Commit Graph

403 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Eric W. Biederman e0c9c0afd2 mnt: Update detach_mounts to leave mounts connected
Now that it is possible to lazily unmount an entire mount tree and
leave the individual mounts connected to each other add a new flag
UMOUNT_CONNECTED to umount_tree to force this behavior and use
this flag in detach_mounts.

This closes a bug where the deletion of a file or directory could
trigger an unmount and reveal data under a mount point.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-09 11:39:57 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman f53e579751 mnt: Fix the error check in __detach_mounts
lookup_mountpoint can return either NULL or an error value.
Update the test in __detach_mounts to test for an error value
to avoid pathological cases causing a NULL pointer dereferences.

The callers of __detach_mounts should prevent it from ever being
called on an unlinked dentry but don't take any chances.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-09 11:39:56 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman ce07d891a0 mnt: Honor MNT_LOCKED when detaching mounts
Modify umount(MNT_DETACH) to keep mounts in the hash table that are
locked to their parent mounts, when the parent is lazily unmounted.

In mntput_no_expire detach the children from the hash table, depending
on mnt_pin_kill in cleanup_mnt to decrement the mnt_count of the children.

In __detach_mounts if there are any mounts that have been unmounted
but still are on the list of mounts of a mountpoint, remove their
children from the mount hash table and those children to the unmounted
list so they won't linger potentially indefinitely waiting for their
final mntput, now that the mounts serve no purpose.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-09 11:39:55 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman 6a46c5735c mnt: Factor umount_mnt from umount_tree
For future use factor out a function umount_mnt from umount_tree.
This function unhashes a mount and remembers where the mount
was mounted so that eventually when the code makes it to a
sleeping context the mountpoint can be dput.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-09 11:39:54 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman 7bdb11de8e mnt: Factor out unhash_mnt from detach_mnt and umount_tree
Create a function unhash_mnt that contains the common code between
detach_mnt and umount_tree, and use unhash_mnt in place of the common
code.  This add a unncessary list_del_init(mnt->mnt_child) into
umount_tree but given that mnt_child is already empty this extra
line is a noop.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-09 11:39:54 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman cd4a40174b mnt: Fail collect_mounts when applied to unmounted mounts
The only users of collect_mounts are in audit_tree.c

In audit_trim_trees and audit_add_tree_rule the path passed into
collect_mounts is generated from kern_path passed an audit_tree
pathname which is guaranteed to be an absolute path.   In those cases
collect_mounts is obviously intended to work on mounted paths and
if a race results in paths that are unmounted when collect_mounts
it is reasonable to fail early.

The paths passed into audit_tag_tree don't have the absolute path
check.  But are used to play with fsnotify and otherwise interact with
the audit_trees, so again operating only on mounted paths appears
reasonable.

Avoid having to worry about what happens when we try and audit
unmounted filesystems by restricting collect_mounts to mounts
that appear in the mount tree.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-09 11:38:31 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman 5d88457eb5 mnt: On an unmount propagate clearing of MNT_LOCKED
A prerequisite of calling umount_tree is that the point where the tree
is mounted at is valid to unmount.

If we are propagating the effect of the unmount clear MNT_LOCKED in
every instance where the same filesystem is mounted on the same
mountpoint in the mount tree, as we know (by virtue of the fact
that umount_tree was called) that it is safe to reveal what
is at that mountpoint.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-02 20:34:19 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman 411a938b5a mnt: Delay removal from the mount hash.
- Modify __lookup_mnt_hash_last to ignore mounts that have MNT_UMOUNTED set.
- Don't remove mounts from the mount hash table in propogate_umount
- Don't remove mounts from the mount hash table in umount_tree before
  the entire list of mounts to be umounted is selected.
- Remove mounts from the mount hash table as the last thing that
  happens in the case where a mount has a parent in umount_tree.
  Mounts without parents are not hashed (by definition).

This paves the way for delaying removal from the mount hash table even
farther and fixing the MNT_LOCKED vs MNT_DETACH issue.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-02 20:34:19 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman 590ce4bcbf mnt: Add MNT_UMOUNT flag
In some instances it is necessary to know if the the unmounting
process has begun on a mount.  Add MNT_UMOUNT to make that reliably
testable.

This fix gets used in fixing locked mounts in MNT_DETACH

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-02 20:34:18 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman c003b26ff9 mnt: In umount_tree reuse mnt_list instead of mnt_hash
umount_tree builds a list of mounts that need to be unmounted.
Utilize mnt_list for this purpose instead of mnt_hash.  This begins to
allow keeping a mount on the mnt_hash after it is unmounted, which is
necessary for a properly functioning MNT_LOCKED implementation.

