Commit Graph

22 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Michael Halcrow f4aad16adf eCryptfs: add key list structure; search keyring
Add support structures for handling multiple keys.  The list in crypt_stat
contains the key identifiers for all of the keys that should be used for
encrypting each file's File Encryption Key (FEK).  For now, each inode
inherits this list from the mount-wide crypt_stat struct, via the
ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs() function.

This patch also removes the global key tfm from the mount-wide crypt_stat
struct, instead keeping a list of tfm's meant for dealing with the various
inode FEK's.  eCryptfs will now search the user's keyring for FEK's parsed
from the existing file metadata, so the user can make keys available at any
time before or after mounting.

Now that multiple FEK packets can be written to the file metadata, we need to
be more meticulous about size limits.  The updates to the code for writing out
packets to the file metadata makes sizes and limits more explicit, uniformly
expressed, and (hopefully) easier to follow.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 09:43:10 -07:00
Ryusuke Konishi a75de1b379 eCryptfs: fix error handling in ecryptfs_init
ecryptfs_init() exits without doing any cleanup jobs if
ecryptfs_init_messaging() fails.  In that case, eCryptfs leaves
sysfs entries, leaks memory, and causes an invalid page fault.
This patch fixes the problem.

Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-08-11 15:47:40 -07:00
Paul Mundt 20c2df83d2 mm: Remove slab destructors from kmem_cache_create().
Slab destructors were no longer supported after Christoph's
c59def9f22 change. They've been
BUGs for both slab and slub, and slob never supported them
either.

This rips out support for the dtor pointer from kmem_cache_create()
completely and fixes up every single callsite in the kernel (there were
about 224, not including the slab allocator definitions themselves,
or the documentation references).

Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
2007-07-20 10:11:58 +09:00
Tejun Heo 7b595756ec sysfs: kill unnecessary attribute->owner
sysfs is now completely out of driver/module lifetime game.  After
deletion, a sysfs node doesn't access anything outside sysfs proper,
so there's no reason to hold onto the attribute owners.  Note that
often the wrong modules were accounted for as owners leading to
accessing removed modules.

This patch kills now unnecessary attribute->owner.  Note that with
this change, userland holding a sysfs node does not prevent the
backing module from being unloaded.

For more info regarding lifetime rule cleanup, please read the
following message.

  http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/510293

(tweaked by Greg to not delete the field just yet, to make it easier to
merge things properly.)

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <htejun@gmail.com>
Cc: Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2007-07-11 16:09:06 -07:00
Christoph Lameter a35afb830f Remove SLAB_CTOR_CONSTRUCTOR
SLAB_CTOR_CONSTRUCTOR is always specified. No point in checking it.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Anton Altaparmakov <aia21@cantab.net>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark.fasheh@oracle.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz>
Cc: David Chinner <dgc@sgi.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-17 05:23:04 -07:00
Christoph Lameter 50953fe9e0 slab allocators: Remove SLAB_DEBUG_INITIAL flag
I have never seen a use of SLAB_DEBUG_INITIAL.  It is only supported by
SLAB.

I think its purpose was to have a callback after an object has been freed
to verify that the state is the constructor state again?  The callback is
performed before each freeing of an object.

I would think that it is much easier to check the object state manually
before the free.  That also places the check near the code object
manipulation of the object.

Also the SLAB_DEBUG_INITIAL callback is only performed if the kernel was
compiled with SLAB debugging on.  If there would be code in a constructor
handling SLAB_DEBUG_INITIAL then it would have to be conditional on
SLAB_DEBUG otherwise it would just be dead code.  But there is no such code
in the kernel.  I think SLUB_DEBUG_INITIAL is too problematic to make real
use of, difficult to understand and there are easier ways to accomplish the
same effect (i.e.  add debug code before kfree).

There is a related flag SLAB_CTOR_VERIFY that is frequently checked to be
clear in fs inode caches.  Remove the pointless checks (they would even be
pointless without removeal of SLAB_DEBUG_INITIAL) from the fs constructors.

