Commit Graph

58 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Linus Torvalds 7b9dc3f75f Power management material for v4.10-rc1
- New cpufreq driver for Broadcom STB SoCs and a Device Tree binding
    for it (Markus Mayer).
 
  - Support for ARM Integrator/AP and Integrator/CP in the generic
    DT cpufreq driver and elimination of the old Integrator cpufreq
    driver (Linus Walleij).
 
  - Support for the zx296718, r8a7743 and r8a7745, Socionext UniPhier,
    and PXA SoCs in the the generic DT cpufreq driver (Baoyou Xie,
    Geert Uytterhoeven, Masahiro Yamada, Robert Jarzmik).
 
  - cpufreq core fix to eliminate races that may lead to using
    inactive policy objects and related cleanups (Rafael Wysocki).
 
  - cpufreq schedutil governor update to make it use SCHED_FIFO
    kernel threads (instead of regular workqueues) for doing delayed
    work (to reduce the response latency in some cases) and related
    cleanups (Viresh Kumar).
 
  - New cpufreq sysfs attribute for resetting statistics (Markus
    Mayer).
 
  - cpufreq governors fixes and cleanups (Chen Yu, Stratos Karafotis,
    Viresh Kumar).
 
  - Support for using generic cpufreq governors in the intel_pstate
    driver (Rafael Wysocki).
 
  - Support for per-logical-CPU P-state limits and the EPP/EPB
    (Energy Performance Preference/Energy Performance Bias) knobs
    in the intel_pstate driver (Srinivas Pandruvada).
 
  - New CPU ID for Knights Mill in intel_pstate (Piotr Luc).
 
  - intel_pstate driver modification to use the P-state selection
    algorithm based on CPU load on platforms with the system profile
    in the ACPI tables set to "mobile" (Srinivas Pandruvada).
 
  - intel_pstate driver cleanups (Arnd Bergmann, Rafael Wysocki,
    Srinivas Pandruvada).
 
  - cpufreq powernv driver updates including fast switching support
    (for the schedutil governor), fixes and cleanus (Akshay Adiga,
    Andrew Donnellan, Denis Kirjanov).
 
  - acpi-cpufreq driver rework to switch it over to the new CPU
    offline/online state machine (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior).
 
  - Assorted cleanups in cpufreq drivers (Wei Yongjun, Prashanth
    Prakash).
 
  - Idle injection rework (to make it use the regular idle path
    instead of a home-grown custom one) and related powerclamp
    thermal driver updates (Peter Zijlstra, Jacob Pan, Petr Mladek,
    Sebastian Andrzej Siewior).
 
  - New CPU IDs for Atom Z34xx and Knights Mill in intel_idle (Andy
    Shevchenko, Piotr Luc).
 
  - intel_idle driver cleanups and switch over to using the new CPU
    offline/online state machine (Anna-Maria Gleixner, Sebastian
    Andrzej Siewior).
 
  - cpuidle DT driver update to support suspend-to-idle properly
    (Sudeep Holla).
 
  - cpuidle core cleanups and misc updates (Daniel Lezcano, Pan Bian,
    Rafael Wysocki).
 
  - Preliminary support for power domains including CPUs in the
    generic power domains (genpd) framework and related DT bindings
    (Lina Iyer).
 
  - Assorted fixes and cleanups in the generic power domains (genpd)
    framework (Colin Ian King, Dan Carpenter, Geert Uytterhoeven).
 
  - Preliminary support for devices with multiple voltage regulators
    and related fixes and cleanups in the Operating Performance Points
    (OPP) library (Viresh Kumar, Masahiro Yamada, Stephen Boyd).
 
  - System sleep state selection interface rework to make it easier
    to support suspend-to-idle as the default system suspend method
    (Rafael Wysocki).
 
  - PM core fixes and cleanups, mostly related to the interactions
    between the system suspend and runtime PM frameworks (Ulf Hansson,
    Sahitya Tummala, Tony Lindgren).
 
  - Latency tolerance PM QoS framework imorovements (Andrew
    Lutomirski).
 
  - New Knights Mill CPU ID for the Intel RAPL power capping driver
    (Piotr Luc).
 
  - Intel RAPL power capping driver fixes, cleanups and switch over
    to using the new CPU offline/online state machine (Jacob Pan,
    Thomas Gleixner, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior).
 
  - Fixes and cleanups in the exynos-ppmu, exynos-nocp, rk3399_dmc,
    rockchip-dfi devfreq drivers and the devfreq core (Axel Lin,
    Chanwoo Choi, Javier Martinez Canillas, MyungJoo Ham, Viresh
    Kumar).
 
  - Fix for false-positive KASAN warnings during resume from ACPI S3
    (suspend-to-RAM) on x86 (Josh Poimboeuf).
 
  - Memory map verification during resume from hibernation on x86 to
    ensure a consistent address space layout (Chen Yu).
 
  - Wakeup sources debugging enhancement (Xing Wei).
 
  - rockchip-io AVS driver cleanup (Shawn Lin).
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 Version: GnuPG v2
 
 iQIcBAABCAAGBQJYTx4+AAoJEILEb/54YlRx9f8P/2SlNHUENW5qh6FtCw00oC2u
 UqJerQJ2L38UgbgxbE/0VYblma9rFABDWC1eO2xN2XdcdW5UPBKPVvNcOgNe1Clh
 gjy3RxZXVpmjfzt2kGfsTLEuGnHqwvx51hTUkeA2LwvkOal45xb8ZESmy8opCtiv
 iG4LwmPHoxdX5Za5nA9ItFKzxyO1EoyNSnBYAVwALDHxmNOfxEcRevfurASt/0M9
 brCCZJA0/sZxeL0lBdy8fNQPIBTUfCoTJG/MtmzGrObJ9wMFvEDfXrVEyZiWs/zA
 AAZ4kQL77enrIKgrLN8e0G6LzTLHoVcvn38Xjf24dKUqhd7ACBhYcnW+jK3+7EAd
 gjZ8efObQsiuyK/EDLUNw35tt96CHOqfrQCj2tIwRVvk9EekLqAGXdIndTCr2kYW
 RpefmP5kMljnm/nQFOVLwMEUQMuVkvUE7EgxADy7DoDmepBFC4ICRDWPye70R2kC
 0O1Tn2PAQq4Fd1tyI9TYYz0YQQkRoaRb5rfYUSzbRbeCdsphUopp4Vhsiyn6IcnF
 XnLbg6pRAat82MoS9n4pfO/VCo8vkErKA8tut9G7TDakkrJoEE7l31PdKW0hP3f6
 sBo6xXy6WTeivU/o/i8TbM6K4mA37pBaj78ooIkWLgg5fzRaS2+0xSPVy2H9x1m5
 LymHcobCK9rSZ1l208Fe
 =vhxI
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'pm-4.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm

