Commit Graph

86 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
David Woodhouse 2148ccc437 [PATCH] MLSXFRM: fix mis-labelling of child sockets
Accepted connections of types other than AF_INET, AF_INET6, AF_UNIX won't
have an appropriate label derived from the peer, so don't use it.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-29 15:58:21 -07:00
Cory Olmo 3528a95322 [PATCH] SELinux: support mls categories for context mounts
Allows commas to be embedded into context mount options (i.e.  "-o
context=some_selinux_context_t"), to better support multiple categories,
which are separated by commas and confuse mount.

For example, with the current code:

  mount -t iso9660 /dev/cdrom /media/cdrom -o \
  ro,context=system_u:object_r:iso9660_t:s0:c1,c3,c4,exec

The context option that will be interpreted by SELinux is
context=system_u:object_r:iso9660_t:s0:c1

instead of
context=system_u:object_r:iso9660_t:s0:c1,c3,c4

The options that will be passed on to the file system will be
ro,c3,c4,exec.

The proposed solution is to allow/require the SELinux context option
specified to mount to use quotes when the context contains a comma.

This patch modifies the option parsing in parse_opts(), contained in
mount.c, to take options after finding a comma only if it hasn't seen a
quote or if the quotes are matched.  It also introduces a new function that
will strip the quotes from the context option prior to translation.  The
quotes are replaced after the translation is completed to insure that in
the event the raw context contains commas the kernel will be able to
interpret the correct context.

Signed-off-by: Cory Olmo <colmo@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-29 09:18:03 -07:00
Stephen Smalley b20c8122a3 [PATCH] selinux: fix tty locking
Take tty_mutex when accessing ->signal->tty in selinux code.  Noted by Alan
Cox.  Longer term, we are looking at refactoring the code to provide better
encapsulation of the tty layer, but this is a simple fix that addresses the
immediate bug.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-26 08:48:53 -07:00
Eric Paris bc7e982b84 [PATCH] SELinux: convert sbsec semaphore to a mutex
This patch converts the semaphore in the superblock security struct to a
mutex.  No locking changes or other code changes are done.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-26 08:48:53 -07:00
Eric Paris 2397074172 [PATCH] SELinux: change isec semaphore to a mutex
This patch converts the remaining isec->sem into a mutex.  Very similar
locking is provided as before only in the faster smaller mutex rather than a
semaphore.  An out_unlock path is introduced rather than the conditional
unlocking found in the original code.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-26 08:48:53 -07:00
Eric Paris 296fddf751 [PATCH] SELinux: eliminate inode_security_set_security
inode_security_set_sid is only called by security_inode_init_security, which
is called when a new file is being created and needs to have its incore
security state initialized and its security xattr set.  This helper used to be
called in other places in the past, but now only has the one.  So this patch
rolls inode_security_set_sid directly back into security_inode_init_security.
There also is no need to hold the isec->sem while doing this, as the inode is
not available to other threads at this point in time.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-26 08:48:53 -07:00
Paul Moore 99f59ed073 [NetLabel]: Correctly initialize the NetLabel fields.
Fix a problem where the NetLabel specific fields of the sk_security_struct
structure were not being initialized early enough in some cases.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 15:18:34 -07:00
Adrian Bunk 9a673e563e [SELINUX]: security/selinux/hooks.c: Make 4 functions static.
This patch makes four needlessly global functions static.

Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 14:54:44 -07:00
Venkat Yekkirala 7420ed23a4 [NetLabel]: SELinux support
Add NetLabel support to the SELinux LSM and modify the
socket_post_create() LSM hook to return an error code.  The most
significant part of this patch is the addition of NetLabel hooks into
the following SELinux LSM hooks:

 * selinux_file_permission()
 * selinux_socket_sendmsg()
 * selinux_socket_post_create()
 * selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb()
 * selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream()
 * selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram()
 * selinux_sock_graft()
 * selinux_inet_conn_request()

The basic reasoning behind this patch is that outgoing packets are
"NetLabel'd" by labeling their socket and the NetLabel security
attributes are checked via the additional hook in
selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb().  NetLabel itself is only a labeling
mechanism, similar to filesystem extended attributes, it is up to the
SELinux enforcement mechanism to perform the actual access checks.

