commit 3b05ac3824 upstream.
The app_tcp_pkt_out() function expects "*diff" to be set and ends up
using uninitialized data if CONFIG_IP_VS_IPV6 is turned on.
The same issue is there in app_tcp_pkt_in(). Thanks to Julian Anastasov
for noticing that.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9ea2aa8b7d upstream.
Make sure there is enough room for the nfnetlink header in the
netlink messages that are part of the batch. There is a similar
check in netlink_rcv_skb().
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7ce64c79c4 upstream.
__netdev_adjacent_dev_insert may add adjust device of different net
namespace, without proper check it leads to emergence of broken
sysfs links from/to devices in another namespace.
Fix: rewrite netdev_adjacent_is_neigh_list macro as a function,
move net_eq check into netdev_adjacent_is_neigh_list.
(thanks David)
related to: 4c75431ac3
Signed-off-by: Alexander Fomichev <git.user@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Miquel van Smoorenburg <mikevs@xs4all.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4c75431ac3 upstream.
Code manipulating sysfs symlinks on adjacent net_devices(s)
currently doesn't take into account that devices potentially
belong to different namespaces.
This patch trying to fix an issue as follows:
- check for net_ns before creating / deleting symlink.
for now only netdev_adjacent_rename_links and
__netdev_adjacent_dev_remove are affected, afaics
__netdev_adjacent_dev_insert implies both net_devs
belong to the same namespace.
- Drop all existing symlinks to / from all adj_devs before
switching namespace and recreate them just after.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Y. Fomichev <git.user@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Miquel van Smoorenburg <mikevs@xs4all.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2196937e12 upstream.
We could be reading 8 bytes into a 4 byte buffer here. It seems
harmless but adding a check is the right thing to do and it silences a
static checker warning.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 08f6f14777 upstream.
The VHT supported channel width field is a two bit integer, not a
bitfield. cfg80211_chandef_usable() was interpreting it incorrectly and
ended up rejecting 160 MHz channel width if the driver indicated support
for both 160 and 80+80 MHz channels.
Fixes: 3d9d1d6656 ("nl80211/cfg80211: support VHT channel configuration")
(however, no real drivers had 160 MHz support it until 3.16)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 34f05f543f upstream.
In the already-set and intersect case of a driver-hint, the previous
wiphy regdomain was not freed before being reset with a copy of the
cfg80211 regdomain.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 70dcec5a48 upstream.
This can happen and there is no point in added more
detection code lower in the stack. Catching these in one
single point (cfg80211) is enough. Stop WARNING about this
case.
This fixes:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89001
Fixes: 2f1c6c572d ("cfg80211: process non country IE conflicting first")
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 2c26d34bbc ]
When using VXLAN tunnels and a sky2 device, I have experienced
checksum failures of the following type:
[ 4297.761899] eth0: hw csum failure
[...]
[ 4297.765223] Call Trace:
[ 4297.765224] <IRQ> [<ffffffff8172f026>] dump_stack+0x46/0x58
[ 4297.765235] [<ffffffff8162ba52>] netdev_rx_csum_fault+0x42/0x50
[ 4297.765238] [<ffffffff8161c1a0>] ? skb_push+0x40/0x40
[ 4297.765240] [<ffffffff8162325c>] __skb_checksum_complete+0xbc/0xd0
[ 4297.765243] [<ffffffff8168c602>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x2e2/0x950
[ 4297.765246] [<ffffffff81666ca0>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x360/0x360
These are reliably reproduced in a network topology of:
container:eth0 == host(OVS VXLAN on VLAN) == bond0 == eth0 (sky2) -> switch
When VXLAN encapsulated traffic is received from a similarly
configured peer, the above warning is generated in the receive
processing of the encapsulated packet. Note that the warning is
associated with the container eth0.
The skbs from sky2 have ip_summed set to CHECKSUM_COMPLETE, and
because the packet is an encapsulated Ethernet frame, the checksum
generated by the hardware includes the inner protocol and Ethernet
headers.
