Commit Graph

22 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Oleg Nesterov 51775fe736 apparmor: remove the "task" arg from may_change_ptraced_domain()
Unless task == current ptrace_parent(task) is not safe even under
rcu_read_lock() and most of the current users are not right.

So may_change_ptraced_domain(task) looks wrong as well. However it
is always called with task == current so the code is actually fine.
Remove this argument to make this fact clear.

Note: perhaps we should simply kill ptrace_parent(), it buys almost
nothing. And it is obviously racy, perhaps this should be fixed.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-10-29 21:34:18 -07:00
John Johansen dd0c6e86f6 apparmor: fix capability to not use the current task, during reporting
Mediation is based off of the cred but auditing includes the current
task which may not be related to the actual request.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-10-29 21:33:37 -07:00
John Johansen 038165070a apparmor: allow setting any profile into the unconfined state
Allow emulating the default profile behavior from boot, by allowing
loading of a profile in the unconfined state into a new NS.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2013-08-14 11:42:07 -07:00
John Johansen fa2ac468db apparmor: update how unconfined is handled
ns->unconfined is being used read side without locking, nor rcu but is
being updated when a namespace is removed. This works for the root ns
which is never removed but has a race window and can cause failures when
children namespaces are removed.

Also ns and ns->unconfined have a circular refcounting dependency that
is problematic and must be broken. Currently this is done incorrectly
when the namespace is destroyed.

Fix this by forward referencing unconfined via the replacedby infrastructure
instead of directly updating the ns->unconfined pointer.

Remove the circular refcount dependency by making the ns and its unconfined
profile share the same refcount.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2013-08-14 11:42:06 -07:00
John Johansen 77b071b340 apparmor: change how profile replacement update is done
remove the use of replaced by chaining and move to profile invalidation
and lookup to handle task replacement.

Replacement chaining can result in large chains of profiles being pinned
in memory when one profile in the chain is use. With implicit labeling
this will be even more of a problem, so move to a direct lookup method.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-08-14 11:42:06 -07:00
John Johansen 01e2b670aa apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-08-14 11:42:06 -07:00
John Johansen 214beacaa7 apparmor: localize getting the security context to a few macros
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2013-04-28 00:39:35 -07:00
John Johansen 7a2871b566 apparmor: use common fn to clear task_context for domain transitions
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
2013-04-28 00:36:20 -07:00
John Johansen 3cfcc19e0b apparmor: add utility function to get an arbitrary tasks profile.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
2013-04-28 00:35:53 -07:00
John Johansen 04266236b1 apparmor: Remove -W1 warnings
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-By: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
2013-04-28 00:35:18 -07:00
John Johansen 17322cc3f9 apparmor: fix auditing of domain transition failures due to incomplete policy
When policy specifies a transition to a profile that is not currently
loaded, it result in exec being denied.  However the failure is not being
audited correctly because the audit code is treating this as an allowed
permission and thus not reporting it.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-By: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
2013-04-28 00:35:04 -07:00
Al Viro 496ad9aa8e new helper: file_inode(file)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-02-22 23:31:31 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman 2db8145293 userns: Convert apparmor to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-09-21 03:13:21 -07:00
John Johansen c29bceb396 Fix execve behavior apparmor for PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS
Add support for AppArmor to explicitly fail requested domain transitions
if NO_NEW_PRIVS is set and the task is not unconfined.

Transitions from unconfined are still allowed because this always results
in a reduction of privileges.

Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>

v18: new acked-by, new description
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-04-14 11:13:18 +10:00
Andy Lutomirski 259e5e6c75 Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs
With this change, calling
  prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)
disables privilege granting operations at execve-time.  For example, a
process will not be able to execute a setuid binary to change their uid
or gid if this bit is set.  The same is true for file capabilities.

Additionally, LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS is defined to ensure that
LSMs respect the requested behavior.

To determine if the NO_NEW_PRIVS bit is set, a task may call
  prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0);
It returns 1 if set and 0 if it is not set. If any of the arguments are
non-zero, it will return -1 and set errno to -EINVAL.
(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS behaves similarly.)

This functionality is desired for the proposed seccomp filter patch
series.  By using PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, it allows a task to modify the
system call behavior for itself and its child tasks without being
able to impact the behavior of a more privileged task.

