Commit Graph

563 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Jann Horn 5c7e372caa security: don't use RCU accessors for cred->session_keyring
sparse complains that a bunch of places in kernel/cred.c access
cred->session_keyring without the RCU helpers required by the __rcu
annotation.

cred->session_keyring is written in the following places:

 - prepare_kernel_cred() [in a new cred struct]
 - keyctl_session_to_parent() [in a new cred struct]
 - prepare_creds [in a new cred struct, via memcpy]
 - install_session_keyring_to_cred()
  - from install_session_keyring() on new creds
  - from join_session_keyring() on new creds [twice]
  - from umh_keys_init()
   - from call_usermodehelper_exec_async() on new creds

All of these writes are before the creds are committed; therefore,
cred->session_keyring doesn't need RCU protection.

Remove the __rcu annotation and fix up all existing users that use __rcu.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-04-10 10:28:21 -07:00
ndesaulniers@google.com be24b37e22 KEYS: trusted: fix -Wvarags warning
Fixes the warning reported by Clang:
security/keys/trusted.c:146:17: warning: passing an object that
undergoes default
      argument promotion to 'va_start' has undefined behavior [-Wvarargs]
        va_start(argp, h3);
                       ^
security/keys/trusted.c:126:37: note: parameter of type 'unsigned
char' is declared here
unsigned char *h2, unsigned char h3, ...)
                               ^
Specifically, it seems that both the C90 (4.8.1.1) and C11 (7.16.1.4)
standards explicitly call this out as undefined behavior:

The parameter parmN is the identifier of the rightmost parameter in
the variable parameter list in the function definition (the one just
before the ...). If the parameter parmN is declared with ... or with a
type that is not compatible with the type that results after
application of the default argument promotions, the behavior is
undefined.

Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/41
Link: https://www.eskimo.com/~scs/cclass/int/sx11c.html
Suggested-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Suggested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-04-08 15:58:54 -07:00
Jarkko Sakkinen c78719203f KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM
Allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM. This commit also adds checks
to the exported functions to fail when a TPM is not available.

Fixes: 240730437d ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure...")
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Reported-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Tested-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-04-08 15:58:53 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 5af7f11588 Merge branch 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull tpm updates from James Morris:

 - Clean up the transmission flow

   Cleaned up the whole transmission flow. Locking of the chip is now
   done in the level of tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops() instead
   taking the chip lock inside tpm_transmit(). The nested calls inside
   tpm_transmit(), used with the resource manager, have been refactored
   out.

   Should make easier to perform more complex transactions with the TPM
   without making the subsystem a bigger mess (e.g. encrypted channel
   patches by James Bottomley).

 - PPI 1.3 support

   TPM PPI 1.3 introduces an additional optional command parameter that
   may be needed for some commands. Display the parameter if the command
   requires such a parameter. Only command 23 (SetPCRBanks) needs one.

   The PPI request file will show output like this then:

      # echo "23 16" > request
      # cat request
      23 16

      # echo "5" > request
      # cat request
      5

 - Extend all PCR banks in IMA

   Instead of static PCR banks array, the array of available PCR banks
   is now allocated dynamically. The digests sizes are determined
   dynamically using a probe PCR read without relying crypto's static
   list of hash algorithms.

   This should finally make sealing of measurements in IMA safe and
   secure.

 - TPM 2.0 selftests

   Added a test suite to tools/testing/selftests/tpm2 previously outside
   of the kernel tree: https://github.com/jsakkine-intel/tpm2-scripts

* 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (37 commits)
  tpm/ppi: Enable submission of optional command parameter for PPI 1.3
  tpm/ppi: Possibly show command parameter if TPM PPI 1.3 is used
  tpm/ppi: Display up to 101 operations as define for version 1.3
  tpm/ppi: rename TPM_PPI_REVISION_ID to TPM_PPI_REVISION_ID_1
  tpm/ppi: pass function revision ID to tpm_eval_dsm()
  tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()
  KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure from tpm_default_chip()
  tpm: move tpm_chip definition to include/linux/tpm.h
  tpm: retrieve digest size of unknown algorithms with PCR read
  tpm: rename and export tpm2_digest and tpm2_algorithms
  tpm: dynamically allocate the allocated_banks array
  tpm: remove @flags from tpm_transmit()
  tpm: take TPM chip power gating out of tpm_transmit()
  tpm: introduce tpm_chip_start() and tpm_chip_stop()
  tpm: remove TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED flag
  tpm: use tpm_try_get_ops() in tpm-sysfs.c.
  tpm: remove @space from tpm_transmit()
  tpm: move TPM space code out of tpm_transmit()
  tpm: move tpm_validate_commmand() to tpm2-space.c
  tpm: clean up tpm_try_transmit() error handling flow
  ...
2019-03-10 17:37:29 -07:00
Linus Torvalds c3665a6be5 Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
 "Mimi Zohar says:

   'Linux 5.0 introduced the platform keyring to allow verifying the IMA
    kexec kernel image signature using the pre-boot keys. This pull
    request similarly makes keys on the platform keyring accessible for
    verifying the PE kernel image signature.

    Also included in this pull request is a new IMA hook that tags tmp
    files, in policy, indicating the file hash needs to be calculated.
    The remaining patches are cleanup'"

* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  evm: Use defined constant for UUID representation
  ima: define ima_post_create_tmpfile() hook and add missing call
  evm: remove set but not used variable 'xattr'
  encrypted-keys: fix Opt_err/Opt_error = -1
  kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify
  integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring
2019-03-10 17:32:04 -07:00
Linus Torvalds ae5906ceee Merge branch 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:

 - Extend LSM stacking to allow sharing of cred, file, ipc, inode, and
   task blobs. This paves the way for more full-featured LSMs to be
   merged, and is specifically aimed at LandLock and SARA LSMs. This
   work is from Casey and Kees.

 - There's a new LSM from Micah Morton: "SafeSetID gates the setid
   family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID transitions from a given
   UID/GID to only those approved by a system-wide whitelist." This
   feature is currently shipping in ChromeOS.

* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (62 commits)
  keys: fix missing __user in KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY
  LSM: Update list of SECURITYFS users in Kconfig
  LSM: Ignore "security=" when "lsm=" is specified
  LSM: Update function documentation for cap_capable
  security: mark expected switch fall-throughs and add a missing break
  tomoyo: Bump version.
  LSM: fix return value check in safesetid_init_securityfs()
  LSM: SafeSetID: add selftest
  LSM: SafeSetID: remove unused include
  LSM: SafeSetID: 'depend' on CONFIG_SECURITY
  LSM: Add 'name' field for SafeSetID in DEFINE_LSM
  LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls
  LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls
  tomoyo: Allow multiple use_group lines.
  tomoyo: Coding style fix.
  tomoyo: Swicth from cred->security to task_struct->security.
  security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughs
  security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughs
  security: keys: annotate implicit fall through
  capabilities:: annotate implicit fall through
  ...
2019-03-07 11:44:01 -08:00
Ben Dooks 468e91cecb keys: fix missing __user in KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY
The arg5 of KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY should have a __user pointer tag on
it as it is a user pointer. This clears the following sparse warning
for this:

security/keys/keyctl.c:1755:43: warning: incorrect type in argument 3 (different address spaces)
security/keys/keyctl.c:1755:43:    expected struct keyctl_pkey_query [noderef] <asn:1>*<noident>
security/keys/keyctl.c:1755:43:    got struct keyctl_pkey_query *<noident>

Signed-off-by: Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-03-04 15:48:37 -08:00
Eric Biggers ede0fa98a9 KEYS: always initialize keyring_index_key::desc_len
syzbot hit the 'BUG_ON(index_key->desc_len == 0);' in __key_link_begin()
called from construct_alloc_key() during sys_request_key(), because the
length of the key description was never calculated.

The problem is that we rely on ->desc_len being initialized by
search_process_keyrings(), specifically by search_nested_keyrings().
But, if the process isn't subscribed to any keyrings that never happens.

Fix it by always initializing keyring_index_key::desc_len as soon as the
description is set, like we already do in some places.

The following program reproduces the BUG_ON() when it's run as root and
no session keyring has been installed.  If it doesn't work, try removing
pam_keyinit.so from /etc/pam.d/login and rebooting.

    #include <stdlib.h>
    #include <unistd.h>
    #include <keyutils.h>

    int main(void)
    {
            int id = add_key("keyring", "syz", NULL, 0, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);

            keyctl_setperm(id, KEY_OTH_WRITE);
            setreuid(5000, 5000);
            request_key("user", "desc", "", id);
    }

Reported-by: syzbot+ec24e95ea483de0a24da@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: b2a4df200d ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-02-22 10:11:34 -08:00
David Howells 7c1857bdbd keys: Timestamp new keys
Set the timestamp on new keys rather than leaving it unset.

Fixes: 31d5a79d7f ("KEYS: Do LRU discard in full keyrings")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-02-15 14:12:09 -08:00
David Howells 822ad64d7e keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key
In the request_key() upcall mechanism there's a dependency loop by which if
a key type driver overrides the ->request_key hook and the userspace side
manages to lose the authorisation key, the auth key and the internal
construction record (struct key_construction) can keep each other pinned.

Fix this by the following changes:

 (1) Killing off the construction record and using the auth key instead.

 (2) Including the operation name in the auth key payload and making the
     payload available outside of security/keys/.

 (3) The ->request_key hook is given the authkey instead of the cons
     record and operation name.

Changes (2) and (3) allow the auth key to naturally be cleaned up if the
keyring it is in is destroyed or cleared or the auth key is unlinked.

Fixes: 7ee02a316600 ("keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-02-15 14:12:09 -08:00
Eric Biggers a08bf91ce2 KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly
If the sysctl 'kernel.keys.maxkeys' is set to some number n, then
actually users can only add up to 'n - 1' keys.  Likewise for
'kernel.keys.maxbytes' and the root_* versions of these sysctls.  But
these sysctls are apparently supposed to be *maximums*, as per their
names and all documentation I could find -- the keyrings(7) man page,
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst, and all the mentions of EDQUOT
meaning that the key quota was *exceeded* (as opposed to reached).

Thus, fix the code to allow reaching the quotas exactly.

Fixes: 0b77f5bfb4 ("keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-02-15 14:12:08 -08:00
Roberto Sassu 0b6cf6b97b tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()
Currently, tpm_pcr_extend() accepts as an input only a SHA1 digest.