Pull power management updates from Rafael Wysocki:
 "Again, cpufreq gets more changes than the other parts this time (one
  new driver, one old driver less, a bunch of enhancements of the
  existing code, new CPU IDs, fixes, cleanups)

  There also are some changes in cpuidle (idle injection rework, a
  couple of new CPU IDs, online/offline rework in intel_idle, fixes and
  cleanups), in the generic power domains framework (mostly related to
  supporting power domains containing CPUs), and in the Operating
  Performance Points (OPP) library (mostly related to supporting devices
  with multiple voltage regulators)

  In addition to that, the system sleep state selection interface is
  modified to make it easier for distributions with unchanged user space
  to support suspend-to-idle as the default system suspend method, some
  issues are fixed in the PM core, the latency tolerance PM QoS
  framework is improved a bit, the Intel RAPL power capping driver is
  cleaned up and there are some fixes and cleanups in the devfreq
  subsystem

  Specifics:

   - New cpufreq driver for Broadcom STB SoCs and a Device Tree binding
     for it (Markus Mayer)

   - Support for ARM Integrator/AP and Integrator/CP in the generic DT
     cpufreq driver and elimination of the old Integrator cpufreq driver
     (Linus Walleij)

   - Support for the zx296718, r8a7743 and r8a7745, Socionext UniPhier,
     and PXA SoCs in the the generic DT cpufreq driver (Baoyou Xie,
     Geert Uytterhoeven, Masahiro Yamada, Robert Jarzmik)

   - cpufreq core fix to eliminate races that may lead to using inactive
     policy objects and related cleanups (Rafael Wysocki)

   - cpufreq schedutil governor update to make it use SCHED_FIFO kernel
     threads (instead of regular workqueues) for doing delayed work (to
     reduce the response latency in some cases) and related cleanups
     (Viresh Kumar)

   - New cpufreq sysfs attribute for resetting statistics (Markus Mayer)

   - cpufreq governors fixes and cleanups (Chen Yu, Stratos Karafotis,
     Viresh Kumar)

   - Support for using generic cpufreq governors in the intel_pstate
     driver (Rafael Wysocki)

   - Support for per-logical-CPU P-state limits and the EPP/EPB (Energy
     Performance Preference/Energy Performance Bias) knobs in the
     intel_pstate driver (Srinivas Pandruvada)

   - New CPU ID for Knights Mill in intel_pstate (Piotr Luc)

   - intel_pstate driver modification to use the P-state selection
     algorithm based on CPU load on platforms with the system profile in
     the ACPI tables set to "mobile" (Srinivas Pandruvada)

   - intel_pstate driver cleanups (Arnd Bergmann, Rafael Wysocki,
     Srinivas Pandruvada)

   - cpufreq powernv driver updates including fast switching support
     (for the schedutil governor), fixes and cleanus (Akshay Adiga,
     Andrew Donnellan, Denis Kirjanov)

   - acpi-cpufreq driver rework to switch it over to the new CPU
     offline/online state machine (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)

   - Assorted cleanups in cpufreq drivers (Wei Yongjun, Prashanth
     Prakash)

   - Idle injection rework (to make it use the regular idle path instead
     of a home-grown custom one) and related powerclamp thermal driver
     updates (Peter Zijlstra, Jacob Pan, Petr Mladek, Sebastian Andrzej
     Siewior)

   - New CPU IDs for Atom Z34xx and Knights Mill in intel_idle (Andy
     Shevchenko, Piotr Luc)

   - intel_idle driver cleanups and switch over to using the new CPU
     offline/online state machine (Anna-Maria Gleixner, Sebastian
     Andrzej Siewior)

   - cpuidle DT driver update to support suspend-to-idle properly
     (Sudeep Holla)

   - cpuidle core cleanups and misc updates (Daniel Lezcano, Pan Bian,
     Rafael Wysocki)

   - Preliminary support for power domains including CPUs in the generic
     power domains (genpd) framework and related DT bindings (Lina Iyer)

   - Assorted fixes and cleanups in the generic power domains (genpd)
     framework (Colin Ian King, Dan Carpenter, Geert Uytterhoeven)

   - Preliminary support for devices with multiple voltage regulators
     and related fixes and cleanups in the Operating Performance Points
     (OPP) library (Viresh Kumar, Masahiro Yamada, Stephen Boyd)

   - System sleep state selection interface rework to make it easier to
     support suspend-to-idle as the default system suspend method
     (Rafael Wysocki)

   - PM core fixes and cleanups, mostly related to the interactions
     between the system suspend and runtime PM frameworks (Ulf Hansson,
     Sahitya Tummala, Tony Lindgren)

   - Latency tolerance PM QoS framework imorovements (Andrew Lutomirski)

   - New Knights Mill CPU ID for the Intel RAPL power capping driver
     (Piotr Luc)

   - Intel RAPL power capping driver fixes, cleanups and switch over to
     using the new CPU offline/online state machine (Jacob Pan, Thomas
     Gleixner, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)

   - Fixes and cleanups in the exynos-ppmu, exynos-nocp, rk3399_dmc,
     rockchip-dfi devfreq drivers and the devfreq core (Axel Lin,
     Chanwoo Choi, Javier Martinez Canillas, MyungJoo Ham, Viresh Kumar)

   - Fix for false-positive KASAN warnings during resume from ACPI S3
     (suspend-to-RAM) on x86 (Josh Poimboeuf)

   - Memory map verification during resume from hibernation on x86 to
     ensure a consistent address space layout (Chen Yu)

   - Wakeup sources debugging enhancement (Xing Wei)

   - rockchip-io AVS driver cleanup (Shawn Lin)"

* tag 'pm-4.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm: (127 commits)
  devfreq: rk3399_dmc: Don't use OPP structures outside of RCU locks
  devfreq: rk3399_dmc: Remove dangling rcu_read_unlock()
  devfreq: exynos: Don't use OPP structures outside of RCU locks
  Documentation: intel_pstate: Document HWP energy/performance hints
  cpufreq: intel_pstate: Support for energy performance hints with HWP
  cpufreq: intel_pstate: Add locking around HWP requests
  PM / sleep: Print active wakeup sources when blocking on wakeup_count reads
  PM / core: Fix bug in the error handling of async suspend
  PM / wakeirq: Fix dedicated wakeirq for drivers not using autosuspend
  PM / Domains: Fix compatible for domain idle state
  PM / OPP: Don't WARN on multiple calls to dev_pm_opp_set_regulators()
  PM / OPP: Allow platform specific custom set_opp() callbacks
  PM / OPP: Separate out _generic_set_opp()
  PM / OPP: Add infrastructure to manage multiple regulators
  PM / OPP: Pass struct dev_pm_opp_supply to _set_opp_voltage()
  PM / OPP: Manage supply's voltage/current in a separate structure
  PM / OPP: Don't use OPP structure outside of rcu protected section
  PM / OPP: Reword binding supporting multiple regulators per device
  PM / OPP: Fix incorrect cpu-supply property in binding
  cpuidle: Add a kerneldoc comment to cpuidle_use_deepest_state()
  ..
2016-12-13 10:41:53 -08:00
Dmitry Vyukov 64abdcb243 kasan: eliminate long stalls during quarantine reduction
Currently we dedicate 1/32 of RAM for quarantine and then reduce it by
1/4 of total quarantine size.  This can be a significant amount of
memory.  For example, with 4GB of RAM total quarantine size is 128MB and
it is reduced by 32MB at a time.  With 128GB of RAM total quarantine
size is 4GB and it is reduced by 1GB.  This leads to several problems:

