Commit Graph

98 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
NeilBrown 0b345d722e Documentation: security/credentials.rst: explain need to sort group_list
This patch updates the documentation with the observations that led
to commit bdcf0a423e ("kernel: make groups_sort calling a
responsibility group_info allocators") and the new behaviour required.
Specifically that groups_sort() should be called on a new group_list
before set_groups() or set_current_groups() is called.

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
[jc: use proper :c:func: references]
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2018-01-08 14:20:31 -07:00
Tobin C. Harding 227d1a61ed doc: add documentation on printing kernel addresses
Hashing addresses printed with printk specifier %p was implemented
recently. During development a number of issues were raised regarding
leaking kernel addresses to userspace. Other documentation was updated but
security/self-protection missed out.

Add self-protection documentation regarding printing kernel addresses.

Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-12-21 13:39:27 -07:00
Eric Biggers be543dd626 KEYS: fix in-kernel documentation for keyctl_read()
When keyctl_read() is passed a buffer that is too small, the behavior is
inconsistent.  Some key types will fill as much of the buffer as
possible, while others won't copy anything.  Moreover, the in-kernel
documentation contradicted the man page on this point.

Update the in-kernel documentation to say that this point is
unspecified.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-11-15 16:38:44 +00:00
Tom Saeger c7f66400f5 Documentation: fix security related doc refs
Make security document refs valid.

Signed-off-by: Tom Saeger <tom.saeger@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-10-12 11:14:40 -06:00
Josh Holland 33c2f4ec98 docs: ReSTify table of contents in core.rst
Sphinx will now generate the table of contents automatically, which
avoids having the ToC getting out of sync with the rest of the document.

Signed-off-by: Josh Holland <anowlcalledjosh@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-08-30 15:27:58 -06:00
Josh Holland adf31eebd7 docs: Fix paths in security/keys
Several paths in the security/keys documentation were incorrect.

Signed-off-by: Josh Holland <anowlcalledjosh@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-08-24 13:10:58 -06:00
Mat Martineau 7228b66aaf KEYS: Add documentation for asymmetric keyring restrictions
Provide more specific examples of keyring restrictions as applied to
X.509 signature chain verification.

Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-07-14 11:01:38 +10:00
Jonathan Corbet 5ea787a7ec docs: Fix some formatting issues in request-key.rst
The white space in the big enumerated list was inconsistent, leading to
some strange formatting artifacts.

Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-05-18 10:46:25 -06:00
Kees Cook 5395d312df doc: ReSTify keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under keys security devel index.

Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-05-18 10:33:56 -06:00
Kees Cook 3db38ed768 doc: ReSTify keys-request-key.txt
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under keys security devel index.

Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-05-18 10:33:51 -06:00
Kees Cook 09f5412cc5 doc: ReSTify keys-ecryptfs.txt
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under keys security devel index.

Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-05-18 10:33:47 -06:00
Kees Cook b68101a1e8 doc: ReSTify keys.txt
This creates a new section in the security development index for kernel
keys, and adjusts for ReST markup.

Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-05-18 10:33:42 -06:00
Kees Cook a5606ced28 doc: ReSTify Smack.txt
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide.

Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-05-18 10:33:24 -06:00
Kees Cook 30da4f77aa doc: ReSTify LoadPin.txt
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-05-18 10:33:12 -06:00
Kees Cook 90bb766440 doc: ReSTify Yama.txt
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-05-18 10:33:04 -06:00
Kees Cook 5ea672c752 doc: ReSTify tomoyo.txt
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide.

Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-05-18 10:32:57 -06:00
Kees Cook 26fccd9ed2 doc: ReSTify apparmor.txt
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide.

Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-05-18 10:32:38 -06:00
Kees Cook 229fd05c56 doc: ReSTify SELinux.txt
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide.

Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-05-18 10:31:30 -06:00
Kees Cook 504f231cda doc: ReSTify and split LSM.txt
The existing LSM.txt file covered both usage and development, so split
this into two files, one under admin-guide and one under kernel
development.

Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-05-18 10:31:24 -06:00
Kees Cook c2ed674343 doc: ReSTify self-protection.txt
This updates the credentials API documentation to ReST markup and moves
it under the security subsection of kernel API documentation.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-05-18 10:30:23 -06:00
Kees Cook af777cd1b8 doc: ReSTify credentials.txt
This updates the credentials API documentation to ReST markup and moves
it under the security subsection of kernel API documentation.

Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-05-18 10:30:19 -06:00
Kees Cook 7b05b11684 doc: ReSTify IMA-templates.txt
Adjust IMA-templates.txt for ReST markup and add to the index for
security/, under the Kernel API Documentation.

Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-05-18 10:30:14 -06:00
Stephan Mueller f1c316a3ab KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH
SP800-56A defines the use of DH with key derivation function based on a
counter. The input to the KDF is defined as (DH shared secret || other
information). The value for the "other information" is to be provided by
the caller.

The KDF is implemented using the hash support from the kernel crypto API.
The implementation uses the symmetric hash support as the input to the
hash operation is usually very small. The caller is allowed to specify
the hash name that he wants to use to derive the key material allowing
the use of all supported hashes provided with the kernel crypto API.

As the KDF implements the proper truncation of the DH shared secret to
the requested size, this patch fills the caller buffer up to its size.

The patch is tested with a new test added to the keyutils user space
code which uses a CAVS test vector testing the compliance with
SP800-56A.

Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-04-04 22:33:38 +01:00
Mat Martineau 6563c91fd6 KEYS: Add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING
Keyrings recently gained restrict_link capabilities that allow
individual keys to be validated prior to linking.  This functionality
was only available using internal kernel APIs.

With the KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING command existing keyrings can be
configured to check the content of keys before they are linked, and
then allow or disallow linkage of that key to the keyring.

To restrict a keyring, call:

  keyctl(KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, key_serial_t keyring, const char *type,
         const char *restriction)

where 'type' is the name of a registered key type and 'restriction' is a
string describing how key linkage is to be restricted. The restriction
option syntax is specific to each key type.

Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
2017-04-04 14:10:12 -07:00
Mat Martineau efba797b97 KEYS: Add an optional lookup_restriction hook to key_type
The restrict_link functions used to validate keys as they are linked
to a keyring can be associated with specific key types.  Each key type
may be loaded (or not) at runtime, so lookup of restrict_link
functions needs to be part of the key type implementation to ensure
that the requested keys can be examined.

Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
2017-04-04 14:10:11 -07:00
Mat Martineau 2b6aa412ff KEYS: Use structure to capture key restriction function and data
Replace struct key's restrict_link function pointer with a pointer to
the new struct key_restriction. The structure contains pointers to the
restriction function as well as relevant data for evaluating the
restriction.

The garbage collector checks restrict_link->keytype when key types are
unregistered. Restrictions involving a removed key type are converted
to use restrict_link_reject so that restrictions cannot be removed by
unregistering key types.

Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
2017-04-04 14:10:10 -07:00
Mat Martineau aaf66c8838 KEYS: Split role of the keyring pointer for keyring restrict functions
The first argument to the restrict_link_func_t functions was a keyring
pointer. These functions are called by the key subsystem with this
argument set to the destination keyring, but restrict_link_by_signature
expects a pointer to the relevant trusted keyring.

Restrict functions may need something other than a single struct key
pointer to allow or reject key linkage, so the data used to make that
decision (such as the trust keyring) is moved to a new, fourth
argument. The first argument is now always the destination keyring.

Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
2017-04-03 10:24:56 -07:00
Mat Martineau 469ff8f7d4 KEYS: Use a typedef for restrict_link function pointers
This pointer type needs to be returned from a lookup function, and
without a typedef the syntax gets cumbersome.

Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
2017-04-03 10:24:55 -07:00
David Howells 0837e49ab3 KEYS: Differentiate uses of rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload()
rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in
two different, incompatible ways:

 (1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used
     to protect the key.

 (2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is
     used to protect the key and the may be being modified.

Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce:

 (1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked:

	dereference_key_locked()
	user_key_payload_locked()

 (2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock:

	dereference_key_rcu()
	user_key_payload_rcu()

This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper

  ===============================
  [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
  4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G        W
  -------------------------------
  ./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
  other info that might help us debug this:
  rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0
  1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987:
    #0:  (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<d000000002527abc>] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4]
  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G        W       4.10.0 #1
  Call Trace:
    dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable)
    lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190
    nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4]
    nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4]
    decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4]
    decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4]
    rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc]
    call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc]
    __rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc]
    rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc]
    nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4]
    _nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4]
    mount_fs+0x74/0x210
    vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
    nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4]
    nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4]
    nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs]
    mount_fs+0x74/0x210
    vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
    do_mount+0x254/0xf70
    SyS_mount+0x94/0x100
    system_call+0x38/0xe0

Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-03-02 10:09:00 +11:00
Linus Torvalds 7bb033829e This renames the (now inaccurate) CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and related config
CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX to the more sensible CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX and
 CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX.
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 Version: GnuPG v1
 Comment: Kees Cook <kees@outflux.net>
 
 iQIcBAABCgAGBQJYrJ2ZAAoJEIly9N/cbcAmb4UQAIDnJYF4xecUfxofypQwt7ey
 DcR8SH+g/Rkm3v2bUOrVdlP333ePRUEs6C47PgYSLlKsZiQA3H6bsTILHJZGHZ3j
 laNH4sjQ0j+Sr2rHXk8fLz3YpHHwIy49bfu2ERXFH92BMnTMCv1h9IWFgOMH+4y5
 09n16TPHMUj1k0DGjHO/n03qLIKOo3Xy/Va5dhQ/6dGU4zR4KhOBnhLlG3IU7Atd
 KTR+ba/qym7bDQbTezMuaajTiZctr6a45yBKDWu4Knu+ot2a7K7fYvfRT3YVb5SU
 aTSYps7NKQbewcQSqNdek1zytoy2Ck7CH511e+3ypwNmao5KQwRgH7OX1pDEXyZv
 rGDaVzKMTSddH23jLEKUbpR847Lza9+V3h5YtbMG8GgiCKs91Ec666iEE3NVZBO8
 1hiiYhE2iDxi10B/EZZcn2gOt2JaB2m2GxWIrJOz4txtDAWbUYlhUpWEUynBTPQ0
 cYBZVnge81awipZJTWUv57LyufnTnMSK3i8Q8t0woj4C7pFbPYfjnKCrgwTQyAvr
 mD4uFBrgFb1lftbc3kfTdeoZmXerzvubsstWdr3rU3nsiJFzY1SwJZe8n0THyL4g
 DzURFrj/8UXb32Kavysz6FTxFO9u87mJm6yqHn/Y3bEK7Y7cch/NYjRC9Q6dpH+4
 ld9apHF6iRrqgf+x6oOh
 =7KhR
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'rodata-v4.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull rodata updates from Kees Cook:
 "This renames the (now inaccurate) DEBUG_RODATA and related
  SET_MODULE_RONX configs to the more sensible STRICT_KERNEL_RWX and
  STRICT_MODULE_RWX"

* tag 'rodata-v4.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  arch: Rename CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_DEBUG_MODULE_RONX
  arch: Move CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX to be common
2017-02-21 17:56:45 -08:00
Laura Abbott 0f5bf6d0af arch: Rename CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_DEBUG_MODULE_RONX
Both of these options are poorly named. The features they provide are
necessary for system security and should not be considered debug only.
Change the names to CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX and
CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX to better describe what these options do.

Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-02-07 12:32:52 -08:00
Laura Abbott ad21fc4faa arch: Move CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX to be common
There are multiple architectures that support CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and
CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX. These options also now have the ability to be
turned off at runtime. Move these to an architecture independent
location and make these options def_bool y for almost all of those
arches.

Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-02-07 12:32:52 -08:00
Casey Schaufler d69dece5f5 LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm
I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine
what security modules are active on a system. I have added
/sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated
list of the active security modules. No more groping around
in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks.

Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated
to the latest security next branch.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-01-19 13:18:29 +11:00
Linus Torvalds 683b96f4d1 Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Generally pretty quiet for this release. Highlights:

  Yama:
   - allow ptrace access for original parent after re-parenting

  TPM:
   - add documentation
   - many bugfixes & cleanups
   - define a generic open() method for ascii & bios measurements

  Integrity:
   - Harden against malformed xattrs

  SELinux:
   - bugfixes & cleanups

  Smack:
   - Remove unnecessary smack_known_invalid label
   - Do not apply star label in smack_setprocattr hook
   - parse mnt opts after privileges check (fixes unpriv DoS vuln)"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (56 commits)
  Yama: allow access for the current ptrace parent
  tpm: adjust return value of tpm_read_log
  tpm: vtpm_proxy: conditionally call tpm_chip_unregister
  tpm: Fix handling of missing event log
  tpm: Check the bios_dir entry for NULL before accessing it
  tpm: return -ENODEV if np is not set
  tpm: cleanup of printk error messages
  tpm: replace of_find_node_by_name() with dev of_node property
  tpm: redefine read_log() to handle ACPI/OF at runtime
  tpm: fix the missing .owner in tpm_bios_measurements_ops
  tpm: have event log use the tpm_chip
  tpm: drop tpm1_chip_register(/unregister)
  tpm: replace dynamically allocated bios_dir with a static array
  tpm: replace symbolic permission with octal for securityfs files
  char: tpm: fix kerneldoc tpm2_unseal_trusted name typo
  tpm_tis: Allow tpm_tis to be bound using DT
  tpm, tpm_vtpm_proxy: add kdoc comments for VTPM_PROXY_IOC_NEW_DEV
  tpm: Only call pm_runtime_get_sync if device has a parent
  tpm: define a generic open() method for ascii & bios measurements
  Documentation: tpm: add the Physical TPM device tree binding documentation
  ...
2016-12-14 13:57:44 -08:00
Jonathan Corbet 22917b992d docs: Add more manuals to the PDF build
There were a few manuals that weren't being built in PDF format, but
there's no reason not to...

Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2016-11-16 16:07:02 -07:00
Baruch Siach 5465d02a49 Doc: security: keys-trusted: drop duplicate blobauth entry
Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-11-13 22:50:10 -05:00
Jarkko Sakkinen 799a545bb9 tpm: move documentation under Documentation/security
In order too make Documentation root directory cleaner move the tpm
directory under Documentation/security.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2016-11-07 18:56:42 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 0f776dc377 Some big changes this month, headlined by the addition of a new formatted
documentation mechanism based on the Sphinx system.  The objectives here
 are to make it easier to create better-integrated (and more attractive)
 documents while (eventually) dumping our one-of-a-kind, cobbled-together
 system for something that is widely used and maintained by others.  There's
 a fair amount of information what's being done, why, and how to use it in:
 
   https://lwn.net/Articles/692704/
   https://lwn.net/Articles/692705/
 
 Closer to home, Documentation/kernel-documentation.rst describes how it
 works.
 
 For now, the new system exists alongside the old one; you should soon see
 the GPU documentation converted over in the DRM pull and some significant
 media conversion work as well.  Once all the docs have been moved over and
 we're convinced that the rough edges (of which are are a few) have been
 smoothed over, the DocBook-based stuff should go away.
 
 Primary credit is to Jani Nikula for doing the heavy lifting to make this
 stuff actually work; there has also been notable effort from Markus Heiser,
 Daniel Vetter, and Mauro Carvalho Chehab.
 
 Expect a couple of conflicts on the new index.rst file over the course of
 the merge window; they are trivially resolvable.  That file may be a bit of
 a conflict magnet in the short term, but I don't expect that situation to
 last for any real length of time.
 