This patch replaces the hash parameter of tpm_pcr_extend() with an array of
tpm_digest structures, so that the caller can provide a digest for each PCR
bank currently allocated in the TPM.

tpm_pcr_extend() will not extend banks for which no digest was provided,
as it happened before this patch, but instead it requires that callers
provide the full set of digests. Since the number of digests will always be
chip->nr_allocated_banks, the count parameter has been removed.

Due to the API change, ima_pcr_extend() and pcrlock() have been modified.
Since the number of allocated banks is not known in advance, the memory for
the digests must be dynamically allocated. To avoid performance degradation
and to avoid that a PCR extend is not done due to lack of memory, the array
of tpm_digest structures is allocated by the users of the TPM driver at
initialization time.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (on x86 for TPM 1.2 & PTT TPM 2.0)
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2019-02-13 09:48:52 +02:00
Roberto Sassu 240730437d KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure from tpm_default_chip()
When crypto agility support will be added to the TPM driver, users of the
driver have to retrieve the allocated banks from chip->allocated_banks and
use this information to prepare the array of tpm_digest structures to be
passed to tpm_pcr_extend().

This patch retrieves a tpm_chip pointer from tpm_default_chip() so that the
pointer can be used to prepare the array of tpm_digest structures.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2019-02-13 09:48:51 +02:00
Mimi Zohar 107dfa2e56 encrypted-keys: fix Opt_err/Opt_error = -1
Properly start the enumeration associated with match_table_t at zero,
making Opt_err/Opt_error the last enumeration value.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2019-02-04 17:36:01 -05:00
Mathieu Malaterre 23711df7f4 security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughs
There is a plan to build the kernel with -Wimplicit-fallthrough and
these places in the code produced warnings (W=1). Fix them up.

This commit remove the following warnings:

  security/keys/request_key.c:293:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
  security/keys/request_key.c:298:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
  security/keys/request_key.c:307:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]

Signed-off-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-22 19:47:47 -08:00
Mathieu Malaterre 0f949bcc7b security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughs
There is a plan to build the kernel with -Wimplicit-fallthrough and
these places in the code produced warnings (W=1). Fix them up.

This commit remove the following warning:

  security/keys/process_keys.c:380:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
  security/keys/process_keys.c:404:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
  security/keys/process_keys.c:424:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]

Signed-off-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-22 19:47:47 -08:00
Mathieu Malaterre 5b73262a5c security: keys: annotate implicit fall through
There is a plan to build the kernel with -Wimplicit-fallthrough and
this place in the code produced a warning (W=1).

This commit remove the following warning:

  security/keys/keyring.c:248:10: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]

Signed-off-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-22 19:47:47 -08:00
Eric Biggers 57b0e31453 KEYS: fix parsing invalid pkey info string
We need to check the return value of match_token() for Opt_err before
doing anything with it.

[ Not only did the old "-1" value for Opt_err cause problems for the
  __test_and_set_bit(), as fixed in commit 94c13f66e1 ("security:
  don't use a negative Opt_err token index"), but accessing
  "args[0].from" is invalid for the Opt_err case, as pointed out by Eric
  later.  - Linus ]

Reported-by: syzbot+a22e0dc07567662c50bc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 00d60fd3b9 ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.20
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-01 13:13:19 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 75f95da078 libnvdimm for 4.21
* Add support for the security features of nvdimm devices that
   implement a security model similar to ATA hard drive security. The
   security model supports locking access to the media at
   device-power-loss, to be unlocked with a passphrase, and secure-erase
   (crypto-scramble).
 
   Unlike the ATA security case where the kernel expects device
   security to be managed in a pre-OS environment, the libnvdimm security
   implementation allows key provisioning and key-operations at OS
   runtime. Keys are managed with the kernel's encrypted-keys facility to
   provide data-at-rest security for the libnvdimm key material. The
   usage model mirrors fscrypt key management, but is driven via
   libnvdimm sysfs.
 
 * Miscellaneous updates for api usage and comment fixes.
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Merge tag 'libnvdimm-for-4.21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm

Pull libnvdimm updates from Dan Williams:
 "The vast bulk of this update is the new support for the security
  capabilities of some nvdimms.

  The userspace tooling for this capability is still a work in progress,
  but the changes survive the existing libnvdimm unit tests. The changes
  also pass manual checkout on hardware and the new nfit_test emulation
  of the security capability.

  The touches of the security/keys/ files have received the necessary
  acks from Mimi and David. Those changes were necessary to allow for a
  new generic encrypted-key type, and allow the nvdimm sub-system to
  lookup key material referenced by the libnvdimm-sysfs interface.

  Summary:

   - Add support for the security features of nvdimm devices that
     implement a security model similar to ATA hard drive security. The
     security model supports locking access to the media at
     device-power-loss, to be unlocked with a passphrase, and
     secure-erase (crypto-scramble).

     Unlike the ATA security case where the kernel expects device
     security to be managed in a pre-OS environment, the libnvdimm
     security implementation allows key provisioning and key-operations
     at OS runtime. Keys are managed with the kernel's encrypted-keys
     facility to provide data-at-rest security for the libnvdimm key
     material. The usage model mirrors fscrypt key management, but is
     driven via libnvdimm sysfs.

   - Miscellaneous updates for api usage and comment fixes"

* tag 'libnvdimm-for-4.21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm: (21 commits)
  libnvdimm/security: Quiet security operations
  libnvdimm/security: Add documentation for nvdimm security support
  tools/testing/nvdimm: add Intel DSM 1.8 support for nfit_test
  tools/testing/nvdimm: Add overwrite support for nfit_test
  tools/testing/nvdimm: Add test support for Intel nvdimm security DSMs
  acpi/nfit, libnvdimm/security: add Intel DSM 1.8 master passphrase support
  acpi/nfit, libnvdimm/security: Add security DSM overwrite support
  acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add support for issue secure erase DSM to Intel nvdimm
  acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add enable/update passphrase support for Intel nvdimms
  acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add disable passphrase support to Intel nvdimm.
  acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add unlock of nvdimm support for Intel DIMMs
  acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add freeze security support to Intel nvdimm
  acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Introduce nvdimm_security_ops
  keys-encrypted: add nvdimm key format type to encrypted keys
  keys: Export lookup_user_key to external users
  acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Store dimm id as a member to struct nvdimm
  libnvdimm, namespace: Replace kmemdup() with kstrndup()
  libnvdimm, label: Switch to bitmap_zalloc()
  ACPI/nfit: Adjust annotation for why return 0 if fail to find NFIT at start
  libnvdimm, bus: Check id immediately following ida_simple_get
  ...
2018-12-28 15:05:13 -08:00
Linus Torvalds b71acb0e37 Merge branch 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
 "API:
   - Add 1472-byte test to tcrypt for IPsec
   - Reintroduced crypto stats interface with numerous changes
   - Support incremental algorithm dumps

  Algorithms:
   - Add xchacha12/20
   - Add nhpoly1305
   - Add adiantum
   - Add streebog hash
   - Mark cts(cbc(aes)) as FIPS allowed

  Drivers:
   - Improve performance of arm64/chacha20
   - Improve performance of x86/chacha20
   - Add NEON-accelerated nhpoly1305
   - Add SSE2 accelerated nhpoly1305
   - Add AVX2 accelerated nhpoly1305
   - Add support for 192/256-bit keys in gcmaes AVX
   - Add SG support in gcmaes AVX
   - ESN for inline IPsec tx in chcr
   - Add support for CryptoCell 703 in ccree
   - Add support for CryptoCell 713 in ccree
   - Add SM4 support in ccree
   - Add SM3 support in ccree
   - Add support for chacha20 in caam/qi2
   - Add support for chacha20 + poly1305 in caam/jr
   - Add support for chacha20 + poly1305 in caam/qi2
   - Add AEAD cipher support in cavium/nitrox"

* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (130 commits)
  crypto: skcipher - remove remnants of internal IV generators
  crypto: cavium/nitrox - Fix build with !CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
  crypto: salsa20-generic - don't unnecessarily use atomic walk
  crypto: skcipher - add might_sleep() to skcipher_walk_virt()
  crypto: x86/chacha - avoid sleeping under kernel_fpu_begin()
  crypto: cavium/nitrox - Added AEAD cipher support
  crypto: mxc-scc - fix build warnings on ARM64
  crypto: api - document missing stats member
  crypto: user - remove unused dump functions
  crypto: chelsio - Fix wrong error counter increments
  crypto: chelsio - Reset counters on cxgb4 Detach
  crypto: chelsio - Handle PCI shutdown event
  crypto: chelsio - cleanup:send addr as value in function argument
  crypto: chelsio - Use same value for both channel in single WR
  crypto: chelsio - Swap location of AAD and IV sent in WR
  crypto: chelsio - remove set but not used variable 'kctx_len'
  crypto: ux500 - Use proper enum in hash_set_dma_transfer
  crypto: ux500 - Use proper enum in cryp_set_dma_transfer
  crypto: aesni - Add scatter/gather avx stubs, and use them in C
  crypto: aesni - Introduce partial block macro
  ..
2018-12-27 13:53:32 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 3f03bf9394 Merge branch 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull general security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "The main changes here are Paul Gortmaker's removal of unneccesary
  module.h infrastructure"

* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  security: integrity: partial revert of make ima_main explicitly non-modular
  security: fs: make inode explicitly non-modular
  security: audit and remove any unnecessary uses of module.h
  security: integrity: make evm_main explicitly non-modular
  keys: remove needless modular infrastructure from ecryptfs_format
  security: integrity: make ima_main explicitly non-modular
  tomoyo: fix small typo
2018-12-27 12:04:52 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 94c13f66e1 security: don't use a negative Opt_err token index
The code uses a bitmap to check for duplicate tokens during parsing, and
that doesn't work at all for the negative Opt_err token case.

There is absolutely no reason to make Opt_err be negative, and in fact
it only confuses things, since some of the affected functions actually
return a positive Opt_xyz enum _or_ a regular negative error code (eg
-EINVAL), and using -1 for Opt_err makes no sense.

There are similar problems in ima_policy.c and key encryption, but they
don't have the immediate bug wrt bitmap handing, and ima_policy.c in
particular needs a different patch to make the enum values match the
token array index.  Mimi is sending that separately.

Reported-by: syzbot+a22e0dc07567662c50bc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Fixes: 5208cc8342 ("keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options")
Fixes: 00d60fd3b9 ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]")
Cc: James Morris James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-17 16:21:48 -08:00
Dave Jiang 9db67581b9 keys-encrypted: add nvdimm key format type to encrypted keys
Adding nvdimm key format type to encrypted keys in order to limit the size
of the key to 32bytes.

Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2018-12-13 17:54:13 -08:00
Dave Jiang 76ef5e1725 keys: Export lookup_user_key to external users
Export lookup_user_key() symbol in order to allow nvdimm passphrase
update to retrieve user injected keys.

Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2018-12-13 17:54:12 -08:00
Paul Gortmaker 876979c930 security: audit and remove any unnecessary uses of module.h
Historically a lot of these existed because we did not have
a distinction between what was modular code and what was providing
support to modules via EXPORT_SYMBOL and friends.  That changed
when we forked out support for the latter into the export.h file.
This means we should be able to reduce the usage of module.h
in code that is obj-y Makefile or bool Kconfig.

The advantage in removing such instances is that module.h itself
sources about 15 other headers; adding significantly to what we feed
cpp, and it can obscure what headers we are effectively using.

Since module.h might have been the implicit source for init.h
(for __init) and for export.h (for EXPORT_SYMBOL) we consider each
instance for the presence of either and replace as needed.

Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-12-12 14:58:51 -08:00
Paul Gortmaker a79860800e keys: remove needless modular infrastructure from ecryptfs_format
Even though the support can be modular, only one file needs to use
all the macros like MODULE_AUTHOR, MODULE_LICENSE etc.  Only the one
responsible for registering/removal with module_init/module_exit
needs to declare these.  In this case, that file is "encrypted.c"
and it already has the MODULE_LICENSE that we are removing here.

Since the file does EXPORT_SYMBOL, we add export.h - and build tests
show that module.h (which includes everything) was hiding an implicit
use of string.h - so that is added as well.

Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-12-12 14:58:50 -08:00
Eric Biggers 3d234b3313 crypto: drop mask=CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC from 'shash' tfm allocations
'shash' algorithms are always synchronous, so passing CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC
in the mask to crypto_alloc_shash() has no effect.  Many users therefore
already don't pass it, but some still do.  This inconsistency can cause
confusion, especially since the way the 'mask' argument works is
somewhat counterintuitive.

Thus, just remove the unneeded CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC flags.

This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-20 14:26:55 +08:00
Denis Kenzior 22447981fc KEYS: Move trusted.h to include/keys [ver #2]
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:47 +01:00
Denis Kenzior e1ea9f8602 KEYS: trusted: Expose common functionality [ver #2]
This patch exposes some common functionality needed to send TPM commands.
Several functions from keys/trusted.c are exposed for use by the new tpm
key subtype and a module dependency is introduced.

In the future, common functionality between the trusted key type and the
asym_tpm subtype should be factored out into a common utility library.

Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:47 +01:00
David Howells 00d60fd3b9 KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]
Provide five keyctl functions that permit userspace to make use of the new
key type ops for accessing and driving asymmetric keys.

 (*) Query an asymmetric key.

	long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY,
		    key_serial_t key, unsigned long reserved,
		    struct keyctl_pkey_query *info);

     Get information about an asymmetric key.  The information is returned
     in the keyctl_pkey_query struct:

	__u32	supported_ops;

     A bit mask of flags indicating which ops are supported.  This is
     constructed from a bitwise-OR of:

	KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_{ENCRYPT,DECRYPT,SIGN,VERIFY}

	__u32	key_size;

     The size in bits of the key.

	__u16	max_data_size;
	__u16	max_sig_size;
	__u16	max_enc_size;
	__u16	max_dec_size;

     The maximum sizes in bytes of a blob of data to be signed, a signature
     blob, a blob to be encrypted and a blob to be decrypted.

     reserved must be set to 0.  This is intended for future use to hand
     over one or more passphrases needed unlock a key.

     If successful, 0 is returned.  If the key is not an asymmetric key,
     EOPNOTSUPP is returned.

 (*) Encrypt, decrypt, sign or verify a blob using an asymmetric key.

	long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT,
		    const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
		    const char *info,
		    const void *in,
		    void *out);

	long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT,
		    const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
		    const char *info,
		    const void *in,
		    void *out);

	long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN,
		    const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
		    const char *info,
		    const void *in,
		    void *out);

	long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY,
		    const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
		    const char *info,
		    const void *in,
		    const void *in2);

     Use an asymmetric key to perform a public-key cryptographic operation
     a blob of data.

     The parameter block pointed to by params contains a number of integer
     values:

	__s32		key_id;
	__u32		in_len;
	__u32		out_len;
	__u32		in2_len;

     For a given operation, the in and out buffers are used as follows:

	Operation ID		in,in_len	out,out_len	in2,in2_len
	=======================	===============	===============	===========
	KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT	Raw data	Encrypted data	-
	KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT	Encrypted data	Raw data	-
	KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN	Raw data	Signature	-
	KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY	Raw data	-		Signature

     info is a string of key=value pairs that supply supplementary
     information.

     The __spare space in the parameter block must be set to 0.  This is
     intended, amongst other things, to allow the passing of passphrases
     required to unlock a key.

     If successful, encrypt, decrypt and sign all return the amount of data
     written into the output buffer.  Verification returns 0 on success.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:46 +01:00
Lubomir Rintel 8c0f9f5b30 Revert "uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct member name"
This changes UAPI, breaking iwd and libell:

  ell/key.c: In function 'kernel_dh_compute':
  ell/key.c:205:38: error: 'struct keyctl_dh_params' has no member named 'private'; did you mean 'dh_private'?
    struct keyctl_dh_params params = { .private = private,
                                        ^~~~~~~
                                        dh_private

This reverts commit 8a2336e549.

Fixes: 8a2336e549 ("uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct member name")
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-25 13:28:58 +02:00
Randy Dunlap 8a2336e549 uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct member name
Since this header is in "include/uapi/linux/", apparently people want to
use it in userspace programs -- even in C++ ones.  However, the header
uses a C++ reserved keyword ("private"), so change that to "dh_private"
instead to allow the header file to be used in C++ userspace.

Fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=191051
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0db6c314-1ef4-9bfa-1baa-7214dd2ee061@infradead.org
Fixes: ddbb411487 ("KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-09-04 16:45:02 -07:00
Herbert Xu c5f5aeef9b Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux
Merge mainline to pick up c7513c2a27 ("crypto/arm64: aes-ce-gcm -
add missing kernel_neon_begin/end pair").
2018-08-03 17:55:12 +08:00
Eric Biggers 85d7311f19 crypto: remove redundant type flags from tfm allocation
Some crypto API users allocating a tfm with crypto_alloc_$FOO() are also
specifying the type flags for $FOO, e.g. crypto_alloc_shash() with
CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH.  But, that's redundant since the crypto API will
override any specified type flag/mask with the correct ones.

So, remove the unneeded flags.

This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-07-09 00:30:29 +08:00
Eric Biggers 3619dec510 dh key: fix rounding up KDF output length
Commit 383203eff7 ("dh key: get rid of stack allocated array") changed
kdf_ctr() to assume that the length of key material to derive is a
multiple of the digest size.  The length was supposed to be rounded up
accordingly.  However, the round_up() macro was used which only gives
the correct result on power-of-2 arguments, whereas not all hash
algorithms have power-of-2 digest sizes.  In some cases this resulted in
a write past the end of the 'outbuf' buffer.

Fix it by switching to roundup(), which works for non-power-of-2 inputs.

Reported-by: syzbot+486f97f892efeb2075a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+29d17b7898b41ee120a5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+8a608baf8751184ec727@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d04e58bd384f1fe0b112@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 383203eff7 ("dh key: get rid of stack allocated array")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-06-26 09:43:05 -07:00
Kees Cook 6da2ec5605 treewide: kmalloc() -> kmalloc_array()
The kmalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kmalloc_array(). This
patch replaces cases of:

        kmalloc(a * b, gfp)

with:
        kmalloc_array(a * b, gfp)

as well as handling cases of:

        kmalloc(a * b * c, gfp)

with:

        kmalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp)

as it's slightly less ugly than:

        kmalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp)

This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like:

        kmalloc(4 * 1024, gfp)

though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion.

Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were
dropped, since they're redundant.

The tools/ directory was manually excluded, since it has its own
implementation of kmalloc().

The Coccinelle script used for this was:

// Fix redundant parens around sizeof().
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING, E;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	(sizeof(TYPE)) * E
+	sizeof(TYPE) * E
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(sizeof(THING)) * E
+	sizeof(THING) * E
  , ...)
)

// Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens.
@@
expression COUNT;
typedef u8;
typedef __u8;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant.
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING;
identifier COUNT_ID;
constant COUNT_CONST;
@@

(
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID)
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID)
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product, only identifiers.
@@
identifier SIZE, COUNT;
@@

- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	SIZE * COUNT
+	COUNT, SIZE
  , ...)

// 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with
// redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING;
identifier STRIDE, COUNT;
type TYPE;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING1, THING2;
identifier COUNT;
type TYPE1, TYPE2;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed.
@@
identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
)

// Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products,
// when they're not all constants...
@@
expression E1, E2, E3;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@

(
  kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(E1) * E2 * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(E1) * (E2) * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(E1) * (E2) * (E3)
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	E1 * E2 * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
)

// And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants,
// keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument.
@@
expression THING, E1, E2;
type TYPE;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@

(
  kmalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...)
|
  kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...)
|
  kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
  kmalloc(C1 * C2, ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (E2)
+	E2, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * E2
+	E2, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (E2)
+	E2, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * E2
+	E2, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	(E1) * E2
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	(E1) * (E2)
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	E1 * E2
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-06-12 16:19:22 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 10b1eb7d8c Merge branch 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security system updates from James Morris:

 - incorporate new socketpair() hook into LSM and wire up the SELinux
   and Smack modules. From David Herrmann:

     "The idea is to allow SO_PEERSEC to be called on AF_UNIX sockets
      created via socketpair(2), and return the same information as if
      you emulated socketpair(2) via a temporary listener socket.

      Right now SO_PEERSEC will return the unlabeled credentials for a
      socketpair, rather than the actual credentials of the creating
      process."

 - remove the unused security_settime LSM hook (Sargun Dhillon).

 - remove some stack allocated arrays from the keys code (Tycho
   Andersen)

* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  dh key: get rid of stack allocated array for zeroes
  dh key: get rid of stack allocated array
  big key: get rid of stack array allocation
  smack: provide socketpair callback
  selinux: provide socketpair callback
  net: hook socketpair() into LSM
  security: add hook for socketpair()
  security: remove security_settime
2018-06-06 16:15:56 -07:00
Christoph Hellwig fddda2b7b5 proc: introduce proc_create_seq{,_data}
Variants of proc_create{,_data} that directly take a struct seq_operations
argument and drastically reduces the boilerplate code in the callers.

