Commit Graph

226 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Robin Holt 34441427aa revert "procfs: provide stack information for threads" and its fixup commits
Originally, commit d899bf7b ("procfs: provide stack information for
threads") attempted to introduce a new feature for showing where the
threadstack was located and how many pages are being utilized by the
stack.

Commit c44972f1 ("procfs: disable per-task stack usage on NOMMU") was
applied to fix the NO_MMU case.

Commit 89240ba0 ("x86, fs: Fix x86 procfs stack information for threads on
64-bit") was applied to fix a bug in ia32 executables being loaded.

Commit 9ebd4eba7 ("procfs: fix /proc/<pid>/stat stack pointer for kernel
threads") was applied to fix a bug which had kernel threads printing a
userland stack address.

Commit 1306d603f ('proc: partially revert "procfs: provide stack
information for threads"') was then applied to revert the stack pages
being used to solve a significant performance regression.

This patch nearly undoes the effect of all these patches.

The reason for reverting these is it provides an unusable value in
field 28.  For x86_64, a fork will result in the task->stack_start
value being updated to the current user top of stack and not the stack
start address.  This unpredictability of the stack_start value makes
it worthless.  That includes the intended use of showing how much stack
space a thread has.

Other architectures will get different values.  As an example, ia64
gets 0.  The do_fork() and copy_process() functions appear to treat the
stack_start and stack_size parameters as architecture specific.

I only partially reverted c44972f1 ("procfs: disable per-task stack usage
on NOMMU") .  If I had completely reverted it, I would have had to change
mm/Makefile only build pagewalk.o when CONFIG_PROC_PAGE_MONITOR is
configured.  Since I could not test the builds without significant effort,
I decided to not change mm/Makefile.

I only partially reverted 89240ba0 ("x86, fs: Fix x86 procfs stack
information for threads on 64-bit") .  I left the KSTK_ESP() change in
place as that seemed worthwhile.

Signed-off-by: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com>
Cc: Stefani Seibold <stefani@seibold.net>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-05-11 17:33:41 -07:00
Neil Horman 76595f79d7 coredump: suppress uid comparison test if core output files are pipes
Modify uid check in do_coredump so as to not apply it in the case of
pipes.

This just got noticed in testing.  The end of do_coredump validates the
uid of the inode for the created file against the uid of the crashing
process to ensure that no one can pre-create a core file with different
ownership and grab the information contained in the core when they
shouldn' tbe able to.  This causes failures when using pipes for a core
dumps if the crashing process is not root, which is the uid of the pipe
when it is created.

The fix is simple.  Since the check for matching uid's isn't relevant for
pipes (a process can't create a pipe that the uermodehelper code will open
anyway), we can just just skip it in the event ispipe is non-zero

Reverts a pipe-affecting change which was accidentally made in

: commit c46f739dd3
: Author:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
: AuthorDate: Wed Nov 28 13:59:18 2007 +0100
: Commit:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org>
: CommitDate: Wed Nov 28 10:58:01 2007 -0800
:
:     vfs: coredumping fix

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-03-06 11:26:46 -08:00
Oleg Nesterov 5c99cbf49a coredump: set ->group_exit_code for other CLONE_VM tasks too
User visible change.

do_coredump() kills all threads which share the same ->mm but only the
coredumping process gets the proper exit_code.  Other tasks which share
the same ->mm die "silently" and return status == 0 to parent.

This is historical behaviour, not actually a bug.  But I think Frank
Heckenbach rightly dislikes the current behaviour.  Simple test-case:

	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <unistd.h>
	#include <signal.h>
	#include <sys/wait.h>

	int main(void)
	{
		int stat;

		if (!fork()) {
			if (!vfork())
				kill(getpid(), SIGQUIT);
		}

		wait(&stat);
		printf("stat=%x\n", stat);
		return 0;
	}

Before this patch it prints "stat=0" despite the fact the child was killed
by SIGQUIT.  After this patch the output is "stat=3" which obviously makes
more sense.

Even with this patch, only the task which originates the coredumping gets
"|= 0x80" if the core was actually dumped, but at least the coredumping
signal is visible to do_wait/etc.

Reported-by: Frank Heckenbach <f.heckenbach@fh-soft.de>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-03-06 11:26:46 -08:00
Masami Hiramatsu 30736a4d43 coredump: pass mm->flags as a coredump parameter for consistency
Pass mm->flags as a coredump parameter for consistency.

 ---
1787         if (mm->core_state || !get_dumpable(mm)) {  <- (1)
1788                 up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
1789                 put_cred(cred);
1790                 goto fail;
1791         }
1792
[...]
1798         if (get_dumpable(mm) == 2) {    /* Setuid core dump mode */ <-(2)
1799                 flag = O_EXCL;          /* Stop rewrite attacks */
1800                 cred->fsuid = 0;        /* Dump root private */
1801         }
 ---

Since dumpable bits are not protected by lock, there is a chance to change
these bits between (1) and (2).

To solve this issue, this patch copies mm->flags to
coredump_params.mm_flags at the beginning of do_coredump() and uses it
instead of get_dumpable() while dumping core.

This copy is also passed to binfmt->core_dump, since elf*_core_dump() uses
dump_filter bits in mm->flags.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix merge]
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-03-06 11:26:46 -08:00
Michael Neuling 5ef097dd7b exec: create initial stack independent of PAGE_SIZE
Currently we create the initial stack based on the PAGE_SIZE.  This is
unnecessary.

This creates this initial stack independent of the PAGE_SIZE.

It also bumps up the number of 4k pages allocated from 20 to 32, to
align with 64K page systems.

Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Americo Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-03-06 11:26:33 -08:00
Jiri Slaby d554ed895d fs: use rlimit helpers
Make sure compiler won't do weird things with limits.  E.g.  fetching them
twice may return 2 different values after writable limits are implemented.