Another potential use is making certain privileged operations
unprivileged.  For example, chroot may be considered "safe" if it cannot
affect privileged tasks.

Note, this patch causes execve to fail when PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is
set and AppArmor is in use.  It is fixed in a subsequent patch.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

v18: updated change desc
v17: using new define values as per 3.4
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-04-14 11:13:18 +10:00
John Johansen 0421ea91dd apparmor: Fix change_onexec when called from a confined task
Fix failure in aa_change_onexec api when the request is made from a confined
task.  This failure was caused by two problems

 The AA_MAY_ONEXEC perm was not being mapped correctly for this case.

 The executable name was being checked as second time instead of using the
 requested onexec profile name, which may not be the same as the exec
 profile name. This mistake can not be exploited to grant extra permission
 because of the above flaw where the ONEXEC permission was not being mapped
 so it will not be granted.

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/963756

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-03-28 01:00:05 +11:00
John Johansen 57fa1e1809 AppArmor: Move path failure information into aa_get_name and rename
Move the path name lookup failure messages into the main path name lookup
routine, as the information is useful in more than just aa_path_perm.

Also rename aa_get_name to aa_path_name as it is not getting a reference
counted object with a corresponding put fn.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2012-03-14 06:15:25 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 95b6886526 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (54 commits)
  tpm_nsc: Fix bug when loading multiple TPM drivers
  tpm: Move tpm_tis_reenable_interrupts out of CONFIG_PNP block
  tpm: Fix compilation warning when CONFIG_PNP is not defined
  TOMOYO: Update kernel-doc.
  tpm: Fix a typo
  tpm_tis: Probing function for Intel iTPM bug
  tpm_tis: Fix the probing for interrupts
  tpm_tis: Delay ACPI S3 suspend while the TPM is busy
  tpm_tis: Re-enable interrupts upon (S3) resume
  tpm: Fix display of data in pubek sysfs entry
  tpm_tis: Add timeouts sysfs entry
  tpm: Adjust interface timeouts if they are too small
  tpm: Use interface timeouts returned from the TPM
  tpm_tis: Introduce durations sysfs entry
  tpm: Adjust the durations if they are too small
  tpm: Use durations returned from TPM
  TOMOYO: Enable conditional ACL.
  TOMOYO: Allow using argv[]/envp[] of execve() as conditions.
  TOMOYO: Allow using executable's realpath and symlink's target as conditions.
  TOMOYO: Allow using owner/group etc. of file objects as conditions.
  ...

Fix up trivial conflict in security/tomoyo/realpath.c
2011-07-27 19:26:38 -07:00
John Johansen 04fdc099f9 AppArmor: Fix reference to rcu protected pointer outside of rcu_read_lock
The pointer returned from tracehook_tracer_task() is only valid inside
the rcu_read_lock.  However the tracer pointer obtained is being passed
to aa_may_ptrace outside of the rcu_read_lock critical section.

Mover the aa_may_ptrace test into the rcu_read_lock critical section, to
fix this.

Kernels affected: 2.6.36 - 3.0

Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2011-06-29 02:02:03 +01:00
Tejun Heo 06d984737b ptrace: s/tracehook_tracer_task()/ptrace_parent()/
tracehook.h is on the way out.  Rename tracehook_tracer_task() to
ptrace_parent() and move it from tracehook.h to ptrace.h.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
2011-06-22 19:26:29 +02:00
James Morris 77c80e6b2f AppArmor: fix build warnings for non-const use of get_task_cred
Fix build warnings for non-const use of get_task_cred.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02 15:49:00 +10:00
John Johansen 898127c34e AppArmor: functions for domain transitions
AppArmor routines for controling domain transitions, which can occur at
exec or through self directed change_profile/change_hat calls.

Unconfined tasks are checked at exec against the profiles in the confining
profile namespace to determine if a profile should be attached to the task.

Confined tasks execs are controlled by the profile which provides rules
determining which execs are allowed and if so which profiles should be
transitioned to.

Self directed domain transitions allow a task to request transition
to a given profile.  If the transition is allowed then the profile will
be applied, either immeditately or at exec time depending on the request.
Immeditate self directed transitions have several security limitations
but have uses in setting up stub transition profiles and other limited
cases.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02 15:35:14 +10:00