All trivial callers converted over.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2018-05-16 07:23:35 +02:00
Tycho Andersen 890e2abe10 dh key: get rid of stack allocated array for zeroes
We're interested in getting rid of all of the stack allocated arrays in
the kernel: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/7/621

This case is interesting, since we really just need an array of bytes that
are zero. The loop already ensures that if the array isn't exactly the
right size that enough zero bytes will be copied in. So, instead of
choosing this value to be the size of the hash, let's just choose it to be
32, since that is a common size, is not too big, and will not result in too
many extra iterations of the loop.

v2: split out from other patch, just hardcode array size instead of
    dynamically allocating something the right size
v3: fix typo of 256 -> 32

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
CC: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
CC: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-05-11 13:07:49 -07:00
Tycho Andersen 383203eff7 dh key: get rid of stack allocated array
We're interested in getting rid of all of the stack allocated arrays in the
kernel: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/7/621

This particular vla is used as a temporary output buffer in case there is
too much hash output for the destination buffer. Instead, let's just
allocate a buffer that's big enough initially, but only copy back to
userspace the amount that was originally asked for.

v2: allocate enough in the original output buffer vs creating a temporary
    output buffer

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
CC: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
CC: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-05-11 13:07:47 -07:00
Tycho Andersen a964f39561 big key: get rid of stack array allocation
We're interested in getting rid of all of the stack allocated arrays in the
kernel [1]. This patch simply hardcodes the iv length to match that of the
hardcoded cipher.

[1]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/7/621

v2: hardcode the length of the nonce to be the GCM AES IV length, and do a
    sanity check in init(), Eric Biggers
v3: * remember to free big_key_aead when sanity check fails
    * define a constant for big key IV size so it can be changed along side
      the algorithm in the code

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
CC: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
CC: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
CC: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-05-11 13:07:45 -07:00
Randy Dunlap 514c603249 headers: untangle kmemleak.h from mm.h
Currently <linux/slab.h> #includes <linux/kmemleak.h> for no obvious
reason.  It looks like it's only a convenience, so remove kmemleak.h
from slab.h and add <linux/kmemleak.h> to any users of kmemleak_* that
don't already #include it.  Also remove <linux/kmemleak.h> from source
files that do not use it.

This is tested on i386 allmodconfig and x86_64 allmodconfig.  It would
be good to run it through the 0day bot for other $ARCHes.  I have
neither the horsepower nor the storage space for the other $ARCHes.

Update: This patch has been extensively build-tested by both the 0day
bot & kisskb/ozlabs build farms.  Both of them reported 2 build failures
for which patches are included here (in v2).

[ slab.h is the second most used header file after module.h; kernel.h is
  right there with slab.h. There could be some minor error in the
  counting due to some #includes having comments after them and I didn't
  combine all of those. ]

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: security/keys/big_key.c needs vmalloc.h, per sfr]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e4309f98-3749-93e1-4bb7-d9501a39d015@infradead.org
Link: http://kisskb.ellerman.id.au/kisskb/head/13396/
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>	[2 build failures]
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>	[2 build failures]
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-05 21:36:27 -07:00
David Howells d9f4bb1a0f KEYS: Use individual pages in big_key for crypto buffers
kmalloc() can't always allocate large enough buffers for big_key to use for
crypto (1MB + some metadata) so we cannot use that to allocate the buffer.
Further, vmalloc'd pages can't be passed to sg_init_one() and the aead
crypto accessors cannot be called progressively and must be passed all the
data in one go (which means we can't pass the data in one block at a time).

Fix this by allocating the buffer pages individually and passing them
through a multientry scatterlist to the crypto layer.  This has the bonus
advantage that we don't have to allocate a contiguous series of pages.

We then vmap() the page list and pass that through to the VFS read/write
routines.

This can trigger a warning:

	WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 60912 at mm/page_alloc.c:3883 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xb7c/0x15f8
	([<00000000002acbb6>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x1ee/0x15f8)
	 [<00000000002dd356>] kmalloc_order+0x46/0x90
	 [<00000000002dd3e0>] kmalloc_order_trace+0x40/0x1f8
	 [<0000000000326a10>] __kmalloc+0x430/0x4c0
	 [<00000000004343e4>] big_key_preparse+0x7c/0x210
	 [<000000000042c040>] key_create_or_update+0x128/0x420
	 [<000000000042e52c>] SyS_add_key+0x124/0x220
	 [<00000000007bba2c>] system_call+0xc4/0x2b0

from the keyctl/padd/useradd test of the keyutils testsuite on s390x.

Note that it might be better to shovel data through in page-sized lumps
instead as there's no particular need to use a monolithic buffer unless the
kernel itself wants to access the data.

Fixes: 13100a72f4 ("Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted")
Reported-by: Paul Bunyan <pbunyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
2018-02-22 14:58:38 +00:00
Linus Torvalds ae0cb7be35 Merge branch 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull tpm updates from James Morris:

 - reduce polling delays in tpm_tis

 - support retrieving TPM 2.0 Event Log through EFI before
   ExitBootServices

 - replace tpm-rng.c with a hwrng device managed by the driver for each
   TPM device

 - TPM resource manager synthesizes TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE response instead
   of returning -EINVAL for unknown TPM commands. This makes user space
   more sound.

 - CLKRUN fixes:

    * Keep #CLKRUN disable through the entier TPM command/response flow

    * Check whether #CLKRUN is enabled before disabling and enabling it
      again because enabling it breaks PS/2 devices on a system where it
      is disabled

* 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  tpm: remove unused variables
  tpm: remove unused data fields from I2C and OF device ID tables
  tpm: only attempt to disable the LPC CLKRUN if is already enabled
  tpm: follow coding style for variable declaration in tpm_tis_core_init()
  tpm: delete the TPM_TIS_CLK_ENABLE flag
  tpm: Update MAINTAINERS for Jason Gunthorpe
  tpm: Keep CLKRUN enabled throughout the duration of transmit_cmd()
  tpm_tis: Move ilb_base_addr to tpm_tis_data
  tpm2-cmd: allow more attempts for selftest execution
  tpm: return a TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE response if command is not implemented
  tpm: Move Linux RNG connection to hwrng
  tpm: use struct tpm_chip for tpm_chip_find_get()
  tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
  efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  tpm: add event log format version
  tpm: rename event log provider files
  tpm: move tpm_eventlog.h outside of drivers folder
  tpm: use tpm_msleep() value as max delay
  tpm: reduce tpm polling delay in tpm_tis_core
  tpm: move wait_for_tpm_stat() to respective driver files
2018-01-31 13:12:31 -08:00
Jarkko Sakkinen aad887f664 tpm: use struct tpm_chip for tpm_chip_find_get()
Device number (the character device index) is not a stable identifier
for a TPM chip. That is the reason why every call site passes
TPM_ANY_NUM to tpm_chip_find_get().

This commit changes the API in a way that instead a struct tpm_chip
instance is given and NULL means the default chip. In addition, this
commit refines the documentation to be up to date with the
implementation.

Suggested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> (@chip_num -> @chip part)
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Tested-by: PrasannaKumar Muralidharan <prasannatsmkumar@gmail.com>
2018-01-08 12:58:36 +02:00
Ingo Molnar 475c5ee193 Merge branch 'for-mingo' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulmck/linux-rcu into core/rcu
Pull RCU updates from Paul E. McKenney:

- Updates to use cond_resched() instead of cond_resched_rcu_qs()
  where feasible (currently everywhere except in kernel/rcu and
  in kernel/torture.c).  Also a couple of fixes to avoid sending
  IPIs to offline CPUs.

- Updates to simplify RCU's dyntick-idle handling.

- Updates to remove almost all uses of smp_read_barrier_depends()
  and read_barrier_depends().

- Miscellaneous fixes.

- Torture-test updates.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-01-03 14:14:18 +01:00
Eric Biggers 18026d8668 KEYS: reject NULL restriction string when type is specified
keyctl_restrict_keyring() allows through a NULL restriction when the
"type" is non-NULL, which causes a NULL pointer dereference in
asymmetric_lookup_restriction() when it calls strcmp() on the
restriction string.

But no key types actually use a "NULL restriction" to mean anything, so
update keyctl_restrict_keyring() to reject it with EINVAL.

Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Fixes: 97d3aa0f31 ("KEYS: Add a lookup_restriction function for the asymmetric key type")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-12-08 15:13:29 +00:00
Colin Ian King 3d1f025542 security: keys: remove redundant assignment to key_ref
Variable key_ref is being assigned a value that is never read;
key_ref is being re-assigned a few statements later.  Hence this
assignment is redundant and can be removed.

Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-12-08 15:13:29 +00:00
Eric Biggers 4dca6ea1d9 KEYS: add missing permission check for request_key() destination
When the request_key() syscall is not passed a destination keyring, it
links the requested key (if constructed) into the "default" request-key
keyring.  This should require Write permission to the keyring.  However,
there is actually no permission check.

This can be abused to add keys to any keyring to which only Search
permission is granted.  This is because Search permission allows joining
the keyring.  keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING)
then will set the default request-key keyring to the session keyring.
Then, request_key() can be used to add keys to the keyring.

Both negatively and positively instantiated keys can be added using this
method.  Adding negative keys is trivial.  Adding a positive key is a
bit trickier.  It requires that either /sbin/request-key positively
instantiates the key, or that another thread adds the key to the process
keyring at just the right time, such that request_key() misses it
initially but then finds it in construct_alloc_key().

Fix this bug by checking for Write permission to the keyring in
construct_get_dest_keyring() when the default keyring is being used.

We don't do the permission check for non-default keyrings because that
was already done by the earlier call to lookup_user_key().  Also,
request_key_and_link() is currently passed a 'struct key *' rather than
a key_ref_t, so the "possessed" bit is unavailable.

We also don't do the permission check for the "requestor keyring", to
continue to support the use case described by commit 8bbf4976b5
("KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument") where
/sbin/request-key recursively calls request_key() to add keys to the
original requestor's destination keyring.  (I don't know of any users
who actually do that, though...)

Fixes: 3e30148c3d ("[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	# v2.6.13+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-12-08 15:13:27 +00:00
Eric Biggers a2d8737d5c KEYS: remove unnecessary get/put of explicit dest_keyring
In request_key_and_link(), in the case where the dest_keyring was
explicitly specified, there is no need to get another reference to
dest_keyring before calling key_link(), then drop it afterwards.  This
is because by definition, we already have a reference to dest_keyring.

This change is useful because we'll be making
construct_get_dest_keyring() able to return an error code, and we don't
want to have to handle that error here for no reason.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-12-08 15:13:27 +00:00
Paul E. McKenney d963007c72 keyring: Remove now-redundant smp_read_barrier_depends()
Now that the associative-array library properly heads dependency chains,
the various smp_read_barrier_depends() calls in security/keys/keyring.c
are no longer needed.  This commit therefore removes them.

Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-12-04 10:53:14 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 844056fd74 Merge branch 'timers-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull timer updates from Thomas Gleixner:

 - The final conversion of timer wheel timers to timer_setup().

   A few manual conversions and a large coccinelle assisted sweep and
   the removal of the old initialization mechanisms and the related
   code.

 - Remove the now unused VSYSCALL update code

 - Fix permissions of /proc/timer_list. I still need to get rid of that
   file completely

 - Rename a misnomed clocksource function and remove a stale declaration

* 'timers-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (27 commits)
  m68k/macboing: Fix missed timer callback assignment
  treewide: Remove TIMER_FUNC_TYPE and TIMER_DATA_TYPE casts
  timer: Remove redundant __setup_timer*() macros
  timer: Pass function down to initialization routines
  timer: Remove unused data arguments from macros
  timer: Switch callback prototype to take struct timer_list * argument
  timer: Pass timer_list pointer to callbacks unconditionally
  Coccinelle: Remove setup_timer.cocci
  timer: Remove setup_*timer() interface
  timer: Remove init_timer() interface
  treewide: setup_timer() -> timer_setup() (2 field)
  treewide: setup_timer() -> timer_setup()
  treewide: init_timer() -> setup_timer()
  treewide: Switch DEFINE_TIMER callbacks to struct timer_list *
  s390: cmm: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  lightnvm: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  drivers/net: cris: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  drm/vc4: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  block/laptop_mode: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  net/atm/mpc: Avoid open-coded assignment of timer callback function
  ...
2017-11-25 08:37:16 -10:00
Kees Cook 24ed960abf treewide: Switch DEFINE_TIMER callbacks to struct timer_list *
This changes all DEFINE_TIMER() callbacks to use a struct timer_list
pointer instead of unsigned long. Since the data argument has already been
removed, none of these callbacks are using their argument currently, so
this renames the argument to "unused".

Done using the following semantic patch:

@match_define_timer@
declarer name DEFINE_TIMER;
identifier _timer, _callback;
@@

 DEFINE_TIMER(_timer, _callback);

@change_callback depends on match_define_timer@
identifier match_define_timer._callback;
type _origtype;
identifier _origarg;
@@

 void
-_callback(_origtype _origarg)
+_callback(struct timer_list *unused)
 { ... }

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-11-21 15:57:05 -08:00
Baolin Wang 0a9dd0e071 security: keys: Replace time_t with time64_t for struct key_preparsed_payload
The 'struct key_preparsed_payload' will use 'time_t' which we will
try to remove in the kernel, since 'time_t' is not year 2038 safe on
32bits systems.

Thus this patch replaces 'time_t' with 'time64_t' which is year 2038
safe on 32 bits system for 'struct key_preparsed_payload', moreover
we should use the 'TIME64_MAX' macro to initialize the 'time64_t'
type variable.

Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-11-15 16:38:45 +00:00
Baolin Wang 074d589895 security: keys: Replace time_t/timespec with time64_t
The 'struct key' will use 'time_t' which we try to remove in the
kernel, since 'time_t' is not year 2038 safe on 32bit systems.
Also the 'struct keyring_search_context' will use 'timespec' type
to record current time, which is also not year 2038 safe on 32bit
systems.

Thus this patch replaces 'time_t' with 'time64_t' which is year 2038
safe for 'struct key', and replace 'timespec' with 'time64_t' for the
'struct keyring_search_context', since we only look at the the seconds
part of 'timespec' variable. Moreover we also change the codes where
using the 'time_t' and 'timespec', and we can get current time by
ktime_get_real_seconds() instead of current_kernel_time(), and use
'TIME64_MAX' macro to initialize the 'time64_t' type variable.

Especially in proc.c file, we have replaced 'unsigned long' and 'timespec'
type with 'u64' and 'time64_t' type to save the timeout value, which means
user will get one 'u64' type timeout value by issuing proc_keys_show()
function.

Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-11-15 16:38:45 +00:00
Linus Torvalds 2bcc673101 Merge branch 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull timer updates from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Yet another big pile of changes:

   - More year 2038 work from Arnd slowly reaching the point where we
     need to think about the syscalls themself.

   - A new timer function which allows to conditionally (re)arm a timer
     only when it's either not running or the new expiry time is sooner
     than the armed expiry time. This allows to use a single timer for
     multiple timeout requirements w/o caring about the first expiry
     time at the call site.

   - A new NMI safe accessor to clock real time for the printk timestamp
     work. Can be used by tracing, perf as well if required.

   - A large number of timer setup conversions from Kees which got
     collected here because either maintainers requested so or they
     simply got ignored. As Kees pointed out already there are a few
     trivial merge conflicts and some redundant commits which was
     unavoidable due to the size of this conversion effort.

   - Avoid a redundant iteration in the timer wheel softirq processing.

   - Provide a mechanism to treat RTC implementations depending on their
     hardware properties, i.e. don't inflict the write at the 0.5
     seconds boundary which originates from the PC CMOS RTC to all RTCs.
     No functional change as drivers need to be updated separately.

   - The usual small updates to core code clocksource drivers. Nothing
     really exciting"

* 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (111 commits)
  timers: Add a function to start/reduce a timer
  pstore: Use ktime_get_real_fast_ns() instead of __getnstimeofday()
  timer: Prepare to change all DEFINE_TIMER() callbacks
  netfilter: ipvs: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  scsi: qla2xxx: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  block/aoe: discover_timer: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  ide: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  drbd: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  mailbox: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  crypto: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  drivers/pcmcia: omap1: Fix error in automated timer conversion
  ARM: footbridge: Fix typo in timer conversion
  drivers/sgi-xp: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  drivers/pcmcia: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  drivers/memstick: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  drivers/macintosh: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  hwrng/xgene-rng: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  auxdisplay: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  sparc/led: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  mips: ip22/32: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  ...
2017-11-13 17:56:58 -08:00
Linus Torvalds ead751507d License cleanup: add SPDX license identifiers to some files
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
 makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
 
 By default all files without license information are under the default
 license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
 
 Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
 SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
 shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
 
 This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
 Philippe Ombredanne.
 
 How this work was done:
 
 Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
 the use cases:
  - file had no licensing information it it.
  - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
  - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
 
 Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
 where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
 had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
 
 The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
 a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
 output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
 tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
 base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
 
 The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
 assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
 results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
 to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
 immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
 
 Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
  - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
  - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
    lines of source
  - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
    lines).
 
 All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
 
 The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
 identifiers to apply.
 
  - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
    considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
    COPYING file license applied.
 
    For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
 
    SPDX license identifier                            # files
    ---------------------------------------------------|-------
    GPL-2.0                                              11139
 
    and resulted in the first patch in this series.
 
    If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
    Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:
 
    SPDX license identifier                            # files
    ---------------------------------------------------|-------
    GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930
 
    and resulted in the second patch in this series.
 
  - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
    of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
    any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
    it (per prior point).  Results summary:
 
    SPDX license identifier                            # files
    ---------------------------------------------------|------
    GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
    GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
    ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
    ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
    LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
    GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
    ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
    LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
    LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
    ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
    ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1
 
    and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
 
  - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
    the concluded license(s).
 
  - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
    license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
    licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
 
  - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
    resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
    which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
 
  - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
    confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
 
  - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
    the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
    in time.
 
 In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
 spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
 source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
 by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
 
 Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
 FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
 disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
 Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
 they are related.
 
 Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
 for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
 files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
 in about 15000 files.
 
 In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
 copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
 correct identifier.
 
 Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
 inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
 version early this week with:
  - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
    license ids and scores
  - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
    files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
  - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
    was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
    SPDX license was correct
 
 This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
 worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
 different types of files to be modified.
 
 These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
 parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
 format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
 based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
 distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
 comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
 generate the patches.
 
 Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
 Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
 Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'spdx_identifiers-4.14-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core

Pull initial SPDX identifiers from Greg KH:
 "License cleanup: add SPDX license identifiers to some files

  Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
  makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

  By default all files without license information are under the default
  license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

  Update the files which contain no license information with the
  'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally
  binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate
  text.

  This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart
  and Philippe Ombredanne.

  How this work was done:

  Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset
  of the use cases:

   - file had no licensing information it it.

   - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,

   - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

  Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
  where non-standard license headers were used, and references to
  license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

  The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied
  to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of
  the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver)
  producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.
  Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review
  of a few 1000 files.

  The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537
  files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the
  scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license
  identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any
  determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with
  the Linux Foundation.

  Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:

   - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.

   - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained
     >5 lines of source

   - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
     lines).

  All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

  The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
  identifiers to apply.

   - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
     considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
     COPYING file license applied.

     For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

       SPDX license identifier                            # files
       ---------------------------------------------------|-------
       GPL-2.0                                              11139

     and resulted in the first patch in this series.

     If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
     Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that
     was:

       SPDX license identifier                            # files
       ---------------------------------------------------|-------
       GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

     and resulted in the second patch in this series.

   - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
     of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
     any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
     it (per prior point). Results summary:

       SPDX license identifier                            # files
       ---------------------------------------------------|------
       GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
       GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
       ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
       ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
       LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
       GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
       ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
       LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
       LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
       ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
       ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

     and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

   - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that
     became the concluded license(s).

   - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected
     a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
     licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

   - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
     resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply
     (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

   - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
     confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

   - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
     the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
     in time.

  In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
  spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
  source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases,
  confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

  Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
  FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
  disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.
  The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in
  part, so they are related.

  Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
  for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
  files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot
  checks in about 15000 files.

  In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
  copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect
  the correct identifier.

  Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
  inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial
  patch version early this week with:

   - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
     license ids and scores

   - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
     files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct

   - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch
     license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the
     applied SPDX license was correct

  This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
  worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
  different types of files to be modified.

  These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
  parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
  format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
  based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
  distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
  comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
  generate the patches.

  Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
  Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
  Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
  Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>"

* tag 'spdx_identifiers-4.14-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core:
  License cleanup: add SPDX license identifier to uapi header files with a license
  License cleanup: add SPDX license identifier to uapi header files with no license
  License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
2017-11-02 10:04:46 -07:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman b24413180f License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-02 11:10:55 +01:00
Eric Biggers a3c812f7cf KEYS: trusted: fix writing past end of buffer in trusted_read()
When calling keyctl_read() on a key of type "trusted", if the
user-supplied buffer was too small, the kernel ignored the buffer length
and just wrote past the end of the buffer, potentially corrupting
userspace memory.  Fix it by instead returning the size required, as per
the documentation for keyctl_read().

