Commit Graph

162 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Alexey Dobriyan 197850a1e0 proc: use "unsigned int" for sigqueue length
It's defined as atomic_t and really long signal queues are unheard of.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180423215119.GF9043@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-07 17:34:38 -07:00
Linus Torvalds af6c5d5e01 Merge branch 'for-4.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/wq
Pull workqueue updates from Tejun Heo:

 - make kworkers report the workqueue it is executing or has executed
   most recently in /proc/PID/comm (so they show up in ps/top)

 - CONFIG_SMP shuffle to move stuff which isn't necessary for UP builds
   inside CONFIG_SMP.

* 'for-4.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/wq:
  workqueue: move function definitions within CONFIG_SMP block
  workqueue: Make sure struct worker is accessible for wq_worker_comm()
  workqueue: Show the latest workqueue name in /proc/PID/{comm,stat,status}
  proc: Consolidate task->comm formatting into proc_task_name()
  workqueue: Set worker->desc to workqueue name by default
  workqueue: Make worker_attach/detach_pool() update worker->pool
  workqueue: Replace pool->attach_mutex with global wq_pool_attach_mutex
2018-06-05 17:31:33 -07:00
Linus Torvalds cf626b0da7 Merge branch 'hch.procfs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull procfs updates from Al Viro:
 "Christoph's proc_create_... cleanups series"

* 'hch.procfs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (44 commits)
  xfs, proc: hide unused xfs procfs helpers
  isdn/gigaset: add back gigaset_procinfo assignment
  proc: update SIZEOF_PDE_INLINE_NAME for the new pde fields
  tty: replace ->proc_fops with ->proc_show
  ide: replace ->proc_fops with ->proc_show
  ide: remove ide_driver_proc_write
  isdn: replace ->proc_fops with ->proc_show
  atm: switch to proc_create_seq_private
  atm: simplify procfs code
  bluetooth: switch to proc_create_seq_data
  netfilter/x_tables: switch to proc_create_seq_private
  netfilter/xt_hashlimit: switch to proc_create_{seq,single}_data
  neigh: switch to proc_create_seq_data
  hostap: switch to proc_create_{seq,single}_data
  bonding: switch to proc_create_seq_data
  rtc/proc: switch to proc_create_single_data
  drbd: switch to proc_create_single
  resource: switch to proc_create_seq_data
  staging/rtl8192u: simplify procfs code
  jfs: simplify procfs code
  ...
2018-06-04 10:00:01 -07:00
Tejun Heo 6b59808bfe workqueue: Show the latest workqueue name in /proc/PID/{comm,stat,status}
There can be a lot of workqueue workers and they all show up with the
cryptic kworker/* names making it difficult to understand which is
doing what and how they came to be.

  # ps -ef | grep kworker
  root           4       2  0 Feb25 ?        00:00:00 [kworker/0:0H]
  root           6       2  0 Feb25 ?        00:00:00 [kworker/u112:0]
  root          19       2  0 Feb25 ?        00:00:00 [kworker/1:0H]
  root          25       2  0 Feb25 ?        00:00:00 [kworker/2:0H]
  root          31       2  0 Feb25 ?        00:00:00 [kworker/3:0H]
  ...

This patch makes workqueue workers report the latest workqueue it was
executing for through /proc/PID/{comm,stat,status}.  The extra
information is appended to the kthread name with intervening '+' if
currently executing, otherwise '-'.

  # cat /proc/25/comm
  kworker/2:0-events_power_efficient
  # cat /proc/25/stat
  25 (kworker/2:0-events_power_efficient) I 2 0 0 0 -1 69238880 0 0...
  # grep Name /proc/25/status
  Name:   kworker/2:0-events_power_efficient

Unfortunately, ps(1) truncates comm to 15 characters,

  # ps 25
    PID TTY      STAT   TIME COMMAND
     25 ?        I      0:00 [kworker/2:0-eve]

making it a lot less useful; however, this should be an easy fix from
ps(1) side.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Craig Small <csmall@enc.com.au>
2018-05-18 08:47:13 -07:00
Tejun Heo 88b72b31e1 proc: Consolidate task->comm formatting into proc_task_name()
proc shows task->comm in three places - comm, stat, status - and each
is fetching and formatting task->comm slighly differently.  This patch
renames task_name() to proc_task_name(), makes it more generic, and
updates all three paths to use it.

This will enable expanding comm reporting for workqueue workers.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
2018-05-18 08:47:13 -07:00
Christoph Hellwig 04015e3fa2 proc: don't detour through seq->private to get the inode
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2018-05-16 07:23:35 +02:00
Christoph Hellwig 76f668be1e proc: introduce a proc_pid_ns helper
Factor out retrieving the per-sb pid namespaces from the sb private data
into an easier to understand helper.

Suggested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2018-05-16 07:23:35 +02:00
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk e96f46ee85 proc: Use underscores for SSBD in 'status'
The style for the 'status' file is CamelCase or this. _.

Fixes: fae1fa0fc ("proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations")
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2018-05-09 21:41:38 +02:00
Thomas Gleixner 356e4bfff2 prctl: Add force disable speculation
For certain use cases it is desired to enforce mitigations so they cannot
be undone afterwards. That's important for loader stubs which want to
prevent a child from disabling the mitigation again. Will also be used for
seccomp(). The extra state preserving of the prctl state for SSB is a
preparatory step for EBPF dymanic speculation control.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2018-05-05 00:51:43 +02:00
Kees Cook fae1fa0fc6 proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations
As done with seccomp and no_new_privs, also show speculation flaw
mitigation state in /proc/$pid/status.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2018-05-03 13:55:51 +02:00
Andrei Vagin d0f0223122 proc: replace seq_printf by seq_put_smth to speed up /proc/pid/status
seq_printf() works slower than seq_puts, seq_puts, etc.