The fact that mnt_list is an ordinary list makding available list_move
is nice bonus.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-02 20:34:18 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman 8318e667f1 mnt: Don't propagate umounts in __detach_mounts
Invoking mount propagation from __detach_mounts is inefficient and
wrong.

It is inefficient because __detach_mounts already walks the list of
mounts that where something needs to be done, and mount propagation
walks some subset of those mounts again.

It is actively wrong because if the dentry that is passed to
__detach_mounts is not part of the path to a mount that mount should
not be affected.

change_mnt_propagation(p,MS_PRIVATE) modifies the mount propagation
tree of a master mount so it's slaves are connected to another master
if possible.  Which means even removing a mount from the middle of a
mount tree with __detach_mounts will not deprive any mount propagated
mount events.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-02 20:34:17 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman e819f15210 mnt: Improve the umount_tree flags
- Remove the unneeded declaration from pnode.h
- Mark umount_tree static as it has no callers outside of namespace.c
- Define an enumeration of umount_tree's flags.
- Pass umount_tree's flags in by name

This removes the magic numbers 0, 1 and 2 making the code a little
clearer and makes it possible for there to be lazy unmounts that don't
propagate.  Which is what __detach_mounts actually wants for example.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-02 20:34:17 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman a3b3c5627c mnt: Use hlist_move_list in namespace_unlock
Small cleanup to make the code more readable and maintainable.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-04-02 20:33:53 -05:00
David Howells e36cb0b89c VFS: (Scripted) Convert S_ISLNK/DIR/REG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_*(dentry)
Convert the following where appropriate:

 (1) S_ISLNK(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_symlink(dentry).

 (2) S_ISREG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_reg(dentry).

 (3) S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_dir(dentry).  This is actually more
     complicated than it appears as some calls should be converted to
     d_can_lookup() instead.  The difference is whether the directory in
     question is a real dir with a ->lookup op or whether it's a fake dir with
     a ->d_automount op.

In some circumstances, we can subsume checks for dentry->d_inode not being
NULL into this, provided we the code isn't in a filesystem that expects
d_inode to be NULL if the dirent really *is* negative (ie. if we're going to
use d_inode() rather than d_backing_inode() to get the inode pointer).

Note that the dentry type field may be set to something other than
DCACHE_MISS_TYPE when d_inode is NULL in the case of unionmount, where the VFS
manages the fall-through from a negative dentry to a lower layer.  In such a
case, the dentry type of the negative union dentry is set to the same as the
type of the lower dentry.

However, if you know d_inode is not NULL at the call site, then you can use
the d_is_xxx() functions even in a filesystem.

There is one further complication: a 0,0 chardev dentry may be labelled
DCACHE_WHITEOUT_TYPE rather than DCACHE_SPECIAL_TYPE.  Strictly, this was
intended for special directory entry types that don't have attached inodes.

The following perl+coccinelle script was used:

use strict;

my @callers;
open($fd, 'git grep -l \'S_IS[A-Z].*->d_inode\' |') ||
    die "Can't grep for S_ISDIR and co. callers";
@callers = <$fd>;
close($fd);
unless (@callers) {
    print "No matches\n";
    exit(0);
}

my @cocci = (
    '@@',
    'expression E;',
    '@@',
    '',
    '- S_ISLNK(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
    '+ d_is_symlink(E)',
    '',
    '@@',
    'expression E;',
    '@@',
    '',
    '- S_ISDIR(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
    '+ d_is_dir(E)',
    '',
    '@@',
    'expression E;',
    '@@',
    '',
    '- S_ISREG(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
    '+ d_is_reg(E)' );

my $coccifile = "tmp.sp.cocci";
open($fd, ">$coccifile") || die $coccifile;
print($fd "$_\n") || die $coccifile foreach (@cocci);
close($fd);

foreach my $file (@callers) {
    chomp $file;
    print "Processing ", $file, "\n";
    system("spatch", "--sp-file", $coccifile, $file, "--in-place", "--no-show-diff") == 0 ||
	die "spatch failed";
}

[AV: overlayfs parts skipped]

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-02-22 11:38:41 -05:00
Linus Torvalds 50652963ea Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull misc VFS updates from Al Viro:
 "This cycle a lot of stuff sits on topical branches, so I'll be sending
  more or less one pull request per branch.

