Commit Graph

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Patrick McHardy f4a87e7bd2 netfilter: synproxy: fix BUG_ON triggered by corrupt TCP packets
TCP packets hitting the SYN proxy through the SYNPROXY target are not
validated by TCP conntrack. When th->doff is below 5, an underflow happens
when calculating the options length, causing skb_header_pointer() to
return NULL and triggering the BUG_ON().

Handle this case gracefully by checking for NULL instead of using BUG_ON().

Reported-by: Martin Topholm <mph@one.com>
Tested-by: Martin Topholm <mph@one.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2013-09-30 12:44:38 +02:00
Jesper Dangaard Brouer 7cc9eb6ef7 netfilter: SYNPROXY: let unrelated packets continue
Packets reaching SYNPROXY were default dropped, as they were most
likely invalid (given the recommended state matching).  This
patch, changes SYNPROXY target to let packets, not consumed,
continue being processed by the stack.

This will be more in line other target modules. As it will allow
more flexible configurations of handling, logging or matching on
packets in INVALID states.

Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2013-09-04 11:44:23 +02:00
Jesper Dangaard Brouer 775ada6d9f netfilter: more strict TCP flag matching in SYNPROXY
Its seems Patrick missed to incoorporate some of my requested changes
during review v2 of SYNPROXY netfilter module.

Which were, to avoid SYN+ACK packets to enter the path, meant for the
ACK packet from the client (from the 3WHS).

Further there were a bug in ip6t_SYNPROXY.c, for matching SYN packets
that didn't exclude the ACK flag.

Go a step further with SYN packet/flag matching by excluding flags
ACK+FIN+RST, in both IPv4 and IPv6 modules.

The intented usage of SYNPROXY is as follows:
(gracefully describing usage in commit)

 iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -i eth0 -p tcp --dport 80 --syn -j NOTRACK
 iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -p tcp --dport 80 -m state UNTRACKED,INVALID \
         -j SYNPROXY --sack-perm --timestamp --mss 1480 --wscale 7 --ecn

 echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tcp_loose

This does filter SYN flags early, for packets in the UNTRACKED state,
but packets in the INVALID state with other TCP flags could still
reach the module, thus this stricter flag matching is still needed.

Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2013-09-04 11:43:11 +02:00
Patrick McHardy 48b1de4c11 netfilter: add SYNPROXY core/target
Add a SYNPROXY for netfilter. The code is split into two parts, the synproxy
core with common functions and an address family specific target.

The SYNPROXY receives the connection request from the client, responds with
a SYN/ACK containing a SYN cookie and announcing a zero window and checks
whether the final ACK from the client contains a valid cookie.

It then establishes a connection to the original destination and, if
successful, sends a window update to the client with the window size
announced by the server.

Support for timestamps, SACK, window scaling and MSS options can be
statically configured as target parameters if the features of the server
are known. If timestamps are used, the timestamp value sent back to
the client in the SYN/ACK will be different from the real timestamp of
the server. In order to now break PAWS, the timestamps are translated in
the direction server->client.

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Tested-by: Martin Topholm <mph@one.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2013-08-28 00:27:54 +02:00