== test_proc.c
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	int n, i, fd;
	char buf[16384];

	n = atoi(argv[1]);
	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
		fd = open(argv[2], O_RDONLY);
		if (fd < 0)
			return 1;
		if (read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) <= 0)
			return 1;
		close(fd);
	}

	return 0;
}
==

$ time ./test_proc  1000000 /proc/1/status

== Before path ==
real	0m5.171s
user	0m0.328s
sys	0m4.783s

== After patch ==
real	0m4.761s
user	0m0.334s
sys	0m4.366s

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180212074931.7227-4-avagin@openvz.org
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11 10:28:33 -07:00
Mateusz Guzik 68c3411ff4 proc: get rid of task lock/unlock pair to read umask for the "status" file
get_task_umask locks/unlocks the task on its own.  The only caller does
the same thing immediately after.

Utilize the fact the task has to be locked anyway and just do it once.
Since there are no other users and the code is short, fold it in.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517995608-23683-1-git-send-email-mguzik@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11 10:28:33 -07:00
Alexey Dobriyan 171ef917df fs/proc/array.c: delete children_seq_release()
It is 1:1 wrapper around seq_release().

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171122171510.GA12161@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-02-06 18:32:43 -08:00
Alexey Dobriyan 8bb2ee192e proc: fix coredump vs read /proc/*/stat race
do_task_stat() accesses IP and SP of a task without bumping reference
count of a stack (which became an entity with independent lifetime at
some point).

Steps to reproduce:

    #include <stdio.h>
    #include <sys/types.h>
    #include <sys/stat.h>
    #include <fcntl.h>
    #include <sys/time.h>
    #include <sys/resource.h>
    #include <unistd.h>
    #include <sys/wait.h>

    int main(void)
    {
    	setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &(struct rlimit){});

    	while (1) {
    		char buf[64];
    		char buf2[4096];
    		pid_t pid;
    		int fd;

    		pid = fork();
    		if (pid == 0) {
    			*(volatile int *)0 = 0;
    		}

    		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "/proc/%u/stat", pid);
    		fd = open(buf, O_RDONLY);
    		read(fd, buf2, sizeof(buf2));
    		close(fd);

    		waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
    	}
    	return 0;
    }

    BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000000000003fd8
    IP: do_task_stat+0x8b4/0xaf0
    PGD 800000003d73e067 P4D 800000003d73e067 PUD 3d558067 PMD 0
    Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
    CPU: 0 PID: 1417 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.15.0-rc8-dirty #2
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1.fc27 04/01/2014
    RIP: 0010:do_task_stat+0x8b4/0xaf0
    Call Trace:
     proc_single_show+0x43/0x70
     seq_read+0xe6/0x3b0
     __vfs_read+0x1e/0x120
     vfs_read+0x84/0x110
     SyS_read+0x3d/0xa0
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x6c
    RIP: 0033:0x7f4d7928cba0
    RSP: 002b:00007ffddb245158 EFLAGS: 00000246
    Code: 03 b7 a0 01 00 00 4c 8b 4c 24 70 4c 8b 44 24 78 4c 89 74 24 18 e9 91 f9 ff ff f6 45 4d 02 0f 84 fd f7 ff ff 48 8b 45 40 48 89 ef <48> 8b 80 d8 3f 00 00 48 89 44 24 20 e8 9b 97 eb ff 48 89 44 24
    RIP: do_task_stat+0x8b4/0xaf0 RSP: ffffc90000607cc8
    CR2: 0000000000003fd8

John Ogness said: for my tests I added an else case to verify that the
race is hit and correctly mitigated.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180116175054.GA11513@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Reported-by: "Kohli, Gaurav" <gkohli@codeaurora.org>
Tested-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-01-19 10:09:41 -08:00
Roman Gushchin c643401218 proc, coredump: add CoreDumping flag to /proc/pid/status
Right now there is no convenient way to check if a process is being
coredumped at the moment.

It might be necessary to recognize such state to prevent killing the
process and getting a broken coredump.  Writing a large core might take
significant time, and the process is unresponsive during it, so it might
be killed by timeout, if another process is monitoring and
killing/restarting hanging tasks.

We're getting a significant number of corrupted coredump files on
machines in our fleet, just because processes are being killed by
timeout in the middle of the core writing process.

We do have a process health check, and some agent is responsible for
restarting processes which are not responding for health check requests.
Writing a large coredump to the disk can easily exceed the reasonable
timeout (especially on an overloaded machine).

This flag will allow the agent to distinguish processes which are being
coredumped, extend the timeout for them, and let them produce a full
coredump file.

To provide an ability to detect if a process is in the state of being
coredumped, we can expose a boolean CoreDumping flag in
/proc/pid/status.