 - freeing 1GB can take tens of seconds, causes rcu stall warnings and
   just introduces unexpected long delays at random places
 - if kmalloc() is called under a mutex, other threads stall on that
   mutex while a thread reduces quarantine
 - threads wait on quarantine_lock while one thread grabs a large batch
   of objects to evict
 - we walk the uncached list of object to free twice which makes all of
   the above worse
 - when a thread frees objects, they are already not accounted against
   global_quarantine.bytes; as the result we can have quarantine_size
   bytes in quarantine + unbounded amount of memory in large batches in
   threads that are in process of freeing

Reduce size of quarantine in smaller batches to reduce the delays.  The
only reason to reduce it in batches is amortization of overheads, the
new batch size of 1MB should be well enough to amortize spinlock
lock/unlock and few function calls.

Plus organize quarantine as a FIFO array of batches.  This allows to not
walk the list in quarantine_reduce() under quarantine_lock, which in
turn reduces contention and is just faster.

This improves performance of heavy load (syzkaller fuzzing) by ~20% with
4 CPUs and 32GB of RAM.  Also this eliminates frequent (every 5 sec)
drops of CPU consumption from ~400% to ~100% (one thread reduces
quarantine while others are waiting on a mutex).

Some reference numbers:
1. Machine with 4 CPUs and 4GB of memory. Quarantine size 128MB.
   Currently we free 32MB at at time.
   With new code we free 1MB at a time (1024 batches, ~128 are used).
2. Machine with 32 CPUs and 128GB of memory. Quarantine size 4GB.
   Currently we free 1GB at at time.
   With new code we free 8MB at a time (1024 batches, ~512 are used).
3. Machine with 4096 CPUs and 1TB of memory. Quarantine size 32GB.
   Currently we free 8GB at at time.
   With new code we free 4MB at a time (16K batches, ~8K are used).

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1478756952-18695-1-git-send-email-dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-12-12 18:55:09 -08:00
Dmitry Vyukov 5c5c1f36ce kasan: support panic_on_warn
If user sets panic_on_warn, he wants kernel to panic if there is
anything barely wrong with the kernel.  KASAN-detected errors are
definitely not less benign than an arbitrary kernel WARNING.

Panic after KASAN errors if panic_on_warn is set.

We use this for continuous fuzzing where we want kernel to stop and
reboot on any error.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1476694764-31986-1-git-send-email-dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-12-12 18:55:09 -08:00
Rafael J. Wysocki 631ddaba59 Merge branches 'pm-sleep' and 'powercap'
* pm-sleep:
  PM / sleep: Print active wakeup sources when blocking on wakeup_count reads
  x86/suspend: fix false positive KASAN warning on suspend/resume
  PM / sleep / ACPI: Use the ACPI_FADT_LOW_POWER_S0 flag
  PM / sleep: System sleep state selection interface rework
  PM / hibernate: Verify the consistent of e820 memory map by md5 digest

* powercap:
  powercap / RAPL: Add Knights Mill CPUID
  powercap/intel_rapl: fix and tidy up error handling
  powercap/intel_rapl: Track active CPUs internally
  powercap/intel_rapl: Cleanup duplicated init code
  powercap/intel rapl: Convert to hotplug state machine
  powercap/intel_rapl: Propagate error code when registration fails
  powercap/intel_rapl: Add missing domain data update on hotplug
2016-12-12 20:46:35 +01:00
Josh Poimboeuf b53f40db59 x86/suspend: fix false positive KASAN warning on suspend/resume
Resuming from a suspend operation is showing a KASAN false positive
warning:

  BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in unwind_get_return_address+0x11d/0x130 at addr ffff8803867d7878
  Read of size 8 by task pm-suspend/7774
  page:ffffea000e19f5c0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x0
  flags: 0x2ffff0000000000()
  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
  CPU: 0 PID: 7774 Comm: pm-suspend Tainted: G    B           4.9.0-rc7+ #8
  Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. Z170X-UD5/Z170X-UD5-CF, BIOS F5 03/07/2016
  Call Trace:
    dump_stack+0x63/0x82
    kasan_report_error+0x4b4/0x4e0
    ? acpi_hw_read_port+0xd0/0x1ea
    ? kfree_const+0x22/0x30
    ? acpi_hw_validate_io_request+0x1a6/0x1a6
    __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x61/0x70
    ? unwind_get_return_address+0x11d/0x130
    unwind_get_return_address+0x11d/0x130
    ? unwind_next_frame+0x97/0xf0
    __save_stack_trace+0x92/0x100
    save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20
    save_stack+0x46/0xd0
    ? save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20
    ? save_stack+0x46/0xd0
    ? kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
    ? kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
    ? acpi_hw_read+0x2b6/0x3aa
    ? acpi_hw_validate_register+0x20b/0x20b
    ? acpi_hw_write_port+0x72/0xc7
    ? acpi_hw_write+0x11f/0x15f
    ? acpi_hw_read_multiple+0x19f/0x19f
    ? memcpy+0x45/0x50
    ? acpi_hw_write_port+0x72/0xc7
    ? acpi_hw_write+0x11f/0x15f
    ? acpi_hw_read_multiple+0x19f/0x19f
    ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
    kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
    kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
    kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xbc/0x1e0
    ? acpi_get_sleep_type_data+0x9a/0x578
    acpi_get_sleep_type_data+0x9a/0x578
    acpi_hw_legacy_wake_prep+0x88/0x22c
    ? acpi_hw_legacy_sleep+0x3c7/0x3c7
    ? acpi_write_bit_register+0x28d/0x2d3
    ? acpi_read_bit_register+0x19b/0x19b
    acpi_hw_sleep_dispatch+0xb5/0xba
    acpi_leave_sleep_state_prep+0x17/0x19
    acpi_suspend_enter+0x154/0x1e0
    ? trace_suspend_resume+0xe8/0xe8
    suspend_devices_and_enter+0xb09/0xdb0
    ? printk+0xa8/0xd8
    ? arch_suspend_enable_irqs+0x20/0x20
    ? try_to_freeze_tasks+0x295/0x600
    pm_suspend+0x6c9/0x780
    ? finish_wait+0x1f0/0x1f0
    ? suspend_devices_and_enter+0xdb0/0xdb0
    state_store+0xa2/0x120
    ? kobj_attr_show+0x60/0x60
    kobj_attr_store+0x36/0x70
    sysfs_kf_write+0x131/0x200
    kernfs_fop_write+0x295/0x3f0
    __vfs_write+0xef/0x760
    ? handle_mm_fault+0x1346/0x35e0
    ? do_iter_readv_writev+0x660/0x660
    ? __pmd_alloc+0x310/0x310
    ? do_lock_file_wait+0x1e0/0x1e0
    ? apparmor_file_permission+0x18/0x20
    ? security_file_permission+0x73/0x1c0
    ? rw_verify_area+0xbd/0x2b0
    vfs_write+0x149/0x4a0
    SyS_write+0xd9/0x1c0
    ? SyS_read+0x1c0/0x1c0
    entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xad
  Memory state around the buggy address:
   ffff8803867d7700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
   ffff8803867d7780: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  >ffff8803867d7800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f4
                                                                  ^
   ffff8803867d7880: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
   ffff8803867d7900: 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f4 f4 f4 f3 f3 f3 f3 00