The receive code is careful to update the skb->csum, except in
__dev_forward_skb, as called by dev_forward_skb. __dev_forward_skb
calls eth_type_trans, which in turn calls skb_pull_inline(skb, ETH_HLEN)
to skip over the Ethernet header, but does not update skb->csum when
doing so.
This patch resolves the problem by adding a call to
skb_postpull_rcsum to update the skb->csum after the call to
eth_type_trans.
Signed-off-by: Jay Vosburgh <jay.vosburgh@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 843925f33f ]
Thomas Jarosch reported IPsec TCP stalls when a PMTU event occurs.
In fact the problem was completely unrelated to IPsec. The bug is
also reproducible if you just disable TSO/GSO.
The problem is that when the MSS goes down, existing queued packet
on the TX queue that have not been transmitted yet all look like
TSO packets and get treated as such.
This then triggers a bug where tcp_mss_split_point tells us to
generate a zero-sized packet on the TX queue. Once that happens
we're screwed because the zero-sized packet can never be removed
by ACKs.
Fixes: 1485348d24 ("tcp: Apply device TSO segment limit earlier")
Reported-by: Thomas Jarosch <thomas.jarosch@intra2net.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cheers,
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit b8fb4e0648 ]
skb_scrub_packet() is called when a packet switches between a context
such as between underlay and overlay, between namespaces, or between
L3 subnets.
While we already scrub the packet mark, connection tracking entry,
and cached destination, the security mark/context is left intact.
It seems wrong to inherit the security context of a packet when going
from overlay to underlay or across forwarding paths.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Acked-by: Flavio Leitner <fbl@sysclose.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 796f2da81b ]
When vlan tags are stacked, it is very likely that the outer tag is stored
in skb->vlan_tci and skb->protocol shows the inner tag's vlan_proto.
Currently netif_skb_features() first looks at skb->protocol even if there
is the outer tag in vlan_tci, thus it incorrectly retrieves the protocol
encapsulated by the inner vlan instead of the inner vlan protocol.
This allows GSO packets to be passed to HW and they end up being
corrupted.
Fixes: 58e998c6d2 ("offloading: Force software GSO for multiple vlan tags.")
Signed-off-by: Toshiaki Makita <makita.toshiaki@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 0d16449195 ]
Gateway having bandwidth_down equal to zero are not accepted
at all and so never added to the Gateway list.
For this reason checking the bandwidth_down member in
batadv_gw_out_of_range() is useless.
This is probably a copy/paste error and this check was supposed
to be "!gw_node" only. Moreover, the way the check is written
now may also lead to a NULL dereference.
Fix this by rewriting the if-condition properly.
Introduced by 414254e342
("batman-adv: tvlv - gateway download/upload bandwidth container")
Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <antonio@meshcoding.com>
Reported-by: David Binderman <dcb314@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 0402e444cd ]
The fragmentation code was replaced in 610bfc6bc9
("batman-adv: Receive fragmented packets and merge") by an implementation which
can handle up to 16 fragments of a packet. The packet is prepared for the split
in fragments by the function batadv_frag_send_packet and the actual split is
done by batadv_frag_create.
Both functions calculate the size of a fragment themself. But their calculation
differs because batadv_frag_send_packet also subtracts ETH_HLEN. Therefore,
the check in batadv_frag_send_packet "can a full fragment can be created?" may
return true even when batadv_frag_create cannot create a full fragment.
The function batadv_frag_create doesn't check the size of the skb before
splitting it and therefore might try to create a larger fragment than the
remaining buffer. This creates an integer underflow and an invalid len is given
to skb_split.
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 5b6698b0e4 ]
The fragmentation code was replaced in 610bfc6bc9
("batman-adv: Receive fragmented packets and merge"). The new code provided a
mostly unused parameter skb for the merging function. It is used inside the
function to calculate the additionally needed skb tailroom. But instead of
increasing its own tailroom, it is only increasing the tailroom of the first
queued skb. This is not correct in some situations because the first queued
entry can be a different one than the parameter.