We also don't even fill the buffer at all in this case, as this is
slightly easier to implement than doing a short read, and either
behavior appears to be permitted.  It also makes it match the behavior
of the "encrypted" key type.

Fixes: d00a1c72f7 ("keys: add new trusted key-type")
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.38+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-11-02 20:58:07 +11:00
Eric Biggers 3239b6f29b KEYS: return full count in keyring_read() if buffer is too small
Commit e645016abc ("KEYS: fix writing past end of user-supplied buffer
in keyring_read()") made keyring_read() stop corrupting userspace memory
when the user-supplied buffer is too small.  However it also made the
return value in that case be the short buffer size rather than the size
required, yet keyctl_read() is actually documented to return the size
required.  Therefore, switch it over to the documented behavior.

Note that for now we continue to have it fill the short buffer, since it
did that before (pre-v3.13) and dump_key_tree_aux() in keyutils arguably
relies on it.

Fixes: e645016abc ("KEYS: fix writing past end of user-supplied buffer in keyring_read()")
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-11-02 20:58:05 +11:00
Eric Biggers ab5c69f013 KEYS: load key flags and expiry time atomically in proc_keys_show()
In proc_keys_show(), the key semaphore is not held, so the key ->flags
and ->expiry can be changed concurrently.  We therefore should read them
atomically just once.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-10-18 09:12:41 +01:00
Eric Biggers 9d6c8711b6 KEYS: Load key expiry time atomically in keyring_search_iterator()
Similar to the case for key_validate(), we should load the key ->expiry
once atomically in keyring_search_iterator(), since it can be changed
concurrently with the flags whenever the key semaphore isn't held.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-10-18 09:12:41 +01:00
Eric Biggers 1823d475a5 KEYS: load key flags and expiry time atomically in key_validate()
In key_validate(), load the flags and expiry time once atomically, since
these can change concurrently if key_validate() is called without the
key semaphore held.  And we don't want to get inconsistent results if a
variable is referenced multiple times.  For example, key->expiry was
referenced in both 'if (key->expiry)' and in 'if (now.tv_sec >=
key->expiry)', making it theoretically possible to see a spurious
EKEYEXPIRED while the expiration time was being removed, i.e. set to 0.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-10-18 09:12:41 +01:00
David Howells 60ff5b2f54 KEYS: don't let add_key() update an uninstantiated key
Currently, when passed a key that already exists, add_key() will call the
key's ->update() method if such exists.  But this is heavily broken in the
case where the key is uninstantiated because it doesn't call
__key_instantiate_and_link().  Consequently, it doesn't do most of the
things that are supposed to happen when the key is instantiated, such as
setting the instantiation state, clearing KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT and
awakening tasks waiting on it, and incrementing key->user->nikeys.

It also never takes key_construction_mutex, which means that
->instantiate() can run concurrently with ->update() on the same key.  In
the case of the "user" and "logon" key types this causes a memory leak, at
best.  Maybe even worse, the ->update() methods of the "encrypted" and
"trusted" key types actually just dereference a NULL pointer when passed an
uninstantiated key.

Change key_create_or_update() to wait interruptibly for the key to finish
construction before continuing.

This patch only affects *uninstantiated* keys.  For now we still allow a
negatively instantiated key to be updated (thereby positively
instantiating it), although that's broken too (the next patch fixes it)
and I'm not sure that anyone actually uses that functionality either.

Here is a simple reproducer for the bug using the "encrypted" key type
(requires CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS=y), though as noted above the bug
pertained to more than just the "encrypted" key type:

    #include <stdlib.h>
    #include <unistd.h>
    #include <keyutils.h>

    int main(void)
    {
        int ringid = keyctl_join_session_keyring(NULL);

        if (fork()) {
            for (;;) {
                const char payload[] = "update user:foo 32";

                usleep(rand() % 10000);
                add_key("encrypted", "desc", payload, sizeof(payload), ringid);
                keyctl_clear(ringid);
            }
        } else {
            for (;;)
                request_key("encrypted", "desc", "callout_info", ringid);
        }
    }

It causes:

    BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018
    IP: encrypted_update+0xb0/0x170
    PGD 7a178067 P4D 7a178067 PUD 77269067 PMD 0
    PREEMPT SMP
    CPU: 0 PID: 340 Comm: reproduce Tainted: G      D         4.14.0-rc1-00025-g428490e38b2e #796
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
    task: ffff8a467a39a340 task.stack: ffffb15c40770000
    RIP: 0010:encrypted_update+0xb0/0x170
    RSP: 0018:ffffb15c40773de8 EFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8a467a275b00 RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: ffff8a467a275b14 RDI: ffffffffb742f303
    RBP: ffffb15c40773e20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8a467a275b17
    R10: 0000000000000020 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8a4677057180 R15: ffff8a467a275b0f
    FS:  00007f5d7fb08700(0000) GS:ffff8a467f200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000077262005 CR4: 00000000001606f0
    Call Trace:
     key_create_or_update+0x2bc/0x460
     SyS_add_key+0x10c/0x1d0
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
    RIP: 0033:0x7f5d7f211259
    RSP: 002b:00007ffed03904c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000f8
    RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000003b2a7955 RCX: 00007f5d7f211259
    RDX: 00000000004009e4 RSI: 00000000004009ff RDI: 0000000000400a04
    RBP: 0000000068db8bad R08: 000000003b2a7955 R09: 0000000000000004
    R10: 000000000000001a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400868
    R13: 00007ffed03905d0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
    Code: 77 28 e8 64 34 1f 00 45 31 c0 31 c9 48 8d 55 c8 48 89 df 48 8d 75 d0 e8 ff f9 ff ff 85 c0 41 89 c4 0f 88 84 00 00 00 4c 8b 7d c8 <49> 8b 75 18 4c 89 ff e8 24 f8 ff ff 85 c0 41 89 c4 78 6d 49 8b
    RIP: encrypted_update+0xb0/0x170 RSP: ffffb15c40773de8
    CR2: 0000000000000018

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.12+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2017-10-18 09:12:40 +01:00
David Howells 363b02dab0 KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:

 (1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.

 (2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.

 (3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.

This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.

The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state.  For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state.  You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.

The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated.  The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.

Additionally, barriering is included:

 (1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.

 (2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.

Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.

Fixes: 146aa8b145 ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2017-10-18 09:12:40 +01:00
Arnd Bergmann 3cd18d1981 security/keys: BIG_KEY requires CONFIG_CRYPTO
The recent rework introduced a possible randconfig build failure
when CONFIG_CRYPTO configured to only allow modules:

security/keys/big_key.o: In function `big_key_crypt':
big_key.c:(.text+0x29f): undefined reference to `crypto_aead_setkey'
security/keys/big_key.o: In function `big_key_init':
big_key.c:(.init.text+0x1a): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_aead'
big_key.c:(.init.text+0x45): undefined reference to `crypto_aead_setauthsize'
big_key.c:(.init.text+0x77): undefined reference to `crypto_destroy_tfm'
crypto/gcm.o: In function `gcm_hash_crypt_remain_continue':
gcm.c:(.text+0x167): undefined reference to `crypto_ahash_finup'
crypto/gcm.o: In function `crypto_gcm_exit_tfm':
gcm.c:(.text+0x847): undefined reference to `crypto_destroy_tfm'

When we 'select CRYPTO' like the other users, we always get a
configuration that builds.

Fixes: 428490e38b ("security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-10-18 09:12:40 +01:00
Eric Biggers 13923d0865 KEYS: encrypted: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload
A key of type "encrypted" references a "master key" which is used to
encrypt and decrypt the encrypted key's payload.  However, when we
accessed the master key's payload, we failed to handle the case where
the master key has been revoked, which sets the payload pointer to NULL.
Note that request_key() *does* skip revoked keys, but there is still a
window where the key can be revoked before we acquire its semaphore.

Fix it by checking for a NULL payload, treating it like a key which was
already revoked at the time it was requested.

This was an issue for master keys of type "user" only.  Master keys can
also be of type "trusted", but those cannot be revoked.

Fixes: 7e70cb4978 ("keys: add new key-type encrypted")
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>    [v2.6.38+]
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-10-12 15:55:09 +01:00
Kees Cook 1d27e3e225 timer: Remove expires and data arguments from DEFINE_TIMER
Drop the arguments from the macro and adjust all callers with the
following script:

  perl -pi -e 's/DEFINE_TIMER\((.*), 0, 0\);/DEFINE_TIMER($1);/g;' \
    $(git grep DEFINE_TIMER | cut -d: -f1 | sort -u | grep -v timer.h)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> # for m68k parts
Acked-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> # for watchdog parts
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> # for networking parts
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> # for wireless parts
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: Sebastian Reichel <sre@kernel.org>
Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@qca.qualcomm.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: linux1394-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Wim Van Sebroeck <wim@iguana.be>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Ursula Braun <ubraun@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Cc: Harish Patil <harish.patil@cavium.com>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Michael Reed <mdr@sgi.com>
Cc: Manish Chopra <manish.chopra@cavium.com>
Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Mark Gross <mark.gross@intel.com>
Cc: linux-watchdog@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507159627-127660-11-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-10-05 15:01:20 +02:00
Jason A. Donenfeld 428490e38b security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto
This started out as just replacing the use of crypto/rng with
get_random_bytes_wait, so that we wouldn't use bad randomness at boot
time. But, upon looking further, it appears that there were even deeper
underlying cryptographic problems, and that this seems to have been
committed with very little crypto review. So, I rewrote the whole thing,
trying to keep to the conventions introduced by the previous author, to
fix these cryptographic flaws.

It makes no sense to seed crypto/rng at boot time and then keep
using it like this, when in fact there's already get_random_bytes_wait,
which can ensure there's enough entropy and be a much more standard way
of generating keys. Since this sensitive material is being stored
untrusted, using ECB and no authentication is simply not okay at all. I
find it surprising and a bit horrifying that this code even made it past
basic crypto review, which perhaps points to some larger issues. This
patch moves from using AES-ECB to using AES-GCM. Since keys are uniquely
generated each time, we can set the nonce to zero. There was also a race
condition in which the same key would be reused at the same time in
different threads. A mutex fixes this issue now.