KASAN instrumentation poisons the stack when entering a function and
unpoisons it when exiting the function.  However, in the suspend path,
some functions never return, so their stack never gets unpoisoned,
resulting in stale KASAN shadow data which can cause later false
positive warnings like the one above.

Reported-by: Scott Bauer <scott.bauer@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2016-12-06 02:22:44 +01:00
Dmitry Vyukov 828347f8f9 kasan: support use-after-scope detection
Gcc revision 241896 implements use-after-scope detection.  Will be
available in gcc 7.  Support it in KASAN.

Gcc emits 2 new callbacks to poison/unpoison large stack objects when
they go in/out of scope.  Implement the callbacks and add a test.

[dvyukov@google.com: v3]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1479998292-144502-1-git-send-email-dvyukov@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1479226045-145148-1-git-send-email-dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[4.0+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-11-30 16:32:52 -08:00
Dmitry Vyukov 045d599a28 kasan: update kasan_global for gcc 7
kasan_global struct is part of compiler/runtime ABI.  gcc revision
241983 has added a new field to kasan_global struct.  Update kernel
definition of kasan_global struct to include the new field.

Without this patch KASAN is broken with gcc 7.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1479219743-28682-1-git-send-email-dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[4.0+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-11-30 16:32:52 -08:00
Dmitry Vyukov 9f7d416c36 kprobes: Unpoison stack in jprobe_return() for KASAN
I observed false KSAN positives in the sctp code, when
sctp uses jprobe_return() in jsctp_sf_eat_sack().

The stray 0xf4 in shadow memory are stack redzones:

[     ] ==================================================================
[     ] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcmp+0xe9/0x150 at addr ffff88005e48f480
[     ] Read of size 1 by task syz-executor/18535
[     ] page:ffffea00017923c0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x0
[     ] flags: 0x1fffc0000000000()
[     ] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[     ] CPU: 1 PID: 18535 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0+ #28
[     ] Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
[     ]  ffff88005e48f2d0 ffffffff82d2b849 ffffffff0bc91e90 fffffbfff10971e8
[     ]  ffffed000bc91e90 ffffed000bc91e90 0000000000000001 0000000000000000
[     ]  ffff88005e48f480 ffff88005e48f350 ffffffff817d3169 ffff88005e48f370
[     ] Call Trace:
[     ]  [<ffffffff82d2b849>] dump_stack+0x12e/0x185
[     ]  [<ffffffff817d3169>] kasan_report+0x489/0x4b0
[     ]  [<ffffffff817d31a9>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20
[     ]  [<ffffffff82d49529>] memcmp+0xe9/0x150
[     ]  [<ffffffff82df7486>] depot_save_stack+0x176/0x5c0
[     ]  [<ffffffff817d2031>] save_stack+0xb1/0xd0
[     ]  [<ffffffff817d27f2>] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0
[     ]  [<ffffffff817d05b8>] kfree+0xc8/0x2a0
[     ]  [<ffffffff85b03f19>] skb_free_head+0x79/0xb0
[     ]  [<ffffffff85b0900a>] skb_release_data+0x37a/0x420
[     ]  [<ffffffff85b090ff>] skb_release_all+0x4f/0x60
[     ]  [<ffffffff85b11348>] consume_skb+0x138/0x370
[     ]  [<ffffffff8676ad7b>] sctp_chunk_put+0xcb/0x180
[     ]  [<ffffffff8676ae88>] sctp_chunk_free+0x58/0x70
[     ]  [<ffffffff8677fa5f>] sctp_inq_pop+0x68f/0xef0
[     ]  [<ffffffff8675ee36>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd6/0x4b0
[     ]  [<ffffffff8677f2c1>] sctp_inq_push+0x131/0x190
[     ]  [<ffffffff867bad69>] sctp_backlog_rcv+0xe9/0xa20
[ ... ]
[     ] Memory state around the buggy address:
[     ]  ffff88005e48f380: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[     ]  ffff88005e48f400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[     ] >ffff88005e48f480: f4 f4 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[     ]                    ^
[     ]  ffff88005e48f500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[     ]  ffff88005e48f580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[     ] ==================================================================

KASAN stack instrumentation poisons stack redzones on function entry
and unpoisons them on function exit. If a function exits abnormally
(e.g. with a longjmp like jprobe_return()), stack redzones are left
poisoned. Later this leads to random KASAN false reports.

Unpoison stack redzones in the frames we are going to jump over
before doing actual longjmp in jprobe_return().

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: surovegin@google.com
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1476454043-101898-1-git-send-email-dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-10-16 11:02:31 +02:00
Alexander Potapenko bcbf0d566b kasan: remove the unnecessary WARN_ONCE from quarantine.c
It's quite unlikely that the user will so little memory that the per-CPU
quarantines won't fit into the given fraction of the available memory.
Even in that case he won't be able to do anything with the information
given in the warning.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470929182-101413-1-git-send-email-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Kuthonuzo Luruo <kuthonuzo.luruo@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-08-11 16:58:14 -07:00
Alexander Potapenko c3cee37228 kasan: avoid overflowing quarantine size on low memory systems
If the total amount of memory assigned to quarantine is less than the
amount of memory assigned to per-cpu quarantines, |new_quarantine_size|
may overflow.  Instead, set it to zero.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanup: use WARN_ONCE return value]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470063563-96266-1-git-send-email-glider@google.com
Fixes: 55834c5909 ("mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-08-02 17:31:41 -04:00
Andrey Ryabinin 7e08897893 kasan: improve double-free reports
Currently we just dump stack in case of double free bug.
Let's dump all info about the object that we have.

[aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: change double free message per Alexander]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470153654-30160-1-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470062715-14077-6-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-08-02 17:31:41 -04:00
Andrey Ryabinin b3cbd9bf77 mm/kasan: get rid of ->state in struct kasan_alloc_meta
The state of object currently tracked in two places - shadow memory, and
the ->state field in struct kasan_alloc_meta.  We can get rid of the
latter.  The will save us a little bit of memory.  Also, this allow us
to move free stack into struct kasan_alloc_meta, without increasing
memory consumption.  So now we should always know when the last time the
object was freed.  This may be useful for long delayed use-after-free
bugs.

As a side effect this fixes following UBSAN warning:
	UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in mm/kasan/quarantine.c:102:13
	member access within misaligned address ffff88000d1efebc for type 'struct qlist_node'
	which requires 8 byte alignment

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470062715-14077-5-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Reported-by: kernel test robot <xiaolong.ye@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-08-02 17:31:41 -04:00
Andrey Ryabinin 47b5c2a0f0 mm/kasan: get rid of ->alloc_size in struct kasan_alloc_meta
Size of slab object already stored in cache->object_size.

Note, that kmalloc() internally rounds up size of allocation, so
object_size may be not equal to alloc_size, but, usually we don't need
to know the exact size of allocated object.  In case if we need that
information, we still can figure it out from the report.  The dump of
shadow memory allows to identify the end of allocated memory, and
thereby the exact allocation size.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470062715-14077-4-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-08-02 17:31:41 -04:00
Andrey Ryabinin f7376aed6c mm/kasan, slub: don't disable interrupts when object leaves quarantine
SLUB doesn't require disabled interrupts to call ___cache_free().

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470062715-14077-3-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-08-02 17:31:41 -04:00
Andrey Ryabinin 4b3ec5a3f4 mm/kasan: don't reduce quarantine in atomic contexts
Currently we call quarantine_reduce() for ___GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM (implied
by __GFP_RECLAIM) allocation.  So, basically we call it on almost every
allocation.  quarantine_reduce() sometimes is heavy operation, and
calling it with disabled interrupts may trigger hard LOCKUP:

 NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 2irq event stamp: 1411258
 Call Trace:
  <NMI>   dump_stack+0x68/0x96
   watchdog_overflow_callback+0x15b/0x190
   __perf_event_overflow+0x1b1/0x540
   perf_event_overflow+0x14/0x20
   intel_pmu_handle_irq+0x36a/0xad0
   perf_event_nmi_handler+0x2c/0x50
   nmi_handle+0x128/0x480
   default_do_nmi+0xb2/0x210
   do_nmi+0x1aa/0x220
   end_repeat_nmi+0x1a/0x1e
  <<EOE>>   __kernel_text_address+0x86/0xb0
   print_context_stack+0x7b/0x100
   dump_trace+0x12b/0x350
   save_stack_trace+0x2b/0x50
   set_track+0x83/0x140
   free_debug_processing+0x1aa/0x420
   __slab_free+0x1d6/0x2e0
   ___cache_free+0xb6/0xd0
   qlist_free_all+0x83/0x100
   quarantine_reduce+0x177/0x1b0
   kasan_kmalloc+0xf3/0x100

Reduce the quarantine_reduce iff direct reclaim is allowed.

Fixes: 55834c59098d("mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470062715-14077-2-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-08-02 17:31:41 -04:00
Andrey Ryabinin 4a3d308d66 mm/kasan: fix corruptions and false positive reports
Once an object is put into quarantine, we no longer own it, i.e.  object
could leave the quarantine and be reallocated.  So having set_track()
call after the quarantine_put() may corrupt slab objects.

 BUG kmalloc-4096 (Not tainted): Poison overwritten
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
 INFO: 0xffff8804540de850-0xffff8804540de857. First byte 0xb5 instead of 0x6b
...
 INFO: Freed in qlist_free_all+0x42/0x100 age=75 cpu=3 pid=24492
  __slab_free+0x1d6/0x2e0
  ___cache_free+0xb6/0xd0
  qlist_free_all+0x83/0x100
  quarantine_reduce+0x177/0x1b0
  kasan_kmalloc+0xf3/0x100
  kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
  kmem_cache_alloc+0x109/0x3e0
  mmap_region+0x53e/0xe40
  do_mmap+0x70f/0xa50
  vm_mmap_pgoff+0x147/0x1b0
  SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x2c7/0x5b0
  SyS_mmap+0x1b/0x30
  do_syscall_64+0x1a0/0x4e0
  return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x7a
 INFO: Slab 0xffffea0011503600 objects=7 used=7 fp=0x          (null) flags=0x8000000000004080
 INFO: Object 0xffff8804540de848 @offset=26696 fp=0xffff8804540dc588
 Redzone ffff8804540de840: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb                          ........
 Object ffff8804540de848: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b b5 52 00 00 f2 01 60 cc  kkkkkkkk.R....`.

Similarly, poisoning after the quarantine_put() leads to false positive
use-after-free reports:

 BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in anon_vma_interval_tree_insert+0x304/0x430 at addr ffff880405c540a0
 Read of size 8 by task trinity-c0/3036
 CPU: 0 PID: 3036 Comm: trinity-c0 Not tainted 4.7.0-think+ #9
 Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0x68/0x96
   kasan_report_error+0x222/0x600
   __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x61/0x70
   anon_vma_interval_tree_insert+0x304/0x430
   anon_vma_chain_link+0x91/0xd0
   anon_vma_clone+0x136/0x3f0
   anon_vma_fork+0x81/0x4c0
   copy_process.part.47+0x2c43/0x5b20
   _do_fork+0x16d/0xbd0
   SyS_clone+0x19/0x20
   do_syscall_64+0x1a0/0x4e0
   entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25

Fix this by putting an object in the quarantine after all other
operations.

Fixes: 80a9201a59 ("mm, kasan: switch SLUB to stackdepot, enable memory quarantine for SLUB")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470062715-14077-1-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-08-02 17:31:41 -04:00
Alexander Potapenko 80a9201a59 mm, kasan: switch SLUB to stackdepot, enable memory quarantine for SLUB
For KASAN builds:
 - switch SLUB allocator to using stackdepot instead of storing the
   allocation/deallocation stacks in the objects;
 - change the freelist hook so that parts of the freelist can be put
   into the quarantine.

[aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: fixes]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468601423-28676-1-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468347165-41906-3-git-send-email-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Red Hat) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Kuthonuzo Luruo <kuthonuzo.luruo@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-07-28 16:07:41 -07:00
Joonsoo Kim 0ab686d8c8 kasan/quarantine: fix bugs on qlist_move_cache()
There are two bugs on qlist_move_cache().  One is that qlist's tail
isn't set properly.  curr->next can be NULL since it is singly linked
list and NULL value on tail is invalid if there is one item on qlist.
Another one is that if cache is matched, qlist_put() is called and it
will set curr->next to NULL.  It would cause to stop the loop
prematurely.

