Commit Graph

79 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Kirill Korotaev 6b3286ed11 [PATCH] rename struct namespace to struct mnt_namespace
Rename 'struct namespace' to 'struct mnt_namespace' to avoid confusion with
other namespaces being developped for the containers : pid, uts, ipc, etc.
'namespace' variables and attributes are also renamed to 'mnt_ns'

Signed-off-by: Kirill Korotaev <dev@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Herbert Poetzl <herbert@13thfloor.at>
Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-08 08:28:51 -08:00
Josef "Jeff" Sipek 2fddfeefee [PATCH] proc: change uses of f_{dentry, vfsmnt} to use f_path
Change all the uses of f_{dentry,vfsmnt} to f_path.{dentry,mnt} in the proc
filesystem code.

Signed-off-by: Josef "Jeff" Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-08 08:28:41 -08:00
Adrian Bunk 9711ef9945 [PATCH] make fs/proc/base.c:proc_pid_instantiate() static
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-07 08:39:40 -08:00
Guillem Jover 8fb4fc68ca [PATCH] Allow user processes to raise their oom_adj value
Currently a user process cannot rise its own oom_adj value (i.e.
unprotecting itself from the OOM killer).  As this value is stored in the
task structure it gets inherited and the unprivileged childs will be unable
to rise it.

The EPERM will be handled by the generic proc fs layer, as only processes
with the proper caps or the owner of the process will be able to write to
the file.  So we allow only the processes with CAP_SYS_RESOURCE to lower
the value, otherwise it will get an EACCES which seems more appropriate
than EPERM.

Signed-off-by: Guillem Jover <guillem.jover@nokia.com>
Acked-by: Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@novell.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-07 08:39:21 -08:00
Vasily Tarasov 701e054e0c [PATCH] mounstats NULL pointer dereference
OpenVZ developers team has encountered the following problem in 2.6.19-rc6
kernel. After some seconds of running script

while [[ 1 ]]
do
	find  /proc -name mountstats | xargs cat
done

this Oops appears:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000010
 printing eip:
c01a6b70
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1]
SMP
Modules linked in: xt_length ipt_ttl xt_tcpmss ipt_TCPMSS iptable_mangle
iptable_filter xt_multiport xt_limit ipt_tos ipt_REJECT ip_tables x_tables
parport_pc lp parport sunrpc af_packet thermal processor fan button battery
asus_acpi ac ohci_hcd ehci_hcd usbcore i2c_nforce2 i2c_core tg3 floppy
pata_amd
ide_cd cdrom sata_nv libata
CPU:    1
EIP:    0060:[<c01a6b70>]    Not tainted VLI
EFLAGS: 00010246   (2.6.19-rc6 #2)
EIP is at mountstats_open+0x70/0xf0
eax: 00000000   ebx: e6247030   ecx: e62470f8   edx: 00000000
esi: 00000000   edi: c01a6b00   ebp: c33b83c0   esp: f4105eb4
ds: 007b   es: 007b   ss: 0068
Process cat (pid: 6044, ti=f4105000 task=f4104a70 task.ti=f4105000)
Stack: c33b83c0 c04ee940 f46a4a80 c33b83c0 e4df31b4 c01a6b00 f4105000 c0169231
       e4df31b4 c33b83c0 c33b83c0 f4105f20 00000003 f4105000 c0169445 f2503cf0
       f7f8c4c0 00008000 c33b83c0 00000000 00008000 c0169350 f4105f20 00008000
Call Trace:
 [<c01a6b00>] mountstats_open+0x0/0xf0
 [<c0169231>] __dentry_open+0x181/0x250
 [<c0169445>] nameidata_to_filp+0x35/0x50
 [<c0169350>] do_filp_open+0x50/0x60
 [<c01873d6>] seq_read+0xc6/0x300
 [<c0169511>] get_unused_fd+0x31/0xc0
 [<c01696d3>] do_sys_open+0x63/0x110
 [<c01697a7>] sys_open+0x27/0x30
 [<c01030bd>] sysenter_past_esp+0x56/0x79
 =======================
Code: 45 74 8b 54 24 20 89 44 24 08 8b 42 f0 31 d2 e8 47 cb f8 ff 85 c0 89 c3
74 51 8d 80 a0 04 00 00 e8 46 06 2c 00 8b 83 48 04 00 00 <8b> 78 10 85 ff 74
03
f0 ff 07 b0 01 86 83 a0 04 00 00 f0 ff 4b
EIP: [<c01a6b70>] mountstats_open+0x70/0xf0 SS:ESP 0068:f4105eb4