  This is the first pile; more to follow in a few.  In this one are
  several misc commits from early in the cycle (before I went for
  separate branches), plus the rework of mntput/dput ordering on umount,
  switching to use of fs_pin instead of convoluted games in
  namespace_unlock()"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  switch the IO-triggering parts of umount to fs_pin
  new fs_pin killing logics
  allow attaching fs_pin to a group not associated with some superblock
  get rid of the second argument of acct_kill()
  take count and rcu_head out of fs_pin
  dcache: let the dentry count go down to zero without taking d_lock
  pull bumping refcount into ->kill()
  kill pin_put()
  mode_t whack-a-mole: chelsio
  file->f_path.dentry is pinned down for as long as the file is open...
  get rid of lustre_dump_dentry()
  gut proc_register() a bit
  kill d_validate()
  ncpfs: get rid of d_validate() nonsense
  selinuxfs: don't open-code d_genocide()
2015-02-17 14:56:45 -08:00
Andrzej Hajda fcc139ae22 fs/namespace: convert devname allocation to kstrdup_const
VFS frequently performs duplication of strings located in read-only memory
section.  Replacing kstrdup by kstrdup_const allows to avoid such
operations.

Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hajda <a.hajda@samsung.com>
Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Cc: Kyungmin Park <kyungmin.park@samsung.com>
Cc: Mike Turquette <mturquette@linaro.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-13 21:21:36 -08:00
Al Viro 87b95ce096 switch the IO-triggering parts of umount to fs_pin
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-01-25 23:17:29 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman c297abfdf1 mnt: Fix a memory stomp in umount
While reviewing the code of umount_tree I realized that when we append
to a preexisting unmounted list we do not change pprev of the former
first item in the list.

Which means later in namespace_unlock hlist_del_init(&mnt->mnt_hash) on
the former first item of the list will stomp unmounted.first leaving
it set to some random mount point which we are likely to free soon.

This isn't likely to hit, but if it does I don't know how anyone could
track it down.

[ This happened because we don't have all the same operations for
  hlist's as we do for normal doubly-linked lists. In particular,
  list_splice() is easy on our standard doubly-linked lists, while
  hlist_splice() doesn't exist and needs both start/end entries of the
  hlist.  And commit 38129a13e6 incorrectly open-coded that missing
  hlist_splice().

  We should think about making these kinds of "mindless" conversions
  easier to get right by adding the missing hlist helpers   - Linus ]

Fixes: 38129a13e6 switch mnt_hash to hlist
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-18 11:22:02 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 87c31b39ab Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull user namespace related fixes from Eric Biederman:
 "As these are bug fixes almost all of thes changes are marked for
  backporting to stable.

  The first change (implicitly adding MNT_NODEV on remount) addresses a
  regression that was created when security issues with unprivileged
  remount were closed.  I go on to update the remount test to make it
  easy to detect if this issue reoccurs.

  Then there are a handful of mount and umount related fixes.

  Then half of the changes deal with the a recently discovered design
  bug in the permission checks of gid_map.  Unix since the beginning has
  allowed setting group permissions on files to less than the user and
  other permissions (aka ---rwx---rwx).  As the unix permission checks
  stop as soon as a group matches, and setgroups allows setting groups
  that can not later be dropped, results in a situtation where it is
  possible to legitimately use a group to assign fewer privileges to a
  process.  Which means dropping a group can increase a processes
  privileges.

  The fix I have adopted is that gid_map is now no longer writable
  without privilege unless the new file /proc/self/setgroups has been
  set to permanently disable setgroups.

  The bulk of user namespace using applications even the applications
  using applications using user namespaces without privilege remain
  unaffected by this change.  Unfortunately this ix breaks a couple user
  space applications, that were relying on the problematic behavior (one
  of which was tools/selftests/mount/unprivileged-remount-test.c).

  To hopefully prevent needing a regression fix on top of my security
  fix I rounded folks who work with the container implementations mostly
  like to be affected and encouraged them to test the changes.

    > So far nothing broke on my libvirt-lxc test bed. :-)
    > Tested with openSUSE 13.2 and libvirt 1.2.9.
    > Tested-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>

    > Tested on Fedora20 with libvirt 1.2.11, works fine.
    > Tested-by: Chen Hanxiao <chenhanxiao@cn.fujitsu.com>

    > Ok, thanks - yes, unprivileged lxc is working fine with your kernels.
    > Just to be sure I was testing the right thing I also tested using
    > my unprivileged nsexec testcases, and they failed on setgroup/setgid
    > as now expected, and succeeded there without your patches.
    > Tested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>

    > I tested this with Sandstorm.  It breaks as is and it works if I add
    > the setgroups thing.
    > Tested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> # breaks things as designed :("

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  userns: Unbreak the unprivileged remount tests
  userns; Correct the comment in map_write
  userns: Allow setting gid_maps without privilege when setgroups is disabled
  userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis
  userns: Rename id_map_mutex to userns_state_mutex
  userns: Only allow the creator of the userns unprivileged mappings
  userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid mapping
  userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings
  userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished
  userns: Document what the invariant required for safe unprivileged mappings.
  groups: Consolidate the setgroups permission checks
  mnt: Clear mnt_expire during pivot_root
  mnt: Carefully set CL_UNPRIVILEGED in clone_mnt
  mnt: Move the clear of MNT_LOCKED from copy_tree to it's callers.
  umount: Do not allow unmounting rootfs.
  umount: Disallow unprivileged mount force
  mnt: Update unprivileged remount test
  mnt: Implicitly add MNT_NODEV on remount when it was implicitly added by mount
2014-12-17 12:31:40 -08:00
Al Viro e149ed2b80 take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs
New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs.  Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now.
It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems,
etc.).  Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback().

