Commit Graph

2226 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Linus Torvalds 6dd9158ae8 Merge git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit
Pull audit update from Eric Paris:
 "Again we stayed pretty well contained inside the audit system.
  Venturing out was fixing a couple of function prototypes which were
  inconsistent (didn't hurt anything, but we used the same value as an
  int, uint, u32, and I think even a long in a couple of places).

  We also made a couple of minor changes to when a couple of LSMs called
  the audit system.  We hoped to add aarch64 audit support this go
  round, but it wasn't ready.

  I'm disappearing on vacation on Thursday.  I should have internet
  access, but it'll be spotty.  If anything goes wrong please be sure to
  cc rgb@redhat.com.  He'll make fixing things his top priority"

* git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit: (50 commits)
  audit: whitespace fix in kernel-parameters.txt
  audit: fix location of __net_initdata for audit_net_ops
  audit: remove pr_info for every network namespace
  audit: Modify a set of system calls in audit class definitions
  audit: Convert int limit uses to u32
  audit: Use more current logging style
  audit: Use hex_byte_pack_upper
  audit: correct a type mismatch in audit_syscall_exit()
  audit: reorder AUDIT_TTY_SET arguments
  audit: rework AUDIT_TTY_SET to only grab spin_lock once
  audit: remove needless switch in AUDIT_SET
  audit: use define's for audit version
  audit: documentation of audit= kernel parameter
  audit: wait_for_auditd rework for readability
  audit: update MAINTAINERS
  audit: log task info on feature change
  audit: fix incorrect set of audit_sock
  audit: print error message when fail to create audit socket
  audit: fix dangling keywords in audit_log_set_loginuid() output
  audit: log on errors from filter user rules
  ...
2014-01-23 18:08:10 -08:00
Linus Torvalds f075e0f699 Merge branch 'for-3.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup
Pull cgroup updates from Tejun Heo:
 "The bulk of changes are cleanups and preparations for the upcoming
  kernfs conversion.

   - cgroup_event mechanism which is and will be used only by memcg is
     moved to memcg.

   - pidlist handling is updated so that it can be served by seq_file.

     Also, the list is not sorted if sane_behavior.  cgroup
     documentation explicitly states that the file is not sorted but it
     has been for quite some time.

   - All cgroup file handling now happens on top of seq_file.  This is
     to prepare for kernfs conversion.  In addition, all operations are
     restructured so that they map 1-1 to kernfs operations.

   - Other cleanups and low-pri fixes"

* 'for-3.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup: (40 commits)
  cgroup: trivial style updates
  cgroup: remove stray references to css_id
  doc: cgroups: Fix typo in doc/cgroups
  cgroup: fix fail path in cgroup_load_subsys()
  cgroup: fix missing unlock on error in cgroup_load_subsys()
  cgroup: remove for_each_root_subsys()
  cgroup: implement for_each_css()
  cgroup: factor out cgroup_subsys_state creation into create_css()
  cgroup: combine css handling loops in cgroup_create()
  cgroup: reorder operations in cgroup_create()
  cgroup: make for_each_subsys() useable under cgroup_root_mutex
  cgroup: css iterations and css_from_dir() are safe under cgroup_mutex
  cgroup: unify pidlist and other file handling
  cgroup: replace cftype->read_seq_string() with cftype->seq_show()
  cgroup: attach cgroup_open_file to all cgroup files
  cgroup: generalize cgroup_pidlist_open_file
  cgroup: unify read path so that seq_file is always used
  cgroup: unify cgroup_write_X64() and cgroup_write_string()
  cgroup: remove cftype->read(), ->read_map() and ->write()
  hugetlb_cgroup: convert away from cftype->read()
  ...
2014-01-21 17:51:34 -08:00
Linus Torvalds fb2e2c8537 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
 "Changes for this kernel include maintenance updates for Smack, SELinux
  (and several networking fixes), IMA and TPM"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits)
  SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy
  tpm/tpm-sysfs: active_show() can be static
  tpm: tpm_tis: Fix compile problems with CONFIG_PM_SLEEP/CONFIG_PNP
  tpm: Make tpm-dev allocate a per-file structure
  tpm: Use the ops structure instead of a copy in tpm_vendor_specific
  tpm: Create a tpm_class_ops structure and use it in the drivers
  tpm: Pull all driver sysfs code into tpm-sysfs.c
  tpm: Move sysfs functions from tpm-interface to tpm-sysfs
  tpm: Pull everything related to /dev/tpmX into tpm-dev.c
  char: tpm: nuvoton: remove unused variable
  tpm: MAINTAINERS: Cleanup TPM Maintainers file
  tpm/tpm_i2c_atmel: fix coccinelle warnings
  tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm: fix unreachable code warning (smatch warning)
  tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: Check return code of get_burstcount
  tpm/tpm_ppi: Check return value of acpi_get_name
  tpm/tpm_ppi: Do not compare strcmp(a,b) == -1
  ima: remove unneeded size_limit argument from ima_eventdigest_init_common()
  ima: update IMA-templates.txt documentation
  ima: pass HASH_ALGO__LAST as hash algo in ima_eventdigest_init()
  ima: change the default hash algorithm to SHA1 in ima_eventdigest_ng_init()
  ...
2014-01-21 09:06:02 -08:00
Richard Guy Briggs 4eb0f4abfb smack: call WARN_ONCE() instead of calling audit_log_start()
Remove the call to audit_log() (which call audit_log_start()) and deal with
the errors in the caller, logging only once if the condition is met.  Calling
audit_log_start() in this location makes buffer allocation and locking more
complicated in the calling tree (audit_filter_user()).

