Commit Graph

479 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Eric Biggers 3619dec510 dh key: fix rounding up KDF output length
Commit 383203eff7 ("dh key: get rid of stack allocated array") changed
kdf_ctr() to assume that the length of key material to derive is a
multiple of the digest size.  The length was supposed to be rounded up
accordingly.  However, the round_up() macro was used which only gives
the correct result on power-of-2 arguments, whereas not all hash
algorithms have power-of-2 digest sizes.  In some cases this resulted in
a write past the end of the 'outbuf' buffer.

Fix it by switching to roundup(), which works for non-power-of-2 inputs.

Reported-by: syzbot+486f97f892efeb2075a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+29d17b7898b41ee120a5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+8a608baf8751184ec727@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d04e58bd384f1fe0b112@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 383203eff7 ("dh key: get rid of stack allocated array")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-06-26 09:43:05 -07:00
Kees Cook 6da2ec5605 treewide: kmalloc() -> kmalloc_array()
The kmalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kmalloc_array(). This
patch replaces cases of:

        kmalloc(a * b, gfp)

with:
        kmalloc_array(a * b, gfp)

as well as handling cases of:

        kmalloc(a * b * c, gfp)

with:

        kmalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp)

as it's slightly less ugly than:

        kmalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp)

This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like:

        kmalloc(4 * 1024, gfp)

though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion.

Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were
dropped, since they're redundant.

The tools/ directory was manually excluded, since it has its own
implementation of kmalloc().

The Coccinelle script used for this was:

// Fix redundant parens around sizeof().
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING, E;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	(sizeof(TYPE)) * E
+	sizeof(TYPE) * E
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(sizeof(THING)) * E
+	sizeof(THING) * E
  , ...)
)

// Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens.
@@
expression COUNT;
typedef u8;
typedef __u8;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant.
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING;
identifier COUNT_ID;
constant COUNT_CONST;
@@

(
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID)
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID)
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product, only identifiers.
@@
identifier SIZE, COUNT;
@@

- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	SIZE * COUNT
+	COUNT, SIZE
  , ...)

// 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with
// redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING;
identifier STRIDE, COUNT;
type TYPE;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING1, THING2;
identifier COUNT;
type TYPE1, TYPE2;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed.
@@
identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
)

// Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products,
// when they're not all constants...
@@
expression E1, E2, E3;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@

(
  kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(E1) * E2 * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(E1) * (E2) * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(E1) * (E2) * (E3)
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	E1 * E2 * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
)

// And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants,
// keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument.
@@
expression THING, E1, E2;
type TYPE;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@

(
  kmalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...)
|
  kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...)
|
  kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
  kmalloc(C1 * C2, ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (E2)
+	E2, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * E2
+	E2, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (E2)
+	E2, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * E2
+	E2, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	(E1) * E2
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	(E1) * (E2)
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	E1 * E2
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-06-12 16:19:22 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 10b1eb7d8c Merge branch 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security system updates from James Morris:

 - incorporate new socketpair() hook into LSM and wire up the SELinux
   and Smack modules. From David Herrmann:

     "The idea is to allow SO_PEERSEC to be called on AF_UNIX sockets
      created via socketpair(2), and return the same information as if
      you emulated socketpair(2) via a temporary listener socket.

      Right now SO_PEERSEC will return the unlabeled credentials for a
      socketpair, rather than the actual credentials of the creating
      process."

 - remove the unused security_settime LSM hook (Sargun Dhillon).

 - remove some stack allocated arrays from the keys code (Tycho
   Andersen)

* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  dh key: get rid of stack allocated array for zeroes
  dh key: get rid of stack allocated array
  big key: get rid of stack array allocation
  smack: provide socketpair callback
  selinux: provide socketpair callback
  net: hook socketpair() into LSM
  security: add hook for socketpair()
  security: remove security_settime
2018-06-06 16:15:56 -07:00
Christoph Hellwig fddda2b7b5 proc: introduce proc_create_seq{,_data}
Variants of proc_create{,_data} that directly take a struct seq_operations
argument and drastically reduces the boilerplate code in the callers.