In addition to the changes outlined above this patch also includes
some changes to the extended bitmap (ebitmap) and multi-level security
(mls) code to import and export SELinux TE/MLS attributes into and out
of NetLabel.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 14:53:36 -07:00
Venkat Yekkirala a51c64f1e5 [MLSXFRM]: Fix build with SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM disabled.
The following patch will fix the build problem (encountered by Andrew
Morton) when SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM is not enabled.

As compared to git-net-selinux_xfrm_decode_session-build-fix.patch in
-mm, this patch sets the return parameter sid to SECSID_NULL in
selinux_xfrm_decode_session() and handles this value in the caller
selinux_inet_conn_request() appropriately.

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 14:53:30 -07:00
Venkat Yekkirala 4237c75c0a [MLSXFRM]: Auto-labeling of child sockets
This automatically labels the TCP, Unix stream, and dccp child sockets
as well as openreqs to be at the same MLS level as the peer. This will
result in the selection of appropriately labeled IPSec Security
Associations.

This also uses the sock's sid (as opposed to the isec sid) in SELinux
enforcement of secmark in rcv_skb and postroute_last hooks.

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 14:53:29 -07:00
Venkat Yekkirala beb8d13bed [MLSXFRM]: Add flow labeling
This labels the flows that could utilize IPSec xfrms at the points the
flows are defined so that IPSec policy and SAs at the right label can
be used.

The following protos are currently not handled, but they should
continue to be able to use single-labeled IPSec like they currently
do.

ipmr
ip_gre
ipip
igmp
sit
sctp
ip6_tunnel (IPv6 over IPv6 tunnel device)
decnet

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 14:53:27 -07:00
Venkat Yekkirala e0d1caa7b0 [MLSXFRM]: Flow based matching of xfrm policy and state
This implements a seemless mechanism for xfrm policy selection and
state matching based on the flow sid. This also includes the necessary
SELinux enforcement pieces.

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 14:53:24 -07:00
Venkat Yekkirala 892c141e62 [MLSXFRM]: Add security sid to sock
This adds security for IP sockets at the sock level. Security at the
sock level is needed to enforce the SELinux security policy for
security associations even when a sock is orphaned (such as in the TCP
LAST_ACK state).

This will also be used to enforce SELinux controls over data arriving
at or leaving a child socket while it's still waiting to be accepted.

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 14:53:22 -07:00
Catherine Zhang dc49c1f94e [AF_UNIX]: Kernel memory leak fix for af_unix datagram getpeersec patch
From: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>

This patch implements a cleaner fix for the memory leak problem of the
original unix datagram getpeersec patch.  Instead of creating a
security context each time a unix datagram is sent, we only create the
security context when the receiver requests it.

This new design requires modification of the current
unix_getsecpeer_dgram LSM hook and addition of two new hooks, namely,
secid_to_secctx and release_secctx.  The former retrieves the security
context and the latter releases it.  A hook is required for releasing
the security context because it is up to the security module to decide
how that's done.  In the case of Selinux, it's a simple kfree
operation.

Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-08-02 14:12:06 -07:00
Eric Paris b04ea3cebf [PATCH] Fix security check for joint context= and fscontext= mount options
After some discussion on the actual meaning of the filesystem class
security check in try context mount it was determined that the checks for
the context= mount options were not correct if fscontext mount option had
already been used.

When labeling the superblock we should be checking relabel_from and
relabel_to.  But if the superblock has already been labeled (with
fscontext) then context= is actually labeling the inodes, and so we should
be checking relabel_from and associate.  This patch fixes which checks are
called depending on the mount options.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-07-14 21:53:55 -07:00
Eric Paris 0808925ea5 [PATCH] SELinux: add rootcontext= option to label root inode when mounting
Introduce a new rootcontext= option to FS mounting.  This option will allow
you to explicitly label the root inode of an FS being mounted before that
FS or inode because visible to userspace.  This was found to be useful for
things like stateless linux, see
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=190001