I.e.  either use rlimit helpers added in commit 3e10e716ab ("resource:
add helpers for fetching rlimits") or ACCESS_ONCE if not applicable.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-03-06 11:26:29 -08:00
Rik van Riel 5beb493052 mm: change anon_vma linking to fix multi-process server scalability issue
The old anon_vma code can lead to scalability issues with heavily forking
workloads.  Specifically, each anon_vma will be shared between the parent
process and all its child processes.

In a workload with 1000 child processes and a VMA with 1000 anonymous
pages per process that get COWed, this leads to a system with a million
anonymous pages in the same anon_vma, each of which is mapped in just one
of the 1000 processes.  However, the current rmap code needs to walk them
all, leading to O(N) scanning complexity for each page.

This can result in systems where one CPU is walking the page tables of
1000 processes in page_referenced_one, while all other CPUs are stuck on
the anon_vma lock.  This leads to catastrophic failure for a benchmark
like AIM7, where the total number of processes can reach in the tens of
thousands.  Real workloads are still a factor 10 less process intensive
than AIM7, but they are catching up.

This patch changes the way anon_vmas and VMAs are linked, which allows us
to associate multiple anon_vmas with a VMA.  At fork time, each child
process gets its own anon_vmas, in which its COWed pages will be
instantiated.  The parents' anon_vma is also linked to the VMA, because
non-COWed pages could be present in any of the children.

This reduces rmap scanning complexity to O(1) for the pages of the 1000
child processes, with O(N) complexity for at most 1/N pages in the system.
 This reduces the average scanning cost in heavily forking workloads from
O(N) to 2.

The only real complexity in this patch stems from the fact that linking a
VMA to anon_vmas now involves memory allocations.  This means vma_adjust
can fail, if it needs to attach a VMA to anon_vma structures.  This in
turn means error handling needs to be added to the calling functions.

A second source of complexity is that, because there can be multiple
anon_vmas, the anon_vma linking in vma_adjust can no longer be done under
"the" anon_vma lock.  To prevent the rmap code from walking up an
incomplete VMA, this patch introduces the VM_LOCK_RMAP VMA flag.  This bit
flag uses the same slot as the NOMMU VM_MAPPED_COPY, with an ifdef in mm.h
to make sure it is impossible to compile a kernel that needs both symbolic
values for the same bitflag.

Some test results:

Without the anon_vma changes, when AIM7 hits around 9.7k users (on a test
box with 16GB RAM and not quite enough IO), the system ends up running
>99% in system time, with every CPU on the same anon_vma lock in the
pageout code.

With these changes, AIM7 hits the cross-over point around 29.7k users.
This happens with ~99% IO wait time, there never seems to be any spike in
system time.  The anon_vma lock contention appears to be resolved.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-03-06 11:26:26 -08:00
KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki 34e55232e5 mm: avoid false sharing of mm_counter
Considering the nature of per mm stats, it's the shared object among
threads and can be a cache-miss point in the page fault path.

This patch adds per-thread cache for mm_counter.  RSS value will be
counted into a struct in task_struct and synchronized with mm's one at
events.

Now, in this patch, the event is the number of calls to handle_mm_fault.
Per-thread value is added to mm at each 64 calls.

 rough estimation with small benchmark on parallel thread (2threads) shows
 [before]
     4.5 cache-miss/faults
 [after]
     4.0 cache-miss/faults
 Anyway, the most contended object is mmap_sem if the number of threads grows.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <lee.schermerhorn@hp.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-03-06 11:26:24 -08:00
Michael Neuling a17e18790a fs/exec.c: fix initial stack reservation
803bf5ec25 ("fs/exec.c: restrict initial
stack space expansion to rlimit") attempts to limit the initial stack to
20*PAGE_SIZE.  Unfortunately, in attempting ensure the stack is not
reduced in size, we ended up not changing the stack at all.

This size reduction check is not necessary as the expand_stack call does
this already.

This caused a regression in UML resulting in most guest processes being
killed.

Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-02-22 19:50:34 -08:00
Michael Neuling 803bf5ec25 fs/exec.c: restrict initial stack space expansion to rlimit
When reserving stack space for a new process, make sure we're not
attempting to expand the stack by more than rlimit allows.

This fixes a bug caused by b6a2fea393 ("mm:
variable length argument support") and unmasked by
fc63cf2370 ("exec: setup_arg_pages() fails
to return errors").

This bug means that when limiting the stack to less the 20*PAGE_SIZE (eg.
80K on 4K pages or 'ulimit -s 79') all processes will be killed before
they start.  This is particularly bad with 64K pages, where a ulimit below
1280K will kill every process.

To test, do:

  'ulimit -s 15; ls'

before and after the patch is applied.  Before it's applied, 'ls' should
be killed.  After the patch is applied, 'ls' should no longer be killed.

A stack limit of 15KB since it's small enough to trigger 20*PAGE_SIZE.
Also 15KB not a multiple of PAGE_SIZE, which is a trickier case to handle
correctly with this code.

4K pages should be fine to test with.

[kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com: cleanup]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanup cleanup]
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Americo Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-02-11 13:59:43 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 7ab02af428 Fix 'flush_old_exec()/setup_new_exec()' split
Commit 221af7f87b ("Split 'flush_old_exec' into two functions") split
the function at the point of no return - ie right where there were no
more error cases to check.  That made sense from a technical standpoint,
but when we then also combined it with the actual personality setting
going in between flush_old_exec() and setup_new_exec(), it needs to be a
bit more careful.

In particular, we need to make sure that we really flush the old
personality bits in the 'flush' stage, rather than later in the 'setup'
stage, since otherwise we might be flushing the _new_ personality state
that we're just setting up.

So this moves the flags and personality flushing (and 'flush_thread()',
which is the arch-specific function that generally resets lazy FP state
etc) of the old process into flush_old_exec(), so that it doesn't affect
any state that execve() is setting up for the new process environment.

This was reported by Michal Simek as breaking his Microblaze qemu
environment.

Reported-and-tested-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@petalogix.com>
Cc: Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-02-02 12:37:44 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 221af7f87b Split 'flush_old_exec' into two functions
'flush_old_exec()' is the point of no return when doing an execve(), and
it is pretty badly misnamed.  It doesn't just flush the old executable
environment, it also starts up the new one.

