified.

Mac used a very slightly different "Services for Mac" remap range
0xF021 through 0xF027.  The attached patch allows cifs.ko (the kernel
client) to read directories on macs containing files with these
characters and display their names properly.  In theory this even
might be useful on mounts to Samba when the vfs_catia or new
"vfs_fruit" module is loaded.

Currently the 7 reserved characters look very strange in directory
listings from cifs.ko to Mac server.  This patch allows these file
name characters to be read (requires specifying mapchars on mount).

Two additional changes are needed:
1) Make it more automatic: a way of detecting enough info so that
we know to try to always remap these characters or not. Various
have suggested that the SFM approach be made the default when
the server does not support POSIX Unix extensions (cifs mounts
to Samba for example) so need to make SFM remapping the default
unless mapchars (SFU style mapping) specified on mount or no
mapping explicitly requested or no mapping needed (cifs mounts to Samba).

2) Adding a patch to map the characters the other direction
(ie UTF-8 to UCS-2 on open).  This patch does it for translating
readdir entries (ie UCS-2 to UTF-8)

Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
2014-10-16 15:20:20 -05:00
Tim Gardner 2c957ddf30 cifs: Use data structures to compute NTLMv2 response offsets
A bit of cleanup plus some gratuitous variable renaming. I think using
structures instead of numeric offsets makes this code much more
understandable.

Also added a comment about current time range expected by
the server.

Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <spargaonkar@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2013-11-11 16:58:11 -06:00
Jeff Layton ba48202932 cifs: fix bad error handling in crypto code
Jarod reported an Oops like when testing with fips=1:

CIFS VFS: could not allocate crypto hmacmd5
CIFS VFS: could not crypto alloc hmacmd5 rc -2
CIFS VFS: Error -2 during NTLMSSP authentication
CIFS VFS: Send error in SessSetup = -2
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000004e
IP: [<ffffffff812b5c7a>] crypto_destroy_tfm+0x1a/0x90
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: md4 nls_utf8 cifs dns_resolver fscache kvm serio_raw virtio_balloon virtio_net mperf i2c_piix4 cirrus drm_kms_helper ttm drm i2c_core virtio_blk ata_generic pata_acpi
CPU: 1 PID: 639 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 3.11.0-0.rc3.git0.1.fc20.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88007bf496e0 ti: ffff88007b080000 task.ti: ffff88007b080000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812b5c7a>]  [<ffffffff812b5c7a>] crypto_destroy_tfm+0x1a/0x90
RSP: 0018:ffff88007b081d10  EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000001f1f RBX: ffff880037422000 RCX: ffff88007b081fd8
RDX: 000000000000001f RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: fffffffffffffffe
RBP: ffff88007b081d30 R08: ffff880037422000 R09: ffff88007c090100
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000fffffffe R12: fffffffffffffffe
R13: ffff880037422000 R14: ffff880037422000 R15: 00000000fffffffe
FS:  00007fc322f4f780(0000) GS:ffff88007fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 000000000000004e CR3: 000000007bdaa000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
 ffffffff81085845 ffff880037422000 ffff8800375e7400 ffff880037422000
 ffff88007b081d48 ffffffffa0176022 ffff880037422000 ffff88007b081d60
 ffffffffa015c07b ffff880037600600 ffff88007b081dc8 ffffffffa01610e1
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff81085845>] ? __cancel_work_timer+0x75/0xf0
 [<ffffffffa0176022>] cifs_crypto_shash_release+0x82/0xf0 [cifs]
 [<ffffffffa015c07b>] cifs_put_tcp_session+0x8b/0xe0 [cifs]
 [<ffffffffa01610e1>] cifs_mount+0x9d1/0xad0 [cifs]
 [<ffffffffa014ff50>] cifs_do_mount+0xa0/0x4d0 [cifs]
 [<ffffffff811ab6e9>] mount_fs+0x39/0x1b0
 [<ffffffff811c466f>] vfs_kern_mount+0x5f/0xf0
 [<ffffffff811c6a9e>] do_mount+0x23e/0xa20
 [<ffffffff811c66e6>] ? copy_mount_options+0x36/0x170
 [<ffffffff811c7303>] SyS_mount+0x83/0xc0
 [<ffffffff8165c8d9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: eb 9e 66 66 66 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 89 e5 41 55 41 54 49 89 fc 53 48 83 ec 08 48 85 ff 74 46 <48> 83 7e 48 00 48 8b 5e 50 74 4b 48 89 f7 e8 83 fc ff ff 4c 8b
RIP  [<ffffffff812b5c7a>] crypto_destroy_tfm+0x1a/0x90
 RSP <ffff88007b081d10>
CR2: 000000000000004e

