When RLIMIT_STACK is, for example, 256MB, the current code results in a
gap between the top of the task and mmap_base of 256MB, failing to take
into account the amount by which the stack address was randomized. In
other words, the stack gets less than RLIMIT_STACK space.
Ensure that the gap between the stack and mmap_base always takes stack
randomization and the stack guard gap into account.
Inspired by Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170622200033.25714-4-riel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.
This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.
Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.
One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications. For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).
Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.
Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.
Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The recent patch to add runtime configuration of the ASLR limits added a bug in
arch_mmap_rnd() where we may shift an integer (32-bits) by up to 33 bits,
leading to undefined behaviour.
In practice it exhibits as every process seg faulting instantly, presumably
because the rnd value hasn't been restricited by the modulus at all. We didn't
notice because it only happens under certain kernel configurations and if the
number of bits is actually set to a large value.
Fix it by switching to unsigned long.
Fixes: 9fea59bd7c ("powerpc/mm: Add support for runtime configuration of ASLR limits")
Reported-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Add powerpc support for mmap_rnd_bits and mmap_rnd_compat_bits, which are two
sysctls that allow a user to configure the number of bits of randomness used for
ASLR.
Because of the way the Kconfig for ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS is defined, we have to
construct at least the MIN value in Kconfig, vs in a header which would be more
natural. Given that we just go ahead and do it all in Kconfig.
At least according to the code (the documentation makes no mention of it), the
value is defined as the number of bits of randomisation *of the page*, not the
address. This makes some sense, with larger page sizes more of the low bits are
forced to zero, which would reduce the randomisation if we didn't take the
PAGE_SIZE into account. However it does mean the min/max values have to change
depending on the PAGE_SIZE in order to actually limit the amount of address
space consumed by the randomisation.
The result of that is that we have to define the default values based on both
32-bit vs 64-bit, but also the configured PAGE_SIZE. Furthermore now that we
have 128TB address space support on Book3S, we also have to take that into
account.
Finally we can wire up the value in arch_mmap_rnd().
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
As part of the new large address space support, processes start out life with a
128TB virtual address space. However when calling mmap() a process can pass a
hint address, and if that hint is > 128TB the kernel will use the full 512TB
address space to try and satisfy the mmap() request.
Currently we have a check that the hint is > 128TB and < 512TB (TASK_SIZE),
which was added as an optimisation to avoid updating addr_limit unnecessarily
and also to avoid calling slice_flush_segments() on all CPUs more than
necessary.
However this has the user-visible side effect that an mmap() hint above 512TB
does not search the full address space unless a preceding mmap() used a hint
value > 128TB && < 512TB.
So fix it to treat any hint above 128TB as a hint to search the full address
space, instead of checking the hint against TASK_SIZE, we instead check if the
addr_limit is already == TASK_SIZE.
This also brings the ABI in-line with what is proposed on x86. ie, that a hint
address above 128TB up to and including (2^64)-1 is an indication to search the
full address space.
Fixes: f4ea6dcb08 (powerpc/mm: Enable mappings above 128TB)
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
We don't init addr_limit correctly for 32 bit applications. So default to using
mm->task_size for boundary condition checking. We use addr_limit to only control
free space search. This makes sure that we do the right thing with 32 bit
applications.
We should consolidate the usage of TASK_SIZE/mm->task_size and
mm->context.addr_limit later.
This partially reverts commit fbfef9027c (powerpc/mm: Switch some
TASK_SIZE checks to use mm_context addr_limit).
Fixes: fbfef9027c ("powerpc/mm: Switch some TASK_SIZE checks to use mm_context addr_limit")
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Not all user space application is ready to handle wide addresses. It's
known that at least some JIT compilers use higher bits in pointers to
encode their information. It collides with valid pointers with 512TB
addresses and leads to crashes.
To mitigate this, we are not going to allocate virtual address space
above 128TB by default.
But userspace can ask for allocation from full address space by
specifying hint address (with or without MAP_FIXED) above 128TB.
If hint address set above 128TB, but MAP_FIXED is not specified, we try
to look for unmapped area by specified address. If it's already
occupied, we look for unmapped area in *full* address space, rather than
from 128TB window.
This approach helps to easily make application's memory allocator aware
about large address space without manually tracking allocated virtual
address space.
This is going to be a per mmap decision. ie, we can have some mmaps with
larger addresses and other that do not.