Which is very inconvenient for things like setting up the new
personality, because we want the new personality to affect the starting
of the new environment, but at the same time we do _not_ want the new
personality to take effect if flushing the old one fails.

As a result, the x86-64 '32-bit' personality is actually done using this
insane "I'm going to change the ABI, but I haven't done it yet" bit
(TIF_ABI_PENDING), with SET_PERSONALITY() not actually setting the
personality, but just the "pending" bit, so that "flush_thread()" can do
the actual personality magic.

This patch in no way changes any of that insanity, but it does split the
'flush_old_exec()' function up into a preparatory part that can fail
(still called flush_old_exec()), and a new part that will actually set
up the new exec environment (setup_new_exec()).  All callers are changed
to trivially comply with the new world order.

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-01-29 08:22:01 -08:00
Masami Hiramatsu f6151dfea2 mm: introduce coredump parameter structure
Introduce coredump parameter data structure (struct coredump_params) to
simplify binfmt->core_dump() arguments.

Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-12-17 15:45:31 -08:00
Oleg Nesterov 9cd80bbb07 do_wait() optimization: do not place sub-threads on task_struct->children list
Thanks to Roland who pointed out de_thread() issues.

Currently we add sub-threads to ->real_parent->children list.  This buys
nothing but slows down do_wait().

With this patch ->children contains only main threads (group leaders).
The only complication is that forget_original_parent() should iterate over
sub-threads by hand, and de_thread() needs another list_replace() when it
changes ->group_leader.

Henceforth do_wait_thread() can never see task_detached() && !EXIT_DEAD
tasks, we can remove this check (and we can unify do_wait_thread() and
ptrace_do_wait()).

This change can confuse the optimistic search in mm_update_next_owner(),
but this is fixable and minor.

Perhaps badness() and oom_kill_process() should be updated, but they
should be fixed in any case.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Ratan Nalumasu <rnalumasu@gmail.com>
Cc: Vitaly Mayatskikh <vmayatsk@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-12-17 15:45:31 -08:00
john stultz 4614a696bd procfs: allow threads to rename siblings via /proc/pid/tasks/tid/comm
Setting a thread's comm to be something unique is a very useful ability
and is helpful for debugging complicated threaded applications.  However
currently the only way to set a thread name is for the thread to name
itself via the PR_SET_NAME prctl.

However, there may be situations where it would be advantageous for a
thread dispatcher to be naming the threads its managing, rather then
having the threads self-describe themselves.  This sort of behavior is
available on other systems via the pthread_setname_np() interface.

This patch exports a task's comm via proc/pid/comm and
proc/pid/task/tid/comm interfaces, and allows thread siblings to write to
these values.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups]
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Cc: Mike Fulton <fultonm@ca.ibm.com>
Cc: Sean Foley <Sean_Foley@ca.ibm.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-12-15 08:53:24 -08:00
James Morris c84d6efd36 Merge branch 'master' into next 2009-12-03 12:03:40 +05:30
Anton Blanchard fc63cf2370 exec: setup_arg_pages() fails to return errors
In setup_arg_pages we work hard to assign a value to ret, but on exit we
always return 0.

Also remove a now duplicated exit path and branch to out_unlock instead.

Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-11-12 07:25:58 -08:00
Mimi Zohar 6c21a7fb49 LSM: imbed ima calls in the security hooks
Based on discussions on LKML and LSM, where there are consecutive
security_ and ima_ calls in the vfs layer, move the ima_ calls to
the existing security_ hooks.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-25 12:22:48 +08:00
Hiroshi Shimamoto 801460d0cf task_struct cleanup: move binfmt field to mm_struct
Because the binfmt is not different between threads in the same process,
it can be moved from task_struct to mm_struct.  And binfmt moudle is
handled per mm_struct instead of task_struct.

Signed-off-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@ct.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-24 07:21:05 -07:00
Oleg Nesterov 964ee7df90 exec: fix set_binfmt() vs sys_delete_module() race
sys_delete_module() can set MODULE_STATE_GOING after
search_binary_handler() does try_module_get().  In this case
set_binfmt()->try_module_get() fails but since none of the callers
check the returned error, the task will run with the wrong old
->binfmt.

The proper fix should change all ->load_binary() methods, but we can
rely on fact that the caller must hold a reference to binfmt->module
and use __module_get() which never fails.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@ct.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-24 07:21:01 -07:00
Neil Horman 61be228a06 exec: allow do_coredump() to wait for user space pipe readers to complete
Allow core_pattern pipes to wait for user space to complete

One of the things that user space processes like to do is look at metadata
for a crashing process in their /proc/<pid> directory.  this is racy
however, since do_coredump in the kernel doesn't wait for the user space
process to complete before it reaps the crashing process.  This patch
corrects that.  Allowing the kernel to wait for the user space process to
complete before cleaning up the crashing process.  This is a bit tricky to
do for a few reasons:

1) The user space process isn't our child, so we can't sys_wait4 on it
2) We need to close the pipe before waiting for the user process to complete,
since the user process may rely on an EOF condition

I've discussed several solutions with Oleg Nesterov off-list about this,
and this is the one we've come up with.  We add ourselves as a pipe reader
(to prevent premature cleanup of the pipe_inode_info), and remove
ourselves as a writer (to provide an EOF condition to the writer in user
space), then we iterate until the user space process exits (which we
detect by pipe->readers == 1, hence the > 1 check in the loop).  When we
exit the loop, we restore the proper reader/writer values, then we return
and let filp_close in do_coredump clean up the pipe data properly.

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: Earl Chew <earl_chew@agilent.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-24 07:21:00 -07:00
Neil Horman a293980c2e exec: let do_coredump() limit the number of concurrent dumps to pipes
Introduce core pipe limiting sysctl.

Since we can dump cores to pipe, rather than directly to the filesystem,
we create a condition in which a user can create a very high load on the
system simply by running bad applications.