These problems come from complicated implementation so I'd like to
re-implement it completely.  Implementation in this patch is really
simple.  Iterate all qlist_nodes and put them to appropriate list.

Unfortunately, I got this bug sometime ago and lose oops message.  But,
the bug looks trivial and no need to attach oops.

Fixes: 55834c5909 ("mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1467766348-22419-1-git-send-email-iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com
Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kuthonuzo Luruo <poll.stdin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-07-15 14:54:27 +09:00
Andrey Ryabinin 9b75a867cc mm: mempool: kasan: don't poot mempool objects in quarantine
Currently we may put reserved by mempool elements into quarantine via
kasan_kfree().  This is totally wrong since quarantine may really free
these objects.  So when mempool will try to use such element,
use-after-free will happen.  Or mempool may decide that it no longer
need that element and double-free it.

So don't put object into quarantine in kasan_kfree(), just poison it.
Rename kasan_kfree() to kasan_poison_kfree() to respect that.

Also, we shouldn't use kasan_slab_alloc()/kasan_krealloc() in
kasan_unpoison_element() because those functions may update allocation
stacktrace.  This would be wrong for the most of the remove_element call
sites.

(The only call site where we may want to update alloc stacktrace is
 in mempool_alloc(). Kmemleak solves this by calling
 kmemleak_update_trace(), so we could make something like that too.
 But this is out of scope of this patch).

Fixes: 55834c5909 ("mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/575977C3.1010905@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reported-by: Kuthonuzo Luruo <kuthonuzo.luruo@hpe.com>
Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-06-24 17:23:52 -07:00
Shuah Khan 91a4c27214 kasan: change memory hot-add error messages to info messages
Change the following memory hot-add error messages to info messages.
There is no need for these to be errors.

   kasan: WARNING: KASAN doesn't support memory hot-add
   kasan: Memory hot-add will be disabled

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464794430-5486-1-git-send-email-shuahkh@osg.samsung.com
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-06-09 14:23:11 -07:00
Andrey Ryabinin 9725759a96 mm: kasan: remove unused 'reserved' field from struct kasan_alloc_meta
Commit cd11016e5f ("mm, kasan: stackdepot implementation.  Enable
stackdepot for SLAB") added 'reserved' field, but never used it.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464021054-2307-1-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-26 15:35:44 -07:00
Andrey Ryabinin 64f8ebaf11 mm/kasan: add API to check memory regions
Memory access coded in an assembly won't be seen by KASAN as a compiler
can instrument only C code.  Add kasan_check_[read,write]() API which is
going to be used to check a certain memory range.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462538722-1574-3-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-20 17:58:30 -07:00
Andrey Ryabinin 936bb4bbbb mm/kasan: print name of mem[set,cpy,move]() caller in report
When bogus memory access happens in mem[set,cpy,move]() it's usually
caller's fault.  So don't blame mem[set,cpy,move]() in bug report, blame
the caller instead.

Before:
  BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds access in memset+0x23/0x40 at <address>
After:
  BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds access in <memset_caller> at <address>

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462538722-1574-2-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-20 17:58:30 -07:00
Alexander Potapenko 55834c5909 mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation
Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue.  The objects are
returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free
errors.

When the object is freed, its state changes from KASAN_STATE_ALLOC to
KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE.  The object is poisoned and put into quarantine
instead of being returned to the allocator, therefore every subsequent
access to that object triggers a KASAN error, and the error handler is
able to say where the object has been allocated and deallocated.

When it's time for the object to leave quarantine, its state becomes
KASAN_STATE_FREE and it's returned to the allocator.  From now on the
allocator may reuse it for another allocation.  Before that happens,
it's still possible to detect a use-after free on that object (it
retains the allocation/deallocation stacks).

When the allocator reuses this object, the shadow is unpoisoned and old
allocation/deallocation stacks are wiped.  Therefore a use of this
object, even an incorrect one, won't trigger ASan warning.

Without the quarantine, it's not guaranteed that the objects aren't
reused immediately, that's why the probability of catching a
use-after-free is lower than with quarantine in place.

Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue.  The objects are
returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free
errors.

Freed objects are first added to per-cpu quarantine queues.  When a
cache is destroyed or memory shrinking is requested, the objects are
moved into the global quarantine queue.  Whenever a kmalloc call allows
memory reclaiming, the oldest objects are popped out of the global queue
until the total size of objects in quarantine is less than 3/4 of the
maximum quarantine size (which is a fraction of installed physical
memory).

As long as an object remains in the quarantine, KASAN is able to report
accesses to it, so the chance of reporting a use-after-free is
increased.  Once the object leaves quarantine, the allocator may reuse
it, in which case the object is unpoisoned and KASAN can't detect
incorrect accesses to it.

Right now quarantine support is only enabled in SLAB allocator.
Unification of KASAN features in SLAB and SLUB will be done later.

This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: quarantine" patch originally
prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov.  A number of improvements have been
suggested by Andrey Ryabinin.

[glider@google.com: v9]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462987130-144092-1-git-send-email-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-20 17:58:30 -07:00
Alexander Potapenko 0b355eaaaa mm, kasan: fix compilation for CONFIG_SLAB
Add the missing argument to set_track().

Fixes: cd11016e5f ("mm, kasan: stackdepot implementation. Enable stackdepot for SLAB")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-04-01 17:03:37 -05:00
Alexander Potapenko cd11016e5f mm, kasan: stackdepot implementation. Enable stackdepot for SLAB
Implement the stack depot and provide CONFIG_STACKDEPOT.  Stack depot
will allow KASAN store allocation/deallocation stack traces for memory
chunks.  The stack traces are stored in a hash table and referenced by
handles which reside in the kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta
structures in the allocated memory chunks.

IRQ stack traces are cut below the IRQ entry point to avoid unnecessary
duplication.

Right now stackdepot support is only enabled in SLAB allocator.  Once
KASAN features in SLAB are on par with those in SLUB we can switch SLUB
to stackdepot as well, thus removing the dependency on SLUB stack
bookkeeping, which wastes a lot of memory.

This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: stack depots" patch originally
prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov.

Joonsoo has said that he plans to reuse the stackdepot code for the
mm/page_owner.c debugging facility.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/depot_stack_handle/depot_stack_handle_t]
[aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: comment style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-25 16:37:42 -07:00
Alexander Potapenko 505f5dcb1c mm, kasan: add GFP flags to KASAN API
Add GFP flags to KASAN hooks for future patches to use.

This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: unified support for SLUB and SLAB
allocators" patch originally prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-25 16:37:42 -07:00
Alexander Potapenko 7ed2f9e663 mm, kasan: SLAB support
Add KASAN hooks to SLAB allocator.