A sample memory layout looks like:
10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fc:00 9057045 /home/max_addr_512TB
10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fc:00 9057045 /home/max_addr_512TB
10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fc:00 9057045 /home/max_addr_512TB
10029630000-10029660000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap]
7fff834a0000-7fff834b0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7fff834b0000-7fff83670000 r-xp 00000000 fc:00 9177190 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so
7fff83670000-7fff83680000 r--p 001b0000 fc:00 9177190 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so
7fff83680000-7fff83690000 rw-p 001c0000 fc:00 9177190 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so
7fff83690000-7fff836a0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7fff836a0000-7fff836c0000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso]
7fff836c0000-7fff83700000 r-xp 00000000 fc:00 9177193 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/ld-2.23.so
7fff83700000-7fff83710000 r--p 00030000 fc:00 9177193 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/ld-2.23.so
7fff83710000-7fff83720000 rw-p 00040000 fc:00 9177193 /lib/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/ld-2.23.so
7fffdccf0000-7fffdcd20000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
1000000000000-1000000010000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
1ffff83710000-1ffff83720000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
We are going to split more MM APIs out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from a couple of .c files.
The APIs that we are going to move are:
arch_pick_mmap_layout()
arch_get_unmapped_area()
arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown()
mm_update_next_owner()
Include the header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We are going to split <linux/sched/signal.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/signal.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Hash needs special get_unmapped_area() handling because of limitations
around base page size, so we have to set HAVE_ARCH_UNMAPPED_AREA.
With radix we don't have such restrictions, so we could use the generic
code. But because we've set HAVE_ARCH_UNMAPPED_AREA (for hash), we have
to re-implement the same logic as the generic code.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Sometimes when sparse warns about undefined symbols, it isn't
because they should have 'static' added, it's because they're
overriding __weak symbols defined elsewhere, and the header has
been missed.
Fix a few of them by adding appropriate headers.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Replace calls to get_random_int() followed by a cast to (unsigned long)
with calls to get_random_long(). Also address shifting bug which, in
case of x86 removed entropy mask for mmap_rnd_bits values > 31 bits.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When an architecture fully supports randomizing the ELF load location,
a per-arch mmap_rnd() function is used to find a randomized mmap base.
In preparation for randomizing the location of ET_DYN binaries
separately from mmap, this renames and exports these functions as
arch_mmap_rnd(). Additionally introduces CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
for describing this feature on architectures that support it
(which is a superset of ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE, since s390
already supports a separated ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR without the
ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE logic).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com>
Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com>
Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com>
Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com>
Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com>
Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In preparation for splitting out ET_DYN ASLR, this refactors the use of
mmap_rnd() to be used similarly to arm and x86.
(Can mmap ASLR be safely enabled in the legacy mmap case here? Other
archs use "mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + random_factor".)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Since all architectures have been converted to use vm_unmapped_area(),
there is no remaining use for the free_area_cache.
Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
On 64bit there is a possibility our stack and mmap randomisation will put
the two close enough such that we can't expand our stack to match the ulimit
specified.
To avoid this, start the upper mmap address at 1GB + 128MB below the top of our
address space, so in the worst case we end up with the same ~128MB hole as in
32bit. This works because we randomise the stack over a 1GB range.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
get_random_int() returns the same value within a 1 jiffy interval. This means
that the mmap and stack regions will almost always end up the same distance
apart, making a relative offset based attack possible.
To fix this, shift the randomness we use for the mmap region by 1 bit.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Rearrange mmap.c to better match the x86 version.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
First thing mm.h does is including sched.h solely for can_do_mlock() inline
function which has "current" dereference inside. By dealing with can_do_mlock()
mm.h can be detached from sched.h which is good. See below, why.
This patch
a) removes unconditional inclusion of sched.h from mm.h
b) makes can_do_mlock() normal function in mm/mlock.c
c) exports can_do_mlock() to not break compilation
d) adds sched.h inclusions back to files that were getting it indirectly.
e) adds less bloated headers to some files (asm/signal.h, jiffies.h) that were
getting them indirectly
Net result is:
a) mm.h users would get less code to open, read, preprocess, parse, ... if
they don't need sched.h
b) sched.h stops being dependency for significant number of files:
on x86_64 allmodconfig touching sched.h results in recompile of 4083 files,
after patch it's only 3744 (-8.3%).
Cross-compile tested on
all arm defconfigs, all mips defconfigs, all powerpc defconfigs,
alpha alpha-up
arm
i386 i386-up i386-defconfig i386-allnoconfig
ia64 ia64-up
m68k
mips
parisc parisc-up
powerpc powerpc-up
s390 s390-up
sparc sparc-up
sparc64 sparc64-up
um-x86_64
x86_64 x86_64-up x86_64-defconfig x86_64-allnoconfig
as well as my two usual configs.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch removes all self references and fixes references to files
in the now defunct arch/ppc64 tree. I think this accomplises
everything wanted, though there might be a few references I missed.
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jdmason@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
This moves the remaining files in arch/ppc64/mm to arch/powerpc/mm,
and arranges that we use them when compiling with ARCH=ppc64.
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Rik van Riel
Hugh Dickins
Michael Ellerman
Aneesh Kumar K.V
Ingo Molnar
Daniel Axtens
Daniel Cashman
Kees Cook
Michel Lespinasse
Daniel Walker
Benjamin Herrenschmidt
Anton Blanchard
Alexey Dobriyan
Jon Mason
Paul Mackerras