All trivial callers converted over.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2018-05-16 07:23:35 +02:00
Tycho Andersen 890e2abe10 dh key: get rid of stack allocated array for zeroes
We're interested in getting rid of all of the stack allocated arrays in
the kernel: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/7/621

This case is interesting, since we really just need an array of bytes that
are zero. The loop already ensures that if the array isn't exactly the
right size that enough zero bytes will be copied in. So, instead of
choosing this value to be the size of the hash, let's just choose it to be
32, since that is a common size, is not too big, and will not result in too
many extra iterations of the loop.

v2: split out from other patch, just hardcode array size instead of
    dynamically allocating something the right size
v3: fix typo of 256 -> 32

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
CC: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
CC: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-05-11 13:07:49 -07:00
Tycho Andersen 383203eff7 dh key: get rid of stack allocated array
We're interested in getting rid of all of the stack allocated arrays in the
kernel: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/7/621

This particular vla is used as a temporary output buffer in case there is
too much hash output for the destination buffer. Instead, let's just
allocate a buffer that's big enough initially, but only copy back to
userspace the amount that was originally asked for.

v2: allocate enough in the original output buffer vs creating a temporary
    output buffer

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
CC: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
CC: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-05-11 13:07:47 -07:00
Tycho Andersen a964f39561 big key: get rid of stack array allocation
We're interested in getting rid of all of the stack allocated arrays in the
kernel [1]. This patch simply hardcodes the iv length to match that of the
hardcoded cipher.

[1]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/7/621

v2: hardcode the length of the nonce to be the GCM AES IV length, and do a
    sanity check in init(), Eric Biggers
v3: * remember to free big_key_aead when sanity check fails
    * define a constant for big key IV size so it can be changed along side
      the algorithm in the code

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
CC: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
CC: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
CC: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-05-11 13:07:45 -07:00
Randy Dunlap 514c603249 headers: untangle kmemleak.h from mm.h
Currently <linux/slab.h> #includes <linux/kmemleak.h> for no obvious
reason.  It looks like it's only a convenience, so remove kmemleak.h
from slab.h and add <linux/kmemleak.h> to any users of kmemleak_* that
don't already #include it.  Also remove <linux/kmemleak.h> from source
files that do not use it.

This is tested on i386 allmodconfig and x86_64 allmodconfig.  It would
be good to run it through the 0day bot for other $ARCHes.  I have
neither the horsepower nor the storage space for the other $ARCHes.

Update: This patch has been extensively build-tested by both the 0day
bot & kisskb/ozlabs build farms.  Both of them reported 2 build failures
for which patches are included here (in v2).

[ slab.h is the second most used header file after module.h; kernel.h is
  right there with slab.h. There could be some minor error in the
  counting due to some #includes having comments after them and I didn't
  combine all of those. ]

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: security/keys/big_key.c needs vmalloc.h, per sfr]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e4309f98-3749-93e1-4bb7-d9501a39d015@infradead.org
Link: http://kisskb.ellerman.id.au/kisskb/head/13396/
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>	[2 build failures]
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>	[2 build failures]
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-05 21:36:27 -07:00
David Howells d9f4bb1a0f KEYS: Use individual pages in big_key for crypto buffers
kmalloc() can't always allocate large enough buffers for big_key to use for
crypto (1MB + some metadata) so we cannot use that to allocate the buffer.
Further, vmalloc'd pages can't be passed to sg_init_one() and the aead
crypto accessors cannot be called progressively and must be passed all the
data in one go (which means we can't pass the data in one block at a time).

Fix this by allocating the buffer pages individually and passing them
through a multientry scatterlist to the crypto layer.  This has the bonus
advantage that we don't have to allocate a contiguous series of pages.

We then vmap() the page list and pass that through to the VFS read/write
routines.

This can trigger a warning:

	WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 60912 at mm/page_alloc.c:3883 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xb7c/0x15f8
	([<00000000002acbb6>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x1ee/0x15f8)
	 [<00000000002dd356>] kmalloc_order+0x46/0x90
	 [<00000000002dd3e0>] kmalloc_order_trace+0x40/0x1f8
	 [<0000000000326a10>] __kmalloc+0x430/0x4c0
	 [<00000000004343e4>] big_key_preparse+0x7c/0x210
	 [<000000000042c040>] key_create_or_update+0x128/0x420
	 [<000000000042e52c>] SyS_add_key+0x124/0x220
	 [<00000000007bba2c>] system_call+0xc4/0x2b0

from the keyctl/padd/useradd test of the keyutils testsuite on s390x.