The problem is that task->nsproxy can be equal NULL for some time during
task exit. This patch fixes the BUG.

Signed-off-by: Vasily Tarasov <vtaras@openvz.org>
Cc: Herbert Poetzl <herbert@13thfloor.at>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-11-25 13:28:33 -08:00
Alexey Dobriyan 8ac773b4f7 [PATCH] OOM killer meets userspace headers
Despite mm.h is not being exported header, it does contain one thing
which is part of userspace ABI -- value disabling OOM killer for given
process. So,
a) create and export include/linux/oom.h
b) move OOM_DISABLE define there.
c) turn bounding values of /proc/$PID/oom_adj into defines and export
   them too.

Note: mass __KERNEL__ removal will be done later.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-20 10:26:38 -07:00
Andrew Morton 0187f879ee [PATCH] PROC_NUMBUF is wrong
Actually, the decimal representation of a 32-bit signed number can take 12
bytes, including the \0.

And then some code adds a \n as well, so let's give it 13 bytes.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-17 08:18:43 -07:00
Oleg Nesterov 1a657f78dc [PATCH] introduce get_task_pid() to fix unsafe get_pid()
proc_pid_make_inode:

	ei->pid = get_pid(task_pid(task));

I think this is not safe.  get_pid() can be preempted after checking "pid
!= NULL".  Then the task exits, does detach_pid(), and RCU frees the pid.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 07:57:25 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 1c0d04c9e4 [PATCH] proc: comment what proc_fill_cache does
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 07:57:25 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 5e61feafa2 [PATCH] proc: remove the useless SMP-safe comments from /proc
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 07:57:25 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 7bcd6b0efd [PATCH] proc: remove trailing blank entry from pid_entry arrays
It was pointed out that since I am taking ARRAY_SIZE anyway the trailing empty
entry is silly and just wastes space.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 07:57:25 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 8e95bd936d [PATCH] proc: properly compute TGID_OFFSET
The value doesn't change but this ensures I will have the proper value when
other files are added to proc_base_stuff.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 07:57:24 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 7fbaac005c [PATCH] proc: Use pid_task instead of open coding it
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 07:57:24 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 72d9dcfc7a [PATCH] proc: Merge proc_tid_attr and proc_tgid_attr
The implementation is exactly the same and there is currently nothing to
distinguish proc_tid_attr, and proc_tgid_attr.  So it is pointless to have two
separate implementations.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 07:57:24 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 61a2878402 [PATCH] proc: Remove the hard coded inode numbers
The hard coded inode numbers in proc currently limit its maintainability,
its flexibility, and what can be done with the rest of system.  /proc limits
pid-max to 32768 on 32 bit systems it limits fd-max to 32768 on all systems,
and placing the pid in the inode number really gets in the way of implementing
subdirectories of per process information.

Ever since people started adding to the middle of the file type enumeration we
haven't been maintaing the historical inode numbers, all we have really
succeeded in doing is keeping the pid in the proc inode number.  The pid is
already available in the directory name so no information is lost removing it
from the inode number.

So if something in user space cares if we remove the inode number from the
/proc inode it is almost certainly broken.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 07:57:24 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 444ceed8d1 [PATCH] proc: Factor out an instantiate method from every lookup method
To remove the hard coded proc inode numbers it is necessary to be able to
create the proc inodes during readdir.  The instantiate methods are the subset
of lookup that is needed to accomplish that.