Example:
$ cat core.sh
  #!/bin/sh

  echo "|/usr/bin/sleep 10" > /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern
  sleep 1000 &
  PID=$!

  cat /proc/$PID/status | grep CoreDumping
  kill -ABRT $PID
  sleep 1
  cat /proc/$PID/status | grep CoreDumping

$ ./core.sh
  CoreDumping:	0
  CoreDumping:	1

[guro@fb.com: document CoreDumping flag in /proc/<pid>/status]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170928135357.GA8470@castle.DHCP.thefacebook.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170920230634.31572-1-guro@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-17 16:10:00 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 3e2014637c Merge branch 'sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull scheduler updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "The main updates in this cycle were:

   - Group balancing enhancements and cleanups (Brendan Jackman)

   - Move CPU isolation related functionality into its separate
     kernel/sched/isolation.c file, with related 'housekeeping_*()'
     namespace and nomenclature et al. (Frederic Weisbecker)

   - Improve the interactive/cpu-intense fairness calculation (Josef
     Bacik)

   - Improve the PELT code and related cleanups (Peter Zijlstra)

   - Improve the logic of pick_next_task_fair() (Uladzislau Rezki)

   - Improve the RT IPI based balancing logic (Steven Rostedt)

   - Various micro-optimizations:

   - better !CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG optimizations (Patrick Bellasi)

   - better idle loop (Cheng Jian)

   - ... plus misc fixes, cleanups and updates"

* 'sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (54 commits)
  sched/core: Optimize sched_feat() for !CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG builds
  sched/sysctl: Fix attributes of some extern declarations
  sched/isolation: Document isolcpus= boot parameter flags, mark it deprecated
  sched/isolation: Add basic isolcpus flags
  sched/isolation: Move isolcpus= handling to the housekeeping code
  sched/isolation: Handle the nohz_full= parameter
  sched/isolation: Introduce housekeeping flags
  sched/isolation: Split out new CONFIG_CPU_ISOLATION=y config from CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL
  sched/isolation: Rename is_housekeeping_cpu() to housekeeping_cpu()
  sched/isolation: Use its own static key
  sched/isolation: Make the housekeeping cpumask private
  sched/isolation: Provide a dynamic off-case to housekeeping_any_cpu()
  sched/isolation, watchdog: Use housekeeping_cpumask() instead of ad-hoc version
  sched/isolation: Move housekeeping related code to its own file
  sched/idle: Micro-optimize the idle loop
  sched/isolcpus: Fix "isolcpus=" boot parameter handling when !CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK
  x86/tsc: Append the 'tsc=' description for the 'tsc=unstable' boot parameter
  sched/rt: Simplify the IPI based RT balancing logic
  block/ioprio: Use a helper to check for RT prio
  sched/rt: Add a helper to test for a RT task
  ...
2017-11-13 13:37:52 -08:00
Ingo Molnar 8a103df440 Merge branch 'linus' into sched/core, to pick up fixes
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-08 10:17:15 +01:00
Ingo Molnar 8c5db92a70 Merge branch 'linus' into locking/core, to resolve conflicts
Conflicts:
	include/linux/compiler-clang.h
	include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
	include/linux/compiler-intel.h
	include/uapi/linux/stddef.h

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-07 10:32:44 +01:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman b24413180f License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-02 11:10:55 +01:00
Mark Rutland 6aa7de0591 locking/atomics: COCCINELLE/treewide: Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() patterns to READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE()
Please do not apply this to mainline directly, instead please re-run the
coccinelle script shown below and apply its output.

For several reasons, it is desirable to use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() in
preference to ACCESS_ONCE(), and new code is expected to use one of the
former. So far, there's been no reason to change most existing uses of
ACCESS_ONCE(), as these aren't harmful, and changing them results in
churn.

However, for some features, the read/write distinction is critical to
correct operation. To distinguish these cases, separate read/write
accessors must be used. This patch migrates (most) remaining
ACCESS_ONCE() instances to {READ,WRITE}_ONCE(), using the following
coccinelle script:

----
// Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() uses to equivalent READ_ONCE() and
// WRITE_ONCE()

// $ make coccicheck COCCI=/home/mark/once.cocci SPFLAGS="--include-headers" MODE=patch

virtual patch

@ depends on patch @
expression E1, E2;
@@

- ACCESS_ONCE(E1) = E2
+ WRITE_ONCE(E1, E2)

@ depends on patch @
expression E;
@@

- ACCESS_ONCE(E)
+ READ_ONCE(E)
----

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: davem@davemloft.net
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au
Cc: shuah@kernel.org
Cc: snitzer@redhat.com
Cc: thor.thayer@linux.intel.com
Cc: tj@kernel.org
Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: will.deacon@arm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1508792849-3115-19-git-send-email-paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-10-25 11:01:08 +02:00
Peter Zijlstra 1d48b080bc sched/debug: Rename task-state printing helpers
Steve requested better names for the new task-state helper functions.

So introduce the concept of task-state index for the printing and
rename __get_task_state() to task_state_index() and
__task_state_to_char() to task_index_to_char().

Requested-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170929115016.pzlqc7ss3ccystyg@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-10-10 11:43:29 +02:00
Peter Zijlstra 8ef9925b02 sched/debug: Add explicit TASK_PARKED printing
Currently TASK_PARKED is masqueraded as TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, give it
its own print state because it will not in fact get woken by regular
wakeups and is a long-term state.

This requires moving TASK_PARKED into the TASK_REPORT mask, and since
that latter needs to be a contiguous bitmask, we need to shuffle the
bits around a bit.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-09-29 11:02:57 +02:00
Peter Zijlstra 06eb61844d sched/debug: Add explicit TASK_IDLE printing
Markus reported that kthreads that idle using TASK_IDLE instead of
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE are reported in as TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE and things
like htop mark those red.

This is undesirable, so add an explicit state for TASK_IDLE.