If the pipe reader specified in core_pattern is poorly written, we can
have lots of ourstandig resources and processes in the system.

This sysctl introduces an ability to limit that resource consumption.
core_pipe_limit defines how many in-flight dumps may be run in parallel,
dumps beyond this value are skipped and a note is made in the kernel log.
A special value of 0 in core_pipe_limit denotes unlimited core dumps may
be handled (this is the default value).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: Earl Chew <earl_chew@agilent.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-24 07:21:00 -07:00
Neil Horman 725eae32df exec: make do_coredump() more resilient to recursive crashes
Change how we detect recursive dumps.

Currently we have a mechanism by which we try to compare pathnames of the
crashing process to the core_pattern path.  This is broken for a dozen
reasons, and just doesn't work in any sort of robust way.

I'm replacing it with the use of a 0 RLIMIT_CORE value.  Since helper apps
set RLIMIT_CORE to zero, we don't write out core files for any process
with that particular limit set.  It the core_pattern is a pipe, any
non-zero limit is translated to RLIM_INFINITY.

This allows complete dumps to be captured, but prevents infinite recursion
in the event that the core_pattern process itself crashes.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: Earl Chew <earl_chew@agilent.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-24 07:21:00 -07:00
Stefani Seibold d899bf7b55 procfs: provide stack information for threads
A patch to give a better overview of the userland application stack usage,
especially for embedded linux.

Currently you are only able to dump the main process/thread stack usage
which is showed in /proc/pid/status by the "VmStk" Value.  But you get no
information about the consumed stack memory of the the threads.

There is an enhancement in the /proc/<pid>/{task/*,}/*maps and which marks
the vm mapping where the thread stack pointer reside with "[thread stack
xxxxxxxx]".  xxxxxxxx is the maximum size of stack.  This is a value
information, because libpthread doesn't set the start of the stack to the
top of the mapped area, depending of the pthread usage.

A sample output of /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/maps looks like:

08048000-08049000 r-xp 00000000 03:00 8312       /opt/z
08049000-0804a000 rw-p 00001000 03:00 8312       /opt/z
0804a000-0806b000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0          [heap]
a7d12000-a7d13000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
a7d13000-a7f13000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0          [thread stack: 001ff4b4]
a7f13000-a7f14000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
a7f14000-a7f36000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
a7f36000-a8069000 r-xp 00000000 03:00 4222       /lib/libc.so.6
a8069000-a806b000 r--p 00133000 03:00 4222       /lib/libc.so.6
a806b000-a806c000 rw-p 00135000 03:00 4222       /lib/libc.so.6
a806c000-a806f000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
a806f000-a8083000 r-xp 00000000 03:00 14462      /lib/libpthread.so.0
a8083000-a8084000 r--p 00013000 03:00 14462      /lib/libpthread.so.0
a8084000-a8085000 rw-p 00014000 03:00 14462      /lib/libpthread.so.0
a8085000-a8088000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
a8088000-a80a4000 r-xp 00000000 03:00 8317       /lib/ld-linux.so.2
a80a4000-a80a5000 r--p 0001b000 03:00 8317       /lib/ld-linux.so.2
a80a5000-a80a6000 rw-p 0001c000 03:00 8317       /lib/ld-linux.so.2
afaf5000-afb0a000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0          [stack]
ffffe000-fffff000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0          [vdso]

Also there is a new entry "stack usage" in /proc/<pid>/{task/*,}/status
which will you give the current stack usage in kb.

A sample output of /proc/self/status looks like:

Name:	cat
State:	R (running)
Tgid:	507
Pid:	507
.
.
.
CapBnd:	fffffffffffffeff
voluntary_ctxt_switches:	0
nonvoluntary_ctxt_switches:	0
Stack usage:	12 kB

I also fixed stack base address in /proc/<pid>/{task/*,}/stat to the base
address of the associated thread stack and not the one of the main
process.  This makes more sense.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/proc/array.c now needs walk_page_range()]
Signed-off-by: Stefani Seibold <stefani@seibold.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-23 07:39:41 -07:00
Jiri Pirko 1f10206cf8 getrusage: fill ru_maxrss value
Make ->ru_maxrss value in struct rusage filled accordingly to rss hiwater
mark.  This struct is filled as a parameter to getrusage syscall.
->ru_maxrss value is set to KBs which is the way it is done in BSD
systems.  /usr/bin/time (gnu time) application converts ->ru_maxrss to KBs
which seems to be incorrect behavior.  Maintainer of this util was
notified by me with the patch which corrects it and cc'ed.

To make this happen we extend struct signal_struct by two fields.  The
first one is ->maxrss which we use to store rss hiwater of the task.  The
second one is ->cmaxrss which we use to store highest rss hiwater of all
task childs.  These values are used in k_getrusage() to actually fill
->ru_maxrss.  k_getrusage() uses current rss hiwater value directly if mm
struct exists.

Note:
exec() clear mm->hiwater_rss, but doesn't clear sig->maxrss.
it is intetionally behavior. *BSD getrusage have exec() inheriting.

test programs
========================================================

getrusage.c
===========
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/time.h>
 #include <sys/resource.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/wait.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <signal.h>
 #include <sys/mman.h>

 #include "common.h"