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-07-10 13:24:13 -07:00
Eric Paris c312feb293 [PATCH] SELinux: decouple fscontext/context mount options
Remove the conflict between fscontext and context mount options.  If
context= is specified without fscontext it will operate just as before, if
both are specified we will use mount point labeling and all inodes will get
the label specified by context=.  The superblock will be labeled with the
label of fscontext=, thus affecting operations which check the superblock
security context, such as associate permissions.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-07-10 13:24:13 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 22a3e233ca Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bunk/trivial
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bunk/trivial:
  Remove obsolete #include <linux/config.h>
  remove obsolete swsusp_encrypt
  arch/arm26/Kconfig typos
  Documentation/IPMI typos
  Kconfig: Typos in net/sched/Kconfig
  v9fs: do not include linux/version.h
  Documentation/DocBook/mtdnand.tmpl: typo fixes
  typo fixes: specfic -> specific
  typo fixes in Documentation/networking/pktgen.txt
  typo fixes: occuring -> occurring
  typo fixes: infomation -> information
  typo fixes: disadvantadge -> disadvantage
  typo fixes: aquire -> acquire
  typo fixes: mecanism -> mechanism
  typo fixes: bandwith -> bandwidth
  fix a typo in the RTC_CLASS help text
  smb is no longer maintained

Manually merged trivial conflict in arch/um/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
2006-06-30 15:39:30 -07:00
David Quigley a1836a42da [PATCH] SELinux: Add security hook definition for getioprio and insert hooks
Add a new security hook definition for the sys_ioprio_get operation.  At
present, the SELinux hook function implementation for this hook is
identical to the getscheduler implementation but a separate hook is
introduced to allow this check to be specialized in the future if
necessary.

This patch also creates a helper function get_task_ioprio which handles the
access check in addition to retrieving the ioprio value for the task.

Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-30 11:25:37 -07:00
David Quigley f9008e4c5c [PATCH] SELinux: extend task_kill hook to handle signals sent by AIO completion
This patch extends the security_task_kill hook to handle signals sent by AIO
completion.  In this case, the secid of the task responsible for the signal
needs to be obtained and saved earlier, so a security_task_getsecid() hook is
added, and then this saved value is passed subsequently to the extended
task_kill hook for use in checking.

Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-30 11:25:36 -07:00
Jörn Engel 6ab3d5624e Remove obsolete #include <linux/config.h>
Signed-off-by: Jörn Engel <joern@wohnheim.fh-wedel.de>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2006-06-30 19:25:36 +02:00
Catherine Zhang 877ce7c1b3 [AF_UNIX]: Datagram getpeersec
This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the
label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of
recvmsg.

Patch purpose:

This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the
security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket.  The application
can then use this security context to determine the security context for
processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet.

Patch design and implementation:

The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET
sockets.  Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for
retrieving user credentials.  Linux offers the API for obtaining user
credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages
that are bundled together with a normal message).  To retrieve the security
context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by
setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt.  Then the application
retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism.

An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this:

toggle = 1;
toggle_len = sizeof(toggle);

setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len);
recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0);
if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
    cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr);
    if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) &&
        cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
        cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
        memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));
    }
}

sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow
a server socket to receive security context of the peer.

Testing:

We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server
applications.  We verified that the server can retrieve the security context
using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.

Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-29 16:58:06 -07:00
Darrel Goeddel c7bdb545d2 [NETLINK]: Encapsulate eff_cap usage within security framework.
This patch encapsulates the usage of eff_cap (in netlink_skb_params) within
the security framework by extending security_netlink_recv to include a required
capability parameter and converting all direct usage of eff_caps outside
of the lsm modules to use the interface.  It also updates the SELinux
implementation of the security_netlink_send and security_netlink_recv
hooks to take advantage of the sid in the netlink_skb_params struct.
This also enables SELinux to perform auditing of netlink capability checks.
Please apply, for 2.6.18 if possible.

Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by:  James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-29 16:57:55 -07:00
Michael LeMay 28eba5bf9d [PATCH] selinux: inherit /proc/self/attr/keycreate across fork
Update SELinux to cause the keycreate process attribute held in
/proc/self/attr/keycreate to be inherited across a fork and reset upon
execve.  This is consistent with the handling of the other process
attributes provided by SELinux and also makes it simpler to adapt logon
programs to properly handle the keycreate attribute.

Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 17:32:37 -07:00
Eric Paris 42c3e03ef6 [PATCH] SELinux: Add sockcreate node to procattr API
Below is a patch to add a new /proc/self/attr/sockcreate A process may write a
context into this interface and all subsequent sockets created will be labeled
with that context.  This is the same idea as the fscreate interface where a
process can specify the label of a file about to be created.  At this time one
envisioned user of this will be xinetd.  It will be able to better label
sockets for the actual services.  At this time all sockets take the label of
the creating process, so all xinitd sockets would just be labeled the same.

I tested this by creating a tcp sender and listener.  The sender was able to
write to this new proc file and then create sockets with the specified label.
I am able to be sure the new label was used since the avc denial messages
kicked out by the kernel included both the new security permission
setsockcreate and all the socket denials were for the new label, not the label
of the running process.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:26 -07:00
Michael LeMay 4eb582cf1f [PATCH] keys: add a way to store the appropriate context for newly-created keys
Add a /proc/<pid>/attr/keycreate entry that stores the appropriate context for
newly-created keys.  Modify the selinux_key_alloc hook to make use of the new
entry.  Update the flask headers to include a new "setkeycreate" permission
for processes.  Update the flask headers to include a new "create" permission
for keys.  Use the create permission to restrict which SIDs each task can
assign to newly-created keys.  Add a new parameter to the security hook
"security_key_alloc" to indicate whether it is being invoked by the kernel, or
from userspace.  If it is being invoked by the kernel, the security hook
should never fail.  Update the documentation to reflect these changes.

Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:18 -07:00
David Howells 7e047ef5fe [PATCH] keys: sort out key quota system
Add the ability for key creation to overrun the user's quota in some
circumstances - notably when a session keyring is created and assigned to a
process that didn't previously have one.

This means it's still possible to log in, should PAM require the creation of a
new session keyring, and fix an overburdened key quota.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-26 09:58:18 -07:00
David Quigley 35601547ba [PATCH] SELinux: add task_movememory hook
This patch adds new security hook, task_movememory, to be called when memory
owened by a task is to be moved (e.g.  when migrating pages to a this hook is
identical to the setscheduler implementation, but a separate hook introduced
to allow this check to be specialized in the future if necessary.

Since the last posting, the hook has been renamed following feedback from
Christoph Lameter.

Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-23 07:42:54 -07:00
James Morris 03e6806063 [PATCH] lsm: add task_setioprio hook
Implement an LSM hook for setting a task's IO priority, similar to the hook
for setting a tasks's nice value.

A previous version of this LSM hook was included in an older version of
multiadm by Jan Engelhardt, although I don't recall it being submitted
upstream.

Also included is the corresponding SELinux hook, which re-uses the setsched
permission in the proccess class.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@linux01.gwdg.de>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-23 07:42:53 -07:00
David Howells 726c334223 [PATCH] VFS: Permit filesystem to perform statfs with a known root dentry
Give the statfs superblock operation a dentry pointer rather than a superblock
pointer.

This complements the get_sb() patch.  That reduced the significance of
sb->s_root, allowing NFS to place a fake root there.  However, NFS does
require a dentry to use as a target for the statfs operation.  This permits
the root in the vfsmount to be used instead.

linux/mount.h has been added where necessary to make allyesconfig build
successfully.

Interest has also been expressed for use with the FUSE and XFS filesystems.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Nathan Scott <nathans@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-23 07:42:45 -07:00
Michael LeMay d720024e94 [PATCH] selinux: add hooks for key subsystem
Introduce SELinux hooks to support the access key retention subsystem
within the kernel.  Incorporate new flask headers from a modified version
of the SELinux reference policy, with support for the new security class
representing retained keys.  Extend the "key_alloc" security hook with a
task parameter representing the intended ownership context for the key
being allocated.  Attach security information to root's default keyrings
within the SELinux initialization routine.

Has passed David's testsuite.

Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-22 15:05:55 -07:00
James Morris 4e5ab4cb85 [SECMARK]: Add new packet controls to SELinux
Add new per-packet access controls to SELinux, replacing the old
packet controls.

Packets are labeled with the iptables SECMARK and CONNSECMARK targets,
then security policy for the packets is enforced with these controls.

To allow for a smooth transition to the new controls, the old code is
still present, but not active by default.  To restore previous
behavior, the old controls may be activated at runtime by writing a
'1' to /selinux/compat_net, and also via the kernel boot parameter
selinux_compat_net.  Switching between the network control models
requires the security load_policy permission.  The old controls will
probably eventually be removed and any continued use is discouraged.

With this patch, the new secmark controls for SElinux are disabled by
default, so existing behavior is entirely preserved, and the user is
not affected at all.

It also provides a config option to enable the secmark controls by
default (which can always be overridden at boot and runtime).  It is
also noted in the kconfig help that the user will need updated
userspace if enabling secmark controls for SELinux and that they'll
probably need the SECMARK and CONNMARK targets, and conntrack protocol
helpers, although such decisions are beyond the scope of kernel
configuration.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-17 21:30:05 -07:00
Christopher J. PeBenito 3e3ff15e6d [SELINUX]: add security class for appletalk sockets
Add a security class for appletalk sockets so that they can be
distinguished in SELinux policy.  Please apply.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-17 21:29:51 -07:00
Catherine Zhang c8c05a8eec [LSM-IPsec]: SELinux Authorize
This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security
contexts to IPsec policies and security associations.  In the previous
patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to
SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security
assocations with security contexts.  Thus a user authorized to change
SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply
deleteing policies with security contexts.  To fix this security hole,
an additional authorization check is added for removing security
policies and security associations with security contexts.

Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on
policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change
unconditionally.  The hook is called on deletion when no context is
present, which we may want to change.  At present, I left it up to the
module.

LSM changes:

The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and
xfrm_state_delete.  The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion
of IPsec policies that have security contexts.  The existing hooks
xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the
authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and
memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM
interface.

Use:

The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are
deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy,
xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete).

SELinux changes:

The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added.

Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-17 21:29:45 -07:00
Stephen Smalley ba0c19ed6a [PATCH] selinux: fix sb_lock/sb_security_lock nesting
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Fix unsafe nesting of sb_lock inside sb_security_lock in
selinux_complete_init.  Detected by the kernel locking validator.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-05 12:29:16 -07:00
Alexey Dobriyan d4e9dc63dc [PATCH] selinux: endian fix
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-05-21 12:59:17 -07:00
Stephen Smalley 30d55280b8 [PATCH] selinux: Clear selinux_enabled flag upon runtime disable.
Clear selinux_enabled flag upon runtime disable of SELinux by userspace,
and make sure it is defined even if selinux= boot parameter support is
not enabled in configuration.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Tested-by: Jon Smirl <jonsmirl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-05-03 10:08:11 -07:00
Steve Grubb 9c7aa6aa74 [PATCH] change lspp ipc auditing
Hi,

The patch below converts IPC auditing to collect sid's and convert to context
string only if it needs to output an audit record. This patch depends on the
inode audit change patch already being applied.

Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2006-05-01 06:09:56 -04:00
Linus Torvalds 1b9a391736 Merge branch 'audit.b3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current
* 'audit.b3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current: (22 commits)
  [PATCH] fix audit_init failure path
  [PATCH] EXPORT_SYMBOL patch for audit_log, audit_log_start, audit_log_end and audit_format
  [PATCH] sem2mutex: audit_netlink_sem
  [PATCH] simplify audit_free() locking
  [PATCH] Fix audit operators
  [PATCH] promiscuous mode
  [PATCH] Add tty to syscall audit records
  [PATCH] add/remove rule update
  [PATCH] audit string fields interface + consumer
  [PATCH] SE Linux audit events
  [PATCH] Minor cosmetic cleanups to the code moved into auditfilter.c
  [PATCH] Fix audit record filtering with !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
  [PATCH] Fix IA64 success/failure indication in syscall auditing.
  [PATCH] Miscellaneous bug and warning fixes
  [PATCH] Capture selinux subject/object context information.
  [PATCH] Exclude messages by message type
  [PATCH] Collect more inode information during syscall processing.
  [PATCH] Pass dentry, not just name, in fsnotify creation hooks.
  [PATCH] Define new range of userspace messages.
  [PATCH] Filter rule comparators
  ...