This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well.
get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would
have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache).
proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot.  The interface used in procfs is
ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops).

Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry
is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path()
if present.  See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details
of that mechanism.

As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt;
it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets
from ns_get_path().

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-12-10 21:30:20 -05:00
Al Viro f77c80142e bury struct proc_ns in fs/proc
a) make get_proc_ns() return a pointer to struct ns_common
b) mirror ns_ops in dentry->d_fsdata of ns dentries, so that
is_mnt_ns_file() could get away with fewer dereferences.

That way struct proc_ns becomes invisible outside of fs/proc/*.c

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-12-04 14:34:54 -05:00
Al Viro 33c429405a copy address of proc_ns_ops into ns_common
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-12-04 14:34:47 -05:00
Al Viro 6344c433a4 new helpers: ns_alloc_inum/ns_free_inum
take struct ns_common *, for now simply wrappers around proc_{alloc,free}_inum()

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-12-04 14:34:36 -05:00
Al Viro 64964528b2 make proc_ns_operations work with struct ns_common * instead of void *
We can do that now.  And kill ->inum(), while we are at it - all instances
are identical.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-12-04 14:34:17 -05:00
Al Viro 58be28256d make mntns ->get()/->put()/->install()/->inum() work with &mnt_ns->ns
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-12-04 14:33:24 -05:00
Al Viro 435d5f4bb2 common object embedded into various struct ....ns
for now - just move corresponding ->proc_inum instances over there

Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-12-04 14:31:00 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman 4fed655c41 mnt: Clear mnt_expire during pivot_root
When inspecting the pivot_root and the current mount expiry logic I
realized that pivot_root fails to clear like mount move does.

Add the missing line in case someone does the interesting feat of
moving an expirable submount.  This gives a strong guarantee that root
of the filesystem tree will never expire.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2014-12-02 10:46:51 -06:00
Eric W. Biederman 381cacb12c mnt: Carefully set CL_UNPRIVILEGED in clone_mnt
old->mnt_expiry should be ignored unless CL_EXPIRE is set.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2014-12-02 10:46:50 -06:00
Eric W. Biederman 8486a7882b mnt: Move the clear of MNT_LOCKED from copy_tree to it's callers.
Clear MNT_LOCKED in the callers of copy_tree except copy_mnt_ns, and
collect_mounts.  In copy_mnt_ns it is necessary to create an exact
copy of a mount tree, so not clearing MNT_LOCKED is important.
Similarly collect_mounts is used to take a snapshot of the mount tree
for audit logging purposes and auditing using a faithful copy of the
tree is important.

This becomes particularly significant when we start setting MNT_LOCKED
on rootfs to prevent it from being unmounted.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2014-12-02 10:46:50 -06:00
Eric W. Biederman da362b09e4 umount: Do not allow unmounting rootfs.
Andrew Vagin <avagin@parallels.com> writes:

> #define _GNU_SOURCE
> #include <sys/types.h>
> #include <sys/stat.h>
> #include <fcntl.h>
> #include <sched.h>
> #include <unistd.h>
> #include <sys/mount.h>
>
> int main(int argc, char **argv)
> {
> 	int fd;
>
> 	fd = open("/proc/self/ns/mnt", O_RDONLY);
> 	if (fd < 0)
> 	   return 1;
> 	   while (1) {
> 	   	 if (umount2("/", MNT_DETACH) ||
> 		        setns(fd, CLONE_NEWNS))
> 					break;
> 					}
>
> 					return 0;
> }
>
> root@ubuntu:/home/avagin# gcc -Wall nsenter.c -o nsenter
> root@ubuntu:/home/avagin# strace ./nsenter
> execve("./nsenter", ["./nsenter"], [/* 22 vars */]) = 0
> ...
> open("/proc/self/ns/mnt", O_RDONLY)     = 3
> umount("/", MNT_DETACH)                 = 0
> setns(3, 131072)                        = 0
> umount("/", MNT_DETACH
>
causes:

> [  260.548301] ------------[ cut here ]------------
> [  260.550941] kernel BUG at /build/buildd/linux-3.13.0/fs/pnode.c:372!
> [  260.552068] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
> [  260.552068] Modules linked in: xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle xt_tcpudp xt_addrtype xt_conntrack ipt_MASQUERADE iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack bridge stp llc dm_thin_pool dm_persistent_data dm_bufio dm_bio_prison iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel binfmt_misc nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl aesni_intel nfs lockd aes_x86_64 sunrpc fscache lrw gf128mul glue_helper ablk_helper cryptd serio_raw ppdev parport_pc lp parport btrfs xor raid6_pq libcrc32c psmouse floppy
> [  260.552068] CPU: 0 PID: 1723 Comm: nsenter Not tainted 3.13.0-30-generic #55-Ubuntu
> [  260.552068] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
> [  260.552068] task: ffff8800376097f0 ti: ffff880074824000 task.ti: ffff880074824000
> [  260.552068] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811e9483>]  [<ffffffff811e9483>] propagate_umount+0x123/0x130
> [  260.552068] RSP: 0018:ffff880074825e98  EFLAGS: 00010246
> [  260.552068] RAX: ffff88007c741140 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: ffff88007c741190
> [  260.552068] RDX: ffff88007c741190 RSI: ffff880074825ec0 RDI: ffff880074825ec0
> [  260.552068] RBP: ffff880074825eb0 R08: 00000000000172e0 R09: ffff88007fc172e0
> [  260.552068] R10: ffffffff811cc642 R11: ffffea0001d59000 R12: ffff88007c741140
> [  260.552068] R13: ffff88007c741140 R14: ffff88007c741140 R15: 0000000000000000
> [  260.552068] FS:  00007fd5c7e41740(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> [  260.552068] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> [  260.552068] CR2: 00007fd5c7968050 CR3: 0000000070124000 CR4: 00000000000406f0
> [  260.552068] Stack:
> [  260.552068]  0000000000000002 0000000000000002 ffff88007c631000 ffff880074825ed8
> [  260.552068]  ffffffff811dcfac ffff88007c741140 0000000000000002 ffff88007c741160
> [  260.552068]  ffff880074825f38 ffffffff811dd12b ffffffff811cc642 0000000075640000
> [  260.552068] Call Trace:
> [  260.552068]  [<ffffffff811dcfac>] umount_tree+0x20c/0x260
> [  260.552068]  [<ffffffff811dd12b>] do_umount+0x12b/0x300
> [  260.552068]  [<ffffffff811cc642>] ? final_putname+0x22/0x50
> [  260.552068]  [<ffffffff811cc849>] ? putname+0x29/0x40
> [  260.552068]  [<ffffffff811dd88c>] SyS_umount+0xdc/0x100
> [  260.552068]  [<ffffffff8172aeff>] tracesys+0xe1/0xe6
> [  260.552068] Code: 89 50 08 48 8b 50 08 48 89 02 49 89 45 08 e9 72 ff ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 4c 89 e6 4c 89 e7 e8 f5 f6 ff ff 48 89 c3 e9 39 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 66 66 66 66 90 55 b8 01
> [  260.552068] RIP  [<ffffffff811e9483>] propagate_umount+0x123/0x130
> [  260.552068]  RSP <ffff880074825e98>
> [  260.611451] ---[ end trace 11c33d85f1d4c652 ]--

Which in practice is totally uninteresting.  Only the global root user can
do it, and it is just a stupid thing to do.

However that is no excuse to allow a silly way to oops the kernel.

We can avoid this silly problem by setting MNT_LOCKED on the rootfs
mount point and thus avoid needing any special cases in the unmount
code.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2014-12-02 10:46:49 -06:00
Eric W. Biederman b2f5d4dc38 umount: Disallow unprivileged mount force
Forced unmount affects not just the mount namespace but the underlying
superblock as well.  Restrict forced unmount to the global root user
for now.  Otherwise it becomes possible a user in a less privileged
mount namespace to force the shutdown of a superblock of a filesystem
in a more privileged mount namespace, allowing a DOS attack on root.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2014-12-02 10:46:48 -06:00
Eric W. Biederman 3e1866410f mnt: Implicitly add MNT_NODEV on remount when it was implicitly added by mount
Now that remount is properly enforcing the rule that you can't remove
nodev at least sandstorm.io is breaking when performing a remount.

It turns out that there is an easy intuitive solution implicitly
add nodev on remount when nodev was implicitly added on mount.

Tested-by: Cedric Bosdonnat <cbosdonnat@suse.com>
Tested-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2014-12-02 10:46:39 -06:00
Miklos Szeredi c771d683a6 vfs: introduce clone_private_mount()
Overlayfs needs a private clone of the mount, so create a function for
this and export to modules.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2014-10-24 00:14:36 +02:00
Linus Torvalds ce9d7f7b45 Merge branch 'CVE-2014-7970' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/luto/linux
Pull pivot_root() fix from Andy Lutomirski.

