Commit Graph

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
David Howells 29db919063 [PATCH] Keys: Add LSM hooks for key management [try #3]
The attached patch adds LSM hooks for key management facilities. The notable
changes are:

 (1) The key struct now supports a security pointer for the use of security
     modules. This will permit key labelling and restrictions on which
     programs may access a key.

 (2) Security modules get a chance to note (or abort) the allocation of a key.

 (3) The key permission checking can now be enhanced by the security modules;
     the permissions check consults LSM if all other checks bear out.

 (4) The key permissions checking functions now return an error code rather
     than a boolean value.

 (5) An extra permission has been added to govern the modification of
     attributes (UID, GID, permissions).

Note that there isn't an LSM hook specifically for each keyctl() operation,
but rather the permissions hook allows control of individual operations based
on the permission request bits.

Key management access control through LSM is enabled by automatically if both
CONFIG_KEYS and CONFIG_SECURITY are enabled.

This should be applied on top of the patch ensubjected:

	[PATCH] Keys: Possessor permissions should be additive

Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-10-30 17:37:23 -08:00
David Howells 664cceb009 [PATCH] Keys: Add possessor permissions to keys [try #3]
The attached patch adds extra permission grants to keys for the possessor of a
key in addition to the owner, group and other permissions bits. This makes
SUID binaries easier to support without going as far as labelling keys and key
targets using the LSM facilities.

This patch adds a second "pointer type" to key structures (struct key_ref *)
that can have the bottom bit of the address set to indicate the possession of
a key. This is propagated through searches from the keyring to the discovered
key. It has been made a separate type so that the compiler can spot attempts
to dereference a potentially incorrect pointer.

The "possession" attribute can't be attached to a key structure directly as
it's not an intrinsic property of a key.

Pointers to keys have been replaced with struct key_ref *'s wherever
possession information needs to be passed through.

This does assume that the bottom bit of the pointer will always be zero on
return from kmem_cache_alloc().

The key reference type has been made into a typedef so that at least it can be
located in the sources, even though it's basically a pointer to an undefined
type. I've also renamed the accessor functions to be more useful, and all
reference variables should now end in "_ref".

Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-28 09:10:47 -07:00
David Howells 1260f801b4 [PATCH] Keys: Fix key management syscall interface bugs
This fixes five bugs in the key management syscall interface:

 (1) add_key() returns 0 rather than EINVAL if the key type is "".

     Checking the key type isn't "" should be left to lookup_user_key().

 (2) request_key() returns ENOKEY rather than EPERM if the key type begins
     with a ".".

     lookup_user_key() can't do this because internal key types begin with a
     ".".

 (3) Key revocation always returns 0, even if it fails.

 (4) Key read can return EAGAIN rather than EACCES under some circumstances.

     A key is permitted to by read by a process if it doesn't grant read
     access, but it does grant search access and it is in the process's
     keyrings. That search returns EAGAIN if it fails, and this needs
     translating to EACCES.

 (5) request_key() never adds the new key to the destination keyring if one is
     supplied.

     The wrong macro was being used to test for an error condition: PTR_ERR()
     will always return true, whether or not there's an error; this should've
     been IS_ERR().

Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-08-04 08:20:47 -07:00
David Howells 3e30148c3d [PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:

 (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".

     This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
     another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
     created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.

     Authorisation keys hold two references:

     (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
     	 constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
     	 rendering it of no further use.

     (b) The "authorising process". This is either:

     	 (i) the process that called request_key(), or:

     	 (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
     	      authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
     	      process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
     	      referred to by the new authorisation key.

	 This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
	 will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
	 the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.

 (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
     /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.

 (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
     it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
     calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
     specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
     (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
     credentials.

     This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
     to the authorising process.

 (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
     direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
     keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
     calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
     credentials of the authorising process.

     This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
     to the authorising process.

 (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
     KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
     than the process doing the instantiation.

 (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
     request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
     done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
     constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.

 (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
     process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
     a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.

Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 00:05:19 -07:00
David Howells 76d8aeabfe [PATCH] keys: Discard key spinlock and use RCU for key payload
The attached patch changes the key implementation in a number of ways:

 (1) It removes the spinlock from the key structure.

 (2) The key flags are now accessed using atomic bitops instead of
     write-locking the key spinlock and using C bitwise operators.

     The three instantiation flags are dealt with with the construction
     semaphore held during the request_key/instantiate/negate sequence, thus
     rendering the spinlock superfluous.

     The key flags are also now bit numbers not bit masks.

 (3) The key payload is now accessed using RCU. This permits the recursive
     keyring search algorithm to be simplified greatly since no locks need be
     taken other than the usual RCU preemption disablement. Searching now does
     not require any locks or semaphores to be held; merely that the starting
     keyring be pinned.

 (4) The keyring payload now includes an RCU head so that it can be disposed
     of by call_rcu(). This requires that the payload be copied on unlink to
     prevent introducing races in copy-down vs search-up.

 (5) The user key payload is now a structure with the data following it. It
     includes an RCU head like the keyring payload and for the same reason. It
     also contains a data length because the data length in the key may be
     changed on another CPU whilst an RCU protected read is in progress on the
     payload. This would then see the supposed RCU payload and the on-key data
     length getting out of sync.

     I'm tempted to drop the key's datalen entirely, except that it's used in
     conjunction with quota management and so is a little tricky to get rid
     of.

 (6) Update the keys documentation.

Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-24 00:05:18 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 1da177e4c3 Linux-2.6.12-rc2
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00