Commit Graph

8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Mimi Zohar d726d8d719 integrity: move integrity_audit_msg()
This patch moves the integrity_audit_msg() function and defintion to
security/integrity/, the parent directory, renames the 'ima_audit'
boot command line option to 'integrity_audit', and fixes the Kconfig
help text to reflect the actual code.

Changelog:
- Fixed ifdef inclusion of integrity_audit_msg() (Fengguang Wu)

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2013-06-20 07:47:49 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin e0751257a6 ima: digital signature verification using asymmetric keys
Asymmetric keys were introduced in linux-3.7 to verify the signature on
signed kernel modules. The asymmetric keys infrastructure abstracts the
signature verification from the crypto details. This patch adds IMA/EVM
signature verification using asymmetric keys. Support for additional
signature verification methods can now be delegated to the asymmetric
key infrastructure.

Although the module signature header and the IMA/EVM signature header
could use the same format, to minimize the signature length and save
space in the extended attribute, this patch defines a new IMA/EVM
header format.  The main difference is that the key identifier is a
sha1[12 - 19] hash of the key modulus and exponent, similar to the
current implementation.  The only purpose of the key identifier is to
identify the corresponding key in the kernel keyring.  ima-evm-utils
was updated to support the new signature format.

While asymmetric signature verification functionality supports many
different hash algorithms, the hash used in this patch is calculated
during the IMA collection phase, based on the configured algorithm.
The default algorithm is sha1, but for backwards compatibility md5
is supported.  Due to this current limitation, signatures should be
generated using a sha1 hash algorithm.

Changes in this patch:
- Functionality has been moved to separate source file in order to get rid of
  in source #ifdefs.
- keyid is derived according to the RFC 3280. It does not require to assign
  IMA/EVM specific "description" when loading X509 certificate. Kernel
  asymmetric key subsystem automatically generate the description. Also
  loading a certificate does not require using of ima-evm-utils and can be
  done using keyctl only.
- keyid size is reduced to 32 bits to save xattr space.  Key search is done
  using partial match functionality of asymmetric_key_match().
- Kconfig option title was changed

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2013-02-06 21:22:18 -05:00
Dmitry Kasatkin f1be242c95 integrity: digital signature config option name change
Similar to SIGNATURE, rename INTEGRITY_DIGSIG to INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2012-01-18 10:46:27 +11:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 5e8898e97a lib: digital signature config option name change
It was reported that DIGSIG is confusing name for digital signature
module. It was suggested to rename DIGSIG to SIGNATURE.

Requested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2012-01-18 10:46:21 +11:00
Dmitry Kasatkin de35353375 digsig: build dependency fix
Fix build errors by adding Kconfig dependency on KEYS.
CRYPTO dependency removed.

  CC      security/integrity/digsig.o
security/integrity/digsig.c: In function ?integrity_digsig_verify?:
security/integrity/digsig.c:38:4: error: implicit declaration of function ?request_key?
security/integrity/digsig.c:38:17: error: ?key_type_keyring? undeclared (first use in this function)
security/integrity/digsig.c:38:17: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
make[2]: *** [security/integrity/digsig.o] Error 1

Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-11-22 10:02:32 +11:00
Dmitry Kasatkin 8607c50147 integrity: digital signature verification using multiple keyrings
Define separate keyrings for each of the different use cases - evm, ima,
and modules. Using different keyrings improves search performance, and also
allows "locking" specific keyring to prevent adding new keys.
This is useful for evm and module keyrings, when keys are usually only
added from initramfs.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2011-11-09 16:51:09 +02:00
Mimi Zohar 66dbc325af evm: re-release
EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity
attacks.  This patchset provides the framework and an initial method.  The
initial method maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security extended
attributes, storing the HMAC value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'.
Other methods of validating the integrity of a file's metadata will be posted
separately (eg. EVM-digital-signatures).

While this patchset does authenticate the security xattrs, and
cryptographically binds them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other
directory and inode metadata for more complete protection.  To help simplify
the review and upstreaming process, each extension will be posted separately
(eg. IMA-appraisal, IMA-appraisal-directory).  For a general overview of the
proposed Linux integrity subsystem, refer to Dave Safford's whitepaper:
http://downloads.sf.net/project/linux-ima/linux-ima/Integrity_overview.pdf.

EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it with a
trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation. The key is loaded onto the
root's keyring using keyctl.  Until EVM receives notification that the key has
been successfully loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM can
not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN.
Loading the key and signaling EVM should be done as early as possible. Normally
this is done in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part of the
trusted boot.  For more information on creating and loading existing
trusted/encrypted keys, refer to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt.  A
sample dracut patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables EVM, is
available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.

Based on the LSMs enabled, the set of EVM protected security xattrs is defined
at compile.  EVM adds the following three calls to the existing security hooks:
evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), and evm_inode_removexattr.  To
initialize and update the 'security.evm' extended attribute, EVM defines three
calls: evm_inode_post_init(), evm_inode_post_setattr() and
evm_inode_post_removexattr() hooks.  To verify the integrity of a security
xattr, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr().

Changelog v7:
- Fixed URL in EVM ABI documentation

Changelog v6: (based on Serge Hallyn's review)
- fix URL in patch description
- remove evm_hmac_size definition
- use SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE (removed both MAX_DIGEST_SIZE and evm_hmac_size)
- moved linux include before other includes
- test for crypto_hash_setkey failure
- fail earlier for invalid key
- clear entire encrypted key, even on failure
- check xattr name length before comparing xattr names

Changelog:
- locking based on i_mutex, remove evm_mutex
- using trusted/encrypted keys for storing the EVM key used in the HMAC-sha1
  operation.
- replaced crypto hash with shash (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- support for additional methods of verifying the security xattrs
  (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- iint not allocated for all regular files, but only for those appraised
- Use cap_sys_admin in lieu of cap_mac_admin
- Use __vfs_setxattr_noperm(), without permission checks, from EVM

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
2011-07-18 12:29:40 -04:00
Mimi Zohar f381c27222 integrity: move ima inode integrity data management
Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory
in order to share the iint among the different integrity models.

Changelog:
- don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE
- rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs,
  locks, etc to 'integrity_'
- replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
- reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles
- remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0
- rebased on current ima_iint.c
- define integrity_iint_store/lock as static

There should be no other functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
2011-07-18 12:29:38 -04:00