Fixed trivial conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c
2006-03-25 09:24:53 -08:00
James Morris 7cae7e26f2 [PATCH] SELinux: add slab cache for inode security struct
Add a slab cache for the SELinux inode security struct, one of which is
allocated for every inode instantiated by the system.

The memory savings are considerable.

On 64-bit, instead of the size-128 cache, we have a slab object of 96
bytes, saving 32 bytes per object.  After booting, I see about 4000 of
these and then about 17,000 after a kernel compile.  With this patch, we
save around 530KB of kernel memory in the latter case.  On 32-bit, the
savings are about half of this.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-22 07:54:07 -08:00
James Morris cf01efd098 [PATCH] SELinux: cleanup stray variable in selinux_inode_init_security()
Remove an unneded pointer variable in selinux_inode_init_security().

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-22 07:54:07 -08:00
Stephen Smalley 8aad38752e [PATCH] selinux: Disable automatic labeling of new inodes when no policy is loaded
This patch disables the automatic labeling of new inodes on disk
when no policy is loaded.

Discussion is here:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=180296

In short, we're changing the behavior so that when no policy is loaded,
SELinux does not label files at all.  Currently it does add an 'unlabeled'
label in this case, which we've found causes problems later.

SELinux always maintains a safe internal label if there is none, so with this
patch, we just stick with that and wait until a policy is loaded before adding
a persistent label on disk.

The effect is simply that if you boot with SELinux enabled but no policy
loaded and create a file in that state, SELinux won't try to set a security
extended attribute on the new inode on the disk.  This is the only sane
behavior for SELinux in that state, as it cannot determine the right label to
assign in the absence of a policy.  That state usually doesn't occur, but the
rawhide installer seemed to be misbehaving temporarily so it happened to show
up on a test install.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-22 07:54:06 -08:00
Catherine Zhang 2c7946a7bf [SECURITY]: TCP/UDP getpeersec
This patch implements an application of the LSM-IPSec networking
controls whereby an application can determine the label of the
security association its TCP or UDP sockets are currently connected to
via getsockopt and the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.

Patch purpose:

This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the
security context of an IPSec security association a particular TCP or
UDP socket is using.  The application can then use this security
context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of
the peer at the other end of this connection.  In the case of UDP, the
security context is for each individual packet.  An example
application is the inetd daemon, which could be modified to start
daemons running at security contexts dependent on the remote client.

Patch design approach:

- Design for TCP
The patch enables the SELinux LSM to set the peer security context for
a socket based on the security context of the IPSec security
association.  The application may retrieve this context using
getsockopt.  When called, the kernel determines if the socket is a
connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket and, if so, uses the dst_entry
cache on the socket to retrieve the security associations.  If a
security association has a security context, the context string is
returned, as for UNIX domain sockets.

- Design for UDP
Unlike TCP, UDP is connectionless.  This requires a somewhat different
API to retrieve the peer security context.  With TCP, the peer
security context stays the same throughout the connection, thus it can
be retrieved at any time between when the connection is established
and when it is torn down.  With UDP, each read/write can have
different peer and thus the security context might change every time.
As a result the security context retrieval must be done TOGETHER with
the packet retrieval.

The solution is to build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for
retrieving user credentials.  Linux offers the API for obtaining user
credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages
that are bundled together with a normal message).

Patch implementation details:

- Implementation for TCP
The security context can be retrieved by applications using getsockopt
with the existing SO_PEERSEC flag.  As an example (ignoring error
checking):

getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, optbuf, &optlen);
printf("Socket peer context is: %s\n", optbuf);

The SELinux function, selinux_socket_getpeersec, is extended to check
for labeled security associations for connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED ==
sk->sk_state) TCP sockets only.  If so, the socket has a dst_cache of
struct dst_entry values that may refer to security associations.  If
these have security associations with security contexts, the security
context is returned.

getsockopt returns a buffer that contains a security context string or
the buffer is unmodified.