 Beyond that, of course, we have the usual collection of tweaks, updates,
 and typo fixes.
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 Version: GnuPG v1
 
 iQIcBAABAgAGBQJXlT8bAAoJEI3ONVYwIuV6IF0QAM7qpEgAveXgwzGr18ReftjB
 ryyPXdLNX8R7fQkUAu85Znlw93k4+7QxHseBgZ1I3t9IhjvzemidOKfj96SJ0DVE
 zco5FUTO1TPfO2uG8asNzlXSrwktrEZoFTraRIYpCjAAimg/UEQAM4xgNOJfmW39
 8eLg6dhnzqnfCH6M+Q7AZPLmqNSOfA2qNFqHNs7VCbwjLQC0l4yw4PHOsdX0QhCL
 NtlukHOhB4CwaELDl6lZOQgnz79e4pDljFd/wA/vVpdq7ev8NnOgVVt93M2fUvLX
 Bdfzo2OtZg7LJnWtpQl2LJq2MJJdOmgIw+ls6cB5gvxV3+CCIndE/6IIbimC/lZi
 DiaaqVU/EV3AemBDbqErO4k3ZvMT2ZTaSx1OQoLpIwNAsAkEOkb+t2hcwrTqhxg1
 kEIXEEboXwStBtH3iar2YiGHQWUhia4mxfv5n4Dvamaca4tGWXHWxSRjbRcaJ1ef
 v1kt6ymjwr2sd9116EUxngfYONwlrhk5F87D/dC2eQzEyS0z7+F8wWb/h2gsAaU1
 6oVCoQjTe2KAc/7dHINMSIjg2TfVfHS5XIhWu5z6wyxRb8ey9QuKLQYlOTV/L3Ms
 aR4O6qvDIsIbOvEd+hHSIbeG7JOPd0LdSI4tdo4d9kquW2OJ6TmmOr/ihbJt430v
 s/Qxqwgme/8DJd3KcV6j
 =4fDK
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'docs-for-linus' of git://git.lwn.net/linux

Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
 "Some big changes this month, headlined by the addition of a new
  formatted documentation mechanism based on the Sphinx system.

  The objectives here are to make it easier to create better-integrated
  (and more attractive) documents while (eventually) dumping our
  one-of-a-kind, cobbled-together system for something that is widely
  used and maintained by others.  There's a fair amount of information
  what's being done, why, and how to use it in:

    https://lwn.net/Articles/692704/
    https://lwn.net/Articles/692705/

  Closer to home, Documentation/kernel-documentation.rst describes how
  it works.

  For now, the new system exists alongside the old one; you should soon
  see the GPU documentation converted over in the DRM pull and some
  significant media conversion work as well.  Once all the docs have
  been moved over and we're convinced that the rough edges (of which are
  are a few) have been smoothed over, the DocBook-based stuff should go
  away.

  Primary credit is to Jani Nikula for doing the heavy lifting to make
  this stuff actually work; there has also been notable effort from
  Markus Heiser, Daniel Vetter, and Mauro Carvalho Chehab.

  Expect a couple of conflicts on the new index.rst file over the course
  of the merge window; they are trivially resolvable.  That file may be
  a bit of a conflict magnet in the short term, but I don't expect that
  situation to last for any real length of time.

  Beyond that, of course, we have the usual collection of tweaks,
  updates, and typo fixes"

* tag 'docs-for-linus' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (77 commits)
  doc-rst: kernel-doc: fix handling of address_space tags
  Revert "doc/sphinx: Enable keep_warnings"
  doc-rst: kernel-doc directive, fix state machine reporter
  docs: deprecate kernel-doc-nano-HOWTO.txt
  doc/sphinx: Enable keep_warnings
  Documentation: add watermark_scale_factor to the list of vm systcl file
  kernel-doc: Fix up warning output
  docs: Get rid of some kernel-documentation warnings
  doc-rst: add an option to ignore DocBooks when generating docs
  workqueue: Fix a typo in workqueue.txt
  Doc: ocfs: Fix typo in filesystems/ocfs2-online-filecheck.txt
  Documentation/sphinx: skip build if user requested specific DOCBOOKS
  Documentation: add cleanmediadocs to the documentation targets
  Add .pyc files to .gitignore
  Doc: PM: Fix a typo in intel_powerclamp.txt
  doc-rst: flat-table directive - initial implementation
  Documentation: add meta-documentation for Sphinx and kernel-doc
  Documentation: tiny typo fix in usb/gadget_multi.txt
  Documentation: fix wrong value in md.txt
  bcache: documentation formatting, edited for clarity, stripe alignment notes
  ...
2016-07-26 13:05:11 -07:00
Kees Cook c9de4a82c8 docs: self-protection: rename "leak" to "exposure"
The meaning of "leak" can be both "untracked resource allocation" and
"memory content disclosure". This document's use was entirely of the
latter meaning, so avoid the confusion by using the Common Weakness
Enumeration name for this: Information Exposure (CWE-200). Additionally
adds a section on structure randomization.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2016-06-09 13:23:27 -06:00
Stephan Mueller 4693fc734d KEYS: Add placeholder for KDF usage with DH
The values computed during Diffie-Hellman key exchange are often used
in combination with key derivation functions to create cryptographic
keys.  Add a placeholder for a later implementation to configure a
key derivation function that will transform the Diffie-Hellman
result returned by the KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command.