This first step just splits the lookup methods into 2 functions.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 07:57:24 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 801199ce80 [PATCH] proc: Make the generation of the self symlink table driven
This patch generalizes the concept of files in /proc that are related to
processes but live in the root directory of /proc

Ideally this would reuse infrastructure from the rest of the process specific
parts of proc but unfortunately security_task_to_inode must not be called on
files that are not strictly per process.  security_task_to_inode really needs
to be reexamined as the security label can change in important places that we
are not currently catching, but I'm not certain that simplifies this problem.

By at least matching the structure of the rest of proc we get more idiom reuse
and it becomes easier to spot problems in the way things are put together.

Later things like /proc/mounts are likely to be moved into proc_base as well.
If union mounts are ever supported we may be able to make /proc a union mount,
and properly split it into 2 filesystems.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 07:57:24 -07:00
Serge E. Hallyn 1651e14e28 [PATCH] namespaces: incorporate fs namespace into nsproxy
This moves the mount namespace into the nsproxy.  The mount namespace count
now refers to the number of nsproxies point to it, rather than the number of
tasks.  As a result, the unshare_namespace() function in kernel/fork.c no
longer checks whether it is being shared.

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Kirill Korotaev <dev@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Herbert Poetzl <herbert@13thfloor.at>
Cc: Andrey Savochkin <saw@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 07:57:20 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 20cdc894c4 [PATCH] proc: modify proc_pident_lookup to be completely table driven
Currently proc_pident_lookup gets the names and types from a table and then
has a huge switch statement to get the inode and file operations it needs.
That is silly and is becoming increasingly hard to maintain so I just put all
of the information in the table.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 07:57:13 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 28a6d67179 [PATCH] proc: reorder the functions in base.c
There were enough changes in my last round of cleaning up proc I had to break
up the patch series into smaller chunks, and my last chunk never got resent.

This patchset gives proc dynamic inode numbers (the static inode numbers were
a pain to maintain and prevent all kinds of things), and removes the horrible
switch statements that had to be kept in sync with everything else.  Being
fully table driver takes us 90% of the way of being able to register new
process specific attributes in proc.

This patch:

Group the functions by what they implement instead of by type of operation.
As it existed base.c was quickly approaching the point where it could not be
followed.

No functionality or code changes asside from adding/removing forward
declartions are implemented in this patch.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 07:57:13 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 0804ef4b0d [PATCH] proc: readdir race fix (take 3)
The problem: An opendir, readdir, closedir sequence can fail to report
process ids that are continually in use throughout the sequence of system
calls.  For this race to trigger the process that proc_pid_readdir stops at
must exit before readdir is called again.

This can cause ps to fail to report processes, and it is in violation of
posix guarantees and normal application expectations with respect to
readdir.

Currently there is no way to work around this problem in user space short
of providing a gargantuan buffer to user space so the directory read all
happens in on system call.

This patch implements the normal directory semantics for proc, that
guarantee that a directory entry that is neither created nor destroyed
while reading the directory entry will be returned.  For directory that are
either created or destroyed during the readdir you may or may not see them.
 Furthermore you may seek to a directory offset you have previously seen.

These are the guarantee that ext[23] provides and that posix requires, and
more importantly that user space expects.  Plus it is a simple semantic to
implement reliable service.  It is just a matter of calling readdir a
second time if you are wondering if something new has show up.

These better semantics are implemented by scanning through the pids in
numerical order and by making the file offset a pid plus a fixed offset.

The pid scan happens on the pid bitmap, which when you look at it is
remarkably efficient for a brute force algorithm.  Given that a typical
cache line is 64 bytes and thus covers space for 64*8 == 200 pids.  There
are only 40 cache lines for the entire 32K pid space.  A typical system
will have 100 pids or more so this is actually fewer cache lines we have to
look at to scan a linked list, and the worst case of having to scan the
entire pid bitmap is pretty reasonable.