An observed problem was:
1. packet with size 104, total_size 1464, fragno 1 was received
- packet is queued
2. packet with size 1400, total_size 1464, fragno 0 was received
- packet is queued at the end of the list
3. enough data was received and can be given to the merge function
(1464 == (1400 - 20) + (104 - 20))
- merge functions gets 1400 byte large packet as skb argument
4. merge function gets first entry in queue (104 byte)
- stored as skb_out
5. merge function calculates the required extra tail as total_size - skb->len
- pskb_expand_head tail of skb_out with 64 bytes
6. merge function tries to squeeze the extra 1380 bytes from the second queued
skb (1400 byte aka skb parameter) in the 64 extra tail bytes of skb_out
Instead calculate the extra required tail bytes for skb_out also using skb_out
instead of using the parameter skb. The skb parameter is only used to get the
total_size from the last received packet. This is also the total_size used to
decide that all fragments were received.
Reported-by: Philipp Psurek <philipp.psurek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Acked-by: Martin Hundebøll <martin@hundeboll.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit a18e6a186f ]
Each mmap Netlink frame contains a status field which indicates
whether the frame is unused, reserved, contains data or needs to
be skipped. Both loads and stores may not be reordeded and must
complete before the status field is changed and another CPU might
pick up the frame for use. Use an smp_mb() to cover needs of both
types of callers to netlink_set_status(), callers which have been
reading data frame from the frame, and callers which have been
filling or releasing and thus writing to the frame.
- Example code path requiring a smp_rmb():
memcpy(skb->data, (void *)hdr + NL_MMAP_HDRLEN, hdr->nm_len);
netlink_set_status(hdr, NL_MMAP_STATUS_UNUSED);
- Example code path requiring a smp_wmb():
hdr->nm_uid = from_kuid(sk_user_ns(sk), NETLINK_CB(skb).creds.uid);
hdr->nm_gid = from_kgid(sk_user_ns(sk), NETLINK_CB(skb).creds.gid);
netlink_frame_flush_dcache(hdr);
netlink_set_status(hdr, NL_MMAP_STATUS_VALID);
Fixes: f9c228 ("netlink: implement memory mapped recvmsg()")
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 4682a03586 ]
Checking the file f_count and the nlk->mapped count is not completely
sufficient to prevent the mmap'd area contents from changing from
under us during netlink mmap sendmsg() operations.
Be careful to sample the header's length field only once, because this
could change from under us as well.
Fixes: 5fd96123ee ("netlink: implement memory mapped sendmsg()")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 8a0033a947 ]
The NBMA GRE tunnels temporarily push GRE header that contain the
per-packet NBMA destination on the skb via header ops early in xmit
path. It is the later pulled before the real GRE header is constructed.
The inner mac was thus set differently in nbma case: the GRE header
has been pushed by neighbor layer, and mac header points to beginning
of the temporary gre header (set by dev_queue_xmit).
Now that the offloads expect mac header to point to the gre payload,
fix the xmit patch to:
- pull first the temporary gre header away
- and reset mac header to point to gre payload
This fixes tso to work again with nbma tunnels.
Fixes: 14051f0452 ("gre: Use inner mac length when computing tunnel length")
Signed-off-by: Timo Teräs <timo.teras@iki.fi>
Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 28a9bc6812 upstream.
When writing the code to allow per-station GTKs, I neglected to
take into account the management frame keys (index 4 and 5) when
freeing the station and only added code to free the first four
data frame keys.
Fix this by iterating the array of keys over the right length.
Fixes: e31b82136d ("cfg80211/mac80211: allow per-station GTKs")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d025933e29 upstream.
As multicast-frames can't be fragmented, "dot11MulticastReceivedFrameCount"
stopped being incremented after the use-after-free fix. Furthermore, the
RX-LED will be triggered by every multicast frame (which wouldn't happen
before) which wouldn't allow the LED to rest at all.
Fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89431 which also had the
patch.
Fixes: b8fff407a1 ("mac80211: fix use-after-free in defragmentation")
Signed-off-by: Andreas Müller <goo@stapelspeicher.org>
[rewrite commit message]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4f031fa9f1 upstream.