So, to summarize, this commit fixes the following vulnerabilities:

  * Low entropy key generation, allowing an attacker to potentially
    guess or predict keys.
  * Unauthenticated encryption, allowing an attacker to modify the
    cipher text in particular ways in order to manipulate the plaintext,
    which is is even more frightening considering the next point.
  * Use of ECB mode, allowing an attacker to trivially swap blocks or
    compare identical plaintext blocks.
  * Key re-use.
  * Faulty memory zeroing.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2017-09-25 23:31:58 +01:00
Jason A. Donenfeld 910801809b security/keys: properly zero out sensitive key material in big_key
Error paths forgot to zero out sensitive material, so this patch changes
some kfrees into a kzfrees.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2017-09-25 23:31:41 +01:00
Eric Biggers e007ce9c59 KEYS: use kmemdup() in request_key_auth_new()
kmemdup() is preferred to kmalloc() followed by memcpy().

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-09-25 15:19:57 +01:00
Eric Biggers 4aa68e07d8 KEYS: restrict /proc/keys by credentials at open time
When checking for permission to view keys whilst reading from
/proc/keys, we should use the credentials with which the /proc/keys file
was opened.  This is because, in a classic type of exploit, it can be
possible to bypass checks for the *current* credentials by passing the
file descriptor to a suid program.

Following commit 34dbbcdbf6 ("Make file credentials available to the
seqfile interfaces") we can finally fix it.  So let's do it.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-09-25 15:19:57 +01:00
Eric Biggers 8f674565d4 KEYS: reset parent each time before searching key_user_tree
In key_user_lookup(), if there is no key_user for the given uid, we drop
key_user_lock, allocate a new key_user, and search the tree again.  But
we failed to set 'parent' to NULL at the beginning of the second search.
If the tree were to be empty for the second search, the insertion would
be done with an invalid 'parent', scribbling over freed memory.

Fortunately this can't actually happen currently because the tree always
contains at least the root_key_user.  But it still should be fixed to
make the code more robust.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-09-25 15:19:57 +01:00
Eric Biggers 37863c43b2 KEYS: prevent KEYCTL_READ on negative key
Because keyctl_read_key() looks up the key with no permissions
requested, it may find a negatively instantiated key.  If the key is
also possessed, we went ahead and called ->read() on the key.  But the
key payload will actually contain the ->reject_error rather than the
normal payload.  Thus, the kernel oopses trying to read the
user_key_payload from memory address (int)-ENOKEY = 0x00000000ffffff82.

Fortunately the payload data is stored inline, so it shouldn't be
possible to abuse this as an arbitrary memory read primitive...

Reproducer:
    keyctl new_session
    keyctl request2 user desc '' @s
    keyctl read $(keyctl show | awk '/user: desc/ {print $1}')

It causes a crash like the following:
     BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff92
     IP: user_read+0x33/0xa0
     PGD 36a54067 P4D 36a54067 PUD 0
     Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
     CPU: 0 PID: 211 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.14.0-rc1 #337
     Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-20170228_101828-anatol 04/01/2014
     task: ffff90aa3b74c3c0 task.stack: ffff9878c0478000
     RIP: 0010:user_read+0x33/0xa0
     RSP: 0018:ffff9878c047bee8 EFLAGS: 00010246
     RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff90aa3d7da340 RCX: 0000000000000017
     RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffffff82 RDI: ffff90aa3d7da340
     RBP: ffff9878c047bf00 R08: 00000024f95da94f R09: 0000000000000000
     R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
     R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
     FS:  00007f58ece69740(0000) GS:ffff90aa3e200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
     CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
     CR2: 00000000ffffff92 CR3: 0000000036adc001 CR4: 00000000003606f0
     Call Trace:
      keyctl_read_key+0xac/0xe0
      SyS_keyctl+0x99/0x120
      entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
     RIP: 0033:0x7f58ec787bb9
     RSP: 002b:00007ffc8d401678 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000fa
     RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc8d402800 RCX: 00007f58ec787bb9
     RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000174a63ac RDI: 000000000000000b
     RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 00007ffc8d402809 R09: 0000000000000020
     R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffc8d402800
     R13: 00007ffc8d4016e0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
     Code: e5 41 55 49 89 f5 41 54 49 89 d4 53 48 89 fb e8 a4 b4 ad ff 85 c0 74 09 80 3d b9 4c 96 00 00 74 43 48 8b b3 20 01 00 00 4d 85 ed <0f> b7 5e 10 74 29 4d 85 e4 74 24 4c 39 e3 4c 89 e2 4c 89 ef 48
     RIP: user_read+0x33/0xa0 RSP: ffff9878c047bee8
     CR2: 00000000ffffff92

Fixes: 61ea0c0ba9 ("KEYS: Skip key state checks when checking for possession")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[v3.13+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-09-25 15:19:57 +01:00
Eric Biggers 237bbd29f7 KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings
It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user.  For example:

    sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
                           keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
                           sleep 15' &
    sleep 1
    sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
    sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us

This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions.  In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:

    -4: alswrv-----v------------  3000     0 keyring: _uid.4000
    -5: alswrv-----v------------  3000     0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000

Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING.  Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.

Fixes: 69664cf16a ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[v2.6.26+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-09-25 15:19:57 +01:00
Eric Biggers e645016abc KEYS: fix writing past end of user-supplied buffer in keyring_read()
Userspace can call keyctl_read() on a keyring to get the list of IDs of
keys in the keyring.  But if the user-supplied buffer is too small, the
kernel would write the full list anyway --- which will corrupt whatever
userspace memory happened to be past the end of the buffer.  Fix it by
only filling the space that is available.

Fixes: b2a4df200d ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[v3.13+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-09-25 15:19:57 +01:00
Eric Biggers 7fc0786d95 KEYS: fix key refcount leak in keyctl_read_key()
In keyctl_read_key(), if key_permission() were to return an error code
other than EACCES, we would leak a the reference to the key.  This can't
actually happen currently because key_permission() can only return an
error code other than EACCES if security_key_permission() does, only
SELinux and Smack implement that hook, and neither can return an error
code other than EACCES.  But it should still be fixed, as it is a bug
waiting to happen.

Fixes: 29db919063 ("[PATCH] Keys: Add LSM hooks for key management [try #3]")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-09-25 15:19:57 +01:00
Eric Biggers 884bee0215 KEYS: fix key refcount leak in keyctl_assume_authority()
In keyctl_assume_authority(), if keyctl_change_reqkey_auth() were to
fail, we would leak the reference to the 'authkey'.  Currently this can
only happen if prepare_creds() fails to allocate memory.  But it still
should be fixed, as it is a more severe bug waiting to happen.

This patch also moves the read of 'authkey->serial' to before the
reference to the authkey is dropped.  Doing the read after dropping the
reference is very fragile because it assumes we still hold another
reference to the key.  (Which we do, in current->cred->request_key_auth,
but there's no reason not to write it in the "obviously correct" way.)

Fixes: d84f4f992c ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-09-25 15:19:57 +01:00
Eric Biggers f7b48cf08f KEYS: don't revoke uninstantiated key in request_key_auth_new()
If key_instantiate_and_link() were to fail (which fortunately isn't
possible currently), the call to key_revoke(authkey) would crash with a
NULL pointer dereference in request_key_auth_revoke() because the key
has not yet been instantiated.

Fix this by removing the call to key_revoke().  key_put() is sufficient,
as it's not possible for an uninstantiated authkey to have been used for
anything yet.

Fixes: b5f545c880 ("[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-09-25 15:19:56 +01:00
Eric Biggers 44d8143340 KEYS: fix cred refcount leak in request_key_auth_new()
In request_key_auth_new(), if key_alloc() or key_instantiate_and_link()
were to fail, we would leak a reference to the 'struct cred'.  Currently
this can only happen if key_alloc() fails to allocate memory.  But it
still should be fixed, as it is a more severe bug waiting to happen.

Fix it by cleaning things up to use a helper function which frees a
'struct request_key_auth' correctly.

Fixes: d84f4f992c ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-09-25 15:03:55 +01:00
Christoph Hellwig e13ec939e9 fs: fix kernel_write prototype
Make the position an in/out argument like all the other read/write
helpers and and make the buf argument a void pointer.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-09-04 19:05:15 -04:00
Christoph Hellwig bdd1d2d3d2 fs: fix kernel_read prototype
Use proper ssize_t and size_t types for the return value and count
argument, move the offset last and make it an in/out argument like
all other read/write helpers, and make the buf argument a void pointer
to get rid of lots of casts in the callers.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-09-04 19:05:15 -04:00
Linus Torvalds e06fdaf40a Now that IPC and other changes have landed, enable manual markings for
randstruct plugin, including the task_struct.
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Merge tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull structure randomization updates from Kees Cook:
 "Now that IPC and other changes have landed, enable manual markings for
  randstruct plugin, including the task_struct.

  This is the rest of what was staged in -next for the gcc-plugins, and
  comes in three patches, largest first:

   - mark "easy" structs with __randomize_layout

   - mark task_struct with an optional anonymous struct to isolate the
     __randomize_layout section

   - mark structs to opt _out_ of automated marking (which will come
     later)

  And, FWIW, this continues to pass allmodconfig (normal and patched to
  enable gcc-plugins) builds of x86_64, i386, arm64, arm, powerpc, and
  s390 for me"

* tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs
  task_struct: Allow randomized layout
  randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization
2017-07-19 08:55:18 -07:00
Eric Biggers 4f9dabfaf8 KEYS: DH: validate __spare field
Syscalls must validate that their reserved arguments are zero and return
EINVAL otherwise.  Otherwise, it will be impossible to actually use them
for anything in the future because existing programs may be passing
garbage in.  This is standard practice when adding new APIs.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-07-14 11:01:38 +10:00
Linus Torvalds 650fc870a2 There has been a fair amount of activity in the docs tree this time
around.  Highlights include:
 
  - Conversion of a bunch of security documentation into RST
 
  - The conversion of the remaining DocBook templates by The Amazing
    Mauro Machine.  We can now drop the entire DocBook build chain.
 
  - The usual collection of fixes and minor updates.
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Merge tag 'docs-4.13' of git://git.lwn.net/linux

Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
 "There has been a fair amount of activity in the docs tree this time
  around. Highlights include:

   - Conversion of a bunch of security documentation into RST

   - The conversion of the remaining DocBook templates by The Amazing
     Mauro Machine. We can now drop the entire DocBook build chain.

