commit 58cd57bfd9
"nfsd: Fix SP4_MACH_CRED negotiation in EXCHANGE_ID"
miss calculating the length of bitmap for spo_must_enforce and spo_must_allow.
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
- don't BUG_ON() when not SP4_NONE
- calculate recv and send reserve sizes correctly
Signed-off-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
You can turn on or off support for minorversions using e.g.
echo "-4.2" >/proc/fs/nfsd/versions
However, the current implementation is a little wonky. For example, the
above will turn off 4.2 support, but it will also turn *on* 4.1 support.
This didn't matter as long as we only had 2 minorversions, which was
true till very recently.
And do a little cleanup here.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
We saw a v4.0 client's create fail as follows:
- open create succeeds and gets a read delegation
- client attempts to set mode on new file, gets DELAY while
server recalls delegation.
- client attempts a CLAIM_DELEGATE_CUR open using the
delegation, gets error because of new file mode.
This probably can't happen on a recent kernel since we're no longer
giving out delegations on create opens. Nevertheless, it's a
bug--reclaim opens should bypass permission checks.
Reported-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Implement labeled NFS on the server: encoding and decoding, and writing
and reading, of file labels.
Enabled with CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL.
Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com>
Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
The Linux client is using CLAIM_FH to implement regular opens, not just
recovery cases, so it depends on the server to check permissions
correctly.
Therefore the owner override, which may make sense in the delegation
recovery case, isn't right in the CLAIM_FH case.
Symptoms: on a client with 49f9a0fafd
"NFSv4.1: Enable open-by-filehandle", Bryan noticed this:
touch test.txt
chmod 000 test.txt
echo test > test.txt
succeeding.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
We're going out of our way here to remap an error to make rfc 3530
happy--but the rfc itself (nor rfc 1813, which has similar language)
gives no justification. And disagrees with local filesystem behavior,
with Linux and posix man pages, and knfsd's implemented behavior for v2
and v3.
And the documented behavior seems better, in that it gives a little more
information--you could implement the 3530 behavior using the posix
behavior, but not the other way around.
Also, the Linux client makes no attempt to remap this error in the v4
case, so it can end up just returning EEXIST to the application in a
case where it should return EISDIR.
So honestly I think the rfc's are just buggy here--or in any case it
doesn't see worth the trouble to remap this error.
Reported-by: Frank S Filz <ffilz@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Closed stateid's are kept around a little while to handle close replays
in the 4.0 case. So we stash them in the last-used stateid in the
oo_last_closed_stateid field of the open owner. We can free that in
encode_seqid_op_tail once the seqid on the open owner is next
incremented. But we don't want to do that on the close itself; so we
set NFS4_OO_PURGE_CLOSE flag set on the open owner, skip freeing it the
first time through encode_seqid_op_tail, then when we see that flag set
next time we free it.
This is unnecessarily baroque.
Instead, just move the logic that increments the seqid out of the xdr
code and into the operation code itself.
The justification given for the current placement is that we need to
wait till the last minute to be sure we know whether the status is a
sequence-id-mutating error or not, but examination of the code shows
that can't actually happen.
Reported-by: Yanchuan Nian <ycnian@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yanchuan Nian <ycnian@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
we should return error status directly when nfs4_preprocess_stateid_op
return error.
Signed-off-by: fanchaoting <fanchaoting@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
If a client sets an owner (or group_owner or acl) attribute on open for
create, and the mapping of that owner to an id fails, then we return
BAD_OWNER. But BAD_OWNER is a seqid-mutating error, so we can't
shortcut the open processing that case: we have to at least look up the
owner so we can find the seqid to bump.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
This BUG_ON just crashes the thread a little earlier than it would
otherwise--it doesn't seem useful.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
It seems slightly simpler to make nfsd4_encode_fattr rather than its
callers responsible for advancing the write pointer on success.
(Also: the count == 0 check in the verify case looks superfluous.
Running out of buffer space is really the only reason fattr encoding
should fail with eresource.)
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
To ensure ordering of read data with any following operations, turn off
zero copy if the read is not the final operation in the compound.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
This is simple: an NFSd service can be started at different times in
different network environments. So, its "boot time" has to be assigned
per net.
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
With NFSv4, if we create a file then open it we explicit avoid checking
the permissions on the file during the open because the fact that we
created it ensures we should be allow to open it (the create and the
open should appear to be a single operation).
However if the reply to an EXCLUSIVE create gets lots and the client
resends the create, the current code will perform the permission check -
because it doesn't realise that it did the open already..
This patch should fix this.
Note that I haven't actually seen this cause a problem. I was just
looking at the code trying to figure out a different EXCLUSIVE open
related issue, and this looked wrong.
(Fix confirmed with pynfs 4.0 test OPEN4--bfields)
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
[bfields: use OWNER_OVERRIDE and update for 4.1]
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Our server rejects compounds containing more than one write operation.
It's unclear whether this is really permitted by the spec; with 4.0,
it's possibly OK, with 4.1 (which has clearer limits on compound
parameters), it's probably not OK. No client that we're aware of has
ever done this, but in theory it could be useful.
The source of the limitation: we need an array of iovecs to pass to the
write operation. In the worst case that array of iovecs could have
hundreds of elements (the maximum rwsize divided by the page size), so
it's too big to put on the stack, or in each compound op. So we instead
keep a single such array in the compound argument.
We fill in that array at the time we decode the xdr operation.
But we decode every op in the compound before executing any of them. So
once we've used that array we can't decode another write.
If we instead delay filling in that array till the time we actually
perform the write, we can reuse it.