Prevent a leak of unreachable mounts.

* 'CVE-2014-7970' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/luto/linux:
  mnt: Prevent pivot_root from creating a loop in the mount tree
2014-10-15 06:43:27 +02:00
Eric W. Biederman 0d0826019e mnt: Prevent pivot_root from creating a loop in the mount tree
Andy Lutomirski recently demonstrated that when chroot is used to set
the root path below the path for the new ``root'' passed to pivot_root
the pivot_root system call succeeds and leaks mounts.

In examining the code I see that starting with a new root that is
below the current root in the mount tree will result in a loop in the
mount tree after the mounts are detached and then reattached to one
another.  Resulting in all kinds of ugliness including a leak of that
mounts involved in the leak of the mount loop.

Prevent this problem by ensuring that the new mount is reachable from
the current root of the mount tree.

[Added stable cc.  Fixes CVE-2014-7970.  --Andy]

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87bnpmihks.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
2014-10-14 14:27:19 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 0ef3a56b1c Merge branch 'CVE-2014-7975' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/luto/linux
Pull do_umount fix from Andy Lutomirski:
 "This fix really ought to be safe.  Inside a mountns owned by a
  non-root user namespace, the namespace root almost always has
  MNT_LOCKED set (if it doesn't, then there's a bug, because rootfs
  could be exposed).  In that case, calling umount on "/" will return
  -EINVAL with or without this patch.

  Outside a userns, this patch will have no effect.  may_mount, required
  by umount, already checks
     ns_capable(current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
  so an additional capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) check will have no effect.

  That leaves anything that calls umount on "/" in a non-root userns
  while chrooted.  This is the case that is currently broken (it
  remounts ro, which shouldn't be allowed) and that my patch changes to
  -EPERM.  If anything relies on *that*, I'd be surprised"

* 'CVE-2014-7975' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/luto/linux:
  fs: Add a missing permission check to do_umount
2014-10-14 08:35:01 +02:00
Seunghun Lee 5e6123f347 vfs: move getname() from callers to do_mount()
It would make more sense to pass char __user * instead of
char * in callers of do_mount() and do getname() inside do_mount().

Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Lee <waydi1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-10-09 02:39:16 -04:00
Tim Gardner b8850d1fa8 fs: namespace: suppress 'may be used uninitialized' warnings
The gcc version 4.9.1 compiler complains Even though it isn't possible for
these variables to not get initialized before they are used.

fs/namespace.c: In function ‘SyS_mount’:
fs/namespace.c:2720:8: warning: ‘kernel_dev’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
  ret = do_mount(kernel_dev, kernel_dir->name, kernel_type, flags,
        ^
fs/namespace.c:2699:8: note: ‘kernel_dev’ was declared here
  char *kernel_dev;
        ^
fs/namespace.c:2720:8: warning: ‘kernel_type’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
  ret = do_mount(kernel_dev, kernel_dir->name, kernel_type, flags,
        ^
fs/namespace.c:2697:8: note: ‘kernel_type’ was declared here
  char *kernel_type;
        ^

Fix the warnings by simplifying copy_mount_string() as suggested by Al Viro.

Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-10-09 02:39:10 -04:00
Eric W. Biederman 80b5dce8c5 vfs: Add a function to lazily unmount all mounts from any dentry.
The new function detach_mounts comes in two pieces.  The first piece
is a static inline test of d_mounpoint that returns immediately
without taking any locks if d_mounpoint is not set.  In the common
case when mountpoints are absent this allows the vfs to continue
running with it's same cacheline foot print.

The second piece of detach_mounts __detach_mounts actually does the
work and it assumes that a mountpoint is present so it is slow and
takes namespace_sem for write, and then locks the mount hash (aka
mount_lock) after a struct mountpoint has been found.

With those two locks held each entry on the list of mounts on a
mountpoint is selected and lazily unmounted until all of the mount
have been lazily unmounted.

v7: Wrote a proper change description and removed the changelog
    documenting deleted wrong turns.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederman@twitter.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-10-09 02:38:55 -04:00
Eric W. Biederman e2dfa93546 vfs: factor out lookup_mountpoint from new_mountpoint
I am shortly going to add a new user of struct mountpoint that
needs to look up existing entries but does not want to create
a struct mountpoint if one does not exist.  Therefore to keep
the code simple and easy to read split out lookup_mountpoint
from new_mountpoint.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-10-09 02:38:55 -04:00
Eric W. Biederman 0a5eb7c818 vfs: Keep a list of mounts on a mount point
To spot any possible problems call BUG if a mountpoint
is put when it's list of mounts is not empty.