Commit 7ec7c4a9a6 (mac80211: port CCMP to
cryptoapi's CCM driver) introduced a regression when decrypting empty
packets (data_len == 0). This will lead to backtraces like:
(scatterwalk_start) from [<c01312f4>] (scatterwalk_map_and_copy+0x2c/0xa8)
(scatterwalk_map_and_copy) from [<c013a5a0>] (crypto_ccm_decrypt+0x7c/0x25c)
(crypto_ccm_decrypt) from [<c032886c>] (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt+0x160/0x170)
(ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt) from [<c031c628>] (ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt+0x1ac/0x238)
(ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt) from [<c032ef28>] (ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x870/0x1d24)
(ieee80211_rx_handlers) from [<c0330c7c>] (ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x8a0/0x91c)
(ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle) from [<c0331260>] (ieee80211_rx+0x568/0x730)
(ieee80211_rx) from [<c01d3054>] (__carl9170_rx+0x94c/0xa20)
(__carl9170_rx) from [<c01d3324>] (carl9170_rx_stream+0x1fc/0x320)
(carl9170_rx_stream) from [<c01cbccc>] (carl9170_usb_tasklet+0x80/0xc8)
(carl9170_usb_tasklet) from [<c00199dc>] (tasklet_hi_action+0x88/0xcc)
(tasklet_hi_action) from [<c00193c8>] (__do_softirq+0xcc/0x200)
(__do_softirq) from [<c0019734>] (irq_exit+0x80/0xe0)
(irq_exit) from [<c0009c10>] (handle_IRQ+0x64/0x80)
(handle_IRQ) from [<c000c3a0>] (__irq_svc+0x40/0x4c)
(__irq_svc) from [<c0009d44>] (arch_cpu_idle+0x2c/0x34)
Such packets can appear for example when using the carl9170 wireless driver
because hardware sometimes generates garbage when the internal FIFO overruns.
This patch adds an additional length check.
Fixes: 7ec7c4a9a6 ("mac80211: port CCMP to cryptoapi's CCM driver")
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Ronald Wahl <ronald.wahl@raritan.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 9772b54c55 ]
To accomodate for enough headroom for tunnels, use MAX_HEADER instead
of LL_MAX_HEADER. Robert reported that he has hit after roughly 40hrs
of trinity an skb_under_panic() via SCTP output path (see reference).
I couldn't reproduce it from here, but not using MAX_HEADER as elsewhere
in other protocols might be one possible cause for this.
In any case, it looks like accounting on chunks themself seems to look
good as the skb already passed the SCTP output path and did not hit
any skb_over_panic(). Given tunneling was enabled in his .config, the
headroom would have been expanded by MAX_HEADER in this case.
Reported-by: Robert Święcki <robert@swiecki.net>
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/12/1/507
Fixes: 594ccc14df ("[SCTP] Replace incorrect use of dev_alloc_skb with alloc_skb in sctp_packet_transmit().")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 6fb2a75673 ]
Set the inner mac header to point to the GRE payload when
doing GRO. This is needed if we proceed to send the packet
through GRE GSO which now uses the inner mac header instead
of inner network header to determine the length of encapsulation
headers.
Fixes: 14051f0452 ("gre: Use inner mac length when computing tunnel length")
Reported-by: Wolfgang Walter <linux@stwm.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit e0ebde0e13 ]
rtnl_link_get_net() holds a reference on the 'struct net', we need to release
it in case of error.
CC: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Fixes: b51642f6d7 ("net: Enable a userns root rtnl calls that are safe for unprivilged users")
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit be6572fdb1 ]
When using GRE redirection in WCCP, it sets the wrong skb->protocol,
that is, ETH_P_IP instead of ETH_P_IPV6 for the encapuslated traffic.