This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: unified support for SLUB and SLAB
allocators" patch originally prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-25 16:37:42 -07:00
Dmitry Vyukov 5c9a8750a6 kernel: add kcov code coverage
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing).  Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system.  A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/).  However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.

kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible.  It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g.  scheduler, locking).

Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes.  Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch).  I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.

This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side.  The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.

We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:

  https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs

We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation".  For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.

Why not gcov.  Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat.  A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g.  an invalid
input).  In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M).  Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges.  On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.

kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure.  But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.

Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22 15:36:02 -07:00
Joe Perches 756a025f00 mm: coalesce split strings
Kernel style prefers a single string over split strings when the string is
'user-visible'.

Miscellanea:

 - Add a missing newline
 - Realign arguments

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>	[percpu]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-17 15:09:34 -07:00
Mark Rutland e3ae116339 kasan: add functions to clear stack poison
Functions which the compiler has instrumented for ASAN place poison on
the stack shadow upon entry and remove this poison prior to returning.

In some cases (e.g. hotplug and idle), CPUs may exit the kernel a
number of levels deep in C code.  If there are any instrumented
functions on this critical path, these will leave portions of the idle
thread stack shadow poisoned.

If a CPU returns to the kernel via a different path (e.g. a cold
entry), then depending on stack frame layout subsequent calls to
instrumented functions may use regions of the stack with stale poison,
resulting in (spurious) KASAN splats to the console.

Contemporary GCCs always add stack shadow poisoning when ASAN is
enabled, even when asked to not instrument a function [1], so we can't
simply annotate functions on the critical path to avoid poisoning.

Instead, this series explicitly removes any stale poison before it can
be hit.  In the common hotplug case we clear the entire stack shadow in
common code, before a CPU is brought online.

On architectures which perform a cold return as part of cpu idle may
retain an architecture-specific amount of stack contents.  To retain the
poison for this retained context, the arch code must call the core KASAN
code, passing a "watermark" stack pointer value beyond which shadow will
be cleared.  Architectures which don't perform a cold return as part of
idle do not need any additional code.

This patch (of 3):

Functions which the compiler has instrumented for KASAN place poison on
the stack shadow upon entry and remove this poision prior to returning.

In some cases (e.g.  hotplug and idle), CPUs may exit the kernel a number
of levels deep in C code.  If there are any instrumented functions on this
critical path, these will leave portions of the stack shadow poisoned.

If a CPU returns to the kernel via a different path (e.g.  a cold entry),
then depending on stack frame layout subsequent calls to instrumented
functions may use regions of the stack with stale poison, resulting in
(spurious) KASAN splats to the console.

To avoid this, we must clear stale poison from the stack prior to
instrumented functions being called.  This patch adds functions to the
KASAN core for removing poison from (portions of) a task's stack.  These
will be used by subsequent patches to avoid problems with hotplug and
idle.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-09 15:43:42 -08:00
Andrey Ryabinin c6d308534a UBSAN: run-time undefined behavior sanity checker
UBSAN uses compile-time instrumentation to catch undefined behavior
(UB).  Compiler inserts code that perform certain kinds of checks before
operations that could cause UB.  If check fails (i.e.  UB detected)
__ubsan_handle_* function called to print error message.

So the most of the work is done by compiler.  This patch just implements
ubsan handlers printing errors.

GCC has this capability since 4.9.x [1] (see -fsanitize=undefined
option and its suboptions).
However GCC 5.x has more checkers implemented [2].
Article [3] has a bit more details about UBSAN in the GCC.

[1] - https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.9.0/gcc/Debugging-Options.html
[2] - https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Debugging-Options.html
[3] - http://developerblog.redhat.com/2014/10/16/gcc-undefined-behavior-sanitizer-ubsan/

Issues which UBSAN has found thus far are:

Found bugs:

 * out-of-bounds access - 97840cb67f ("netfilter: nfnetlink: fix
   insufficient validation in nfnetlink_bind")

undefined shifts:

 * d48458d4a7 ("jbd2: use a better hash function for the revoke
   table")

 * 10632008b9 ("clockevents: Prevent shift out of bounds")

 * 'x << -1' shift in ext4 -
   http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<5444EF21.8020501@samsung.com>

 * undefined rol32(0) -
   http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<1449198241-20654-1-git-send-email-sasha.levin@oracle.com>

 * undefined dirty_ratelimit calculation -
   http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<566594E2.3050306@odin.com>

 * undefined roundown_pow_of_two(0) -
   http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<1449156616-11474-1-git-send-email-sasha.levin@oracle.com>

 * [WONTFIX] undefined shift in __bpf_prog_run -
   http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CACT4Y+ZxoR3UjLgcNdUm4fECLMx2VdtfrENMtRRCdgHB2n0bJA@mail.gmail.com>

   WONTFIX here because it should be fixed in bpf program, not in kernel.

signed overflows:

 * 32a8df4e0b ("sched: Fix odd values in effective_load()
   calculations")

 * mul overflow in ntp -
   http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<1449175608-1146-1-git-send-email-sasha.levin@oracle.com>

 * incorrect conversion into rtc_time in rtc_time64_to_tm() -
   http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<1449187944-11730-1-git-send-email-sasha.levin@oracle.com>

 * unvalidated timespec in io_getevents() -
   http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CACT4Y+bBxVYLQ6LtOKrKtnLthqLHcw-BMp3aqP3mjdAvr9FULQ@mail.gmail.com>

 * [NOTABUG] signed overflow in ktime_add_safe() -
   http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CACT4Y+aJ4muRnWxsUe1CMnA6P8nooO33kwG-c8YZg=0Xc8rJqw@mail.gmail.com>

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix unused local warning]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix __int128 build woes]
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Yury Gribov <y.gribov@samsung.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-01-20 17:09:18 -08:00
Andrey Ryabinin 459372545c kasan: fix kmemleak false-positive in kasan_module_alloc()
Kmemleak reports the following leak:

	unreferenced object 0xfffffbfff41ea000 (size 20480):
	comm "modprobe", pid 65199, jiffies 4298875551 (age 542.568s)
	hex dump (first 32 bytes):
	  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
	  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
	backtrace:
	  [<ffffffff82354f5e>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xc0
	  [<ffffffff8152e718>] __vmalloc_node_range+0x4b8/0x740
	  [<ffffffff81574072>] kasan_module_alloc+0x72/0xc0
	  [<ffffffff810efe68>] module_alloc+0x78/0xb0
	  [<ffffffff812f6a24>] module_alloc_update_bounds+0x14/0x70
	  [<ffffffff812f8184>] layout_and_allocate+0x16f4/0x3c90
	  [<ffffffff812faa1f>] load_module+0x2ff/0x6690
	  [<ffffffff813010b6>] SyS_finit_module+0x136/0x170
	  [<ffffffff8239bbc9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
	  [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff

kasan_module_alloc() allocates shadow memory for module and frees it on
module unloading.  It doesn't store the pointer to allocated shadow memory
because it could be calculated from the shadowed address, i.e.
kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr).