AV: use hlist instead of list_head

Reviewed-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederman@twitter.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-10-09 02:38:54 -04:00
Eric W. Biederman 7af1364ffa vfs: Don't allow overwriting mounts in the current mount namespace
In preparation for allowing mountpoints to be renamed and unlinked
in remote filesystems and in other mount namespaces test if on a dentry
there is a mount in the local mount namespace before allowing it to
be renamed or unlinked.

The primary motivation here are old versions of fusermount unmount
which is not safe if the a path can be renamed or unlinked while it is
verifying the mount is safe to unmount.  More recent versions are simpler
and safer by simply using UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW when unmounting a mount
in a directory owned by an arbitrary user.

Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> reports this is approach is good
enough to remove concerns about new kernels mixed with old versions
of fusermount.

A secondary motivation for restrictions here is that it removing empty
directories that have non-empty mount points on them appears to
violate the rule that rmdir can not remove empty directories.  As
Linus Torvalds pointed out this is useful for programs (like git) that
test if a directory is empty with rmdir.

Therefore this patch arranges to enforce the existing mount point
semantics for local mount namespace.

v2: Rewrote the test to be a drop in replacement for d_mountpoint
v3: Use bool instead of int as the return type of is_local_mountpoint

Reviewed-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-10-09 02:38:54 -04:00
Al Viro 9ea459e110 delayed mntput
On final mntput() we want fs shutdown to happen before return to
userland; however, the only case where we want it happen right
there (i.e. where task_work_add won't do) is MNT_INTERNAL victim.
Those have to be fully synchronous - failure halfway through module
init might count on having vfsmount killed right there.  Fortunately,
final mntput on MNT_INTERNAL vfsmounts happens on shallow stack.
So we handle those synchronously and do an analog of delayed fput
logics for everything else.

As the result, we are guaranteed that fs shutdown will always happen
on shallow stack.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-10-09 02:38:53 -04:00
Andy Lutomirski a1480dcc3c fs: Add a missing permission check to do_umount
Accessing do_remount_sb should require global CAP_SYS_ADMIN, but
only one of the two call sites was appropriately protected.

Fixes CVE-2014-7975.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
2014-10-08 12:32:47 -07:00
Al Viro 81b6b06197 fix EBUSY on umount() from MNT_SHRINKABLE
We need the parents of victims alive until namespace_unlock() gets to
dput() of the (ex-)mountpoints.  However, that screws up the "is it
busy" checks in case when we have shrinkable mounts that need to be
killed.  Solution: go ahead and decrement refcounts of parents right
in umount_tree(), increment them again just before dropping rwsem in
namespace_unlock() (and let the loop in the end of namespace_unlock()
finally drop those references for good, as we do now).  Parents can't
get freed until we drop rwsem - at least one reference is kept until
then, both in case when parent is among the victims and when it is
not.  So they'll still be around when we get to namespace_unlock().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.12+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-08-30 18:32:05 -04:00
Al Viro 88b368f27a get rid of propagate_umount() mistakenly treating slaves as busy.
The check in __propagate_umount() ("has somebody explicitly mounted
something on that slave?") is done *before* taking the already doomed
victims out of the child lists.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-08-30 18:31:41 -04:00
Linus Torvalds f6f993328b Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "Stuff in here:

   - acct.c fixes and general rework of mnt_pin mechanism.  That allows
     to go for delayed-mntput stuff, which will permit mntput() on deep
     stack without worrying about stack overflows - fs shutdown will
     happen on shallow stack.  IOW, we can do Eric's umount-on-rmdir
     series without introducing tons of stack overflows on new mntput()
     call chains it introduces.
   - Bruce's d_splice_alias() patches
   - more Miklos' rename() stuff.
   - a couple of regression fixes (stable fodder, in the end of branch)
     and a fix for API idiocy in iov_iter.c.

  There definitely will be another pile, maybe even two.  I'd like to
  get Eric's series in this time, but even if we miss it, it'll go right
  in the beginning of for-next in the next cycle - the tricky part of
  prereqs is in this pile"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (40 commits)
  fix copy_tree() regression
  __generic_file_write_iter(): fix handling of sync error after DIO
  switch iov_iter_get_pages() to passing maximal number of pages
  fs: mark __d_obtain_alias static
  dcache: d_splice_alias should detect loops
  exportfs: update Exporting documentation
  dcache: d_find_alias needn't recheck IS_ROOT && DCACHE_DISCONNECTED
  dcache: remove unused d_find_alias parameter
  dcache: d_obtain_alias callers don't all want DISCONNECTED
  dcache: d_splice_alias should ignore DCACHE_DISCONNECTED
  dcache: d_splice_alias mustn't create directory aliases
  dcache: close d_move race in d_splice_alias
  dcache: move d_splice_alias
  namei: trivial fix to vfs_rename_dir comment
  VFS: allow ->d_manage() to declare -EISDIR in rcu_walk mode.
  cifs: support RENAME_NOREPLACE
  hostfs: support rename flags
  shmem: support RENAME_EXCHANGE
  shmem: support RENAME_NOREPLACE
  btrfs: add RENAME_NOREPLACE
  ...
2014-08-11 11:44:11 -07:00
Al Viro 12a5b5294c fix copy_tree() regression
Since 3.14 we had copy_tree() get the shadowing wrong - if we had one
vfsmount shadowing another (i.e. if A is a slave of B, C is mounted
on A/foo, then D got mounted on B/foo creating D' on A/foo shadowed
by C), copy_tree() of A would make a copy of D' shadow the the copy of
C, not the other way around.