This is the last slab flag that SLUB did not support.  Remove the check for
unimplemented flags from SLUB.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-07 12:12:57 -07:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman 823bccfc40 remove "struct subsystem" as it is no longer needed
We need to work on cleaning up the relationship between kobjects, ksets and
ktypes.  The removal of 'struct subsystem' is the first step of this,
especially as it is not really needed at all.

Thanks to Kay for fixing the bugs in this patch.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2007-05-02 18:57:59 -07:00
Dmitriy Monakhov 82b1652840 [PATCH] ecryptfs: lower root result must be adirectory
- Currently after path_lookup succeed we dot't have any guarantie what
  it is DIR. This must be explicitly demanded.
- path_lookup can't return negative dentry, So inode check is useless.

Signed-off-by: Dmitriy Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-03-05 07:57:53 -08:00
Michael Halcrow 65dc814571 [PATCH] eCryptfs: no path_release() after path_lookup() error
Dmitriy Monakhov wrote:
> if path_lookup() return non zero code we don't have to worry about
> 'nd' parameter, but ecryptfs_read_super does path_release(&nd) after
> path_lookup has failed, and dentry counter becomes negative

Do not do a path_release after a path_lookup error.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitriy Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-03-01 14:53:38 -08:00
Michael Halcrow eb95e7ffa5 [PATCH] eCryptfs: Reduce stack usage in ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set()
eCryptfs is gobbling a lot of stack in ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set()
because it allocates a temporary memory-hungry ecryptfs_key_record struct.
This patch introduces a new kmem_cache for that struct and converts
ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set() to use it.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-16 08:14:01 -08:00
Michael Halcrow dd2a3b7ad9 [PATCH] eCryptfs: Generalize metadata read/write
Generalize the metadata reading and writing mechanisms, with two targets for
now: metadata in file header and metadata in the user.ecryptfs xattr of the
lower file.

[akpm@osdl.org: printk warning fix]
[bunk@stusta.de: make some needlessly global code static]
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-12 09:48:36 -08:00
Michael Halcrow 17398957aa [PATCH] eCryptfs: xattr flags and mount options
This patch set introduces the ability to store cryptographic metadata into an
lower file extended attribute rather than the lower file header region.

This patch set implements two new mount options:

ecryptfs_xattr_metadata
 - When set, newly created files will have their cryptographic
   metadata stored in the extended attribute region of the file rather
   than the header.

   When storing the data in the file header, there is a minimum of 8KB
   reserved for the header information for each file, making each file at
   least 12KB in size.  This can take up a lot of extra disk space if the user
   creates a lot of small files.  By storing the data in the extended
   attribute, each file will only occupy at least of 4KB of space.

   As the eCryptfs metadata set becomes larger with new features such as
   multi-key associations, most popular filesystems will not be able to store
   all of the information in the xattr region in some cases due to space
   constraints.  However, the majority of users will only ever associate one
   key per file, so most users will be okay with storing their data in the
   xattr region.

   This option should be used with caution.  I want to emphasize that the
   xattr must be maintained under all circumstances, or the file will be
   rendered permanently unrecoverable.  The last thing I want is for a user to
   forget to set an xattr flag in a backup utility, only to later discover
   that their backups are worthless.

ecryptfs_encrypted_view
 - When set, this option causes eCryptfs to present applications a
   view of encrypted files as if the cryptographic metadata were
   stored in the file header, whether the metadata is actually stored
   in the header or in the extended attributes.

   No matter what eCryptfs winds up doing in the lower filesystem, I want
   to preserve a baseline format compatibility for the encrypted files.  As of
   right now, the metadata may be in the file header or in an xattr.  There is
   no reason why the metadata could not be put in a separate file in future
   versions.

   Without the compatibility mode, backup utilities would have to know to
   back up the metadata file along with the files.  The semantics of eCryptfs
   have always been that the lower files are self-contained units of encrypted
   data, and the only additional information required to decrypt any given
   eCryptfs file is the key.  That is what has always been emphasized about
   eCryptfs lower files, and that is what users expect.  Providing the
   encrypted view option will provide a way to userspace applications wherein
   they can always get to the same old familiar eCryptfs encrypted files,
   regardless of what eCryptfs winds up doing with the metadata behind the
   scenes.