The cifs code allocates some crypto structures. If that fails, it
returns an error, but it leaves the pointers set to their PTR_ERR
values. Then later when it tries to clean up, it sees that those values
are non-NULL and then passes them to the routine that frees them.

Fix this by setting the pointers to NULL after collecting the error code
in this situation.

Cc: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2013-07-31 13:44:59 -05:00
Chen Gang 057d6332b2 cifs: extend the buffer length enought for sprintf() using
For cifs_set_cifscreds() in "fs/cifs/connect.c", 'desc' buffer length
is 'CIFSCREDS_DESC_SIZE' (56 is less than 256), and 'ses->domainName'
length may be "255 + '\0'".

The related sprintf() may cause memory overflow, so need extend related
buffer enough to hold all things.

It is also necessary to be sure of 'ses->domainName' must be less than
256, and define the related macro instead of hard code number '256'.

Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Scott Lovenberg <scott.lovenberg@gmail.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2013-07-30 23:54:40 -05:00
Steve French 95dc8dd14e Limit allocation of crypto mechanisms to dialect which requires
Updated patch to try to prevent allocation of cifs, smb2 or smb3 crypto
secmech structures unless needed.  Currently cifs allocates all crypto
mechanisms when the first session is established (4 functions and
4 contexts), rather than only allocating these when needed (smb3 needs
two, the rest of the dialects only need one).

Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2013-07-04 14:38:08 -05:00
Steve French 429b46f4fd [CIFS] SMB3 Signing enablement
SMB3 uses a much faster method of signing (which is also better in other ways),
AES-CMAC.  With the kernel now supporting AES-CMAC since last release, we
are overdue to allow SMB3 signing (today only CIFS and SMB2 and SMB2.1,
but not SMB3 and SMB3.1 can sign) - and we need this also for checking
secure negotation and also per-share encryption (two other new SMB3 features
which we need to implement).

This patch needs some work in a few areas - for example we need to
move signing for SMB2/SMB3 from per-socket to per-user (we may be able to
use the "nosharesock" mount option in the interim for the multiuser case),
and Shirish found a bug in the earlier authentication overhaul
(setting signing flags properly) - but those can be done in followon
patches.

Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2013-06-26 23:45:05 -05:00
Steve French fdf96a907c Handle big endianness in NTLM (ntlmv2) authentication
This is RH bug 970891
Uppercasing of username during calculation of ntlmv2 hash fails
because UniStrupr function does not handle big endian wchars.

Also fix a comment in the same code to reflect its correct usage.

[To make it easier for stable (rather than require 2nd patch) fixed
this patch of Shirish's to remove endian warning generated
by sparse -- steve f.]

Reported-by: steve <sanpatr1@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2013-06-26 17:31:45 -05:00
Jeff Layton 3f618223dc move sectype to the cifs_ses instead of TCP_Server_Info
Now that we track what sort of NEGOTIATE response was received, stop
mandating that every session on a socket use the same type of auth.

Push that decision out into the session setup code, and make the sectype
a per-session property. This should allow us to mix multiple sectypes on
a socket as long as they are compatible with the NEGOTIATE response.