Reported-by: Markus Trippelsdorf <markus@trippelsdorf.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-09-29 11:02:56 +02:00
Peter Zijlstra 1593baab91 sched/debug: Implement consistent task-state printing
Currently get_task_state() and task_state_to_char() report different
states, create a number of common helpers and unify the reported state
space.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-09-29 10:09:08 +02:00
John Ogness fd7d56270b fs/proc: Report eip/esp in /prod/PID/stat for coredumping
Commit 0a1eb2d474 ("fs/proc: Stop reporting eip and esp in
/proc/PID/stat") stopped reporting eip/esp because it is
racy and dangerous for executing tasks. The comment adds:

    As far as I know, there are no use programs that make any
    material use of these fields, so just get rid of them.

However, existing userspace core-dump-handler applications (for
example, minicoredumper) are using these fields since they
provide an excellent cross-platform interface to these valuable
pointers. So that commit introduced a user space visible
regression.

Partially revert the change and make the readout possible for
tasks with the proper permissions and only if the target task
has the PF_DUMPCORE flag set.

Fixes: 0a1eb2d474 ("fs/proc: Stop reporting eip and esp in> /proc/PID/stat")
Reported-by: Marco Felsch <marco.felsch@preh.de>
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87poatfwg6.fsf@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-09-15 23:31:16 +02:00
Ingo Molnar 32ef5517c2 sched/headers: Prepare to move cputime functionality from <linux/sched.h> into <linux/sched/cputime.h>
Introduce a trivial, mostly empty <linux/sched/cputime.h> header
to prepare for the moving of cputime functionality out of sched.h.

Update all code that relies on these facilities.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-02 08:42:39 +01:00
Ingo Molnar 299300258d sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to <linux/sched/task.h>
We are going to split <linux/sched/task.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.

Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/task.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.

Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-02 08:42:35 +01:00
Ingo Molnar 6a3827d750 sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to <linux/sched/numa_balancing.h>
We are going to split <linux/sched/numa_balancing.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.

Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/numa_balancing.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.

Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-02 08:42:30 +01:00
Ingo Molnar 6e84f31522 sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to <linux/sched/mm.h>
We are going to split <linux/sched/mm.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.

Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/mm.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.

The APIs that are going to be moved first are:

   mm_alloc()
   __mmdrop()
   mmdrop()
   mmdrop_async_fn()
   mmdrop_async()
   mmget_not_zero()
   mmput()
   mmput_async()
   get_task_mm()
   mm_access()
   mm_release()

Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-02 08:42:28 +01:00
Frederic Weisbecker 5613fda9a5 sched/cputime: Convert task/group cputime to nsecs
Now that most cputime readers use the transition API which return the
task cputime in old style cputime_t, we can safely store the cputime in
nsecs. This will eventually make cputime statistics less opaque and more
granular. Back and forth convertions between cputime_t and nsecs in order
to deal with cputime_t random granularity won't be needed anymore.

Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485832191-26889-8-git-send-email-fweisbec@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-02-01 09:13:49 +01:00
Frederic Weisbecker 16a6d9be90 sched/cputime: Convert guest time accounting to nsecs (u64)
cputime_t is being obsolete and replaced by nsecs units in order to make
internal timestamps less opaque and more granular.

Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485832191-26889-6-git-send-email-fweisbec@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-02-01 09:13:48 +01:00
Rasmus Villemoes 209b14dc03 fs/proc/array.c: slightly improve render_sigset_t
format_decode and vsnprintf occasionally show up in perf top, so I went
looking for places that might not need the full printf power.  With the
help of kprobes, I gathered some statistics on which format strings we
mostly pass to vsnprintf.  On a trivial desktop workload, I hit "%x" 25%
of the time, so something apparently reads /proc/pid/status (which does
5*16 printf("%x") calls) a lot.

With this patch, reading /proc/pid/status is 30% faster according to
this microbenchmark:

	char buf[4096];
	int i, fd;
	for (i = 0; i < 10000; ++i) {
		fd = open("/proc/self/status", O_RDONLY);
		read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
		close(fd);
	}

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474410485-1305-1-git-send-email-linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-12-12 18:55:09 -08:00
Kees Cook af884cd4a5 proc: report no_new_privs state
Similar to being able to examine if a process has been correctly
confined with seccomp, the state of no_new_privs is equally interesting,
so this adds it to /proc/$pid/status.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161103214041.GA58566@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Rodrigo Freire <rfreire@redhat.com>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Robert Ho <robert.hu@intel.com>
Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: "Richard W.M. Jones" <rjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-12-12 18:55:09 -08:00
Andy Lutomirski 0a1eb2d474 fs/proc: Stop reporting eip and esp in /proc/PID/stat
Reporting these fields on a non-current task is dangerous.  If the
task is in any state other than normal kernel code, they may contain
garbage or even kernel addresses on some architectures.  (x86_64
used to do this.  I bet lots of architectures still do.)  With
CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK=y, it can OOPS, too.

As far as I know, there are no use programs that make any material
use of these fields, so just get rid of them.

Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a5fed4c3f4e33ed25d4bb03567e329bc5a712bcc.1475257877.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-10-20 09:21:41 +02:00
Alexey Dobriyan 81243eacfa cred: simpler, 1D supplementary groups
Current supplementary groups code can massively overallocate memory and
is implemented in a way so that access to individual gid is done via 2D
array.

If number of gids is <= 32, memory allocation is more or less tolerable
(140/148 bytes).  But if it is not, code allocates full page (!)
regardless and, what's even more fun, doesn't reuse small 32-entry
array.

2D array means dependent shifts, loads and LEAs without possibility to
optimize them (gid is never known at compile time).

All of the above is unnecessary.  Switch to the usual
trailing-zero-len-array scheme.  Memory is allocated with
kmalloc/vmalloc() and only as much as needed.  Accesses become simpler
(LEA 8(gi,idx,4) or even without displacement).