This patch:

Add extended attribute support to version bit vector, flags to indicate when
xattr or encrypted view modes are enabled, and support for the new mount
options.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-12 09:48:36 -08:00
Michael Halcrow dddfa461fc [PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key; packet management
Public key support code.  This reads and writes packets in the header that
contain public key encrypted file keys.  It calls the messaging code in the
previous patch to send and receive encryption and decryption request
packets from the userspace daemon.

[akpm@osdl.org: cleab fix]
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-12 09:48:36 -08:00
Robert P. J. Day c376222960 [PATCH] Transform kmem_cache_alloc()+memset(0) -> kmem_cache_zalloc().
Replace appropriate pairs of "kmem_cache_alloc()" + "memset(0)" with the
corresponding "kmem_cache_zalloc()" call.

Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@mindspring.com>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@steeleye.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Acked-by: Joel Becker <Joel.Becker@oracle.com>
Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-11 10:51:27 -08:00
Josef "Jeff" Sipek 0cc72dc7f0 [PATCH] eCryptfs: Use fsstack's generic copy inode attr functions
Replace eCryptfs specific code & calls with the more generic fsstack
equivalents and remove the eCryptfs specific functions.

Signed-off-by: Josef "Jeff" Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-08 08:28:40 -08:00
Adrian Bunk 8487f2e406 [PATCH] make ecryptfs_version_str_map[] static
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-07 08:39:39 -08:00
Christoph Lameter e18b890bb0 [PATCH] slab: remove kmem_cache_t
Replace all uses of kmem_cache_t with struct kmem_cache.

The patch was generated using the following script:

	#!/bin/sh
	#
	# Replace one string by another in all the kernel sources.
	#

	set -e

	for file in `find * -name "*.c" -o -name "*.h"|xargs grep -l $1`; do
		quilt add $file
		sed -e "1,\$s/$1/$2/g" $file >/tmp/$$
		mv /tmp/$$ $file
		quilt refresh
	done

The script was run like this

	sh replace kmem_cache_t "struct kmem_cache"

Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-07 08:39:25 -08:00
Christoph Lameter e94b176609 [PATCH] slab: remove SLAB_KERNEL
SLAB_KERNEL is an alias of GFP_KERNEL.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-07 08:39:24 -08:00
Michael Halcrow 8bba066f4e [PATCH] eCryptfs: Cipher code to new crypto API
Update cipher block encryption code to the new crypto API.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-31 08:07:01 -08:00
Michael Halcrow e5d9cbde6c [PATCH] eCryptfs: Clean up crypto initialization
Clean up the crypto initialization code; let the crypto API take care of the
key size checks.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-31 08:07:00 -08:00
Pekka Enberg 26da82058e [PATCH] ecryptfs: use special_file()
Use the special_file() macro to check whether an inode is special instead of
open-coding it.

Acked-by: Mike Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Phillip Hellewell <phillip@hellewell.homeip.net>
Signed-off-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-20 10:26:35 -07:00
Michael Halcrow 237fead619 [PATCH] ecryptfs: fs/Makefile and fs/Kconfig
eCryptfs is a stacked cryptographic filesystem for Linux.  It is derived from
Erez Zadok's Cryptfs, implemented through the FiST framework for generating
stacked filesystems.  eCryptfs extends Cryptfs to provide advanced key
management and policy features.  eCryptfs stores cryptographic metadata in the
header of each file written, so that encrypted files can be copied between
hosts; the file will be decryptable with the proper key, and there is no need
to keep track of any additional information aside from what is already in the
encrypted file itself.

[akpm@osdl.org: updates for ongoing API changes]
[bunk@stusta.de: cleanups]
[akpm@osdl.org: alpha build fix]
[akpm@osdl.org: cleanups]
[tytso@mit.edu: inode-diet updates]
[pbadari@us.ibm.com: generic_file_*_read/write() interface updates]
[rdunlap@xenotime.net: printk format fixes]
[akpm@osdl.org: make slab creation and teardown table-driven]
Signed-off-by: Phillip Hellewell <phillip@hellewell.homeip.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Erez Zadok <ezk@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Badari Pulavarty <pbadari@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04 07:55:24 -07:00