Fixes: c12b395a46 ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6")
Cc: Dmitry Kozlov <xeb@mail.ru>
Signed-off-by: Yuri Chislov <yuri.chislov@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yuri Chislov <yuri.chislov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 20ea60ca99 ]
Now the vti_link_ops do not point the .dellink, for fb tunnel device
(ip_vti0), the net_device will be removed as the default .dellink is
unregister_netdevice_queue,but the tunnel still in the tunnel list,
then if we add a new vti tunnel, in ip_tunnel_find():
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(t, head, hash_node) {
if (local == t->parms.iph.saddr &&
remote == t->parms.iph.daddr &&
link == t->parms.link &&
==> type == t->dev->type &&
ip_tunnel_key_match(&t->parms, flags, key))
break;
}
the panic will happen, cause dev of ip_tunnel *t is null:
[ 3835.072977] IP: [<ffffffffa04103fd>] ip_tunnel_find+0x9d/0xc0 [ip_tunnel]
[ 3835.073008] PGD b2c21067 PUD b7277067 PMD 0
[ 3835.073008] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
.....
[ 3835.073008] Stack:
[ 3835.073008] ffff8800b72d77f0 ffffffffa0411924 ffff8800bb956000 ffff8800b72d78e0
[ 3835.073008] ffff8800b72d78a0 0000000000000000 ffffffffa040d100 ffff8800b72d7858
[ 3835.073008] ffffffffa040b2e3 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 3835.073008] Call Trace:
[ 3835.073008] [<ffffffffa0411924>] ip_tunnel_newlink+0x64/0x160 [ip_tunnel]
[ 3835.073008] [<ffffffffa040b2e3>] vti_newlink+0x43/0x70 [ip_vti]
[ 3835.073008] [<ffffffff8150d4da>] rtnl_newlink+0x4fa/0x5f0
[ 3835.073008] [<ffffffff812f68bb>] ? nla_strlcpy+0x5b/0x70
[ 3835.073008] [<ffffffff81508fb0>] ? rtnl_link_ops_get+0x40/0x60
[ 3835.073008] [<ffffffff8150d11f>] ? rtnl_newlink+0x13f/0x5f0
[ 3835.073008] [<ffffffff81509cf4>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xa4/0x270
[ 3835.073008] [<ffffffff8126adf5>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90
[ 3835.073008] [<ffffffff81509c50>] ? rtnetlink_rcv+0x30/0x30
[ 3835.073008] [<ffffffff81529e39>] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa9/0xc0
[ 3835.073008] [<ffffffff81509c48>] rtnetlink_rcv+0x28/0x30
....
modprobe ip_vti
ip link del ip_vti0 type vti
ip link add ip_vti0 type vti
rmmod ip_vti
do that one or more times, kernel will panic.
fix it by assigning ip_tunnel_dellink to vti_link_ops' dellink, in
which we skip the unregister of fb tunnel device. do the same on ip6_vti.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b6ed549860 upstream.
batman tries to search dev->iflink to check if it's a batman interface,
but ->iflink could be 0, which is not a valid ifindex. It should just
avoid iflink == 0 case.
Reported-by: Jet Chen <jet.chen@intel.com>
Tested-by: Jet Chen <jet.chen@intel.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Antonio Quartulli <antonio@open-mesh.com>
Cc: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 91a0b60346 upstream.
ping_lookup() may return a wrong sock if sk_buff's and sock's protocols
dont' match. For example, sk_buff's protocol is ETH_P_IPV6, but sock's
sk_family is AF_INET, in that case, if sk->sk_bound_dev_if is zero, a wrong
sock will be returned.
the fix is to "continue" the searching, if no matching, return NULL.
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jane Zhou <a17711@motorola.com>
Signed-off-by: Yiwei Zhao <gbjc64@motorola.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 01462405f0 ]
This fixes an old regression introduced by commit
b0d0d915 (ipx: remove the BKL).
When a recvmsg syscall blocks waiting for new data, no data can be sent on the
same socket with sendmsg because ipx_recvmsg() sleeps with the socket locked.
This breaks mars-nwe (NetWare emulator):
- the ncpserv process reads the request using recvmsg
- ncpserv forks and spawns nwconn
- ncpserv calls a (blocking) recvmsg and waits for new requests
- nwconn deadlocks in sendmsg on the same socket
Commit b0d0d915 has simply replaced BKL locking with
lock_sock/release_sock. Unlike now, BKL got unlocked while
sleeping, so a blocking recvmsg did not block a concurrent
sendmsg.