With this too, we can now eliminate the ses->secFlg field since that
info is redundant and harder to work with than a securityEnum.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2013-06-24 01:56:44 -05:00
Jeff Layton ffa598a537 cifs: remove useless memset in LANMAN auth code
It turns out that CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE == CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE, so this
memset doesn't do anything useful.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2013-06-24 01:56:39 -05:00
Jeff Layton 0124cc4511 cifs: store the real expected sequence number in the mid
Currently, the signing routines take a pointer to a place to store the
expected sequence number for the mid response. It then stores a value
that's one below what that sequence number should be, and then adds one
to it when verifying the signature on the response.

Increment the sequence number before storing the value in the mid, and
eliminate the "+1" when checking the signature.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2013-05-04 22:18:01 -05:00
Joe Perches f96637be08 [CIFS] cifs: Rename cERROR and cFYI to cifs_dbg
It's not obvious from reading the macro names that these macros
are for debugging.  Convert the names to a single more typical
kernel style cifs_dbg macro.

	cERROR(1, ...)   -> cifs_dbg(VFS, ...)
	cFYI(1, ...)     -> cifs_dbg(FYI, ...)
	cFYI(DBG2, ...)  -> cifs_dbg(NOISY, ...)

Move the terminating format newline from the macro to the call site.

Add CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG function cifs_vfs_err to emit the
"CIFS VFS: " prefix for VFS messages.

Size is reduced ~ 1% when CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG is set (default y)

$ size fs/cifs/cifs.ko*
   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
 265245	   2525	    132	 267902	  4167e	fs/cifs/cifs.ko.new
 268359    2525     132  271016   422a8 fs/cifs/cifs.ko.old

Other miscellaneous changes around these conversions:

o Miscellaneous typo fixes
o Add terminating \n's to almost all formats and remove them
  from the macros to be more kernel style like.  A few formats
  previously had defective \n's
o Remove unnecessary OOM messages as kmalloc() calls dump_stack
o Coalesce formats to make grep easier,
  added missing spaces when coalescing formats
o Use %s, __func__ instead of embedded function name
o Removed unnecessary "cifs: " prefixes
o Convert kzalloc with multiply to kcalloc
o Remove unused cifswarn macro

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2013-05-04 22:17:23 -05:00
Jeff Layton fb308a6f22 cifs: teach signing routines how to deal with arrays of pages in a smb_rqst
Use the smb_send_rqst helper function to kmap each page in the array
and update the hash for that chunk.

Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2012-09-24 21:46:31 -05:00
Jeff Layton bf5ea0e2f2 cifs: change signing routines to deal with smb_rqst structs
We need a way to represent a call to be sent on the wire that does not
require having all of the page data kmapped. Behold the smb_rqst struct.
This new struct represents an array of kvecs immediately followed by an
array of pages.

Convert the signing routines to use these structs under the hood and
turn the existing functions for this into wrappers around that. For now,
we're just changing these functions to take different args. Later, we'll
teach them how to deal with arrays of pages.

Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2012-09-24 21:46:30 -05:00
Pavel Shilovsky 3c1bf7e48e CIFS: Enable signing in SMB2
Use hmac-sha256 and rather than hmac-md5 that is used for CIFS/SMB.

Signature field in SMB2 header is 16 bytes instead of 8 bytes.

Automatically enable signing by client when requested by the server
when signing ability is available to the client.

Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2012-09-24 21:46:28 -05:00
Jeff Layton 762a4206a3 cifs: rename cifs_sign_smb2 to cifs_sign_smbv
"smb2" makes me think of the SMB2.x protocol, which isn't at all what
this function is for...

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2012-07-23 16:36:34 -05:00
Jeff Layton ac3aa2f8ae cifs: remove extraneous newlines from cERROR and cFYI calls
Those macros add a newline on their own, so there's not any need to
embed one in the message itself.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2012-07-23 16:36:26 -05:00
Steve French acbbb76a26 CIFS: Rename *UCS* functions to *UTF16*
to reflect the unicode encoding used by CIFS protocol.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
2012-01-18 22:32:33 -06:00
Jeff Layton 04febabcf5 cifs: sanitize username handling
Currently, it's not very clear whether you're allowed to have a NULL
vol->username or ses->user_name. Some places check for it and some don't.