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2014-01-13 22:32:06 -05:00
Richard Guy Briggs 9ad42a7924 selinux: call WARN_ONCE() instead of calling audit_log_start()
Two of the conditions in selinux_audit_rule_match() should never happen and
the third indicates a race that should be retried.  Remove the calls to
audit_log() (which call audit_log_start()) and deal with the errors in the
caller, logging only once if the condition is met.  Calling audit_log_start()
in this location makes buffer allocation and locking more complicated in the
calling tree (audit_filter_user()).

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2014-01-13 22:32:00 -05:00
Steven Rostedt 3dc91d4338 SELinux: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference in selinux_inode_permission()
While running stress tests on adding and deleting ftrace instances I hit
this bug:

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
  IP: selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  PGD 63681067 PUD 7ddbe067 PMD 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT
  CPU: 0 PID: 5634 Comm: ftrace-test-mki Not tainted 3.13.0-rc4-test-00033-gd2a6dde-dirty #20
  Hardware name:                  /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006
  task: ffff880078375800 ti: ffff88007ddb0000 task.ti: ffff88007ddb0000
  RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d8bc5>]  [<ffffffff812d8bc5>] selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  RSP: 0018:ffff88007ddb1c48  EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000800000 RCX: ffff88006dd43840
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000081 RDI: ffff88006ee46000
  RBP: ffff88007ddb1c88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88007ddb1c54
  R10: 6e6576652f6f6f66 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: 0000000000000081 R14: ffff88006ee46000 R15: 0000000000000000
  FS:  00007f217b5b6700(0000) GS:ffffffff81e21000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033^M
  CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000006a0fe000 CR4: 00000000000007f0
  Call Trace:
    security_inode_permission+0x1c/0x30
    __inode_permission+0x41/0xa0
    inode_permission+0x18/0x50
    link_path_walk+0x66/0x920
    path_openat+0xa6/0x6c0
    do_filp_open+0x43/0xa0
    do_sys_open+0x146/0x240
    SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
    system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
  Code: 84 a1 00 00 00 81 e3 00 20 00 00 89 d8 83 c8 02 40 f6 c6 04 0f 45 d8 40 f6 c6 08 74 71 80 cf 02 49 8b 46 38 4c 8d 4d cc 45 31 c0 <0f> b7 50 20 8b 70 1c 48 8b 41 70 89 d9 8b 78 04 e8 36 cf ff ff
  RIP  selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  CR2: 0000000000000020

Investigating, I found that the inode->i_security was NULL, and the
dereference of it caused the oops.

in selinux_inode_permission():

	isec = inode->i_security;

	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);

Note, the crash came from stressing the deletion and reading of debugfs
files.  I was not able to recreate this via normal files.  But I'm not
sure they are safe.  It may just be that the race window is much harder
to hit.

What seems to have happened (and what I have traced), is the file is
being opened at the same time the file or directory is being deleted.
As the dentry and inode locks are not held during the path walk, nor is
the inodes ref counts being incremented, there is nothing saving these
structures from being discarded except for an rcu_read_lock().

The rcu_read_lock() protects against freeing of the inode, but it does
not protect freeing of the inode_security_struct.  Now if the freeing of
the i_security happens with a call_rcu(), and the i_security field of
the inode is not changed (it gets freed as the inode gets freed) then
there will be no issue here.  (Linus Torvalds suggested not setting the
field to NULL such that we do not need to check if it is NULL in the
permission check).

Note, this is a hack, but it fixes the problem at hand.  A real fix is
to restructure the destroy_inode() to call all the destructor handlers
from the RCU callback.  But that is a major job to do, and requires a
lot of work.  For now, we just band-aid this bug with this fix (it
works), and work on a more maintainable solution in the future.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109101932.0508dec7@gandalf.local.home
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109182756.17abaaa8@gandalf.local.home

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-01-12 16:53:13 +07:00
James Morris 923b49ff69 Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into next 2014-01-08 17:22:32 +11:00
Tetsuo Handa 8ed8146028 SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy
Hello.

I got below leak with linux-3.10.0-54.0.1.el7.x86_64 .