[This patch was stripped down from a patch produced by Mat Martineau that
 had a bug in the compat code - so for the moment Stephan's patch simply
 requires that the placeholder argument must be NULL]

Original-signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-06-03 16:14:34 +10:00
Linus Torvalds e9ad9b9bd3 The most interesting thing (IMO) this time around is some beginning
infrastructural work to allow documents to be written using restructured
 text.  Maybe someday, in a galaxy far far away, we'll be able to eliminate
 the DocBook dependency and have a much better integrated set of kernel
 docs.  Someday.
 
 Beyond that, there's a new document on security hardening from Kees, the
 movement of some sample code over to samples/, a number of improvements to
 the serial docs from Geert, and the usual collection of corrections, typo
 fixes, etc.
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 Version: GnuPG v1
 
 iQIcBAABAgAGBQJXPf/VAAoJEI3ONVYwIuV60pkP/3brq+CavbwptWppESoyZaf7
 mpVSH7sOKicMcfHYYIXHmmg0K5gM4e22ATl39+izUCRZRwRnObXvroH++G5mARLs
 MUDxLvkc/QxDDuCZnUBq5E2gPtuyYpgj1q9fMGB+70ucc/EXYp5cxUhDmbNVrpSG
 KBMoZqKaW/Cf8/4fvRQG/glSR0iwyaQuvvoFAWLHgf8uWN/JPM2Cnv9V2zGQCtzP
 4B4Jzayu2BGKowBd65WUYdpGnccc7OAJFSJDY/Z9x7kVxKyD+VTn7VgxGnXxs88v
 uNmUEMENUpswzuoYEnDHoR0Y2o7jUi2doFKv+eacSmPaMLWL5EMDzcooZ+Vi7HWH
 mvp6GtAZ5qs96OGjsi+gFIw4kY8HGdnpzs7qk/uEdAndfAif5v24YLSQRG2rUCJM
 LxomnAWOJEIWGKJtuJnl16aZkgOcn6soecXw3PJmpxzhwd8BnQzwyZIdaZ98kwjA
 7Enq2Mmw5NBQwGIV2ODUxzoQ3Axj7aJJsDra2n6lPGTGXONGdgNFzk/hGmtQSuIp
 Aeatiy66FF0qKomzs2+EACOFP+eH/IId0yvW83Pj0o9nV25YZiPsw0Z1Tae5n3+g
 zgTFycalaowIwE3YzyH6BwvnMrluiPpUTjSLsmEaviJxE7/o+zrjOvMvallUIVUn
 YkJcia/DtSuc7u7LYkWe
 =2O+a
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'docs-for-linus' of git://git.lwn.net/linux

Pull Documentation updates from Jon Corbet:
 "A bit busier this time around.

  The most interesting thing (IMO) this time around is some beginning
  infrastructural work to allow documents to be written using
  restructured text.  Maybe someday, in a galaxy far far away, we'll be
  able to eliminate the DocBook dependency and have a much better
  integrated set of kernel docs.  Someday.