 #define err(str) perror(str), exit(1)

int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
	int status;

	printf("allocate 100MB\n");
	consume(100);

	printf("testcase1: fork inherit? \n");
	printf("  expect: initial.self ~= child.self\n");
	show_rusage("initial");
	if (__fork()) {
		wait(&status);
	} else {
		show_rusage("fork child");
		_exit(0);
	}
	printf("\n");

	printf("testcase2: fork inherit? (cont.) \n");
	printf("  expect: initial.children ~= 100MB, but child.children = 0\n");
	show_rusage("initial");
	if (__fork()) {
		wait(&status);
	} else {
		show_rusage("child");
		_exit(0);
	}
	printf("\n");

	printf("testcase3: fork + malloc \n");
	printf("  expect: child.self ~= initial.self + 50MB\n");
	show_rusage("initial");
	if (__fork()) {
		wait(&status);
	} else {
		printf("allocate +50MB\n");
		consume(50);
		show_rusage("fork child");
		_exit(0);
	}
	printf("\n");

	printf("testcase4: grandchild maxrss\n");
	printf("  expect: post_wait.children ~= 300MB\n");
	show_rusage("initial");
	if (__fork()) {
		wait(&status);
		show_rusage("post_wait");
	} else {
		system("./child -n 0 -g 300");
		_exit(0);
	}
	printf("\n");

	printf("testcase5: zombie\n");
	printf("  expect: pre_wait ~= initial, IOW the zombie process is not accounted.\n");
	printf("          post_wait ~= 400MB, IOW wait() collect child's max_rss. \n");
	show_rusage("initial");
	if (__fork()) {
		sleep(1); /* children become zombie */
		show_rusage("pre_wait");
		wait(&status);
		show_rusage("post_wait");
	} else {
		system("./child -n 400");
		_exit(0);
	}
	printf("\n");

	printf("testcase6: SIG_IGN\n");
	printf("  expect: initial ~= after_zombie (child's 500MB alloc should be ignored).\n");
	show_rusage("initial");
	signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN);
	if (__fork()) {
		sleep(1); /* children become zombie */
		show_rusage("after_zombie");
	} else {
		system("./child -n 500");
		_exit(0);
	}
	printf("\n");
	signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);

	printf("testcase7: exec (without fork) \n");
	printf("  expect: initial ~= exec \n");
	show_rusage("initial");
	execl("./child", "child", "-v", NULL);

	return 0;
}

child.c
=======
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/wait.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/time.h>
 #include <sys/resource.h>

 #include "common.h"

int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
	int status;
	int c;
	long consume_size = 0;
	long grandchild_consume_size = 0;
	int show = 0;

	while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "n:g:v")) != -1) {
		switch (c) {
		case 'n':
			consume_size = atol(optarg);
			break;
		case 'v':
			show = 1;
			break;
		case 'g':

			grandchild_consume_size = atol(optarg);
			break;
		default:
			break;
		}
	}

	if (show)
		show_rusage("exec");

	if (consume_size) {
		printf("child alloc %ldMB\n", consume_size);
		consume(consume_size);
	}

	if (grandchild_consume_size) {
		if (fork()) {
			wait(&status);
		} else {
			printf("grandchild alloc %ldMB\n", grandchild_consume_size);
			consume(grandchild_consume_size);

			exit(0);
		}
	}

	return 0;
}

common.c
========
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/time.h>
 #include <sys/resource.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/wait.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <signal.h>
 #include <sys/mman.h>

 #include "common.h"
 #define err(str) perror(str), exit(1)

void show_rusage(char *prefix)
{
    	int err, err2;
    	struct rusage rusage_self;
    	struct rusage rusage_children;

    	printf("%s: ", prefix);
    	err = getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rusage_self);
    	if (!err)
    		printf("self %ld ", rusage_self.ru_maxrss);
    	err2 = getrusage(RUSAGE_CHILDREN, &rusage_children);
    	if (!err2)
    		printf("children %ld ", rusage_children.ru_maxrss);

    	printf("\n");
}

/* Some buggy OS need this worthless CPU waste. */
void make_pagefault(void)
{
	void *addr;
	int size = getpagesize();
	int i;

	for (i=0; i<1000; i++) {
		addr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0);
		if (addr == MAP_FAILED)
			err("make_pagefault");
		memset(addr, 0, size);
		munmap(addr, size);
	}
}

void consume(int mega)
{
    	size_t sz = mega * 1024 * 1024;
    	void *ptr;

    	ptr = malloc(sz);
    	memset(ptr, 0, sz);
	make_pagefault();
}

pid_t __fork(void)
{
	pid_t pid;

	pid = fork();
	make_pagefault();

	return pid;
}

common.h
========
void show_rusage(char *prefix);
void make_pagefault(void);
void consume(int mega);
pid_t __fork(void);

FreeBSD result (expected result)
========================================================
allocate 100MB
testcase1: fork inherit?
  expect: initial.self ~= child.self
initial: self 103492 children 0
fork child: self 103540 children 0

testcase2: fork inherit? (cont.)
  expect: initial.children ~= 100MB, but child.children = 0
initial: self 103540 children 103540
child: self 103564 children 0

testcase3: fork + malloc
  expect: child.self ~= initial.self + 50MB
initial: self 103564 children 103564
allocate +50MB
fork child: self 154860 children 0

testcase4: grandchild maxrss
  expect: post_wait.children ~= 300MB
initial: self 103564 children 154860
grandchild alloc 300MB
post_wait: self 103564 children 308720

testcase5: zombie
  expect: pre_wait ~= initial, IOW the zombie process is not accounted.
          post_wait ~= 400MB, IOW wait() collect child's max_rss.
initial: self 103564 children 308720
child alloc 400MB
pre_wait: self 103564 children 308720
post_wait: self 103564 children 411312

testcase6: SIG_IGN
  expect: initial ~= after_zombie (child's 500MB alloc should be ignored).
initial: self 103564 children 411312
child alloc 500MB
after_zombie: self 103624 children 411312

testcase7: exec (without fork)
  expect: initial ~= exec
initial: self 103624 children 411312
exec: self 103624 children 411312