[  681.903890] kmemleak: 5538 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak)

Below is a patch, but I don't know whether we need special handing for undoing
ebitmap_set_bit() call.
----------
>>From fe97527a90fe95e2239dfbaa7558f0ed559c0992 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 16:30:21 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy

Commit 2463c26d "SELinux: put name based create rules in a hashtable" did not
check return value from hashtab_insert() in filename_trans_read(). It leaks
memory if hashtab_insert() returns error.

  unreferenced object 0xffff88005c9160d0 (size 8):
    comm "systemd", pid 1, jiffies 4294688674 (age 235.265s)
    hex dump (first 8 bytes):
      57 0b 00 00 6b 6b 6b a5                          W...kkk.
    backtrace:
      [<ffffffff816604ae>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
      [<ffffffff811cba5e>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x12e/0x360
      [<ffffffff812aec5d>] policydb_read+0xd1d/0xf70
      [<ffffffff812b345c>] security_load_policy+0x6c/0x500
      [<ffffffff812a623c>] sel_write_load+0xac/0x750
      [<ffffffff811eb680>] vfs_write+0xc0/0x1f0
      [<ffffffff811ec08c>] SyS_write+0x4c/0xa0
      [<ffffffff81690419>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
      [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff

However, we should not return EEXIST error to the caller, or the systemd will
show below message and the boot sequence freezes.

  systemd[1]: Failed to load SELinux policy. Freezing.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2014-01-07 10:21:44 -05:00
James Morris d4a82a4a03 Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into next
Conflicts:
	security/selinux/hooks.c

Resolved using request struct.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2014-01-07 01:45:59 +11:00
James Morris 38fd2c202a Merge to v3.13-rc7 for prerequisite changes in the Xen code for TPM 2014-01-06 22:23:01 +11:00
Roberto Sassu dcf4e39286 ima: remove unneeded size_limit argument from ima_eventdigest_init_common()
This patch removes the 'size_limit' argument from
ima_eventdigest_init_common(). Since the 'd' field will never include
the hash algorithm as prefix and the 'd-ng' will always have it, we can
use the hash algorithm to differentiate the two cases in the modified
function (it is equal to HASH_ALGO__LAST in the first case, the opposite
in the second).

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-01-03 07:43:00 -05:00
Roberto Sassu 712a49bd7d ima: pass HASH_ALGO__LAST as hash algo in ima_eventdigest_init()
Replace the '-1' value with HASH_ALGO__LAST in ima_eventdigest_init()
as the called function ima_eventdigest_init_common() expects an unsigned
char.

Fix commit:
  4d7aeee ima: define new template ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-01-03 07:42:59 -05:00
Roberto Sassu c502c78ba7 ima: change the default hash algorithm to SHA1 in ima_eventdigest_ng_init()
Replace HASH_ALGO__LAST with HASH_ALGO_SHA1 as the initial value of
the hash algorithm so that the prefix 'sha1:' is added to violation
digests.

Fix commit:
  4d7aeee ima: define new template ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.13.x
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-01-03 07:42:57 -05:00
Casey Schaufler 4482a44f6a Smack: File receive audit correction
Eric Paris politely points out:

    Inside smack_file_receive() it seems like you are initting the audit
    field with LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK.  And then use
    smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path().

    Seems like LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH would make more sense.  (and depending
    on how it's used fix a crash...)

He is correct. This puts things in order.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2013-12-31 13:35:27 -08:00
Casey Schaufler 24ea1b6efc Smack: Rationalize mount restrictions
The mount restrictions imposed by Smack rely heavily on the
use of the filesystem "floor", which is the label that all
processes writing to the filesystem must have access to. It
turns out that while the "floor" notion is sound, it has yet
to be fully implemented and has never been used.

The sb_mount and sb_umount hooks only make sense if the
filesystem floor is used actively, and it isn't. They can
be reintroduced if a rational restriction comes up. Until
then, they get removed.

The sb_kern_mount hook is required for the option processing.
It is too permissive in the case of unprivileged mounts,
effectively bypassing the CAP_MAC_ADMIN restrictions if
any of the smack options are specified. Unprivileged mounts
are no longer allowed to set Smack filesystem options.
Additionally, the root and default values are set to the
label of the caller, in keeping with the policy that objects
get the label of their creator.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2013-12-31 13:35:16 -08:00
Casey Schaufler 4afde48be8 Smack: change rule cap check
smk_write_change_rule() is calling capable rather than
the more correct smack_privileged(). This allows for setting
rules in violation of the onlycap facility. This is the
simple repair.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2013-12-23 15:57:43 -08:00
Casey Schaufler 00f84f3f2e Smack: Make the syslog control configurable
The syslog control requires that the calling proccess
have the floor ("_") Smack label. Tizen does not run any
processes except for kernel helpers with the floor label.
This changes allows the admin to configure a specific
label for syslog. The default value is the star ("*")
label, effectively removing the restriction. The value
can be set using smackfs/syslog for anyone who wants
a more restrictive behavior.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2013-12-23 15:50:55 -08:00
Oleg Nesterov c0c1439541 selinux: selinux_setprocattr()->ptrace_parent() needs rcu_read_lock()
selinux_setprocattr() does ptrace_parent(p) under task_lock(p),
but task_struct->alloc_lock doesn't pin ->parent or ->ptrace,
this looks confusing and triggers the "suspicious RCU usage"
warning because ptrace_parent() does rcu_dereference_check().