Make it clear that a NULL pointer is OK in these fields, and ensure that
all the callers check for that.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2012-01-17 22:40:26 -06:00
Shirish Pargaonkar 9ef5992e44 cifs: Assume passwords are encoded according to iocharset (try #2)
Re-posting a patch originally posted by Oskar Liljeblad after
rebasing on 3.2.

Modify cifs to assume that the supplied password is encoded according
to iocharset.  Before this patch passwords would be treated as
raw 8-bit data, which made authentication with Unicode passwords impossible
(at least passwords with characters > 0xFF).

The previous code would as a side effect accept passwords encoded with
ISO 8859-1, since Unicode < 0x100 basically is ISO 8859-1.  Software which
relies on that will no longer support password chars > 0x7F unless it also
uses iocharset=iso8859-1.  (mount.cifs does not care about the encoding so
it will work as expected.)

Signed-off-by: Oskar Liljeblad <oskar@osk.mine.nu>
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Tested-by: A <nimbus1_03087@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2011-10-29 22:06:54 -05:00
Jeff Layton 826a95e4a3 cifs: consolidate signature generating code
We have two versions of signature generating code. A vectorized and
non-vectorized version. Eliminate a large chunk of cut-and-paste
code by turning the non-vectorized version into a wrapper around the
vectorized one.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2011-10-12 23:41:41 -05:00
Jeff Layton b4dacbc282 cifs: use memcpy for magic string in cifs signature generation BSRSPYL
...it's more efficient since we know the length.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2011-10-12 23:41:18 -05:00
Shirish Pargaonkar cfbd6f84c2 cifs: Fix broken sec=ntlmv2/i sec option (try #2)
Fix sec=ntlmv2/i authentication option during mount of Samba shares.

cifs client was coding ntlmv2 response incorrectly.
All that is needed in temp as specified in MS-NLMP seciton 3.3.2

"Define ComputeResponse(NegFlg, ResponseKeyNT, ResponseKeyLM,
CHALLENGE_MESSAGE.ServerChallenge, ClientChallenge, Time, ServerName)

as
Set temp to ConcatenationOf(Responserversion, HiResponserversion,
Z(6), Time, ClientChallenge, Z(4), ServerName, Z(4)"

is MsvAvNbDomainName.

For sec=ntlmsspi, build_av_pair is not used, a blob is plucked from
type 2 response sent by the server to use in authentication.

I tested sec=ntlmv2/i and sec=ntlmssp/i mount options against
Samba (3.6) and Windows - XP, 2003 Server and 7.
They all worked.

Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-09-19 21:16:58 -05:00
Jeff Layton 998d6fcb24 cifs: don't start signing too early
Sniffing traffic on the wire shows that windows clients send a zeroed
out signature field in a NEGOTIATE request, and send "BSRSPYL" in the
signature field during SESSION_SETUP. Make the cifs client behave the
same way.

It doesn't seem to make much difference in any server that I've tested
against, but it's probably best to follow windows behavior as closely as
possible here.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-07-31 21:21:06 +00:00
Shirish Pargaonkar 14cae3243b cifs: Cleanup: check return codes of crypto api calls
Check return codes of crypto api calls and either log an error or log
an error and return from the calling function with error.

Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-07-25 22:12:10 +00:00
Jeff Layton 9c4843ea57 cifs: silence printk when establishing first session on socket
When signing is enabled, the first session that's established on a
socket will cause a printk like this to pop:

    CIFS VFS: Unexpected SMB signature

This is because the key exchange hasn't happened yet, so the signature
field is bogus. Don't try to check the signature on the socket until the
first session has been established. Also, eliminate the specific check
for SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE since this check covers that case too.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Cc: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-06-07 00:57:05 +00:00
Steve French 96daf2b091 [CIFS] Rename three structures to avoid camel case
secMode to sec_mode
and
cifsTconInfo to cifs_tcon
and
cifsSesInfo to cifs_ses

Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-05-27 04:34:02 +00:00