Linux result (actual test result)
========================================================
allocate 100MB
testcase1: fork inherit?
  expect: initial.self ~= child.self
initial: self 102848 children 0
fork child: self 102572 children 0

testcase2: fork inherit? (cont.)
  expect: initial.children ~= 100MB, but child.children = 0
initial: self 102876 children 102644
child: self 102572 children 0

testcase3: fork + malloc
  expect: child.self ~= initial.self + 50MB
initial: self 102876 children 102644
allocate +50MB
fork child: self 153804 children 0

testcase4: grandchild maxrss
  expect: post_wait.children ~= 300MB
initial: self 102876 children 153864
grandchild alloc 300MB
post_wait: self 102876 children 307536

testcase5: zombie
  expect: pre_wait ~= initial, IOW the zombie process is not accounted.
          post_wait ~= 400MB, IOW wait() collect child's max_rss.
initial: self 102876 children 307536
child alloc 400MB
pre_wait: self 102876 children 307536
post_wait: self 102876 children 410076

testcase6: SIG_IGN
  expect: initial ~= after_zombie (child's 500MB alloc should be ignored).
initial: self 102876 children 410076
child alloc 500MB
after_zombie: self 102880 children 410076

testcase7: exec (without fork)
  expect: initial ~= exec
initial: self 102880 children 410076
exec: self 102880 children 410076

Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jpirko@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-23 07:39:30 -07:00
Ingo Molnar cdd6c482c9 perf: Do the big rename: Performance Counters -> Performance Events
Bye-bye Performance Counters, welcome Performance Events!

In the past few months the perfcounters subsystem has grown out its
initial role of counting hardware events, and has become (and is
becoming) a much broader generic event enumeration, reporting, logging,
monitoring, analysis facility.

Naming its core object 'perf_counter' and naming the subsystem
'perfcounters' has become more and more of a misnomer. With pending
code like hw-breakpoints support the 'counter' name is less and
less appropriate.

All in one, we've decided to rename the subsystem to 'performance
events' and to propagate this rename through all fields, variables
and API names. (in an ABI compatible fashion)

The word 'event' is also a bit shorter than 'counter' - which makes
it slightly more convenient to write/handle as well.

Thanks goes to Stephane Eranian who first observed this misnomer and
suggested a rename.

User-space tooling and ABI compatibility is not affected - this patch
should be function-invariant. (Also, defconfigs were not touched to
keep the size down.)

This patch has been generated via the following script:

  FILES=$(find * -type f | grep -vE 'oprofile|[^K]config')

  sed -i \
    -e 's/PERF_EVENT_/PERF_RECORD_/g' \
    -e 's/PERF_COUNTER/PERF_EVENT/g' \
    -e 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g' \
    -e 's/nb_counters/nb_events/g' \
    -e 's/swcounter/swevent/g' \
    -e 's/tpcounter_event/tp_event/g' \
    $FILES

  for N in $(find . -name perf_counter.[ch]); do
    M=$(echo $N | sed 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g')
    mv $N $M
  done

  FILES=$(find . -name perf_event.*)

  sed -i \
    -e 's/COUNTER_MASK/REG_MASK/g' \
    -e 's/COUNTER/EVENT/g' \
    -e 's/\<event\>/event_id/g' \
    -e 's/counter/event/g' \
    -e 's/Counter/Event/g' \
    $FILES

... to keep it as correct as possible. This script can also be
used by anyone who has pending perfcounters patches - it converts
a Linux kernel tree over to the new naming. We tried to time this
change to the point in time where the amount of pending patches
is the smallest: the end of the merge window.

Namespace clashes were fixed up in a preparatory patch - and some
stylistic fallout will be fixed up in a subsequent patch.

( NOTE: 'counters' are still the proper terminology when we deal
  with hardware registers - and these sed scripts are a bit
  over-eager in renaming them. I've undone some of that, but
  in case there's something left where 'counter' would be
  better than 'event' we can undo that on an individual basis
  instead of touching an otherwise nicely automated patch. )

Suggested-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
LKML-Reference: <new-submission>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-09-21 14:28:04 +02:00
Oleg Nesterov a2a8474c3f exec: do not sleep in TASK_TRACED under ->cred_guard_mutex
Tom Horsley reports that his debugger hangs when it tries to read
/proc/pid_of_tracee/maps, this happens since

	"mm_for_maps: take ->cred_guard_mutex to fix the race with exec"
	04b836cbf19e885f8366bccb2e4b0474346c02d

commit in 2.6.31.

But the root of the problem lies in the fact that do_execve() path calls
tracehook_report_exec() which can stop if the tracer sets PT_TRACE_EXEC.

The tracee must not sleep in TASK_TRACED holding this mutex.  Even if we
remove ->cred_guard_mutex from mm_for_maps() and proc_pid_attr_write(),
another task doing PTRACE_ATTACH should not hang until it is killed or the
tracee resumes.

With this patch do_execve() does not use ->cred_guard_mutex directly and
we do not hold it throughout, instead:

	- introduce prepare_bprm_creds() helper, it locks the mutex
	  and calls prepare_exec_creds() to initialize bprm->cred.

	- install_exec_creds() drops the mutex after commit_creds(),
	  and thus before tracehook_report_exec()->ptrace_stop().

	  or, if exec fails,

	  free_bprm() drops this mutex when bprm->cred != NULL which
	  indicates install_exec_creds() was not called.

Reported-by: Tom Horsley <tom.horsley@att.net>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-05 11:30:42 -07:00
Mimi Zohar 6777d773a4 kernel_read: redefine offset type
vfs_read() offset is defined as loff_t, but kernel_read()
offset is only defined as unsigned long. Redefine
kernel_read() offset as loff_t.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-24 14:58:23 +10:00
Oleg Nesterov 793285fcaf cred_guard_mutex: do not return -EINTR to user-space
do_execve() and ptrace_attach() return -EINTR if
mutex_lock_interruptible(->cred_guard_mutex) fails.

This is not right, change the code to return ERESTARTNOINTR.

Perhaps we should also change proc_pid_attr_write().