And in theory this is wrong, spin_lock()->preempt_disable()
doesn't necessarily imply rcu_read_lock() we need to access
the ->parent.

Reported-by: Evan McNabb <emcnabb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-23 17:45:17 -05:00
Chad Hanson 46d01d6322 selinux: fix broken peer recv check
Fix a broken networking check. Return an error if peer recv fails.  If
secmark is active and the packet recv succeeds the peer recv error is
ignored.

Signed-off-by: Chad Hanson <chanson@trustedcs.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-23 17:45:17 -05:00
Casey Schaufler 19760ad03c Smack: Prevent the * and @ labels from being used in SMACK64EXEC
Smack prohibits processes from using the star ("*") and web ("@") labels
because we don't want files with those labels getting created implicitly.
All setting of those labels should be done explicitly. The trouble is that
there is no check for these labels in the processing of SMACK64EXEC. That
is repaired.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2013-12-19 13:05:24 -08:00
Oleg Nesterov 465954cd64 selinux: selinux_setprocattr()->ptrace_parent() needs rcu_read_lock()
selinux_setprocattr() does ptrace_parent(p) under task_lock(p),
but task_struct->alloc_lock doesn't pin ->parent or ->ptrace,
this looks confusing and triggers the "suspicious RCU usage"
warning because ptrace_parent() does rcu_dereference_check().

And in theory this is wrong, spin_lock()->preempt_disable()
doesn't necessarily imply rcu_read_lock() we need to access
the ->parent.

Reported-by: Evan McNabb <emcnabb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-16 16:00:29 -05:00
Wei Yongjun a5e333d340 SELinux: remove duplicated include from hooks.c
Remove duplicated include.

Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-16 15:58:23 -05:00
Linus Torvalds b5745c5962 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull SELinux fixes from James Morris.

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  selinux: process labeled IPsec TCP SYN-ACK packets properly in selinux_ip_postroute()
  selinux: look for IPsec labels on both inbound and outbound packets
  selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_postroute()
  selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_output()
  selinux: fix possible memory leak
2013-12-15 11:28:02 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 29b1deb2a4 Revert "selinux: consider filesystem subtype in policies"
This reverts commit 102aefdda4.

Tom London reports that it causes sync() to hang on Fedora rawhide:

  https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1033965

and Josh Boyer bisected it down to this commit.  Reverting the commit in
the rawhide kernel fixes the problem.

Eric Paris root-caused it to incorrect subtype matching in that commit
breaking fuse, and has a tentative patch, but by now we're better off
retrying this in 3.14 rather than playing with it any more.

Reported-by: Tom London <selinux@gmail.com>
Bisected-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Anand Avati <avati@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-12-15 11:17:45 -08:00
Paul Moore 4d546f8171 selinux: revert 102aefdda4
Revert "selinux: consider filesystem subtype in policies"

This reverts commit 102aefdda4.

Explanation from Eric Paris:

	SELinux policy can specify if it should use a filesystem's
	xattrs or not.  In current policy we have a specification that
	fuse should not use xattrs but fuse.glusterfs should use
	xattrs.  This patch has a bug in which non-glusterfs
	filesystems would match the rule saying fuse.glusterfs should
	use xattrs.  If both fuse and the particular filesystem in
	question are not written to handle xattr calls during the mount
	command, they will deadlock.

	I have fixed the bug to do proper matching, however I believe a
	revert is still the correct solution.  The reason I believe
	that is because the code still does not work.  The s_subtype is
	not set until after the SELinux hook which attempts to match on
	the ".gluster" portion of the rule.  So we cannot match on the
	rule in question.  The code is useless.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-13 14:52:25 -05:00
James Morris d93aca6050 Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux_fixes into for-linus 2013-12-13 13:27:55 +11:00
Paul Moore c0828e5048 selinux: process labeled IPsec TCP SYN-ACK packets properly in selinux_ip_postroute()
Due to difficulty in arriving at the proper security label for
TCP SYN-ACK packets in selinux_ip_postroute(), we need to check packets
while/before they are undergoing XFRM transforms instead of waiting
until afterwards so that we can determine the correct security label.

Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-12 17:21:31 -05:00
Paul Moore 817eff718d selinux: look for IPsec labels on both inbound and outbound packets
Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled
IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to
check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security
labels.

Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-12 17:21:31 -05:00
Paul Moore 446b802437 selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_postroute()
In selinux_ip_postroute() we perform access checks based on the
packet's security label.  For locally generated traffic we get the
packet's security label from the associated socket; this works in all
cases except for TCP SYN-ACK packets.  In the case of SYN-ACK packet's
the correct security label is stored in the connection's request_sock,
not the server's socket.  Unfortunately, at the point in time when
selinux_ip_postroute() is called we can't query the request_sock
directly, we need to recreate the label using the same logic that
originally labeled the associated request_sock.

See the inline comments for more explanation.

Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-12 17:21:31 -05:00
Paul Moore 4718006827 selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_output()
In selinux_ip_output() we always label packets based on the parent
socket.  While this approach works in almost all cases, it doesn't
work in the case of TCP SYN-ACK packets when the correct label is not
the label of the parent socket, but rather the label of the larval
socket represented by the request_sock struct.

Unfortunately, since the request_sock isn't queued on the parent
socket until *after* the SYN-ACK packet is sent, we can't lookup the
request_sock to determine the correct label for the packet; at this
point in time the best we can do is simply pass/NF_ACCEPT the packet.
It must be said that simply passing the packet without any explicit
labeling action, while far from ideal, is not terrible as the SYN-ACK
packet will inherit any IP option based labeling from the initial
connection request so the label *should* be correct and all our
access controls remain in place so we shouldn't have to worry about
information leaks.

Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-12 17:21:31 -05:00
Linus Torvalds 5dec682c7f Keyrings fixes 2013-12-10
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Merge tag 'keys-devel-20131210' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs

Pull misc keyrings fixes from David Howells:
 "These break down into five sets:

   - A patch to error handling in the big_key type for huge payloads.
     If the payload is larger than the "low limit" and the backing store
     allocation fails, then big_key_instantiate() doesn't clear the
     payload pointers in the key, assuming them to have been previously
     cleared - but only one of them is.

     Unfortunately, the garbage collector still calls big_key_destroy()
     when sees one of the pointers with a weird value in it (and not
     NULL) which it then tries to clean up.

   - Three patches to fix the keyring type:

     * A patch to fix the hash function to correctly divide keyrings off
       from keys in the topology of the tree inside the associative
       array.  This is only a problem if searching through nested
       keyrings - and only if the hash function incorrectly puts the a
       keyring outside of the 0 branch of the root node.

     * A patch to fix keyrings' use of the associative array.  The
       __key_link_begin() function initially passes a NULL key pointer
       to assoc_array_insert() on the basis that it's holding a place in
       the tree whilst it does more allocation and stuff.

       This is only a problem when a node contains 16 keys that match at
       that level and we want to add an also matching 17th.  This should
       easily be manufactured with a keyring full of keyrings (without
       chucking any other sort of key into the mix) - except for (a)
       above which makes it on average adding the 65th keyring.

     * A patch to fix searching down through nested keyrings, where any
       keyring in the set has more than 16 keyrings and none of the
       first keyrings we look through has a match (before the tree
       iteration needs to step to a more distal node).

     Test in keyutils test suite:

        http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/commit/?id=8b4ae963ed92523aea18dfbb8cab3f4979e13bd1

   - A patch to fix the big_key type's use of a shmem file as its
     backing store causing audit messages and LSM check failures.  This
     is done by setting S_PRIVATE on the file to avoid LSM checks on the
     file (access to the shmem file goes through the keyctl() interface
     and so is gated by the LSM that way).

     This isn't normally a problem if a key is used by the context that
     generated it - and it's currently only used by libkrb5.

     Test in keyutils test suite:

        http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/commit/?id=d9a53cbab42c293962f2f78f7190253fc73bd32e

   - A patch to add a generated file to .gitignore.

   - A patch to fix the alignment of the system certificate data such
     that it it works on s390.  As I understand it, on the S390 arch,
     symbols must be 2-byte aligned because loading the address discards
     the least-significant bit"

* tag 'keys-devel-20131210' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
  KEYS: correct alignment of system_certificate_list content in assembly file
  Ignore generated file kernel/x509_certificate_list
  security: shmem: implement kernel private shmem inodes
  KEYS: Fix searching of nested keyrings
  KEYS: Fix multiple key add into associative array
  KEYS: Fix the keyring hash function
  KEYS: Pre-clear struct key on allocation
2013-12-12 10:15:24 -08:00
Chad Hanson 598cdbcf86 selinux: fix broken peer recv check
Fix a broken networking check. Return an error if peer recv fails.  If
secmark is active and the packet recv succeeds the peer recv error is
ignored.