Note that it might be better to shovel data through in page-sized lumps
instead as there's no particular need to use a monolithic buffer unless the
kernel itself wants to access the data.

Fixes: 13100a72f4 ("Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted")
Reported-by: Paul Bunyan <pbunyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
2018-02-22 14:58:38 +00:00
Linus Torvalds ae0cb7be35 Merge branch 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull tpm updates from James Morris:

 - reduce polling delays in tpm_tis

 - support retrieving TPM 2.0 Event Log through EFI before
   ExitBootServices

 - replace tpm-rng.c with a hwrng device managed by the driver for each
   TPM device

 - TPM resource manager synthesizes TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE response instead
   of returning -EINVAL for unknown TPM commands. This makes user space
   more sound.

 - CLKRUN fixes:

    * Keep #CLKRUN disable through the entier TPM command/response flow

    * Check whether #CLKRUN is enabled before disabling and enabling it
      again because enabling it breaks PS/2 devices on a system where it
      is disabled

* 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  tpm: remove unused variables
  tpm: remove unused data fields from I2C and OF device ID tables
  tpm: only attempt to disable the LPC CLKRUN if is already enabled
  tpm: follow coding style for variable declaration in tpm_tis_core_init()
  tpm: delete the TPM_TIS_CLK_ENABLE flag
  tpm: Update MAINTAINERS for Jason Gunthorpe
  tpm: Keep CLKRUN enabled throughout the duration of transmit_cmd()
  tpm_tis: Move ilb_base_addr to tpm_tis_data
  tpm2-cmd: allow more attempts for selftest execution
  tpm: return a TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE response if command is not implemented
  tpm: Move Linux RNG connection to hwrng
  tpm: use struct tpm_chip for tpm_chip_find_get()
  tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
  efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  tpm: add event log format version
  tpm: rename event log provider files
  tpm: move tpm_eventlog.h outside of drivers folder
  tpm: use tpm_msleep() value as max delay
  tpm: reduce tpm polling delay in tpm_tis_core
  tpm: move wait_for_tpm_stat() to respective driver files
2018-01-31 13:12:31 -08:00
Jarkko Sakkinen aad887f664 tpm: use struct tpm_chip for tpm_chip_find_get()
Device number (the character device index) is not a stable identifier
for a TPM chip. That is the reason why every call site passes
TPM_ANY_NUM to tpm_chip_find_get().

This commit changes the API in a way that instead a struct tpm_chip
instance is given and NULL means the default chip. In addition, this
commit refines the documentation to be up to date with the
implementation.

Suggested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> (@chip_num -> @chip part)
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Tested-by: PrasannaKumar Muralidharan <prasannatsmkumar@gmail.com>
2018-01-08 12:58:36 +02:00
Ingo Molnar 475c5ee193 Merge branch 'for-mingo' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulmck/linux-rcu into core/rcu
Pull RCU updates from Paul E. McKenney:

- Updates to use cond_resched() instead of cond_resched_rcu_qs()
  where feasible (currently everywhere except in kernel/rcu and
  in kernel/torture.c).  Also a couple of fixes to avoid sending
  IPIs to offline CPUs.

- Updates to simplify RCU's dyntick-idle handling.

- Updates to remove almost all uses of smp_read_barrier_depends()
  and read_barrier_depends().

- Miscellaneous fixes.

- Torture-test updates.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-01-03 14:14:18 +01:00
Eric Biggers 18026d8668 KEYS: reject NULL restriction string when type is specified
keyctl_restrict_keyring() allows through a NULL restriction when the
"type" is non-NULL, which causes a NULL pointer dereference in
asymmetric_lookup_restriction() when it calls strcmp() on the
restriction string.

But no key types actually use a "NULL restriction" to mean anything, so
update keyctl_restrict_keyring() to reject it with EINVAL.

Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Fixes: 97d3aa0f31 ("KEYS: Add a lookup_restriction function for the asymmetric key type")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-12-08 15:13:29 +00:00
Colin Ian King 3d1f025542 security: keys: remove redundant assignment to key_ref
Variable key_ref is being assigned a value that is never read;
key_ref is being re-assigned a few statements later.  Hence this
assignment is redundant and can be removed.

Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-12-08 15:13:29 +00:00
Eric Biggers 4dca6ea1d9 KEYS: add missing permission check for request_key() destination
When the request_key() syscall is not passed a destination keyring, it
links the requested key (if constructed) into the "default" request-key
keyring.  This should require Write permission to the keyring.  However,
there is actually no permission check.

This can be abused to add keys to any keyring to which only Search
permission is granted.  This is because Search permission allows joining
the keyring.  keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING)
then will set the default request-key keyring to the session keyring.
Then, request_key() can be used to add keys to the keyring.

Both negatively and positively instantiated keys can be added using this
method.  Adding negative keys is trivial.  Adding a positive key is a
bit trickier.  It requires that either /sbin/request-key positively
instantiates the key, or that another thread adds the key to the process
keyring at just the right time, such that request_key() misses it
initially but then finds it in construct_alloc_key().

Fix this bug by checking for Write permission to the keyring in
construct_get_dest_keyring() when the default keyring is being used.

We don't do the permission check for non-default keyrings because that
was already done by the earlier call to lookup_user_key().  Also,
request_key_and_link() is currently passed a 'struct key *' rather than
a key_ref_t, so the "possessed" bit is unavailable.

We also don't do the permission check for the "requestor keyring", to
continue to support the use case described by commit 8bbf4976b5
("KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument") where
/sbin/request-key recursively calls request_key() to add keys to the
original requestor's destination keyring.  (I don't know of any users
who actually do that, though...)

Fixes: 3e30148c3d ("[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	# v2.6.13+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-12-08 15:13:27 +00:00
Eric Biggers a2d8737d5c KEYS: remove unnecessary get/put of explicit dest_keyring
In request_key_and_link(), in the case where the dest_keyring was
explicitly specified, there is no need to get another reference to
dest_keyring before calling key_link(), then drop it afterwards.  This
is because by definition, we already have a reference to dest_keyring.

This change is useful because we'll be making
construct_get_dest_keyring() able to return an error code, and we don't
want to have to handle that error here for no reason.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-12-08 15:13:27 +00:00
Paul E. McKenney d963007c72 keyring: Remove now-redundant smp_read_barrier_depends()
Now that the associative-array library properly heads dependency chains,
the various smp_read_barrier_depends() calls in security/keys/keyring.c
are no longer needed.  This commit therefore removes them.

Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-12-04 10:53:14 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 844056fd74 Merge branch 'timers-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull timer updates from Thomas Gleixner:

 - The final conversion of timer wheel timers to timer_setup().

   A few manual conversions and a large coccinelle assisted sweep and
   the removal of the old initialization mechanisms and the related
   code.

 - Remove the now unused VSYSCALL update code

 - Fix permissions of /proc/timer_list. I still need to get rid of that
   file completely

 - Rename a misnomed clocksource function and remove a stale declaration

* 'timers-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (27 commits)
  m68k/macboing: Fix missed timer callback assignment
  treewide: Remove TIMER_FUNC_TYPE and TIMER_DATA_TYPE casts
  timer: Remove redundant __setup_timer*() macros
  timer: Pass function down to initialization routines
  timer: Remove unused data arguments from macros
  timer: Switch callback prototype to take struct timer_list * argument
  timer: Pass timer_list pointer to callbacks unconditionally
  Coccinelle: Remove setup_timer.cocci
  timer: Remove setup_*timer() interface
  timer: Remove init_timer() interface
  treewide: setup_timer() -> timer_setup() (2 field)
  treewide: setup_timer() -> timer_setup()
  treewide: init_timer() -> setup_timer()
  treewide: Switch DEFINE_TIMER callbacks to struct timer_list *
  s390: cmm: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  lightnvm: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  drivers/net: cris: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  drm/vc4: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  block/laptop_mode: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  net/atm/mpc: Avoid open-coded assignment of timer callback function
  ...
2017-11-25 08:37:16 -10:00
Kees Cook 24ed960abf treewide: Switch DEFINE_TIMER callbacks to struct timer_list *
This changes all DEFINE_TIMER() callbacks to use a struct timer_list
pointer instead of unsigned long. Since the data argument has already been
removed, none of these callbacks are using their argument currently, so
this renames the argument to "unused".