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-07-06 13:57:04 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 8a1ca8cedd Merge branch 'perfcounters-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'perfcounters-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (574 commits)
  perf_counter: Turn off by default
  perf_counter: Add counter->id to the throttle event
  perf_counter: Better align code
  perf_counter: Rename L2 to LL cache
  perf_counter: Standardize event names
  perf_counter: Rename enums
  perf_counter tools: Clean up u64 usage
  perf_counter: Rename perf_counter_limit sysctl
  perf_counter: More paranoia settings
  perf_counter: powerpc: Implement generalized cache events for POWER processors
  perf_counters: powerpc: Add support for POWER7 processors
  perf_counter: Accurate period data
  perf_counter: Introduce struct for sample data
  perf_counter tools: Normalize data using per sample period data
  perf_counter: Annotate exit ctx recursion
  perf_counter tools: Propagate signals properly
  perf_counter tools: Small frequency related fixes
  perf_counter: More aggressive frequency adjustment
  perf_counter/x86: Fix the model number of Intel Core2 processors
  perf_counter, x86: Correct some event and umask values for Intel processors
  ...
2009-06-11 14:01:07 -07:00
James Morris 2c9e703c61 Merge branch 'master' into next
Conflicts:
	fs/exec.c

Removed IMA changes (the IMA checks are now performed via may_open()).

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-22 18:40:59 +10:00
Mimi Zohar b9fc745db8 integrity: path_check update
- Add support in ima_path_check() for integrity checking without
incrementing the counts. (Required for nfsd.)
- rename and export opencount_get to ima_counts_get
- replace ima_shm_check calls with ima_counts_get
- export ima_path_check

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-22 09:43:41 +10:00
Ingo Molnar dc3f81b129 Merge commit 'v2.6.30-rc6' into perfcounters/core
Merge reason: this branch was on an -rc4 base, merge it up to -rc6
              to get the latest upstream fixes.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-05-18 07:37:49 +02:00
David Howells 5e751e992f CRED: Rename cred_exec_mutex to reflect that it's a guard against ptrace
Rename cred_exec_mutex to reflect that it's a guard against foreign
intervention on a process's credential state, such as is made by ptrace().  The
attachment of a debugger to a process affects execve()'s calculation of the new
credential state - _and_ also setprocattr()'s calculation of that state.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-11 08:15:36 +10:00
Al Viro 6e8341a11e Switch open_exec() and sys_uselib() to do_open_filp()
... and make path_lookup_open() static

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-05-09 10:49:42 -04:00
Al Viro a44ddbb6d8 Make open_exec() and sys_uselib() use may_open(), instead of duplicating its parts
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-05-09 10:49:42 -04:00
Ivan Kokshaysky 74641f584d alpha: binfmt_aout fix
This fixes the problem introduced by commit 3bfacef412 (get rid of
special-casing the /sbin/loader on alpha): osf/1 ecoff binary segfaults
when binfmt_aout built as module.  That happens because aout binary
handler gets on the top of the binfmt list due to late registration, and
kernel attempts to execute the binary without preparatory work that must
be done by binfmt_loader.

Fixed by changing the registration order of the default binfmt handlers
using list_add_tail() and introducing insert_binfmt() function which
places new handler on the top of the binfmt list.  This might be generally
useful for installing arch-specific frontends for default handlers or just
for overriding them.

Signed-off-by: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-05-02 15:36:10 -07:00
Ingo Molnar e7fd5d4b3d Merge branch 'linus' into perfcounters/core
Merge reason: This brach was on -rc1, refresh it to almost-rc4 to pick up
              the latest upstream fixes.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-04-29 14:47:05 +02:00
Oleg Nesterov 437f7fdb60 check_unsafe_exec: s/lock_task_sighand/rcu_read_lock/
write_lock(&current->fs->lock) guarantees we can't wrongly miss
LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE, this is what we care about. Use rcu_read_lock()
instead of ->siglock to iterate over the sub-threads. We must see
all CLONE_THREAD|CLONE_FS threads which didn't pass exit_fs(), it
takes fs->lock too.

With or without this patch we can miss the freshly cloned thread
and set LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE, we don't care.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
[ Fixed lock/unlock typo  - Hugh ]
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-24 07:39:45 -07:00
Oleg Nesterov 8c652f96d3 do_execve() must not clear fs->in_exec if it was set by another thread
If do_execve() fails after check_unsafe_exec(), it clears fs->in_exec
unconditionally. This is wrong if we race with our sub-thread which
also does do_execve:

	Two threads T1 and T2 and another process P, all share the same
	->fs.

	T1 starts do_execve(BAD_FILE). It calls check_unsafe_exec(), since
	->fs is shared, we set LSM_UNSAFE but not ->in_exec.

	P exits and decrements fs->users.

	T2 starts do_execve(), calls check_unsafe_exec(), now ->fs is not
	shared, we set fs->in_exec.

	T1 continues, open_exec(BAD_FILE) fails, we clear ->in_exec and
	return to the user-space.

	T1 does clone(CLONE_FS /* without CLONE_THREAD */).

	T2 continues without LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE while ->fs is shared with
	another process.

Change check_unsafe_exec() to return res = 1 if we set ->in_exec, and change
do_execve() to clear ->in_exec depending on res.

When do_execve() suceeds, it is safe to clear ->in_exec unconditionally.
It can be set only if we don't share ->fs with another process, and since
we already killed all sub-threads either ->in_exec == 0 or we are the
only user of this ->fs.

Also, we do not need fs->lock to clear fs->in_exec.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-24 07:39:45 -07:00
Peter Zijlstra 8d1b2d9361 perf_counter: track task-comm data
Similar to the mmap data stream, add one that tracks the task COMM field,
so that the userspace reporting knows what to call a task.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Corey Ashford <cjashfor@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
LKML-Reference: <20090408130409.127422406@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-04-08 19:05:47 +02:00
Ingo Molnar f541ae326f Merge branch 'linus' into perfcounters/core-v2
Merge reason: we have gathered quite a few conflicts, need to merge upstream

Conflicts:
	arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
	arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S
	arch/x86/include/asm/hardirq.h
	arch/x86/include/asm/unistd_32.h
	arch/x86/include/asm/unistd_64.h
	arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
	arch/x86/kernel/irq.c
	arch/x86/kernel/syscall_table_32.S
	arch/x86/mm/iomap_32.c
	include/linux/sched.h
	kernel/Makefile

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-04-06 09:02:57 +02:00
Al Viro 5ad4e53bd5 Get rid of indirect include of fs_struct.h
Don't pull it in sched.h; very few files actually need it and those
can include directly.  sched.h itself only needs forward declaration
of struct fs_struct;