Maximum number of gids is 65536 which translates to 256KB+8 bytes.  I
think kernel can handle such allocation.

On my usual desktop system with whole 9 (nine) aux groups, struct
group_info shrinks from 148 bytes to 44 bytes, yay!

Nice side effects:

 - "gi->gid[i]" is shorter than "GROUP_AT(gi, i)", less typing,

 - fix little mess in net/ipv4/ping.c
   should have been using GROUP_AT macro but this point becomes moot,

 - aux group allocation is persistent and should be accounted as such.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160817201927.GA2096@p183.telecom.by
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-10-07 18:46:30 -07:00
Joe Perches 75ba1d07fd seq/proc: modify seq_put_decimal_[u]ll to take a const char *, not char
Allow some seq_puts removals by taking a string instead of a single
char.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: update vmstat_show(), per Joe]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/667e1cf3d436de91a5698170a1e98d882905e956.1470704995.git.joe@perches.com
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-10-07 18:46:30 -07:00
Alexey Dobriyan f7a5f132b4 proc: faster /proc/*/status
top(1) opens the following files for every PID:

	/proc/*/stat
	/proc/*/statm
	/proc/*/status

This patch switches /proc/*/status away from seq_printf().
The result is 13.5% speedup.

Benchmark is open("/proc/self/status")+read+close 1.000.000 million times.

				BEFORE
$ perf stat -r 10 taskset -c 3 ./proc-self-status

 Performance counter stats for 'taskset -c 3 ./proc-self-status' (10 runs):

      10748.474301      task-clock (msec)         #    0.954 CPUs utilized            ( +-  0.91% )
                12      context-switches          #    0.001 K/sec                    ( +-  1.09% )
                 1      cpu-migrations            #    0.000 K/sec
               104      page-faults               #    0.010 K/sec                    ( +-  0.45% )
    37,424,127,876      cycles                    #    3.482 GHz                      ( +-  0.04% )
     8,453,010,029      stalled-cycles-frontend   #   22.59% frontend cycles idle     ( +-  0.12% )
     3,747,609,427      stalled-cycles-backend    #  10.01% backend cycles idle       ( +-  0.68% )
    65,632,764,147      instructions              #    1.75  insn per cycle
                                                  #    0.13  stalled cycles per insn  ( +-  0.00% )
    13,981,324,775      branches                  # 1300.773 M/sec                    ( +-  0.00% )
       138,967,110      branch-misses             #    0.99% of all branches          ( +-  0.18% )

      11.263885428 seconds time elapsed                                          ( +-  0.04% )
      ^^^^^^^^^^^^

				AFTER
$ perf stat -r 10 taskset -c 3 ./proc-self-status

 Performance counter stats for 'taskset -c 3 ./proc-self-status' (10 runs):

       9010.521776      task-clock (msec)         #    0.925 CPUs utilized            ( +-  1.54% )
                11      context-switches          #    0.001 K/sec                    ( +-  1.54% )
                 1      cpu-migrations            #    0.000 K/sec                    ( +- 11.11% )
               103      page-faults               #    0.011 K/sec                    ( +-  0.60% )
    32,352,310,603      cycles                    #    3.591 GHz                      ( +-  0.07% )
     7,849,199,578      stalled-cycles-frontend   #   24.26% frontend cycles idle     ( +-  0.27% )
     3,269,738,842      stalled-cycles-backend    #  10.11% backend cycles idle       ( +-  0.73% )
    56,012,163,567      instructions              #    1.73  insn per cycle
                                                  #    0.14  stalled cycles per insn  ( +-  0.00% )
    11,735,778,795      branches                  # 1302.453 M/sec                    ( +-  0.00% )
        98,084,459      branch-misses             #    0.84% of all branches          ( +-  0.28% )

       9.741247736 seconds time elapsed                                          ( +-  0.07% )
       ^^^^^^^^^^^

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160806125608.GB1187@p183.telecom.by
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-10-07 18:46:30 -07:00
Richard W.M. Jones 3e42979e65 procfs: expose umask in /proc/<PID>/status
It's not possible to read the process umask without also modifying it,
which is what umask(2) does.  A library cannot read umask safely,
especially if the main program might be multithreaded.

Add a new status line ("Umask") in /proc/<PID>/status.  It contains the
file mode creation mask (umask) in octal.  It is only shown for tasks
which have task->fs.

This patch is adapted from one originally written by Pierre Carrier.

The use case is that we have endless trouble with people setting weird
umask() values (usually on the grounds of "security"), and then
everything breaking.  I'm on the hook to fix these.  We'd like to add
debugging to our program so we can dump out the umask in debug reports.

Previous versions of the patch used a syscall so you could only read
your own umask.  That's all I need.  However there was quite a lot of
push-back from those, so this new version exports it in /proc.

See:
  https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/4/13/704 [umask2]
  https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/4/13/487 [getumask]

Signed-off-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Pierre Carrier <pierre@spotify.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-20 17:58:30 -07:00
Jann Horn caaee6234d ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks
By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.

To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.

The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g.  by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.

While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.

In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:

 /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
     should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
     directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
     this scenario:
     lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
     drwx------ root root /root
     drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
     -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret

Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-01-20 17:09:18 -08:00
Andy Shevchenko 3a49f3d2a1 fs/proc/array.c: set overflow flag in case of error
For now in task_name() we ignore the return code of string_escape_str()
call.  This is not good if buffer suddenly becomes not big enough.  Do the
proper error handling there.

Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-06 17:50:42 -08:00
Ingo Molnar b2f73922d1 fs/proc, core/debug: Don't expose absolute kernel addresses via wchan
So the /proc/PID/stat 'wchan' field (the 30th field, which contains
the absolute kernel address of the kernel function a task is blocked in)
leaks absolute kernel addresses to unprivileged user-space:

        seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', wchan);

The absolute address might also leak via /proc/PID/wchan as well, if
KALLSYMS is turned off or if the symbol lookup fails for some reason:

static int proc_pid_wchan(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
                          struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
{
        unsigned long wchan;
        char symname[KSYM_NAME_LEN];

        wchan = get_wchan(task);

        if (lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname) < 0) {
                if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
                        return 0;
                seq_printf(m, "%lu", wchan);
        } else {
                seq_printf(m, "%s", symname);
        }

        return 0;
}

This isn't ideal, because for example it trivially leaks the KASLR offset
to any local attacker:

  fomalhaut:~> printf "%016lx\n" $(cat /proc/$$/stat | cut -d' ' -f35)
  ffffffff8123b380

Most real-life uses of wchan are symbolic:

  ps -eo pid:10,tid:10,wchan:30,comm

and procps uses /proc/PID/wchan, not the absolute address in /proc/PID/stat:

  triton:~/tip> strace -f ps -eo pid:10,tid:10,wchan:30,comm 2>&1 | grep wchan | tail -1
  open("/proc/30833/wchan", O_RDONLY)     = 6

There's one compatibility quirk here: procps relies on whether the
absolute value is non-zero - and we can provide that functionality
by outputing "0" or "1" depending on whether the task is blocked
(whether there's a wchan address).

These days there appears to be very little legitimate reason
user-space would be interested in  the absolute address. The
absolute address is mostly historic: from the days when we
didn't have kallsyms and user-space procps had to do the
decoding itself via the System.map.

So this patch sets all numeric output to "0" or "1" and keeps only
symbolic output, in /proc/PID/wchan.

( The absolute sleep address can generally still be profiled via
  perf, by tasks with sufficient privileges. )

Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150930135917.GA3285@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-10-01 12:55:34 +02:00
Andy Lutomirski 58319057b7 capabilities: ambient capabilities
Credit where credit is due: this idea comes from Christoph Lameter with
a lot of valuable input from Serge Hallyn.  This patch is heavily based
on Christoph's patch.

===== The status quo =====

On Linux, there are a number of capabilities defined by the kernel.  To
perform various privileged tasks, processes can wield capabilities that
they hold.

Each task has four capability masks: effective (pE), permitted (pP),
inheritable (pI), and a bounding set (X).  When the kernel checks for a
capability, it checks pE.  The other capability masks serve to modify
what capabilities can be in pE.

Any task can remove capabilities from pE, pP, or pI at any time.  If a
task has a capability in pP, it can add that capability to pE and/or pI.
If a task has CAP_SETPCAP, then it can add any capability to pI, and it
can remove capabilities from X.

Tasks are not the only things that can have capabilities; files can also
have capabilities.  A file can have no capabilty information at all [1].
If a file has capability information, then it has a permitted mask (fP)
and an inheritable mask (fI) as well as a single effective bit (fE) [2].
File capabilities modify the capabilities of tasks that execve(2) them.

A task that successfully calls execve has its capabilities modified for
the file ultimately being excecuted (i.e.  the binary itself if that
binary is ELF or for the interpreter if the binary is a script.) [3] In
the capability evolution rules, for each mask Z, pZ represents the old
value and pZ' represents the new value.  The rules are:

  pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
  pI' = pI
  pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0)
  X is unchanged

For setuid binaries, fP, fI, and fE are modified by a moderately
complicated set of rules that emulate POSIX behavior.  Similarly, if
euid == 0 or ruid == 0, then fP, fI, and fE are modified differently
(primary, fP and fI usually end up being the full set).  For nonroot
users executing binaries with neither setuid nor file caps, fI and fP
are empty and fE is false.

As an extra complication, if you execute a process as nonroot and fE is
set, then the "secure exec" rules are in effect: AT_SECURE gets set,
LD_PRELOAD doesn't work, etc.

This is rather messy.  We've learned that making any changes is
dangerous, though: if a new kernel version allows an unprivileged
program to change its security state in a way that persists cross
execution of a setuid program or a program with file caps, this
persistent state is surprisingly likely to allow setuid or file-capped
programs to be exploited for privilege escalation.

===== The problem =====

Capability inheritance is basically useless.

If you aren't root and you execute an ordinary binary, fI is zero, so
your capabilities have no effect whatsoever on pP'.  This means that you
can't usefully execute a helper process or a shell command with elevated
capabilities if you aren't root.

On current kernels, you can sort of work around this by setting fI to
the full set for most or all non-setuid executable files.  This causes
pP' = pI for nonroot, and inheritance works.  No one does this because
it's a PITA and it isn't even supported on most filesystems.

If you try this, you'll discover that every nonroot program ends up with
secure exec rules, breaking many things.

This is a problem that has bitten many people who have tried to use
capabilities for anything useful.

===== The proposed change =====

This patch adds a fifth capability mask called the ambient mask (pA).
pA does what most people expect pI to do.

pA obeys the invariant that no bit can ever be set in pA if it is not
set in both pP and pI.  Dropping a bit from pP or pI drops that bit from
pA.  This ensures that existing programs that try to drop capabilities
still do so, with a complication.  Because capability inheritance is so
broken, setting KEEPCAPS, using setresuid to switch to nonroot uids, and
then calling execve effectively drops capabilities.  Therefore,
setresuid from root to nonroot conditionally clears pA unless
SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP is set.  Processes that don't like this can
re-add bits to pA afterwards.