Only keep the socket locked while actually working with the socket data and
release it prior to calling skb_recv_datagram().
Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 49dd18ba46 ]
Trying to add an unreachable route incorrectly returns -ESRCH if
if custom FIB rules are present:
[root@localhost ~]# ip route add 74.125.31.199 dev eth0 via 1.2.3.4
RTNETLINK answers: Network is unreachable
[root@localhost ~]# ip rule add to 55.66.77.88 table 200
[root@localhost ~]# ip route add 74.125.31.199 dev eth0 via 1.2.3.4
RTNETLINK answers: No such process
[root@localhost ~]#
Commit 83886b6b63 ("[NET]: Change "not found"
return value for rule lookup") changed fib_rules_lookup()
to use -ESRCH as a "not found" code internally, but for user space it
should be translated into -ENETUNREACH. Handle the translation centrally in
ipv4-specific fib_lookup(), leaving the DECnet case alone.
On a related note, commit b7a71b51ee
("ipv4: removed redundant conditional") removed a similar translation from
ip_route_input_slow() prematurely AIUI.
Fixes: b7a71b51ee ("ipv4: removed redundant conditional")
Signed-off-by: Panu Matilainen <pmatilai@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9de7922bc7 upstream.
Commit 6f4c618ddb ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for
ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however,
it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a
special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels:
skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768
head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950
end:0x440 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70
[<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
[<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0
[<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
[<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60
This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap
connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for
example, ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------>
... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ...
1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16)
2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255)
... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the
Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too.
This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks
could be used just as well.
The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all
parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended
up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke
sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with
WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account.
In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in
sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP
address that is also the source address of the packet containing
the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the
failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function
sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a
sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given
skb.
When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed
with ...
length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;
... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here
in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage
parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic
for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time,
which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length.
Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in
INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and*
in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over,
that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being
more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and
missized addresses.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b69040d8e3 upstream.
When receiving a e.g. semi-good formed connection scan in the
form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---------------- ASCONF_a; ASCONF_b ----------------->
... where ASCONF_a equals ASCONF_b chunk (at least both serials
need to be equal), we panic an SCTP server!
The problem is that good-formed ASCONF chunks that we reply with
ASCONF_ACK chunks are cached per serial. Thus, when we receive a
same ASCONF chunk twice (e.g. through a lost ASCONF_ACK), we do
not need to process them again on the server side (that was the
idea, also proposed in the RFC). Instead, we know it was cached
and we just resend the cached chunk instead. So far, so good.
Where things get nasty is in SCTP's side effect interpreter, that
is, sctp_cmd_interpreter():
While incoming ASCONF_a (chunk = event_arg) is being marked
!end_of_packet and !singleton, and we have an association context,
we do not flush the outqueue the first time after processing the
ASCONF_ACK singleton chunk via SCTP_CMD_REPLY. Instead, we keep it
queued up, although we set local_cork to 1. Commit 2e3216cd54
changed the precedence, so that as long as we get bundled, incoming
chunks we try possible bundling on outgoing queue as well. Before
this commit, we would just flush the output queue.
Now, while ASCONF_a's ASCONF_ACK sits in the corked outq, we
continue to process the same ASCONF_b chunk from the packet. As
we have cached the previous ASCONF_ACK, we find it, grab it and
do another SCTP_CMD_REPLY command on it. So, effectively, we rip
the chunk->list pointers and requeue the same ASCONF_ACK chunk
another time. Since we process ASCONF_b, it's correctly marked
with end_of_packet and we enforce an uncork, and thus flush, thus
crashing the kernel.
Fix it by testing if the ASCONF_ACK is currently pending and if
that is the case, do not requeue it. When flushing the output
queue we may relink the chunk for preparing an outgoing packet,
but eventually unlink it when it's copied into the skb right
before transmission.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 26b87c7881 upstream.
This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
[...]
---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>
... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.
We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].
The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd54 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.
In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.
One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7965ee9371 upstream.