   - The usual collection of fixes and minor updates"

* tag 'docs-4.13' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (90 commits)
  scripts/kernel-doc: handle DECLARE_HASHTABLE
  Documentation: atomic_ops.txt is core-api/atomic_ops.rst
  Docs: clean up some DocBook loose ends
  Make the main documentation title less Geocities
  Docs: Use kernel-figure in vidioc-g-selection.rst
  Docs: fix table problems in ras.rst
  Docs: Fix breakage with Sphinx 1.5 and upper
  Docs: Include the Latex "ifthen" package
  doc/kokr/howto: Only send regression fixes after -rc1
  docs-rst: fix broken links to dynamic-debug-howto in kernel-parameters
  doc: Document suitability of IBM Verse for kernel development
  Doc: fix a markup error in coding-style.rst
  docs: driver-api: i2c: remove some outdated information
  Documentation: DMA API: fix a typo in a function name
  Docs: Insert missing space to separate link from text
  doc/ko_KR/memory-barriers: Update control-dependencies example
  Documentation, kbuild: fix typo "minimun" -> "minimum"
  docs: Fix some formatting issues in request-key.rst
  doc: ReSTify keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
  doc: ReSTify keys-request-key.txt
  ...
2017-07-03 21:13:25 -07:00
Kees Cook 3859a271a0 randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization
This marks many critical kernel structures for randomization. These are
structures that have been targeted in the past in security exploits, or
contain functions pointers, pointers to function pointer tables, lists,
workqueues, ref-counters, credentials, permissions, or are otherwise
sensitive. This initial list was extracted from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's
code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Left out of this list is task_struct, which requires special handling
and will be covered in a subsequent patch.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-06-30 12:00:51 -07:00
Ingo Molnar 5dd43ce2f6 sched/wait: Split out the wait_bit*() APIs from <linux/wait.h> into <linux/wait_bit.h>
The wait_bit*() types and APIs are mixed into wait.h, but they
are a pretty orthogonal extension of wait-queues.

Furthermore, only about 50 kernel files use these APIs, while
over 1000 use the regular wait-queue functionality.

So clean up the main wait.h by moving the wait-bit functionality
out of it, into a separate .h and .c file:

  include/linux/wait_bit.h  for types and APIs
  kernel/sched/wait_bit.c   for the implementation

Update all header dependencies.

This reduces the size of wait.h rather significantly, by about 30%.

Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-06-20 12:19:09 +02:00
Mark Rutland 92347cfd62 KEYS: fix refcount_inc() on zero
If a key's refcount is dropped to zero between key_lookup() peeking at
the refcount and subsequently attempting to increment it, refcount_inc()
will see a zero refcount.  Here, refcount_inc() will WARN_ONCE(), and
will *not* increment the refcount, which will remain zero.

Once key_lookup() drops key_serial_lock, it is possible for the key to
be freed behind our back.

This patch uses refcount_inc_not_zero() to perform the peek and increment
atomically.

Fixes: fff292914d ("security, keys: convert key.usage from atomic_t to refcount_t")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-06-09 13:29:50 +10:00
Mat Martineau 7cbe0932c2 KEYS: Convert KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE to use the crypto KPP API
The initial Diffie-Hellman computation made direct use of the MPI
library because the crypto module did not support DH at the time. Now
that KPP is implemented, KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE should use it to get rid of
duplicate code and leverage possible hardware acceleration.

This fixes an issue whereby the input to the KDF computation would
include additional uninitialized memory when the result of the
Diffie-Hellman computation was shorter than the input prime number.

Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-06-09 13:29:50 +10:00
Eric Biggers 0ddd9f1a6b KEYS: DH: ensure the KDF counter is properly aligned
Accessing a 'u8[4]' through a '__be32 *' violates alignment rules.  Just
make the counter a __be32 instead.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-06-09 13:29:49 +10:00
Eric Biggers 281590b422 KEYS: DH: don't feed uninitialized "otherinfo" into KDF
If userspace called KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE with kdf_params containing NULL
otherinfo but nonzero otherinfolen, the kernel would allocate a buffer
for the otherinfo, then feed it into the KDF without initializing it.
Fix this by always doing the copy from userspace (which will fail with
EFAULT in this scenario).

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-06-09 13:29:49 +10:00
Eric Biggers bbe240454d KEYS: DH: forbid using digest_null as the KDF hash
Requesting "digest_null" in the keyctl_kdf_params caused an infinite
loop in kdf_ctr() because the "null" hash has a digest size of 0.  Fix
it by rejecting hash algorithms with a digest size of 0.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-06-09 13:29:49 +10:00
Eric Biggers 0620fddb56 KEYS: sanitize key structs before freeing
While a 'struct key' itself normally does not contain sensitive
information, Documentation/security/keys.txt actually encourages this:

     "Having a payload is not required; and the payload can, in fact,
     just be a value stored in the struct key itself."

In case someone has taken this advice, or will take this advice in the
future, zero the key structure before freeing it.  We might as well, and
as a bonus this could make it a bit more difficult for an adversary to
determine which keys have recently been in use.

This is safe because the key_jar cache does not use a constructor.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-06-09 13:29:48 +10:00
Eric Biggers ee618b4619 KEYS: trusted: sanitize all key material
As the previous patch did for encrypted-keys, zero sensitive any
potentially sensitive data related to the "trusted" key type before it
is freed.  Notably, we were not zeroing the tpm_buf structures in which
the actual key is stored for TPM seal and unseal, nor were we zeroing
the trusted_key_payload in certain error paths.

Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-06-09 13:29:48 +10:00
Eric Biggers a9dd74b252 KEYS: encrypted: sanitize all key material
For keys of type "encrypted", consistently zero sensitive key material
before freeing it.  This was already being done for the decrypted
payloads of encrypted keys, but not for the master key and the keys
derived from the master key.

Out of an abundance of caution and because it is trivial to do so, also
zero buffers containing the key payload in encrypted form, although
depending on how the encrypted-keys feature is used such information
does not necessarily need to be kept secret.

Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-06-09 13:29:48 +10:00
Eric Biggers 6966c74932 KEYS: user_defined: sanitize key payloads
Zero the payloads of user and logon keys before freeing them.  This
prevents sensitive key material from being kept around in the slab
caches after a key is released.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-06-09 13:29:48 +10:00
Eric Biggers 57070c850a KEYS: sanitize add_key() and keyctl() key payloads
Before returning from add_key() or one of the keyctl() commands that
takes in a key payload, zero the temporary buffer that was allocated to
hold the key payload copied from userspace.  This may contain sensitive
key material that should not be kept around in the slab caches.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-06-09 13:29:48 +10:00
Eric Biggers 63a0b0509e KEYS: fix freeing uninitialized memory in key_update()
key_update() freed the key_preparsed_payload even if it was not
initialized first.  This would cause a crash if userspace called
keyctl_update() on a key with type like "asymmetric" that has a
->preparse() method but not an ->update() method.  Possibly it could
even be triggered for other key types by racing with keyctl_setperm() to
make the KEY_NEED_WRITE check fail (the permission was already checked,
so normally it wouldn't fail there).

Reproducer with key type "asymmetric", given a valid cert.der:

keyctl new_session
keyid=$(keyctl padd asymmetric desc @s < cert.der)
keyctl setperm $keyid 0x3f000000
keyctl update $keyid data

[  150.686666] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
[  150.687601] IP: asymmetric_key_free_kids+0x12/0x30
[  150.688139] PGD 38a3d067
[  150.688141] PUD 3b3de067
[  150.688447] PMD 0
[  150.688745]
[  150.689160] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[  150.689455] Modules linked in:
[  150.689769] CPU: 1 PID: 2478 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.11.0-rc4-xfstests-00187-ga9f6b6b8cd2f #742
[  150.690916] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-20170228_101828-anatol 04/01/2014
[  150.692199] task: ffff88003b30c480 task.stack: ffffc90000350000
[  150.692952] RIP: 0010:asymmetric_key_free_kids+0x12/0x30
[  150.693556] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000353e58 EFLAGS: 00010202
[  150.694142] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000004
[  150.694845] RDX: ffffffff81ee3920 RSI: ffff88003d4b0700 RDI: 0000000000000001
[  150.697569] RBP: ffffc90000353e60 R08: ffff88003d5d2140 R09: 0000000000000000
[  150.702483] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001
[  150.707393] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: ffff880038a4d2d8 R15: 000000000040411f
[  150.709720] FS:  00007fcbcee35700(0000) GS:ffff88003fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  150.711504] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  150.712733] CR2: 0000000000000001 CR3: 0000000039eab000 CR4: 00000000003406e0
[  150.714487] Call Trace:
[  150.714975]  asymmetric_key_free_preparse+0x2f/0x40
[  150.715907]  key_update+0xf7/0x140
[  150.716560]  ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
[  150.717319]  keyctl_update_key+0xb0/0xe0
[  150.718066]  SyS_keyctl+0x109/0x130
[  150.718663]  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
[  150.719440] RIP: 0033:0x7fcbce75ff19
[  150.719926] RSP: 002b:00007ffd5d167088 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000fa
[  150.720918] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000404d80 RCX: 00007fcbce75ff19
[  150.721874] RDX: 00007ffd5d16785e RSI: 000000002866cd36 RDI: 0000000000000002
[  150.722827] RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 000000002866cd36 R09: 00007ffd5d16785e
[  150.723781] R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000404d80
[  150.724650] R13: 00007ffd5d16784d R14: 00007ffd5d167238 R15: 000000000040411f
[  150.725447] Code: 83 c4 08 31 c0 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 85 ff 74 23 55 48 89 e5 53 48 89 fb <48> 8b 3f e8 06 21 c5 ff 48 8b 7b 08 e8 fd 20 c5 ff 48 89 df e8
[  150.727489] RIP: asymmetric_key_free_kids+0x12/0x30 RSP: ffffc90000353e58
[  150.728117] CR2: 0000000000000001
[  150.728430] ---[ end trace f7f8fe1da2d5ae8d ]---

Fixes: 4d8c0250b8 ("KEYS: Call ->free_preparse() even after ->preparse() returns an error")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.17+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-06-09 13:29:47 +10:00
Eric Biggers 5649645d72 KEYS: fix dereferencing NULL payload with nonzero length
sys_add_key() and the KEYCTL_UPDATE operation of sys_keyctl() allowed a
NULL payload with nonzero length to be passed to the key type's
->preparse(), ->instantiate(), and/or ->update() methods.  Various key
types including asymmetric, cifs.idmap, cifs.spnego, and pkcs7_test did
not handle this case, allowing an unprivileged user to trivially cause a
NULL pointer dereference (kernel oops) if one of these key types was
present.  Fix it by doing the copy_from_user() when 'plen' is nonzero
rather than when '_payload' is non-NULL, causing the syscall to fail
with EFAULT as expected when an invalid buffer is specified.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.10+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-06-09 13:29:47 +10:00
Eric Biggers 0f534e4a13 KEYS: encrypted: use constant-time HMAC comparison
MACs should, in general, be compared using crypto_memneq() to prevent
timing attacks.

Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-06-09 13:29:47 +10:00