Done using the following semantic patch:

@match_define_timer@
declarer name DEFINE_TIMER;
identifier _timer, _callback;
@@

 DEFINE_TIMER(_timer, _callback);

@change_callback depends on match_define_timer@
identifier match_define_timer._callback;
type _origtype;
identifier _origarg;
@@

 void
-_callback(_origtype _origarg)
+_callback(struct timer_list *unused)
 { ... }

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-11-21 15:57:05 -08:00
Baolin Wang 0a9dd0e071 security: keys: Replace time_t with time64_t for struct key_preparsed_payload
The 'struct key_preparsed_payload' will use 'time_t' which we will
try to remove in the kernel, since 'time_t' is not year 2038 safe on
32bits systems.

Thus this patch replaces 'time_t' with 'time64_t' which is year 2038
safe on 32 bits system for 'struct key_preparsed_payload', moreover
we should use the 'TIME64_MAX' macro to initialize the 'time64_t'
type variable.

Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-11-15 16:38:45 +00:00
Baolin Wang 074d589895 security: keys: Replace time_t/timespec with time64_t
The 'struct key' will use 'time_t' which we try to remove in the
kernel, since 'time_t' is not year 2038 safe on 32bit systems.
Also the 'struct keyring_search_context' will use 'timespec' type
to record current time, which is also not year 2038 safe on 32bit
systems.

Thus this patch replaces 'time_t' with 'time64_t' which is year 2038
safe for 'struct key', and replace 'timespec' with 'time64_t' for the
'struct keyring_search_context', since we only look at the the seconds
part of 'timespec' variable. Moreover we also change the codes where
using the 'time_t' and 'timespec', and we can get current time by
ktime_get_real_seconds() instead of current_kernel_time(), and use
'TIME64_MAX' macro to initialize the 'time64_t' type variable.

Especially in proc.c file, we have replaced 'unsigned long' and 'timespec'
type with 'u64' and 'time64_t' type to save the timeout value, which means
user will get one 'u64' type timeout value by issuing proc_keys_show()
function.

Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-11-15 16:38:45 +00:00
Linus Torvalds 2bcc673101 Merge branch 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull timer updates from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Yet another big pile of changes:

   - More year 2038 work from Arnd slowly reaching the point where we
     need to think about the syscalls themself.

   - A new timer function which allows to conditionally (re)arm a timer
     only when it's either not running or the new expiry time is sooner
     than the armed expiry time. This allows to use a single timer for
     multiple timeout requirements w/o caring about the first expiry
     time at the call site.

   - A new NMI safe accessor to clock real time for the printk timestamp
     work. Can be used by tracing, perf as well if required.

   - A large number of timer setup conversions from Kees which got
     collected here because either maintainers requested so or they
     simply got ignored. As Kees pointed out already there are a few
     trivial merge conflicts and some redundant commits which was
     unavoidable due to the size of this conversion effort.

   - Avoid a redundant iteration in the timer wheel softirq processing.

   - Provide a mechanism to treat RTC implementations depending on their
     hardware properties, i.e. don't inflict the write at the 0.5
     seconds boundary which originates from the PC CMOS RTC to all RTCs.
     No functional change as drivers need to be updated separately.

   - The usual small updates to core code clocksource drivers. Nothing
     really exciting"

* 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (111 commits)
  timers: Add a function to start/reduce a timer
  pstore: Use ktime_get_real_fast_ns() instead of __getnstimeofday()
  timer: Prepare to change all DEFINE_TIMER() callbacks
  netfilter: ipvs: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  scsi: qla2xxx: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  block/aoe: discover_timer: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  ide: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  drbd: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  mailbox: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  crypto: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  drivers/pcmcia: omap1: Fix error in automated timer conversion
  ARM: footbridge: Fix typo in timer conversion
  drivers/sgi-xp: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  drivers/pcmcia: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  drivers/memstick: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  drivers/macintosh: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  hwrng/xgene-rng: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  auxdisplay: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  sparc/led: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  mips: ip22/32: Convert timers to use timer_setup()
  ...
2017-11-13 17:56:58 -08:00
Linus Torvalds ead751507d License cleanup: add SPDX license identifiers to some files
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
 makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
 
 By default all files without license information are under the default
 license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
 
 Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
 SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
 shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
 
 This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
 Philippe Ombredanne.
 