The code looks for an already loaded target, and the correct list to search
is nft_target_list, not nft_match_list.
Signed-off-by: Arturo Borrero Gonzalez <arturo.borrero.glez@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b51d3fa364 upstream.
The kernel should reserve enough room in the skb so that the DONE
message can always be appended. However, in case of e.g. new attribute
erronously not being size-accounted for, __nfulnl_send() will still
try to put next nlmsg into this full skbuf, causing the skb to be stuck
forever and blocking delivery of further messages.
Fix issue by releasing skb immediately after nlmsg_put error and
WARN() so we can track down the cause of such size mismatch.
[ fw@strlen.de: add tailroom/len info to WARN ]
Signed-off-by: Houcheng Lin <houcheng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c1e7dc91ee upstream.
don't try to queue payloads > 0xffff - NLA_HDRLEN, it does not work.
The nla length includes the size of the nla struct, so anything larger
results in u16 integer overflow.
This patch is similar to
9cefbbc9c8 (netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: cleanup copy_range usage).
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9dfa1dfe4d upstream.
We currently neither account for the nlattr size, nor do we consider
the size of the trailing NLMSG_DONE when allocating nlmsg skb.
This can result in nflog to stop working, as __nfulnl_send() re-tries
sending forever if it failed to append NLMSG_DONE (which will never
work if buffer is not large enough).
Reported-by: Houcheng Lin <houcheng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0f9f5e1b83 upstream.
The ->ip_set_list[] array is initialized in ip_set_net_init() and it
has ->ip_set_max elements so this check should be >= instead of >
otherwise we are off by one.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b8fff407a1 upstream.
Upon receiving the last fragment, all but the first fragment
are freed, but the multicast check for statistics at the end
of the function refers to the current skb (the last fragment)
causing a use-after-free bug.
Since multicast frames cannot be fragmented and we check for
this early in the function, just modify that check to also
do the accounting to fix the issue.
Reported-by: Yosef Khyal <yosefx.khyal@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ff1e417c7c upstream.
Due to the time it takes to process the beacon that started the CSA
process, we may be late for the switch if we try to reach exactly
beacon 0. To avoid that, use count - 1 when calculating the switch time.
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 84469a45a1 upstream.
If we are switching from an HT40+ to an HT40- channel (or vice-versa),
we need the secondary channel offset IE to specify what is the
post-CSA offset to be used. This applies both to beacons and to probe
responses.
In ieee80211_parse_ch_switch_ie() we were ignoring this IE from
beacons and using the *current* HT information IE instead. This was
causing us to use the same offset as before the switch.
Fix that by using the secondary channel offset IE also for beacons and
don't ever use the pre-switch offset. Additionally, remove the
"beacon" argument from ieee80211_parse_ch_switch_ie(), since it's not
needed anymore.
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 46238845bd upstream.
When an interface is deleted, an ongoing hardware scan is canceled and
the driver must abort the scan, at the very least reporting completion
while the interface is removed.
However, if it scheduled the work that might only run after everything
is said and done, which leads to cfg80211 warning that the scan isn't
reported as finished yet; this is no fault of the driver, it already
did, but mac80211 hasn't processed it.
To fix this situation, flush the delayed work when the interface being
removed is the one that was executing the scan.
Reported-by: Sujith Manoharan <sujith@msujith.org>
Tested-by: Sujith Manoharan <sujith@msujith.org>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 4184b2a79a ]
A very minimal and simple user space application allocating an SCTP
socket, setting SCTP_AUTH_KEY setsockopt(2) on it and then closing
the socket again will leak the memory containing the authentication
key from user space:
unreferenced object 0xffff8800837047c0 (size 16):
comm "a.out", pid 2789, jiffies 4296954322 (age 192.258s)
hex dump (first 16 bytes):
01 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff816d7e8e>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
[<ffffffff811c88d8>] __kmalloc+0xe8/0x270
[<ffffffffa0870c23>] sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa08718b1>] sctp_auth_set_key+0xa1/0x140 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa086b383>] sctp_setsockopt+0xd03/0x1180 [sctp]
[<ffffffff815bfd94>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
[<ffffffff815beb61>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0
[<ffffffff816e58a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
This is bad because of two things, we can bring down a machine from
user space when auth_enable=1, but also we would leave security sensitive
keying material in memory without clearing it after use. The issue is
that sctp_auth_create_key() already sets the refcount to 1, but after
allocation sctp_auth_set_key() does an additional refcount on it, and
thus leaving it around when we free the socket.