If we need something more efficient we can go to a more efficient data
structure for indexing the pids, but for now what we have should be
sufficient.

In addition this takes no additional locks and is actually less code than
what we are doing now.

Also another very subtle bug in this area has been fixed.  It is possible
to catch a task in the middle of de_thread where a thread is assuming the
thread of it's thread group leader.  This patch carefully handles that case
so if we hit it we don't fail to return the pid, that is undergoing the
de_thread dance.

Thanks to KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> for
providing the first fix, pointing this out and working on it.

[oleg@tv-sign.ru: fix it]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 07:57:12 -07:00
Frederik Deweerdt f7ca54f486 [PATCH] fix mem_write() return value
At the beginning of the routine, "copied" is set to 0, but it is no good
because in lines 805 and 812 it is set to other values.  Finally, the
routine returns as if it copied 12 (=ENOMEM) bytes less than it actually
did.

Signed-off-by: Frederik Deweerdt <frederik.deweerdt@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-29 09:18:19 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 6d76fa58b0 Don't allow chmod() on the /proc/<pid>/ files
This just turns off chmod() on the /proc/<pid>/ files, since there is no
good reason to allow it, and had we disallowed it originally, the nasty
/proc race exploit wouldn't have been possible.

The other patches already fixed the problem chmod() could cause, so this
is really just some final mop-up..

This particular version is based off a patch by Eugene and Marcel which
had much better naming than my original equivalent one.

Signed-off-by: Eugene Teo <eteo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-07-15 12:26:45 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 9ee8ab9fbf Relax /proc fix a bit
Clearign all of i_mode was a bit draconian. We only really care about
S_ISUID/ISGID, after all.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-07-14 21:48:03 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 18b0bbd8ca Fix nasty /proc vulnerability
We have a bad interaction with both the kernel and user space being able
to change some of the /proc file status.  This fixes the most obvious
part of it, but I expect we'll also make it harder for users to modify
even their "own" files in /proc.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-07-14 16:51:34 -07:00
Jörn Engel 6ab3d5624e Remove obsolete #include <linux/config.h>
Signed-off-by: Jörn Engel <joern@wohnheim.fh-wedel.de>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2006-06-30 19:25:36 +02:00
Eric Paris 42c3e03ef6 [PATCH] SELinux: Add sockcreate node to procattr API
Below is a patch to add a new /proc/self/attr/sockcreate A process may write a
context into this interface and all subsequent sockets created will be labeled
with that context.  This is the same idea as the fscreate interface where a
process can specify the label of a file about to be created.  At this time one
envisioned user of this will be xinetd.  It will be able to better label
sockets for the actual services.  At this time all sockets take the label of
the creating process, so all xinitd sockets would just be labeled the same.

I tested this by creating a tcp sender and listener.  The sender was able to
write to this new proc file and then create sockets with the specified label.
I am able to be sure the new label was used since the avc denial messages
kicked out by the kernel included both the new security permission
setsockcreate and all the socket denials were for the new label, not the label
of the running process.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:26 -07:00
Oleg Nesterov c1df7fb88a [PATCH] cleanup next_tid()
Try to make next_tid() a bit more readable and deletes unnecessary
"pid_alive(pos)" check.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:26 -07:00
Oleg Nesterov a872ff0cb2 [PATCH] simplify/fix first_tid()
first_tid:

	/* If nr exceeds the number of threads there is nothing todo */
	if (nr) {
		if (nr >= get_nr_threads(leader))
			goto done;
	}

This is not reliable: sub-threads can exit after this check, so the
'for' loop below can overlap and proc_task_readdir() can return an
already filldir'ed dirents.

	for (; pos && pid_alive(pos); pos = next_thread(pos)) {
		if (--nr > 0)
			continue;

Off-by-one error, will return 'leader' when nr == 1.

This patch tries to fix these problems and simplify the code.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:26 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman cc288738c9 [PATCH] proc: Remove tasklist_lock from proc_task_readdir.
This is just like my previous removal of tasklist_lock from first_tgid, and
next_tgid.  It simply had to wait until it was rcu safe to walk the thread
list.