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-03-31 23:00:27 -04:00
Al Viro f1191b50ec check_unsafe_exec() doesn't care about signal handlers sharing
... since we'll unshare sighand anyway

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-03-31 23:00:26 -04:00
Al Viro 498052bba5 New locking/refcounting for fs_struct
* all changes of current->fs are done under task_lock and write_lock of
  old fs->lock
* refcount is not atomic anymore (same protection)
* its decrements are done when removing reference from current; at the
  same time we decide whether to free it.
* put_fs_struct() is gone
* new field - ->in_exec.  Set by check_unsafe_exec() if we are trying to do
  execve() and only subthreads share fs_struct.  Cleared when finishing exec
  (success and failure alike).  Makes CLONE_FS fail with -EAGAIN if set.
* check_unsafe_exec() may fail with -EAGAIN if another execve() from subthread
  is in progress.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-03-31 23:00:26 -04:00
Hugh Dickins e426b64c41 fix setuid sometimes doesn't
Joe Malicki reports that setuid sometimes doesn't: very rarely,
a setuid root program does not get root euid; and, by the way,
they have a health check running lsof every few minutes.

Right, check_unsafe_exec() notes whether the files_struct is being
shared by more threads than will get killed by the exec, and if so
sets LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE to make bprm_set_creds() careful about euid.
But /proc/<pid>/fd and /proc/<pid>/fdinfo lookups make transient
use of get_files_struct(), which also raises that sharing count.

There's a rather simple fix for this: exec's check on files->count
has been redundant ever since 2.6.1 made it unshare_files() (except
while compat_do_execve() omitted to do so) - just remove that check.

[Note to -stable: this patch will not apply before 2.6.29: earlier
releases should just remove the files->count line from unsafe_exec().]

Reported-by: Joe Malicki <jmalicki@metacarta.com>
Narrowed-down-by: Michael Itz <mitz@metacarta.com>
Tested-by: Joe Malicki <jmalicki@metacarta.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-28 17:30:00 -07:00
James Morris 703a3cd728 Merge branch 'master' into next 2009-03-24 10:52:46 +11:00
Kentaro Takeda f9ce1f1cda Add in_execve flag into task_struct.
This patch allows LSM modules to determine whether current process is in an
execve operation or not so that they can behave differently while an execve
operation is in progress.

This patch is needed by TOMOYO. Please see another patch titled "LSM adapter
functions." for backgrounds.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-12 15:15:03 +11:00
Ingo Molnar 95fd4845ed Merge commit 'v2.6.29-rc4' into perfcounters/core
Conflicts:
	arch/x86/kernel/setup_percpu.c
	arch/x86/mm/fault.c
	drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c
	kernel/irq/handle.c
2009-02-11 09:22:04 +01:00
David Howells 0bf2f3aec5 CRED: Fix SUID exec regression
The patch:

	commit a6f76f23d2
	CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials

moved the place in which the 'safeness' of a SUID/SGID exec was performed to
before de_thread() was called.  This means that LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE is now
calculated incorrectly.  This flag is set if any of the usage counts for
fs_struct, files_struct and sighand_struct are greater than 1 at the time the
determination is made.  All of which are true for threads created by the
pthread library.

However, since we wish to make the security calculation before irrevocably
damaging the process so that we can return it an error code in the case where
we decide we want to reject the exec request on this basis, we have to make the
determination before calling de_thread().

So, instead, we count up the number of threads (CLONE_THREAD) that are sharing
our fs_struct (CLONE_FS), files_struct (CLONE_FILES) and sighand_structs
(CLONE_SIGHAND/CLONE_THREAD) with us.  These will be killed by de_thread() and
so can be discounted by check_unsafe_exec().

We do have to be careful because CLONE_THREAD does not imply FS or FILES.

We _assume_ that there will be no extra references to these structs held by the
threads we're going to kill.

This can be tested with the attached pair of programs.  Build the two programs
using the Makefile supplied, and run ./test1 as a non-root user.  If
successful, you should see something like:

	[dhowells@andromeda tmp]$ ./test1
	--TEST1--
	uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043
	exec ./test2
	--TEST2--
	uid=4043, euid=0 suid=0
	SUCCESS - Correct effective user ID

and if unsuccessful, something like:

	[dhowells@andromeda tmp]$ ./test1
	--TEST1--
	uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043
	exec ./test2
	--TEST2--
	uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043
	ERROR - Incorrect effective user ID!

The non-root user ID you see will depend on the user you run as.

[test1.c]
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <pthread.h>

static void *thread_func(void *arg)
{
	while (1) {}
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	pthread_t tid;
	uid_t uid, euid, suid;

	printf("--TEST1--\n");
	getresuid(&uid, &euid, &suid);
	printf("uid=%d, euid=%d suid=%d\n", uid, euid, suid);

	if (pthread_create(&tid, NULL, thread_func, NULL) < 0) {
		perror("pthread_create");
		exit(1);
	}

	printf("exec ./test2\n");
	execlp("./test2", "test2", NULL);
	perror("./test2");
	_exit(1);
}

[test2.c]
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	uid_t uid, euid, suid;

	getresuid(&uid, &euid, &suid);
	printf("--TEST2--\n");
	printf("uid=%d, euid=%d suid=%d\n", uid, euid, suid);

	if (euid != 0) {
		fprintf(stderr, "ERROR - Incorrect effective user ID!\n");
		exit(1);
	}
	printf("SUCCESS - Correct effective user ID\n");
	exit(0);
}

[Makefile]
CFLAGS = -D_GNU_SOURCE -Wall -Werror -Wunused
all: test1 test2

test1: test1.c
	gcc $(CFLAGS) -o test1 test1.c -lpthread

test2: test2.c
	gcc $(CFLAGS) -o test2 test2.c
	sudo chown root.root test2
	sudo chmod +s test2

Reported-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-07 08:46:18 +11:00