Fixes: 65b07e5d0d ("[SCTP]: API updates to suport SCTP-AUTH extensions.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit e40607cbe2 ]
An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death
in the form of:
------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------>
While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things
in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters
inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary
IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address
parameter.
So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS
or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0
and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily
dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param().
The trace for the log:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078
IP: [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e9c62>] [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01f2add>] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e1fcb>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e5c09>] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e61f6>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[...]
A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all
other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could
possibly return with NULL.
Fixes: d6de309759 ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit f03eb128e3 ]
Otherwise it gets overwritten by register_netdev().
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit ebe084aafb ]
ipip6_tunnel_init() sets the dev->iflink via a call to
ipip6_tunnel_bind_dev(). After that, register_netdevice()
sets dev->iflink = -1. So we loose the iflink configuration
for ipv6 tunnels. Fix this by using ipip6_tunnel_init() as the
ndo_init function. Then ipip6_tunnel_init() is called after
dev->iflink is set to -1 from register_netdevice().
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 16a0231bf7 ]
vti6_dev_init() sets the dev->iflink via a call to
vti6_link_config(). After that, register_netdevice()
sets dev->iflink = -1. So we loose the iflink configuration
for vti6 tunnels. Fix this by using vti6_dev_init() as the
ndo_init function. Then vti6_dev_init() is called after
dev->iflink is set to -1 from register_netdevice().
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 6c6151daaf ]
ip6_tnl_dev_init() sets the dev->iflink via a call to
ip6_tnl_link_config(). After that, register_netdevice()
sets dev->iflink = -1. So we loose the iflink configuration
for ipv6 tunnels. Fix this by using ip6_tnl_dev_init() as the
ndo_init function. Then ip6_tnl_dev_init() is called after
dev->iflink is set to -1 from register_netdevice().
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c7abf25af0 upstream.
It affects non-(V)HT rates and can lead to selecting an rts_cts rate
that is not a basic rate or way superior to the reference rate (ATM
rates[0] used for the 1st attempt of the protected frame data).
E.g, assuming drivers register growing (bitrate) sorted tables of
ieee80211_rate-s, having :
- rates[0].idx == d'2 and basic_rates == b'10100
will select rts_cts idx b'10011 & ~d'(BIT(2)-1), i.e. 1, likewise
- rates[0].idx == d'2 and basic_rates == b'10001
will select rts_cts idx b'10000
The first is not a basic rate and the second is > rates[0].
Also, wrt severity of the addressed misbehavior, ATM we only have one
rts_cts_rate_idx rather than one per rate table entry, so this idx might
still point to bitrates > rates[1..MAX_RATES].
Fixes: 5253ffb8c9 ("mac80211: always pick a basic rate to tx RTS/CTS for pre-HT rates")
Signed-off-by: Karl Beldan <karl.beldan@rivierawaves.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Dan Carpenter
Pablo Neira Ayuso
Alexander Y. Fomichev
Jouni Malinen
Arik Nemtsov
Emmanuel Grumbach
Jay Vosburgh
Herbert Xu
Thomas Graf
Toshiaki Makita
Antonio Quartulli
Sven Eckelmann
David Miller
Timo Teräs
Johannes Berg
Andreas Müller
Ronald Wahl
Daniel Borkmann
Tom Herbert
Nicolas Dichtel
Yuri Chislov
lucien
Cong Wang
Jane Zhou
Jiri Bohac
Panu Matilainen
Arturo Borrero
Houcheng Lin
Florian Westphal
Luciano Coelho
Johannes Berg
Ilya Dryomov
Steffen Klassert
Karl Beldan