Since kmemleak cannot find pointer to allocated shadow, it thinks that
memory leaked.

Use kmemleak_ignore() to tell kmemleak that this is not a leak and shadow
memory doesn't contain any pointers.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-20 16:17:32 -08:00
Andrey Ryabinin eb06f43f1c kasan: always taint kernel on report
Currently we already taint the kernel in some cases.  E.g.  if we hit some
bug in slub memory we call object_err() which will taint the kernel with
TAINT_BAD_PAGE flag.  But for other kind of bugs kernel left untainted.

Always taint with TAINT_BAD_PAGE if kasan found some bug.  This is useful
for automated testing.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-05 19:34:48 -08:00
Xishi Qiu 10f702627e kasan: use IS_ALIGNED in memory_is_poisoned_8()
Use IS_ALIGNED() to determine whether the shadow span two bytes.  It
generates less code and more readable.  Also add some comments in shadow
check functions.

Signed-off-by: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-05 19:34:48 -08:00
Wang Long e0d5771439 kasan: Fix a type conversion error
The current KASAN code can not find the following out-of-bounds bugs:

        char *ptr;
        ptr = kmalloc(8, GFP_KERNEL);
        memset(ptr+7, 0, 2);

the cause of the problem is the type conversion error in
*memory_is_poisoned_n* function.  So this patch fix that.

Signed-off-by: Wang Long <long.wanglong@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-05 19:34:48 -08:00
Andrey Konovalov 5d0926efe7 kasan: update reference to kasan prototype repo
Update the reference to the kasan prototype repository on github, since it
was renamed.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-05 19:34:48 -08:00
Andrey Konovalov 25add7ec70 kasan: update log messages
We decided to use KASAN as the short name of the tool and
KernelAddressSanitizer as the full one.  Update log messages according to
that.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-05 19:34:48 -08:00
Andrey Konovalov cdf6a273dc kasan: accurately determine the type of the bad access
Makes KASAN accurately determine the type of the bad access. If the shadow
byte value is in the [0, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) range we can look at
the next shadow byte to determine the type of the access.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-05 19:34:48 -08:00
Andrey Konovalov 0952d87fd6 kasan: update reported bug types for kernel memory accesses
Update the names of the bad access types to better reflect the type of
the access that happended and make these error types "literals" that can
be used for classification and deduplication in scripts.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-05 19:34:48 -08:00
Andrey Konovalov e912107663 kasan: update reported bug types for not user nor kernel memory accesses
Each access with address lower than
kasan_shadow_to_mem(KASAN_SHADOW_START) is reported as user-memory-access.
This is not always true, the accessed address might not be in user space.
Fix this by reporting such accesses as null-ptr-derefs or
wild-memory-accesses.

There's another reason for this change.  For userspace ASan we have a
bunch of systems that analyze error types for the purpose of
classification and deduplication.  Sooner of later we will write them to
KASAN as well.  Then clearly and explicitly stated error types will bring
value.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-05 19:34:48 -08:00
Aneesh Kumar K.V fc5aeeaf59 mm/kasan: prevent deadlock in kasan reporting
When we end up calling kasan_report in real mode, our shadow mapping for
the spinlock variable will show poisoned.  This will result in us calling
kasan_report_error with lock_report spin lock held.  To prevent this
disable kasan reporting when we are priting error w.r.t kasan.

Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-05 19:34:48 -08:00
Aneesh Kumar K.V f2377d4eaa mm/kasan: don't use kasan shadow pointer in generic functions
We can't use generic functions like print_hex_dump to access kasan shadow
region.  This require us to setup another kasan shadow region for the
address passed (kasan shadow address).  Some architectures won't be able
to do that.  Hence make a copy of the shadow region row and pass that to
generic functions.

Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-05 19:34:48 -08:00
Aneesh Kumar K.V 527f215b78 mm/kasan: MODULE_VADDR is not available on all archs
Use is_module_address instead

Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-05 19:34:48 -08:00
Aneesh Kumar K.V 0ba8663cbf mm/kasan: rename kasan_enabled() to kasan_report_enabled()
The function only disable/enable reporting.  In the later patch we will be
adding a kasan early enable/disable.  Rename kasan_enabled to properly
reflect its function.

Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-05 19:34:48 -08:00
Xishi Qiu 8d77a6d18a kasan: fix last shadow judgement in memory_is_poisoned_16()
The shadow which correspond 16 bytes memory may span 2 or 3 bytes.  If
the memory is aligned on 8, then the shadow takes only 2 bytes.  So we
check "shadow_first_bytes" is enough, and need not to call
"memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + 15);".  But the code "if
(likely(!last_byte))" is wrong judgement.

e.g.  addr=0, so last_byte = 15 & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK = 7, then the code
will continue to call "memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + 15);"

Signed-off-by: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-17 21:16:07 -07:00
Andrey Ryabinin 69786cdb37 x86/kasan, mm: Introduce generic kasan_populate_zero_shadow()
Introduce generic kasan_populate_zero_shadow(shadow_start,
shadow_end). This function maps kasan_zero_page to the
[shadow_start, shadow_end] addresses.

This replaces x86_64 specific populate_zero_shadow() and will
be used for ARM64 in follow on patches.

The main changes from original version are:

 * Use p?d_populate*() instead of set_p?d()
 * Use memblock allocator directly instead of vmemmap_alloc_block()
 * __pa() instead of __pa_nodebug(). __pa() causes troubles
   iff we use it before kasan_early_init(). kasan_populate_zero_shadow()
   will be used later, so we ok with __pa() here.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexey Klimov <klimov.linux@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: David Keitel <dkeitel@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Yury <yury.norov@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1439444244-26057-3-git-send-email-ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-08-22 14:54:55 +02:00
Andrey Ryabinin 2baf9e8948 .mailmap: Andrey Ryabinin has moved
Update my email address.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-08-14 15:56:32 -07:00
Wang Long bffacb9132 kasan: remove duplicate definition of the macro KASAN_FREE_PAGE
Remove duplicate definition of the macro KASAN_FREE_PAGE in
mm/kasan/kasan.h

Signed-off-by: Wang Long <long.wanglong@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 17:00:42 -07:00
Andrey Ryabinin 923936157b mm/mempool.c: kasan: poison mempool elements
Mempools keep allocated objects in reserved for situations when ordinary
allocation may not be possible to satisfy.  These objects shouldn't be
accessed before they leave the pool.

This patch poison elements when get into the pool and unpoison when they
leave it.  This will let KASan to detect use-after-free of mempool's
elements.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Tested-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <drcheren@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 16:35:20 -07:00