  Beyond that, there's a new document on security hardening from Kees,
  the movement of some sample code over to samples/, a number of
  improvements to the serial docs from Geert, and the usual collection
  of corrections, typo fixes, etc"

* tag 'docs-for-linus' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (55 commits)
  doc: self-protection: provide initial details
  serial: doc: Use port->state instead of info
  serial: doc: Always refer to tty_port->mutex
  Documentation: vm: Spelling s/paltform/platform/g
  Documentation/memcg: update kmem limit doc as codes behavior
  docproc: print a comment about autogeneration for rst output
  docproc: add support for reStructuredText format via --rst option
  docproc: abstract terminating lines at first space
  docproc: abstract docproc directive detection
  docproc: reduce unnecessary indentation
  docproc: add variables for subcommand and filename
  kernel-doc: use rst C domain directives and references for types
  kernel-doc: produce RestructuredText output
  kernel-doc: rewrite usage description, remove duplicated comments
  Doc: correct the location of sysrq.c
  Documentation: fix common spelling mistakes
  samples: v4l: from Documentation to samples directory
  samples: connector: from Documentation to samples directory
  Documentation: xillybus: fix spelling mistake
  Documentation: x86: fix spelling mistakes
  ...
2016-05-19 18:07:25 -07:00
Kees Cook 9f8036643d doc: self-protection: provide initial details
This document attempts to codify the intent around kernel self-protection
along with discussion of both existing and desired technologies, with
attention given to the rationale behind them, and the expectations of
their usage.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
[jc: applied fixes suggested by Randy]
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2016-05-17 16:24:52 -06:00
James Morris 0250abcd72 Merge tag 'keys-next-20160505' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next 2016-05-06 09:29:00 +10:00
David Howells d55201ce08 Merge branch 'keys-trust' into keys-next
Here's a set of patches that changes how certificates/keys are determined
to be trusted.  That's currently a two-step process:

 (1) Up until recently, when an X.509 certificate was parsed - no matter
     the source - it was judged against the keys in .system_keyring,
     assuming those keys to be trusted if they have KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED set
     upon them.

     This has just been changed such that any key in the .ima_mok keyring,
     if configured, may also be used to judge the trustworthiness of a new
     certificate, whether or not the .ima_mok keyring is meant to be
     consulted for whatever process is being undertaken.

     If a certificate is determined to be trustworthy, KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED
     will be set upon a key it is loaded into (if it is loaded into one),
     no matter what the key is going to be loaded for.

 (2) If an X.509 certificate is loaded into a key, then that key - if
     KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED gets set upon it - can be linked into any keyring
     with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY set upon it.  This was meant to be the
     system keyring only, but has been extended to various IMA keyrings.
     A user can at will link any key marked KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED into any
     keyring marked KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY if the relevant permissions masks
     permit it.

These patches change that:

 (1) Trust becomes a matter of consulting the ring of trusted keys supplied
     when the trust is evaluated only.

 (2) Every keyring can be supplied with its own manager function to
     restrict what may be added to that keyring.  This is called whenever a
     key is to be linked into the keyring to guard against a key being
     created in one keyring and then linked across.

     This function is supplied with the keyring and the key type and
     payload[*] of the key being linked in for use in its evaluation.  It
     is permitted to use other data also, such as the contents of other
     keyrings such as the system keyrings.

     [*] The type and payload are supplied instead of a key because as an
         optimisation this function may be called whilst creating a key and
         so may reject the proposed key between preparse and allocation.

 (3) A default manager function is provided that permits keys to be
     restricted to only asymmetric keys that are vouched for by the
     contents of the system keyring.

     A second manager function is provided that just rejects with EPERM.

 (4) A key allocation flag, KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, is made available
     so that the kernel can initialise keyrings with keys that form the
     root of the trust relationship.

 (5) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY are removed, along with
     key_preparsed_payload::trusted.

This change also makes it possible in future for userspace to create a private
set of trusted keys and then to have it sealed by setting a manager function
where the private set is wholly independent of the kernel's trust
relationships.