Signed-off-by: Chad Hanson <chanson@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-11 17:07:56 -05:00
Jarkko Sakkinen 398ce07370 smack: fix: allow either entry be missing on access/access2 check (v2)
This is a regression caused by f7112e6c. When either subject or
object is not found the answer for access should be no. This
patch fixes the situation. '0' is written back instead of failing
with -EINVAL.

v2: cosmetic style fixes

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2013-12-11 10:48:55 -08:00
Paul Moore 5c6c26813a selinux: process labeled IPsec TCP SYN-ACK packets properly in selinux_ip_postroute()
Due to difficulty in arriving at the proper security label for
TCP SYN-ACK packets in selinux_ip_postroute(), we need to check packets
while/before they are undergoing XFRM transforms instead of waiting
until afterwards so that we can determine the correct security label.

Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-10 14:50:25 -05:00
Paul Moore 5b67c49324 selinux: look for IPsec labels on both inbound and outbound packets
Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled
IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to
check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security
labels.

Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-09 15:32:33 -05:00
Tejun Heo 2da8ca822d cgroup: replace cftype->read_seq_string() with cftype->seq_show()
In preparation of conversion to kernfs, cgroup file handling is
updated so that it can be easily mapped to kernfs.  This patch
replaces cftype->read_seq_string() with cftype->seq_show() which is
not limited to single_open() operation and will map directcly to
kernfs seq_file interface.

The conversions are mechanical.  As ->seq_show() doesn't have @css and
@cft, the functions which make use of them are converted to use
seq_css() and seq_cft() respectively.  In several occassions, e.f. if
it has seq_string in its name, the function name is updated to fit the
new method better.

This patch does not introduce any behavior changes.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Aristeu Rozanski <arozansk@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Daniel Wagner <daniel.wagner@bmw-carit.de>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
2013-12-05 12:28:04 -05:00
Geyslan G. Bem 0af901643f selinux: fix possible memory leak
Free 'ctx_str' when necessary.

Signed-off-by: Geyslan G. Bem <geyslan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-04 16:10:24 -05:00
Paul Moore 0b1f24e6db selinux: pull address family directly from the request_sock struct
We don't need to inspect the packet to determine if the packet is an
IPv4 packet arriving on an IPv6 socket when we can query the
request_sock directly.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-04 16:08:27 -05:00
Paul Moore 050d032b25 selinux: ensure that the cached NetLabel secattr matches the desired SID
In selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid() we leverage a cached NetLabel
secattr whenever possible.  However, we never check to ensure that
the desired SID matches the cached NetLabel secattr.  This patch
checks the SID against the secattr before use and only uses the
cached secattr when the SID values match.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-04 16:08:17 -05:00
Paul Moore 7f721643db selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_postroute()
In selinux_ip_postroute() we perform access checks based on the
packet's security label.  For locally generated traffic we get the
packet's security label from the associated socket; this works in all
cases except for TCP SYN-ACK packets.  In the case of SYN-ACK packet's
the correct security label is stored in the connection's request_sock,
not the server's socket.  Unfortunately, at the point in time when
selinux_ip_postroute() is called we can't query the request_sock
directly, we need to recreate the label using the same logic that
originally labeled the associated request_sock.

See the inline comments for more explanation.

Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-04 16:07:28 -05:00
Paul Moore da2ea0d056 selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_output()
In selinux_ip_output() we always label packets based on the parent
socket.  While this approach works in almost all cases, it doesn't
work in the case of TCP SYN-ACK packets when the correct label is not
the label of the parent socket, but rather the label of the larval
socket represented by the request_sock struct.

Unfortunately, since the request_sock isn't queued on the parent
socket until *after* the SYN-ACK packet is sent, we can't lookup the
request_sock to determine the correct label for the packet; at this
point in time the best we can do is simply pass/NF_ACCEPT the packet.
It must be said that simply passing the packet without any explicit
labeling action, while far from ideal, is not terrible as the SYN-ACK
packet will inherit any IP option based labeling from the initial
connection request so the label *should* be correct and all our
access controls remain in place so we shouldn't have to worry about
information leaks.

Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-04 16:06:47 -05:00
Roberto Sassu a7ed7c60e1 ima: properly free ima_template_entry structures
The new templates management mechanism records information associated
to an event into an array of 'ima_field_data' structures and makes it
available through the 'template_data' field of the 'ima_template_entry'
structure (the element of the measurements list created by IMA).

Since 'ima_field_data' contains dynamically allocated data (which length
varies depending on the data associated to a selected template field),
it is not enough to just free the memory reserved for a
'ima_template_entry' structure if something goes wrong.

This patch creates the new function ima_free_template_entry() which
walks the array of 'ima_field_data' structures, frees the memory
referenced by the 'data' pointer and finally the space reserved for
the 'ima_template_entry' structure. Further, it replaces existing kfree()
that have a pointer to an 'ima_template_entry' structure as argument
with calls to the new function.

Fixes: a71dc65: ima: switch to new template management mechanism
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
2013-12-02 20:46:56 -05:00
Christoph Paasch 09ae634572 ima: Do not free 'entry' before it is initialized
7bc5f447ce (ima: define new function ima_alloc_init_template() to
API) moved the initialization of 'entry' in ima_add_boot_aggregate() a
bit more below, after the if (ima_used_chip).