 How this work was done:
 
 Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
 the use cases:
  - file had no licensing information it it.
  - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
  - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
 
 Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
 where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
 had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
 
 The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
 a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
 output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
 tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
 base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
 
 The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
 assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
 results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
 to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
 immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
 
 Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
  - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
  - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
    lines of source
  - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
    lines).
 
 All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
 
 The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
 identifiers to apply.
 
  - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
    considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
    COPYING file license applied.
 
    For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
 
    SPDX license identifier                            # files
    ---------------------------------------------------|-------
    GPL-2.0                                              11139
 
    and resulted in the first patch in this series.
 
    If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
    Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:
 
    SPDX license identifier                            # files
    ---------------------------------------------------|-------
    GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930
 
    and resulted in the second patch in this series.
 
  - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
    of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
    any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
    it (per prior point).  Results summary:
 
    SPDX license identifier                            # files
    ---------------------------------------------------|------
    GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
    GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
    ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
    ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
    LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
    GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
    ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
    LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
    LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
    ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
    ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1
 
    and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
 
  - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
    the concluded license(s).
 
  - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
    license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
    licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
 
  - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
    resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
    which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
 
  - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
    confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
 
  - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
    the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
    in time.
 
 In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
 spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
 source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
 by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
 
 Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
 FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
 disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
 Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
 they are related.
 
 Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
 for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
 files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
 in about 15000 files.
 
 In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
 copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
 correct identifier.
 
 Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
 inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
 version early this week with:
  - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
    license ids and scores
  - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
    files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
  - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
    was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
    SPDX license was correct
 
 This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
 worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
 different types of files to be modified.
 
 These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
 parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
 format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
 based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
 distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
 comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
 generate the patches.
 
 Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
 Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
 Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'spdx_identifiers-4.14-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core

Pull initial SPDX identifiers from Greg KH:
 "License cleanup: add SPDX license identifiers to some files

  Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
  makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

  By default all files without license information are under the default
  license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

  Update the files which contain no license information with the
  'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally
  binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate
  text.

  This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart
  and Philippe Ombredanne.

  How this work was done:

  Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset
  of the use cases:

   - file had no licensing information it it.

   - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,

   - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

  Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
  where non-standard license headers were used, and references to
  license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

  The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied
  to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of
  the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver)
  producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.
  Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review
  of a few 1000 files.

  The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537
  files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the
  scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license
  identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any
  determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with
  the Linux Foundation.

  Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:

   - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.

   - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained
     >5 lines of source

   - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
     lines).

  All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

  The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
  identifiers to apply.

   - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
     considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
     COPYING file license applied.

     For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

       SPDX license identifier                            # files
       ---------------------------------------------------|-------
       GPL-2.0                                              11139

     and resulted in the first patch in this series.

     If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
     Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that
     was:

       SPDX license identifier                            # files
       ---------------------------------------------------|-------
       GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

     and resulted in the second patch in this series.

   - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
     of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
     any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
     it (per prior point). Results summary:

       SPDX license identifier                            # files
       ---------------------------------------------------|------
       GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
       GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
       ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
       ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
       LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
       GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
       ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
       LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
       LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
       ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
       ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

     and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

   - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that
     became the concluded license(s).

   - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected
     a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
     licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

   - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
     resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply
     (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

   - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
     confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

   - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
     the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
     in time.

  In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
  spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
  source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases,
  confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

  Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
  FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
  disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.
  The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in
  part, so they are related.

  Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
  for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
  files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot
  checks in about 15000 files.

  In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
  copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect
  the correct identifier.

  Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
  inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial
  patch version early this week with:

   - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
     license ids and scores

   - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
     files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct

   - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch
     license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the
     applied SPDX license was correct

  This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
  worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
  different types of files to be modified.

  These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
  parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
  format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
  based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
  distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
  comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
  generate the patches.

  Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
  Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
  Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
  Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>"

* tag 'spdx_identifiers-4.14-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core:
  License cleanup: add SPDX license identifier to uapi header files with a license
  License cleanup: add SPDX license identifier to uapi header files with no license
  License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
2017-11-02 10:04:46 -07:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman b24413180f License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-02 11:10:55 +01:00
Eric Biggers a3c812f7cf KEYS: trusted: fix writing past end of buffer in trusted_read()
When calling keyctl_read() on a key of type "trusted", if the
user-supplied buffer was too small, the kernel ignored the buffer length
and just wrote past the end of the buffer, potentially corrupting
userspace memory.  Fix it by instead returning the size required, as per
the documentation for keyctl_read().

We also don't even fill the buffer at all in this case, as this is
slightly easier to implement than doing a short read, and either
behavior appears to be permitted.  It also makes it match the behavior
of the "encrypted" key type.

Fixes: d00a1c72f7 ("keys: add new trusted key-type")
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.38+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-11-02 20:58:07 +11:00
Eric Biggers 3239b6f29b KEYS: return full count in keyring_read() if buffer is too small
Commit e645016abc ("KEYS: fix writing past end of user-supplied buffer
in keyring_read()") made keyring_read() stop corrupting userspace memory
when the user-supplied buffer is too small.  However it also made the
return value in that case be the short buffer size rather than the size
required, yet keyctl_read() is actually documented to return the size
required.  Therefore, switch it over to the documented behavior.

Note that for now we continue to have it fill the short buffer, since it
did that before (pre-v3.13) and dump_key_tree_aux() in keyutils arguably
relies on it.

Fixes: e645016abc ("KEYS: fix writing past end of user-supplied buffer in keyring_read()")
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-11-02 20:58:05 +11:00
Eric Biggers ab5c69f013 KEYS: load key flags and expiry time atomically in proc_keys_show()
In proc_keys_show(), the key semaphore is not held, so the key ->flags
and ->expiry can be changed concurrently.  We therefore should read them
atomically just once.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-10-18 09:12:41 +01:00
Eric Biggers 9d6c8711b6 KEYS: Load key expiry time atomically in keyring_search_iterator()
Similar to the case for key_validate(), we should load the key ->expiry
once atomically in keyring_search_iterator(), since it can be changed
concurrently with the flags whenever the key semaphore isn't held.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-10-18 09:12:41 +01:00
Eric Biggers 1823d475a5 KEYS: load key flags and expiry time atomically in key_validate()
In key_validate(), load the flags and expiry time once atomically, since
these can change concurrently if key_validate() is called without the
key semaphore held.  And we don't want to get inconsistent results if a
variable is referenced multiple times.  For example, key->expiry was
referenced in both 'if (key->expiry)' and in 'if (now.tv_sec >=
key->expiry)', making it theoretically possible to see a spurious
EKEYEXPIRED while the expiration time was being removed, i.e. set to 0.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-10-18 09:12:41 +01:00
David Howells 60ff5b2f54 KEYS: don't let add_key() update an uninstantiated key
Currently, when passed a key that already exists, add_key() will call the
key's ->update() method if such exists.  But this is heavily broken in the
case where the key is uninstantiated because it doesn't call
__key_instantiate_and_link().  Consequently, it doesn't do most of the
things that are supposed to happen when the key is instantiated, such as
setting the instantiation state, clearing KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT and
awakening tasks waiting on it, and incrementing key->user->nikeys.

It also never takes key_construction_mutex, which means that
->instantiate() can run concurrently with ->update() on the same key.  In
the case of the "user" and "logon" key types this causes a memory leak, at
best.  Maybe even worse, the ->update() methods of the "encrypted" and
"trusted" key types actually just dereference a NULL pointer when passed an
uninstantiated key.

Change key_create_or_update() to wait interruptibly for the key to finish
construction before continuing.

This patch only affects *uninstantiated* keys.  For now we still allow a
negatively instantiated key to be updated (thereby positively
instantiating it), although that's broken too (the next patch fixes it)
and I'm not sure that anyone actually uses that functionality either.