The capability evolution rules are changed:

  pA' = (file caps or setuid or setgid ? 0 : pA)
  pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA'
  pI' = pI
  pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA')
  X is unchanged

If you are nonroot but you have a capability, you can add it to pA.  If
you do so, your children get that capability in pA, pP, and pE.  For
example, you can set pA = CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, and your children can
automatically bind low-numbered ports.  Hallelujah!

Unprivileged users can create user namespaces, map themselves to a
nonzero uid, and create both privileged (relative to their namespace)
and unprivileged process trees.  This is currently more or less
impossible.  Hallelujah!

You cannot use pA to try to subvert a setuid, setgid, or file-capped
program: if you execute any such program, pA gets cleared and the
resulting evolution rules are unchanged by this patch.

Users with nonzero pA are unlikely to unintentionally leak that
capability.  If they run programs that try to drop privileges, dropping
privileges will still work.

It's worth noting that the degree of paranoia in this patch could
possibly be reduced without causing serious problems.  Specifically, if
we allowed pA to persist across executing non-pA-aware setuid binaries
and across setresuid, then, naively, the only capabilities that could
leak as a result would be the capabilities in pA, and any attacker
*already* has those capabilities.  This would make me nervous, though --
setuid binaries that tried to privilege-separate might fail to do so,
and putting CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE into pA could have
unexpected side effects.  (Whether these unexpected side effects would
be exploitable is an open question.) I've therefore taken the more
paranoid route.  We can revisit this later.

An alternative would be to require PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS before setting
ambient capabilities.  I think that this would be annoying and would
make granting otherwise unprivileged users minor ambient capabilities
(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE or CAP_NET_RAW for example) much less useful than
it is with this patch.

===== Footnotes =====

[1] Files that are missing the "security.capability" xattr or that have
unrecognized values for that xattr end up with has_cap set to false.
The code that does that appears to be complicated for no good reason.

[2] The libcap capability mask parsers and formatters are dangerously
misleading and the documentation is flat-out wrong.  fE is *not* a mask;
it's a single bit.  This has probably confused every single person who
has tried to use file capabilities.

[3] Linux very confusingly processes both the script and the interpreter
if applicable, for reasons that elude me.  The results from thinking
about a script's file capabilities and/or setuid bits are mostly
discarded.

Preliminary userspace code is here, but it needs updating:
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/luto/util-linux-playground.git/commit/?h=cap_ambient&id=7f5afbd175d2

Here is a test program that can be used to verify the functionality
(from Christoph):

/*
 * Test program for the ambient capabilities. This program spawns a shell
 * that allows running processes with a defined set of capabilities.
 *
 * (C) 2015 Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
 * Released under: GPL v3 or later.
 *
 *
 * Compile using:
 *
 *	gcc -o ambient_test ambient_test.o -lcap-ng
 *
 * This program must have the following capabilities to run properly:
 * Permissions for CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_NICE
 *
 * A command to equip the binary with the right caps is:
 *
 *	setcap cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin,cap_sys_nice+p ambient_test
 *
 *
 * To get a shell with additional caps that can be inherited by other processes:
 *
 *	./ambient_test /bin/bash
 *
 *
 * Verifying that it works:
 *
 * From the bash spawed by ambient_test run
 *
 *	cat /proc/$$/status
 *
 * and have a look at the capabilities.
 */

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <cap-ng.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>

/*
 * Definitions from the kernel header files. These are going to be removed
 * when the /usr/include files have these defined.
 */
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT 47
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET 1
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE 2
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4

static void set_ambient_cap(int cap)
{
	int rc;

	capng_get_caps_process();
	rc = capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_INHERITABLE, cap);
	if (rc) {
		printf("Cannot add inheritable cap\n");
		exit(2);
	}
	capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS);

	/* Note the two 0s at the end. Kernel checks for these */
	if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0)) {
		perror("Cannot set cap");
		exit(1);
	}
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	int rc;

	set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_RAW);
	set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_ADMIN);
	set_ambient_cap(CAP_SYS_NICE);

	printf("Ambient_test forking shell\n");
	if (execv(argv[1], argv + 1))
		perror("Cannot exec");

	return 0;
}

Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> # Original author
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com>
Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>
Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-04 16:54:41 -07:00
Iago López Galeiras 2e13ba54a2 fs, proc: introduce CONFIG_PROC_CHILDREN
Commit 818411616b ("fs, proc: introduce /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/children
entry") introduced the children entry for checkpoint restore and the
file is only available on kernels configured with CONFIG_EXPERT and
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.

This is available in most distributions (Fedora, Debian, Ubuntu, CoreOS)
because they usually enable CONFIG_EXPERT and CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
But Arch does not enable CONFIG_EXPERT or CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.

However, the children proc file is useful outside of checkpoint restore.
I would like to use it in rkt.  The rkt process exec() another program
it does not control, and that other program will fork()+exec() a child
process.  I would like to find the pid of the child process from an
external tool without iterating in /proc over all processes to find
which one has a parent pid equal to rkt.

This commit introduces CONFIG_PROC_CHILDREN and makes
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE select it.  This allows enabling
/proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/children without needing to enable
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE and CONFIG_EXPERT.