This should be the last instance of the tasklist_lock in proc.  So user
processes should not be able to influence the tasklist lock hold times.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:26 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman df26c40e56 [PATCH] proc: Cleanup proc_fd_access_allowed
In process of getting proc_fd_access_allowed to work it has developed a few
warts.  In particular the special case that always allows introspection and
the special case to allow inspection of kernel threads.

The special case for introspection is needed for /proc/self/mem.

The special case for kernel threads really should be overridable
by security modules.

So consolidate these checks into ptrace.c:may_attach().

The check to always allow introspection is trivial.

The check to allow access to kernel threads, and zombies is a little
trickier.  mem_read and mem_write already verify an mm exists so it isn't
needed twice.  proc_fd_access_allowed only doesn't want a check to verify
task->mm exits, s it prevents all access to kernel threads.  So just move
the task->mm check into ptrace_attach where it is needed for practical
reasons.

I did a quick audit and none of the security modules in the kernel seem to
care if they are passed a task without an mm into security_ptrace.  So the
above move should be safe and it allows security modules to come up with
more restrictive policy.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:26 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 778c114477 [PATCH] proc: Use sane permission checks on the /proc/<pid>/fd/ symlinks
Since 2.2 we have been doing a chroot check to see if it is appropriate to
return a read or follow one of these magic symlinks.  The chroot check was
asking a question about the visibility of files to the calling process and
it was actually checking the destination process, and not the files
themselves.  That test was clearly bogus.

In my first pass through I simply fixed the test to check the visibility of
the files themselves.  That naive approach to fixing the permissions was
too strict and resulted in cases where a task could not even see all of
it's file descriptors.

What has disturbed me about relaxing this check is that file descriptors
are per-process private things, and they are occasionaly used a user space
capability tokens.  Looking a little farther into the symlink path on /proc
I did find userid checks and a check for capability (CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) so
there were permissions checking this.

But I was still concerned about privacy.  Besides /proc there is only one
other way to find out this kind of information, and that is ptrace.  ptrace
has been around for a long time and it has a well established security
model.

So after thinking about it I finally realized that the permission checks
that make sense are the permission checks applied to ptrace_attach.  The
checks are simple per process, and won't cause nasty surprises for people
coming from less capable unices.

Unfortunately there is one case that the current ptrace_attach test does
not cover: Zombies and kernel threads.  Single stepping those kinds of
processes is impossible.  Being able to see which file descriptors are open
on these tasks is important to lsof, fuser and friends.  So for these
special processes I made the rule you can't find out unless you have
CAP_SYS_PTRACE.

These proc permission checks should now conform to the principle of least
surprise.  As well as using much less code to implement :)

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:26 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 5b0c1dd38b [PATCH] proc: optimize proc_check_dentry_visible
The code doesn't need to sleep to when making this check so I can just do the
comparison and not worry about the reference counts.

TODO: While looking at this I realized that my original cleanup did not push
the permission check far enough down into the stack.  The call of
proc_check_dentry_visible needs to move out of the generic proc
readlink/follow link code and into the individual get_link instances.
Otherwise the shared resources checks are not quite correct (shared
files_struct does not require a shared fs_struct), and there are races with
unshare.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:26 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 13b41b0949 [PATCH] proc: Use struct pid not struct task_ref
Incrementally update my proc-dont-lock-task_structs-indefinitely patches so
that they work with struct pid instead of struct task_ref.

Mostly this is a straight 1-1 substitution.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:26 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 99f8955183 [PATCH] proc: don't lock task_structs indefinitely
Every inode in /proc holds a reference to a struct task_struct.  If a
directory or file is opened and remains open after the the task exits this
pinning continues.  With 8K stacks on a 32bit machine the amount pinned per
file descriptor is about 10K.

