Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Thomas Gleixner 1ccea77e2a treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 13
Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
  your option any later version this program is distributed in the
  hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even
  the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
  purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you
  should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along
  with this program if not see http www gnu org licenses

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
  your option any later version this program is distributed in the
  hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even
  the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
  purpose see the gnu general public license for more details [based]
  [from] [clk] [highbank] [c] you should have received a copy of the
  gnu general public license along with this program if not see http
  www gnu org licenses

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-or-later

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 355 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jilayne Lovejoy <opensource@jilayne.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Winslow <swinslow@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190519154041.837383322@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-21 11:28:45 +02:00
Peter Zijlstra ea24213d80 objtool: Add UACCESS validation
It is important that UACCESS regions are as small as possible;
furthermore the UACCESS state is not scheduled, so doing anything that
might directly call into the scheduler will cause random code to be
ran with UACCESS enabled.

Teach objtool too track UACCESS state and warn about any CALL made
while UACCESS is enabled. This very much includes the __fentry__()
and __preempt_schedule() calls.

Note that exceptions _do_ save/restore the UACCESS state, and therefore
they can drive preemption. This also means that all exception handlers
must have an otherwise redundant UACCESS disable instruction;
therefore ignore this warning for !STT_FUNC code (exception handlers
are not normal functions).

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-03 11:02:24 +02:00
Josh Poimboeuf 442f04c34a objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
This adds a host tool named objtool which has a "check" subcommand which
analyzes .o files to ensure the validity of stack metadata.  It enforces
a set of rules on asm code and C inline assembly code so that stack
traces can be reliable.

For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths and
validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.

It also follows code paths involving kernel special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions).  Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.

Here are some of the benefits of validating stack metadata:

a) More reliable stack traces for frame pointer enabled kernels

   Frame pointers are used for debugging purposes.  They allow runtime
   code and debug tools to be able to walk the stack to determine the
   chain of function call sites that led to the currently executing
   code.

   For some architectures, frame pointers are enabled by
   CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER.  For some other architectures they may be
   required by the ABI (sometimes referred to as "backchain pointers").

   For C code, gcc automatically generates instructions for setting up
   frame pointers when the -fno-omit-frame-pointer option is used.

   But for asm code, the frame setup instructions have to be written by
   hand, which most people don't do.  So the end result is that
   CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER is honored for C code but not for most asm code.

   For stack traces based on frame pointers to be reliable, all
   functions which call other functions must first create a stack frame
   and update the frame pointer.  If a first function doesn't properly
   create a stack frame before calling a second function, the *caller*
   of the first function will be skipped on the stack trace.

   For example, consider the following example backtrace with frame
   pointers enabled:

     [<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
     [<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
     [<ffffffff8127f568>] seq_read+0x108/0x3e0
     [<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
     [<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
     [<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
     [<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
     [<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76

   It correctly shows that the caller of cmdline_proc_show() is
   seq_read().

   If we remove the frame pointer logic from cmdline_proc_show() by
   replacing the frame pointer related instructions with nops, here's
   what it looks like instead:

     [<ffffffff81812584>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x63
     [<ffffffff812d6dc2>] cmdline_proc_show+0x12/0x30
     [<ffffffff812cce62>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
     [<ffffffff81256197>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
     [<ffffffff81256b16>] vfs_read+0x86/0x130
     [<ffffffff81257898>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
     [<ffffffff8181c1f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76

   Notice that cmdline_proc_show()'s caller, seq_read(), has been
   skipped.  Instead the stack trace seems to show that
   cmdline_proc_show() was called by proc_reg_read().

   The benefit of "objtool check" here is that because it ensures that
   *all* functions honor CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, no functions will ever[*]
   be skipped on a stack trace.

   [*] unless an interrupt or exception has occurred at the very
       beginning of a function before the stack frame has been created,
       or at the very end of the function after the stack frame has been
       destroyed.  This is an inherent limitation of frame pointers.

b) 100% reliable stack traces for DWARF enabled kernels

   This is not yet implemented.  For more details about what is planned,
   see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.

c) Higher live patching compatibility rate

   This is not yet implemented.  For more details about what is planned,
   see tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt.

To achieve the validation, "objtool check" enforces the following rules:

1. Each callable function must be annotated as such with the ELF
   function type.  In asm code, this is typically done using the
   ENTRY/ENDPROC macros.  If objtool finds a return instruction
   outside of a function, it flags an error since that usually indicates
   callable code which should be annotated accordingly.

   This rule is needed so that objtool can properly identify each
   callable function in order to analyze its stack metadata.

2. Conversely, each section of code which is *not* callable should *not*
   be annotated as an ELF function.  The ENDPROC macro shouldn't be used
   in this case.

   This rule is needed so that objtool can ignore non-callable code.
   Such code doesn't have to follow any of the other rules.

3. Each callable function which calls another function must have the
   correct frame pointer logic, if required by CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER or
   the architecture's back chain rules.  This can by done in asm code
   with the FRAME_BEGIN/FRAME_END macros.

   This rule ensures that frame pointer based stack traces will work as
   designed.  If function A doesn't create a stack frame before calling
   function B, the _caller_ of function A will be skipped on the stack
   trace.

4. Dynamic jumps and jumps to undefined symbols are only allowed if:

   a) the jump is part of a switch statement; or

   b) the jump matches sibling call semantics and the frame pointer has
      the same value it had on function entry.

   This rule is needed so that objtool can reliably analyze all of a
   function's code paths.  If a function jumps to code in another file,
   and it's not a sibling call, objtool has no way to follow the jump
   because it only analyzes a single file at a time.

5. A callable function may not execute kernel entry/exit instructions.
   The only code which needs such instructions is kernel entry code,
   which shouldn't be be in callable functions anyway.

   This rule is just a sanity check to ensure that callable functions
   return normally.

It currently only supports x86_64.  I tried to make the code generic so
that support for other architectures can hopefully be plugged in
relatively easily.

On my Lenovo laptop with a i7-4810MQ 4-core/8-thread CPU, building the
kernel with objtool checking every .o file adds about three seconds of
total build time.  It hasn't been optimized for performance yet, so
there are probably some opportunities for better build performance.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f3efb173de43bd067b060de73f856567c0fa1174.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-29 08:35:12 +01:00