So, 'entry' is not initialized while being inside this if-block. So, we
should not attempt to free it.

Found by Coverity (CID: 1131971)

Fixes: 7bc5f447ce (ima: define new function ima_alloc_init_template() to API)
Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
2013-12-02 20:46:32 -05:00
Eric Paris c727709092 security: shmem: implement kernel private shmem inodes
We have a problem where the big_key key storage implementation uses a
shmem backed inode to hold the key contents.  Because of this detail of
implementation LSM checks are being done between processes trying to
read the keys and the tmpfs backed inode.  The LSM checks are already
being handled on the key interface level and should not be enforced at
the inode level (since the inode is an implementation detail, not a
part of the security model)

This patch implements a new function shmem_kernel_file_setup() which
returns the equivalent to shmem_file_setup() only the underlying inode
has S_PRIVATE set.  This means that all LSM checks for the inode in
question are skipped.  It should only be used for kernel internal
operations where the inode is not exposed to userspace without proper
LSM checking.  It is possible that some other users of
shmem_file_setup() should use the new interface, but this has not been
explored.

Reproducing this bug is a little bit difficult.  The steps I used on
Fedora are:

 (1) Turn off selinux enforcing:

	setenforce 0

 (2) Create a huge key

	k=`dd if=/dev/zero bs=8192 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key test-key @s`

 (3) Access the key in another context:

	runcon system_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 keyctl print $k >/dev/null

 (4) Examine the audit logs:

	ausearch -m AVC -i --subject httpd_t | audit2allow

If the last command's output includes a line that looks like:

	allow httpd_t user_tmpfs_t:file { open read };

There was an inode check between httpd and the tmpfs filesystem.  With
this patch no such denial will be seen.  (NOTE! you should clear your
audit log if you have tested for this previously)

(Please return you box to enforcing)

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
2013-12-02 11:24:19 +00:00
David Howells 9c5e45df21 KEYS: Fix searching of nested keyrings
If a keyring contains more than 16 keyrings (the capacity of a single node in
the associative array) then those keyrings are split over multiple nodes
arranged as a tree.

If search_nested_keyrings() is called to search the keyring then it will
attempt to manually walk over just the 0 branch of the associative array tree
where all the keyring links are stored.  This works provided the key is found
before the algorithm steps from one node containing keyrings to a child node
or if there are sufficiently few keyring links that the keyrings are all in
one node.

However, if the algorithm does need to step from a node to a child node, it
doesn't change the node pointer unless a shortcut also gets transited.  This
means that the algorithm will keep scanning the same node over and over again
without terminating and without returning.

To fix this, move the internal-pointer-to-node translation from inside the
shortcut transit handler so that it applies it to node arrival as well.

This can be tested by:

	r=`keyctl newring sandbox @s`
	for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl newring ring$i $r; done
	for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl add user a$i a %:ring$i; done
	for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl search $r user a$i; done
	for ((i=17; i<=20; i++)); do keyctl search $r user a$i; done

The searches should all complete successfully (or with an error for 17-20),
but instead one or more of them will hang.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Stephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com>
2013-12-02 11:24:19 +00:00
David Howells 23fd78d764 KEYS: Fix multiple key add into associative array
If sufficient keys (or keyrings) are added into a keyring such that a node in
the associative array's tree overflows (each node has a capacity N, currently
16) and such that all N+1 keys have the same index key segment for that level
of the tree (the level'th nibble of the index key), then assoc_array_insert()
calls ops->diff_objects() to indicate at which bit position the two index keys
vary.

However, __key_link_begin() passes a NULL object to assoc_array_insert() with
the intention of supplying the correct pointer later before we commit the
change.  This means that keyring_diff_objects() is given a NULL pointer as one
of its arguments which it does not expect.  This results in an oops like the
attached.

With the previous patch to fix the keyring hash function, this can be forced
much more easily by creating a keyring and only adding keyrings to it.  Add any
other sort of key and a different insertion path is taken - all 16+1 objects
must want to cluster in the same node slot.

This can be tested by:

	r=`keyctl newring sandbox @s`
	for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl newring ring$i $r; done

This should work fine, but oopses when the 17th keyring is added.

Since ops->diff_objects() is always called with the first pointer pointing to
the object to be inserted (ie. the NULL pointer), we can fix the problem by
changing the to-be-inserted object pointer to point to the index key passed
into assoc_array_insert() instead.

Whilst we're at it, we also switch the arguments so that they are the same as
for ->compare_object().