Further changes in the set involve extracting certain IMA special keyrings
and making them generally global:

 (*) .system_keyring is renamed to .builtin_trusted_keys and remains read
     only.  It carries only keys built in to the kernel.  It may be where
     UEFI keys should be loaded - though that could better be the new
     secondary keyring (see below) or a separate UEFI keyring.

 (*) An optional secondary system keyring (called .secondary_trusted_keys)
     is added to replace the IMA MOK keyring.

     (*) Keys can be added to the secondary keyring by root if the keys can
         be vouched for by either ring of system keys.

 (*) Module signing and kexec only use .builtin_trusted_keys and do not use
     the new secondary keyring.

 (*) Config option SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS now depends on ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE as
     that's the only type currently permitted on the system keyrings.

 (*) A new config option, IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY,
     is provided to allow keys to be added to IMA keyrings, subject to the
     restriction that such keys are validly signed by a key already in the
     system keyrings.

     If this option is enabled, but secondary keyrings aren't, additions to
     the IMA keyrings will be restricted to signatures verifiable by keys in
     the builtin system keyring only.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-05-04 17:20:20 +01:00
Kees Cook 9b091556a0 LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions
This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc)
must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that
such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity
or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable
filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without
needing to sign the files individually.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-04-21 10:47:27 +10:00
Mat Martineau ddbb411487 KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command
This adds userspace access to Diffie-Hellman computations through a
new keyctl() syscall command to calculate shared secrets or public
keys using input parameters stored in the keyring.

Input key ids are provided in a struct due to the current 5-arg limit
for the keyctl syscall. Only user keys are supported in order to avoid
exposing the content of logon or encrypted keys.

The output is written to the provided buffer, based on the assumption
that the values are only needed in userspace.

Future support for other types of key derivation would involve a new
command, like KEYCTL_ECDH_COMPUTE.

Once Diffie-Hellman support is included in the crypto API, this code
can be converted to use the crypto API to take advantage of possible
hardware acceleration and reduce redundant code.

Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-12 19:54:58 +01:00
David Howells 5ac7eace2d KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyring
Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be
vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary.  This can be used to
block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which
the signature verification fails.  It could also be used to provide
blacklisting.

This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE.

To this end:

 (1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to
     the vetting function.  This is called as:

	int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring,
			     const struct key_type *key_type,
			     unsigned long key_flags,
			     const union key_payload *key_payload),

     where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and
     key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be
     AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED.

     [*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when
     	 KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed.

     The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an
     error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the
     link.

     The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set
     through keyring_alloc().

     Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this
     method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function
     is called.

 (2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added.  This can be passed to
     key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the
     restriction check.

 (3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed.  The entire contents of a keyring
     with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by
     virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted.

 (4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be
     used to set restrict_link in the new key.  This ensures that the
     pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window
     of unrestrictedness.  Normally this argument will be NULL.

 (5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added.  It
     should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of
     setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring.  This will be replaced in
     a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for
     authoritative keys.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-04-11 22:37:37 +01:00
Jarkko Sakkinen 5beb0c435b keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy
TPM2 supports authorization policies, which are essentially
combinational logic statements repsenting the conditions where the data
can be unsealed based on the TPM state. This patch enables to use
authorization policies to seal trusted keys.

Two following new options have been added for trusted keys:

* 'policydigest=': provide an auth policy digest for sealing.
* 'policyhandle=': provide a policy session handle for unsealing.

If 'hash=' option is supplied after 'policydigest=' option, this
will result an error because the state of the option would become
mixed.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
2015-12-20 15:27:13 +02:00
Jarkko Sakkinen 5ca4c20cfd keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips
Added 'hash=' option for selecting the hash algorithm for add_key()
syscall and documentation for it.

Added entry for sm3-256 to the following tables in order to support
TPM_ALG_SM3_256:

* hash_algo_name
* hash_digest_size

Includes support for the following hash algorithms:

* sha1
* sha256
* sha384
* sha512
* sm3-256

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
2015-12-20 15:27:12 +02:00
David Howells 146aa8b145 KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data
Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk
as it seems pointless to keep them separate.

Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded
user-defined keys.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
2015-10-21 15:18:36 +01:00