Normally I would figure a reasonable per user process limit is about 100
processes.  With 80 processes, with a 1000 file descriptors each I can trigger
the 00M killer on a 32bit kernel, because I have pinned about 800MB of useless
data.

This patch replaces the struct task_struct pointer with a pointer to a struct
task_ref which has a struct task_struct pointer.  The so the pinning of dead
tasks does not happen.

The code now has to contend with the fact that the task may now exit at any
time.  Which is a little but not muh more complicated.

With this change it takes about 1000 processes each opening up 1000 file
descriptors before I can trigger the OOM killer.  Much better.

[mlp@google.com: task_mmu small fixes]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Albert Cahalan <acahalan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Prasanna Meda <mlp@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:25 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 8578cea750 [PATCH] proc: make PROC_NUMBUF the buffer size for holding integers as strings
Currently in /proc at several different places we define buffers to hold a
process id, or a file descriptor .  In most of them we use either a hard coded
number or a different define.  Modify them all to use PROC_NUMBUF, so the code
has a chance of being maintained.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:25 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 9cc8cbc7f8 [PATCH] simply fix first_tgid
Like the bug Oleg spotted in first_tid there was also a small off by one
error in first_tgid, when a seek was done on the /proc directory.  This
fixes that and changes the code structure to make it a little more obvious
what is going on.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:25 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman de7587343b [PATCH] proc: Remove tasklist_lock from proc_pid_lookup() and proc_task_lookup()
Since we no longer need the tasklist_lock for get_task_struct the lookup
methods no longer need the tasklist_lock.

This just depends on my previous patch that makes get_task_struct() rcu
safe.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:25 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 454cc105ef [PATCH] proc: Remove tasklist_lock from proc_pid_readdir
We don't need the tasklist_lock to safely iterate through processes
anymore.

This depends on my previous to task patches that make get_task_struct rcu
safe, and that make next_task() rcu safe.  I haven't gotten
first_tid/next_tid yet only because next_thread is missing an
rcu_dereference.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:25 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 0bc58a9102 [PATCH] proc: refactor reading directories of tasks
There are a couple of problems this patch addresses.
- /proc/<tgid>/task currently does not work correctly if you stop reading
  in the middle of a directory.

- /proc/ currently requires a full pass through the task list with
  the tasklist lock held, to determine there are no more processes to read.

- The hand rolled integer to string conversion does not properly running
  out of buffer space.

- We seem to be batching reading of pids from the tasklist without reason,
  and complicating the logic of the code.

This patch addresses that by changing how tasks are processed.  A
first_<task_type> function is built that handles restarts, and a
next_<task_type> function is built that just advances to the next task.

first_<task_type> when it detects a restart usually uses find_task_by_pid.  If
that doesn't work because there has been a seek on the directory, or we have
already given a complete directory listing, it first checks the number tasks
of that type, and only if we are under that count does it walk through all of
the tasks to find the one we are interested in.

The code that fills in the directory is simpler because there is only a single
for loop.

The hand rolled integer to string conversion is replaced by snprintf which
should handle the the out of buffer case correctly.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:25 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman cd6a3ce9ec [PATCH] proc: Close the race of a process dying durning lookup
proc_lookup and task exiting are not synchronized, although some of the
previous code may have suggested that.  Every time before we reuse a dentry
namei.c calls d_op->derevalidate which prevents us from reusing a stale dcache
entry.  Unfortunately it does not prevent us from returning a stale dcache
entry.  This race has been explicitly plugged in proc_pid_lookup but there is
nothing to confine it to just that proc lookup function.

So to prevent the race I call revalidate explictily in all of the proc lookup
functions after I call d_add, and report an error if the revalidate does not
succeed.

Years ago Al Viro did something similar but those changes got lost in the
churn.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:25 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 48e6484d49 [PATCH] proc: Rewrite the proc dentry flush on exit optimization
To keep the dcache from filling up with dead /proc entries we flush them on
process exit.  However over the years that code has gotten hairy with a
dentry_pointer and a lock in task_struct and misdocumented as a correctness
feature.