Another option might be to switch to decoding compound ops one at a
time. I considered doing that, but it has a number of other side
effects, and I'd rather fix just this one problem for now.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
This patch replaces init_net by SVC_NET(), where possible and also passes
proper context to nested functions where required.
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Something like creating a client with setclientid and then trying to
confirm it with create_session may not crash the server, but I'm not
completely positive of that, and in any case it's obviously bad client
behavior.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
stateid_setter should be matched to op_set_currentstateid, rather than
op_get_currentstateid.
Signed-off-by: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Passed network namespace replaced hard-coded init_net
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Pull nfsd bugfixes from J. Bruce Fields:
"One bugfix, and one minor header fix from Jeff Layton while we're
here"
* 'for-3.4' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux:
nfsd: include cld.h in the headers_install target
nfsd: don't fail unchecked creates of non-special files
Allow a v3 unchecked open of a non-regular file succeed as if it were a
lookup; typically a client in such a case will want to fall back on a
local open, so succeeding and giving it the filehandle is more useful
than failing with nfserr_exist, which makes it appear that nothing at
all exists by that name.
Similarly for v4, on an open-create, return the same errors we would on
an attempt to open a non-regular file, instead of returning
nfserr_exist.
This fixes a problem found doing a v4 open of a symlink with
O_RDONLY|O_CREAT, which resulted in the current client returning EEXIST.
Thanks also to Trond for analysis.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Orion Poplawski <orion@cora.nwra.com>
Tested-by: Orion Poplawski <orion@cora.nwra.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
We'll need a way to flag the nfs4_client as already being recorded on
stable storage so that we don't continually upcall. Currently, that's
recorded in the cl_firststate field of the client struct. Using an
entire u32 to store a flag is rather wasteful though.
The cl_cb_flags field is only using 2 bits right now, so repurpose that
to a generic flags field. Rename NFSD4_CLIENT_KILL to
NFSD4_CLIENT_CB_KILL to make it evident that it's part of the callback
flags. Add a mask that we can use for existing checks that look to see
whether any flags are set, so that the new flags don't interfere.
Convert all references to cl_firstate to the NFSD4_CLIENT_STABLE flag,
and add a new NFSD4_CLIENT_RECLAIM_COMPLETE flag.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Clean up due to code review.
The nfs4_verifier's data field is not guaranteed to be u32-aligned.
Casting an array of chars to a u32 * is considered generally
hazardous.
We can fix most of this by using a __be32 array to generate the
verifier's contents and then byte-copying it into the verifier field.
However, there is one spot where there is a backwards compatibility
constraint: the do_nfsd_create() call expects a verifier which is
32-bit aligned. Fix this spot by forcing the alignment of the create
verifier in the nfsd4_open args structure.
Also, sizeof(nfs4_verifer) is the size of the in-core verifier data
structure, but NFS4_VERIFIER_SIZE is the number of octets in an XDR'd
verifier. The two are not interchangeable, even if they happen to
have the same value.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
I get 320 bytes for struct svc_fh on x86_64, really a little large to be
putting on the stack; kmalloc() instead.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Compound processing stops on error, so the current filehandle won't be
used on error. Thus the order here doesn't really matter. It'll be
more convenient to do it later, though.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
* 'for-3.3' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (31 commits)
nfsd4: nfsd4_create_clid_dir return value is unused
NFSD: Change name of extended attribute containing junction
svcrpc: don't revert to SVC_POOL_DEFAULT on nfsd shutdown
svcrpc: fix double-free on shutdown of nfsd after changing pool mode
nfsd4: be forgiving in the absence of the recovery directory
nfsd4: fix spurious 4.1 post-reboot failures
NFSD: forget_delegations should use list_for_each_entry_safe
NFSD: Only reinitilize the recall_lru list under the recall lock
nfsd4: initialize special stateid's at compile time
NFSd: use network-namespace-aware cache registering routines
SUNRPC: create svc_xprt in proper network namespace
svcrpc: update outdated BKL comment
nfsd41: allow non-reclaim open-by-fh's in 4.1
svcrpc: avoid memory-corruption on pool shutdown
svcrpc: destroy server sockets all at once
svcrpc: make svc_delete_xprt static
nfsd: Fix oops when parsing a 0 length export
nfsd4: Use kmemdup rather than duplicating its implementation
nfsd4: add a separate (lockowner, inode) lookup
nfsd4: fix CONFIG_NFSD_FAULT_INJECTION compile error
...
A bunch of places in nfsd does mnt_{want,drop}_write on vfsmount of
export of given fhandle. Switched to obvious inlined helpers...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
With NFSv4.0 it was safe to assume that open-by-filehandles were always
reclaims.
With NFSv4.1 there are non-reclaim open-by-filehandle operations, so we
should ensure we're only insisting on reclaims in the
OPEN_CLAIM_PREVIOUS case.
Signed-off-by: Mi Jinlong <mijinlong@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
According to rfc5661 18.50, implement DESTROY_CLIENTID operation.
Signed-off-by: Mi Jinlong <mijinlong@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
If we create the object and then return failure to the client, we're
left with an unexpected file in the filesystem.
I'm trying to eliminate such cases but not 100% sure I have so an
assertion might be helpful for now.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
If process_open1() creates a new open owner, but the open later fails,
the current code will leave the open owner around. It won't be on the
close_lru list, and the client isn't expected to send a CLOSE, so it
will hang around as long as the client does.
Similarly, if process_open1() removes an existing open owner from the
close lru, anticipating that an open owner that previously had no
associated stateid's now will, but the open subsequently fails, then
we'll again be left with the same leak.
Fix both problems.
Reported-by: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Kinglong Mee