Alban tested that /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/children is present when the
kernel is configured with CONFIG_PROC_CHILDREN=y but without
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE

Signed-off-by: Iago López Galeiras <iago@endocode.com>
Tested-by: Alban Crequy <alban@endocode.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Djalal Harouni <djalal@endocode.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 17:00:37 -07:00
Chris Metcalf f51c0eaee3 procfs: treat parked tasks as sleeping for task state
Allowing watchdog threads to be parked means that we now have the
opportunity of actually seeing persistent parked threads in the output
of /proc/<pid>/stat and /proc/<pid>/status.  The existing code reported
such threads as "Running", which is kind-of true if you think of the
case where we park them as part of taking cpus offline.  But if we allow
parking them indefinitely, "Running" is pretty misleading, so we report
them as "Sleeping" instead.

We could simply report them with a new string, "Parked", but it feels
like it's a bit risky for userspace to see unexpected new values; the
output is already documented in Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt, and
it seems like a mistake to change that lightly.

The scheduler does report parked tasks with a "P" in debugging output
from sched_show_task() or dump_cpu_task(), but that's a different API.
Similarly, the trace_ctxwake_* routines report a "P" for parked tasks,
but again, different API.

This change seemed slightly cleaner than updating the task_state_array
to have additional rows.  TASK_DEAD should be subsumed by the exit_state
bits; TASK_WAKEKILL is just a modifier; and TASK_WAKING can very
reasonably be reported as "Running" (as it is now).  Only TASK_PARKED
shows up with unreasonable output here.

Signed-off-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-24 17:49:40 -07:00
Joe Perches 25ce319167 proc: remove use of seq_printf return value
The seq_printf return value, because it's frequently misused,
will eventually be converted to void.

See: commit 1f33c41c03 ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to
     seq_has_overflowed() and make public")

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 16:35:25 -07:00
Rasmus Villemoes 41416f2330 lib/string_helpers.c: change semantics of string_escape_mem
The current semantics of string_escape_mem are inadequate for one of its
current users, vsnprintf().  If that is to honour its contract, it must
know how much space would be needed for the entire escaped buffer, and
string_escape_mem provides no way of obtaining that (short of allocating a
large enough buffer (~4 times input string) to let it play with, and
that's definitely a big no-no inside vsnprintf).

So change the semantics for string_escape_mem to be more snprintf-like:
Return the size of the output that would be generated if the destination
buffer was big enough, but of course still only write to the part of dst
it is allowed to, and (contrary to snprintf) don't do '\0'-termination.
It is then up to the caller to detect whether output was truncated and to
append a '\0' if desired.  Also, we must output partial escape sequences,
otherwise a call such as snprintf(buf, 3, "%1pE", "\123") would cause
printf to write a \0 to buf[2] but leaving buf[0] and buf[1] with whatever
they previously contained.

This also fixes a bug in the escaped_string() helper function, which used
to unconditionally pass a length of "end-buf" to string_escape_mem();
since the latter doesn't check osz for being insanely large, it would
happily write to dst.  For example, kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "something and
then %pE", ...); is an easy way to trigger an oops.

In test-string_helpers.c, the -ENOMEM test is replaced with testing for
getting the expected return value even if the buffer is too small.  We
also ensure that nothing is written (by relying on a NULL pointer deref)
if the output size is 0 by passing NULL - this has to work for
kasprintf("%pE") to work.

In net/sunrpc/cache.c, I think qword_add still has the same semantics.
Someone should definitely double-check this.

In fs/proc/array.c, I made the minimum possible change, but longer-term it
should stop poking around in seq_file internals.

[andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com: simplify qword_add]
[andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com: add missed curly braces]
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 16:35:24 -07:00
Chen Hanxiao e4bc332451 /proc/PID/status: show all sets of pid according to ns
If some issues occurred inside a container guest, host user could not know
which process is in trouble just by guest pid: the users of container
guest only knew the pid inside containers.  This will bring obstacle for
trouble shooting.

This patch adds four fields: NStgid, NSpid, NSpgid and NSsid:

a) In init_pid_ns, nothing changed;

b) In one pidns, will tell the pid inside containers:
  NStgid: 21776   5       1
  NSpid:  21776   5       1
  NSpgid: 21776   5       1
  NSsid:  21729   1       0
  ** Process id is 21776 in level 0, 5 in level 1, 1 in level 2.

c) If pidns is nested, it depends on which pidns are you in.
  NStgid: 5       1
  NSpid:  5       1
  NSpgid: 5       1
  NSsid:  1       0
  ** Views from level 1

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add CONFIG_PID_NS ifdef]
Signed-off-by: Chen Hanxiao <chenhanxiao@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Tested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Nathan Scott <nathans@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 16:35:22 -07:00
Tejun Heo a0c2e07d6d proc: use %*pb[l] to print bitmaps including cpumasks and nodemasks
printk and friends can now format bitmaps using '%*pb[l]'.  cpumask
and nodemask also provide cpumask_pr_args() and nodemask_pr_args()
respectively which can be used to generate the two printf arguments
necessary to format the specified cpu/nodemask.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-13 21:21:38 -08:00
Andy Shevchenko edc924e023 fs/proc/array.c: convert to use string_escape_str()
Instead of custom approach let's use string_escape_str() to escape a given
string (task_name in this case).

Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-12 18:54:12 -08:00
Oleg Nesterov abdba6e9ea proc: task_state: ptrace_parent() doesn't need pid_alive() check
p->ptrace != 0 means that release_task(p) was not called, so pid_alive()
buys nothing and we can remove this check.  Other callers already use it
directly without additional checks.

Note: with or without this patch ptrace_parent() can return the pointer to
the freed task, this will be explained/fixed later.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Cc: Sterling Alexander <stalexan@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-10 17:41:09 -08:00