I have rewritten this code to look and see if we have a corresponding entry in
the dcache and if so flush it on process exit.  This removes the extra fields
in the task_struct and allows me to trivially handle the case of a
/proc/<tgid>/task/<pid> entry as well as the current /proc/<pid> entries.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:24 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 662795deb8 [PATCH] proc: Move proc_maps_operations into task_mmu.c
All of the functions for proc_maps_operations are already defined in
task_mmu.c so move the operations structure to keep the functionality
together.

Since task_nommu.c implements a dummy version of /proc/<pid>/maps give it a
simplified version of proc_maps_operations that it can modify to best suit its
needs.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:24 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 6e66b52bf5 [PATCH] proc: Fix the link count for /proc/<pid>/task
Use getattr to get an accurate link count when needed.  This is cheaper and
more accurate than trying to derive it by walking the thread list of a
process.

Especially as it happens when needed stat instead of at readdir time.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:24 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 0f2fe20f55 [PATCH] proc: Properly filter out files that are not visible to a process
Long ago and far away in 2.2 we started checking to ensure the files we
displayed in /proc were visible to the current process.  It was an
unsophisticated time and no one was worried about functions full of FIXMES in
a stable kernel.  As time passed the function became sacred and was enshrined
in the shrine of how things have always been.  The fixes came in but only to
keep the function working no one really remembering or documenting why we did
things that way.

The intent and the functionality make a lot of sense.  Don't let /proc be an
access point for files a process can see no other way.  The implementation
however is completely wrong.

We are currently checking the root directories of the two processes, we are
not checking the actual file descriptors themselves.

We are strangely checking with a permission method instead of just when we use
the data.

This patch fixes the logic to actually check the file descriptors and make a
note that implementing a permission method for this part of /proc almost
certainly indicates a bug in the reasoning.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:24 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 22c2c5d75e [PATCH] proc: Kill proc_mem_inode_operations
The inode operations only exist to support the proc_permission function.
Currently mem_read and mem_write have all the same permission checks as
ptrace.  The fs check makes no sense in this context, and we can trivially get
around it by calling ptrace.

So simply the code by killing the strange weird case.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:24 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 68602066c3 [PATCH] proc: Remove bogus proc_task_permission
First we can access every /proc/<tgid>/task/<pid> directory as /proc/<pid> so
proc_task_permission is not usefully limiting visibility.

Second having related filesystems information should have nothing to do with
process visibility.  kill does not implement any checks like that.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:24 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman aed7a6c476 [PATCH] proc: Replace proc_inode.type with proc_inode.fd
The sole renaming use of proc_inode.type is to discover the file descriptor
number, so just store the file descriptor number and don't wory about
processing this field.  This removes any /proc limits on the maximum number of
file descriptors, and clears the path to make the hard coded /proc inode
numbers go away.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:24 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 87bfbf679f [PATCH] proc: Simplify the ownership rules for /proc
Currently in /proc if the task is dumpable all of files are owned by the tasks
effective users.  Otherwise the files are owned by root.  Unless it is the
/proc/<tgid>/ or /proc/<tgid>/task/<pid> directory in that case we always make
the directory owned by the effective user.

However the special case for directories is pointless except as a way to read
the effective user, because the permissions on both of those directories are
world readable, and executable.

/proc/<tgid>/status provides a much better way to read a processes effecitve
userid, so it is silly to try to provide that on the directory.

So this patch simplifies the code by removing a pointless special case and
gets us one step closer to being able to remove the hard coded /proc inode
numbers.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:23 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman 1679654951 [PATCH] proc: Remove unnecessary and misleading assignments from proc_pid_make_inode
The removed fields are already set by proc_alloc_inode.  Initializing them in
proc_alloc_inode implies they need it for proper cleanup.  At least ei->pde
was not set on all paths making it look like proc_alloc_inode was buggy.  So
just remove the redundant assignments.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:23 -07:00