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000088
IP: [<ffffffff81191ee4>] hash_key_type_and_desc+0x18/0xb0
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81191ee4>] hash_key_type_and_desc+0x18/0xb0
...
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff81191f9d>] keyring_diff_objects+0x21/0xd2
 [<ffffffff811f09ef>] assoc_array_insert+0x3b6/0x908
 [<ffffffff811929a7>] __key_link_begin+0x78/0xe5
 [<ffffffff81191a2e>] key_create_or_update+0x17d/0x36a
 [<ffffffff81192e0a>] SyS_add_key+0x123/0x183
 [<ffffffff81400ddb>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Stephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com>
2013-12-02 11:24:18 +00:00
David Howells d54e58b7f0 KEYS: Fix the keyring hash function
The keyring hash function (used by the associative array) is supposed to clear
the bottommost nibble of the index key (where the hash value resides) for
keyrings and make sure it is non-zero for non-keyrings.  This is done to make
keyrings cluster together on one branch of the tree separately to other keys.

Unfortunately, the wrong mask is used, so only the bottom two bits are
examined and cleared and not the whole bottom nibble.  This means that keys
and keyrings can still be successfully searched for under most circumstances
as the hash is consistent in its miscalculation, but if a keyring's
associative array bottom node gets filled up then approx 75% of the keyrings
will not be put into the 0 branch.

The consequence of this is that a key in a keyring linked to by another
keyring, ie.

	keyring A -> keyring B -> key

may not be found if the search starts at keyring A and then descends into
keyring B because search_nested_keyrings() only searches up the 0 branch (as it
"knows" all keyrings must be there and not elsewhere in the tree).

The fix is to use the right mask.

This can be tested with:

	r=`keyctl newring sandbox @s`
	for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl newring ring$i $r; done
	for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl add user a$i a %:ring$i; done
	for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl search $r user a$i; done

This creates a sandbox keyring, then creates 17 keyrings therein (labelled
ring0..ring16).  This causes the root node of the sandbox's associative array
to overflow and for the tree to have extra nodes inserted.

Each keyring then is given a user key (labelled aN for ringN) for us to search
for.

We then search for the user keys we added, starting from the sandbox.  If
working correctly, it should return the same ordered list of key IDs as
for...keyctl add... did.  Without this patch, it reports ENOKEY "Required key
not available" for some of the keys.  Just which keys get this depends as the
kernel pointer to the key type forms part of the hash function.

Reported-by: Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Stephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com>
2013-12-02 11:24:18 +00:00
David Howells 2480f57fb3 KEYS: Pre-clear struct key on allocation
The second word of key->payload does not get initialised in key_alloc(), but
the big_key type is relying on it having been cleared.  The problem comes when
big_key fails to instantiate a large key and doesn't then set the payload.  The
big_key_destroy() op is called from the garbage collector and this assumes that
the dentry pointer stored in the second word will be NULL if instantiation did
not complete.

Therefore just pre-clear the entire struct key on allocation rather than trying
to be clever and only initialising to 0 only those bits that aren't otherwise
initialised.

The lack of initialisation can lead to a bug report like the following if
big_key failed to initialise its file:

	general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP
	Modules linked in: ...
	CPU: 0 PID: 51 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 3.10.0-53.el7.x86_64 #1
	Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge 1955/0HC513, BIOS 1.4.4 12/09/2008
	Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector
	task: ffff8801294f5680 ti: ffff8801296e2000 task.ti: ffff8801296e2000
	RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811b4a51>] dput+0x21/0x2d0
	...
	Call Trace:
	 [<ffffffff811a7b06>] path_put+0x16/0x30
	 [<ffffffff81235604>] big_key_destroy+0x44/0x60
	 [<ffffffff8122dc4b>] key_gc_unused_keys.constprop.2+0x5b/0xe0
	 [<ffffffff8122df2f>] key_garbage_collector+0x1df/0x3c0
	 [<ffffffff8107759b>] process_one_work+0x17b/0x460
	 [<ffffffff8107834b>] worker_thread+0x11b/0x400
	 [<ffffffff81078230>] ? rescuer_thread+0x3e0/0x3e0
	 [<ffffffff8107eb00>] kthread+0xc0/0xd0
	 [<ffffffff8107ea40>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x110/0x110
	 [<ffffffff815c4bec>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
	 [<ffffffff8107ea40>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x110/0x110

Reported-by: Patrik Kis <pkis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com>
2013-12-02 11:24:18 +00:00
Roberto Sassu af91706d5d ima: store address of template_fmt_copy in a pointer before calling strsep
This patch stores the address of the 'template_fmt_copy' variable in a new
variable, called 'template_fmt_ptr', so that the latter is passed as an
argument of strsep() instead of the former. This modification is needed
in order to correctly free the memory area referenced by
'template_fmt_copy' (strsep() modifies the pointer of the passed string).

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Reported-by: Sebastian Ott <sebott@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2013-11-30 13:09:53 +11:00
Paul Moore dd0a11815a Linux 3.12
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Merge tag 'v3.12'

Linux 3.12
2013-11-26 17:32:55 -05:00