- Implementation for UDP
To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to
the kernel such desire by setting the IP_PASSSEC option via
getsockopt.  Then the application retrieves the security context using
the auxiliary data mechanism.

An example server application for UDP should look like this:

toggle = 1;
toggle_len = sizeof(toggle);

setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len);
recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0);
if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
    cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr);
    if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) &&
        cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_IP &&
        cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
        memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));
    }
}

ip_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option IP_PASSSEC to allow
a server socket to receive security context of the peer.  A new
ancillary message type SCM_SECURITY.

When the packet is received we get the security context from the
sec_path pointer which is contained in the sk_buff, and copy it to the
ancillary message space.  An additional LSM hook,
selinux_socket_getpeersec_udp, is defined to retrieve the security
context from the SELinux space.  The existing function,
selinux_socket_getpeersec does not suit our purpose, because the
security context is copied directly to user space, rather than to
kernel space.

Testing:

We have tested the patch by setting up TCP and UDP connections between
applications on two machines using the IPSec policies that result in
labeled security associations being built.  For TCP, we can then
extract the peer security context using getsockopt on either end.  For
UDP, the receiving end can retrieve the security context using the
auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.

Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-20 22:41:23 -08:00
Dustin Kirkland 7306a0b9b3 [PATCH] Miscellaneous bug and warning fixes
This patch fixes a couple of bugs revealed in new features recently
added to -mm1:
* fixes warnings due to inconsistent use of const struct inode *inode
* fixes bug that prevent a kernel from booting with audit on, and SELinux off
  due to a missing function in security/dummy.c
* fixes a bug that throws spurious audit_panic() messages due to a missing
  return just before an error_path label
* some reasonable house cleaning in audit_ipc_context(),
  audit_inode_context(), and audit_log_task_context()

Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
2006-03-20 14:08:54 -05:00
Dustin Kirkland 8c8570fb8f [PATCH] Capture selinux subject/object context information.
This patch extends existing audit records with subject/object context
information. Audit records associated with filesystem inodes, ipc, and
tasks now contain SELinux label information in the field "subj" if the
item is performing the action, or in "obj" if the item is the receiver
of an action.

These labels are collected via hooks in SELinux and appended to the
appropriate record in the audit code.

This additional information is required for Common Criteria Labeled
Security Protection Profile (LSPP).

[AV: fixed kmalloc flags use]
[folded leak fixes]
[folded cleanup from akpm (kfree(NULL)]
[folded audit_inode_context() leak fix]
[folded akpm's fix for audit_ipc_perm() definition in case of !CONFIG_AUDIT]

Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2006-03-20 14:08:54 -05:00
Stephen Smalley 341c2d806b [PATCH] selinux: tracer SID fix
Fix SELinux to not reset the tracer SID when the child is already being
traced, since selinux_ptrace is also called by proc for access checking
outside of the context of a ptrace attach.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-11 09:19:34 -08:00
Stephen Smalley c2b507fda3 [PATCH] selinux: require SECURITY_NETWORK
Make SELinux depend on SECURITY_NETWORK (which depends on SECURITY), as it
requires the socket hooks for proper operation even in the local case.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-02-05 11:06:52 -08:00
Stephen Smalley 9ac49d2213 [PATCH] selinux: remove security struct magic number fields and tests
Remove the SELinux security structure magic number fields and tests, along
with some unnecessary tests for NULL security pointers.  These fields and
tests are leftovers from the early attempts to support SELinux as a
loadable module during LSM development.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-02-01 08:53:19 -08:00
Stephen Smalley 26d2a4be6a [PATCH] selinux: change file_alloc_security to use GFP_KERNEL
This patch changes the SELinux file_alloc_security function to use
GFP_KERNEL rather than GFP_ATOMIC; the use of GFP_ATOMIC appears to be a
remnant of when this function was being called with the files_lock spinlock
held, and is no longer necessary.  Please apply.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-02-01 08:53:18 -08:00