It's easy to fix, fortunately - just make sure that mount follows
the one that shadows it in mnt_child as well as in mnt_hash, and when
copy_tree() decides to attach a new mount, check if the last child
it has added to the same parent should be shadowing the new one.
And if it should, just use the same logics commit_tree() has - put the
new mount into the hash and children lists right after the one that
should shadow it.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [3.14 and later]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-08-11 12:28:10 -04:00
Linus Torvalds 77e40aae76 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
 "This is a bunch of small changes built against 3.16-rc6.  The most
  significant change for users is the first patch which makes setns
  drmatically faster by removing unneded rcu handling.

  The next chunk of changes are so that "mount -o remount,.." will not
  allow the user namespace root to drop flags on a mount set by the
  system wide root.  Aks this forces read-only mounts to stay read-only,
  no-dev mounts to stay no-dev, no-suid mounts to stay no-suid, no-exec
  mounts to stay no exec and it prevents unprivileged users from messing
  with a mounts atime settings.  I have included my test case as the
  last patch in this series so people performing backports can verify
  this change works correctly.

  The next change fixes a bug in NFS that was discovered while auditing
  nsproxy users for the first optimization.  Today you can oops the
  kernel by reading /proc/fs/nfsfs/{servers,volumes} if you are clever
  with pid namespaces.  I rebased and fixed the build of the
  !CONFIG_NFS_FS case yesterday when a build bot caught my typo.  Given
  that no one to my knowledge bases anything on my tree fixing the typo
  in place seems more responsible that requiring a typo-fix to be
  backported as well.

  The last change is a small semantic cleanup introducing
  /proc/thread-self and pointing /proc/mounts and /proc/net at it.  This
  prevents several kinds of problemantic corner cases.  It is a
  user-visible change so it has a minute chance of causing regressions
  so the change to /proc/mounts and /proc/net are individual one line
  commits that can be trivially reverted.  Unfortunately I lost and
  could not find the email of the original reporter so he is not
  credited.  From at least one perspective this change to /proc/net is a
  refgression fix to allow pthread /proc/net uses that were broken by
  the introduction of the network namespace"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  proc: Point /proc/mounts at /proc/thread-self/mounts instead of /proc/self/mounts
  proc: Point /proc/net at /proc/thread-self/net instead of /proc/self/net
  proc: Implement /proc/thread-self to point at the directory of the current thread
  proc: Have net show up under /proc/<tgid>/task/<tid>
  NFS: Fix /proc/fs/nfsfs/servers and /proc/fs/nfsfs/volumes
  mnt: Add tests for unprivileged remount cases that have found to be faulty
  mnt: Change the default remount atime from relatime to the existing value
  mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
  mnt: Move the test for MNT_LOCK_READONLY from change_mount_flags into do_remount
  mnt: Only change user settable mount flags in remount
  namespaces: Use task_lock and not rcu to protect nsproxy
2014-08-09 17:10:41 -07:00
Al Viro 3064c3563b death to mnt_pinned
Rather than playing silly buggers with vfsmount refcounts, just have
acct_on() ask fs/namespace.c for internal clone of file->f_path.mnt
and replace it with said clone.  Then attach the pin to original
vfsmount.  Voila - the clone will be alive until the file gets closed,
making sure that underlying superblock remains active, etc., and
we can drop the original vfsmount, so that it's not kept busy.
If the file lives until the final mntput of the original vfsmount,
we'll notice that there's an fs_pin (one in bsd_acct_struct that
holds that file) and mnt_pin_kill() will take it out.  Since
->kill() is synchronous, we won't proceed past that point until
these files are closed (and private clones of our vfsmount are
gone), so we get the same ordering warranties we used to get.

mnt_pin()/mnt_unpin()/->mnt_pinned is gone now, and good riddance -
it never became usable outside of kernel/acct.c (and racy wrt
umount even there).

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-08-07 14:40:09 -04:00