Here is a simple reproducer for the bug using the "encrypted" key type
(requires CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS=y), though as noted above the bug
pertained to more than just the "encrypted" key type:

    #include <stdlib.h>
    #include <unistd.h>
    #include <keyutils.h>

    int main(void)
    {
        int ringid = keyctl_join_session_keyring(NULL);

        if (fork()) {
            for (;;) {
                const char payload[] = "update user:foo 32";

                usleep(rand() % 10000);
                add_key("encrypted", "desc", payload, sizeof(payload), ringid);
                keyctl_clear(ringid);
            }
        } else {
            for (;;)
                request_key("encrypted", "desc", "callout_info", ringid);
        }
    }

It causes:

    BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018
    IP: encrypted_update+0xb0/0x170
    PGD 7a178067 P4D 7a178067 PUD 77269067 PMD 0
    PREEMPT SMP
    CPU: 0 PID: 340 Comm: reproduce Tainted: G      D         4.14.0-rc1-00025-g428490e38b2e #796
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
    task: ffff8a467a39a340 task.stack: ffffb15c40770000
    RIP: 0010:encrypted_update+0xb0/0x170
    RSP: 0018:ffffb15c40773de8 EFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8a467a275b00 RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: ffff8a467a275b14 RDI: ffffffffb742f303
    RBP: ffffb15c40773e20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8a467a275b17
    R10: 0000000000000020 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8a4677057180 R15: ffff8a467a275b0f
    FS:  00007f5d7fb08700(0000) GS:ffff8a467f200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000077262005 CR4: 00000000001606f0
    Call Trace:
     key_create_or_update+0x2bc/0x460
     SyS_add_key+0x10c/0x1d0
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
    RIP: 0033:0x7f5d7f211259
    RSP: 002b:00007ffed03904c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000f8
    RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000003b2a7955 RCX: 00007f5d7f211259
    RDX: 00000000004009e4 RSI: 00000000004009ff RDI: 0000000000400a04
    RBP: 0000000068db8bad R08: 000000003b2a7955 R09: 0000000000000004
    R10: 000000000000001a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400868
    R13: 00007ffed03905d0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
    Code: 77 28 e8 64 34 1f 00 45 31 c0 31 c9 48 8d 55 c8 48 89 df 48 8d 75 d0 e8 ff f9 ff ff 85 c0 41 89 c4 0f 88 84 00 00 00 4c 8b 7d c8 <49> 8b 75 18 4c 89 ff e8 24 f8 ff ff 85 c0 41 89 c4 78 6d 49 8b
    RIP: encrypted_update+0xb0/0x170 RSP: ffffb15c40773de8
    CR2: 0000000000000018

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.12+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2017-10-18 09:12:40 +01:00
David Howells 363b02dab0 KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:

 (1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.

 (2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.

 (3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.

This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.

The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state.  For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state.  You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.

The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated.  The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.

Additionally, barriering is included:

 (1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.

 (2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.

Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.

Fixes: 146aa8b145 ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2017-10-18 09:12:40 +01:00
Arnd Bergmann 3cd18d1981 security/keys: BIG_KEY requires CONFIG_CRYPTO
The recent rework introduced a possible randconfig build failure
when CONFIG_CRYPTO configured to only allow modules:

security/keys/big_key.o: In function `big_key_crypt':
big_key.c:(.text+0x29f): undefined reference to `crypto_aead_setkey'
security/keys/big_key.o: In function `big_key_init':
big_key.c:(.init.text+0x1a): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_aead'
big_key.c:(.init.text+0x45): undefined reference to `crypto_aead_setauthsize'
big_key.c:(.init.text+0x77): undefined reference to `crypto_destroy_tfm'
crypto/gcm.o: In function `gcm_hash_crypt_remain_continue':
gcm.c:(.text+0x167): undefined reference to `crypto_ahash_finup'
crypto/gcm.o: In function `crypto_gcm_exit_tfm':
gcm.c:(.text+0x847): undefined reference to `crypto_destroy_tfm'

When we 'select CRYPTO' like the other users, we always get a
configuration that builds.

Fixes: 428490e38b ("security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-10-18 09:12:40 +01:00
Eric Biggers 13923d0865 KEYS: encrypted: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload
A key of type "encrypted" references a "master key" which is used to
encrypt and decrypt the encrypted key's payload.  However, when we
accessed the master key's payload, we failed to handle the case where
the master key has been revoked, which sets the payload pointer to NULL.
Note that request_key() *does* skip revoked keys, but there is still a
window where the key can be revoked before we acquire its semaphore.

Fix it by checking for a NULL payload, treating it like a key which was
already revoked at the time it was requested.

This was an issue for master keys of type "user" only.  Master keys can
also be of type "trusted", but those cannot be revoked.

Fixes: 7e70cb4978 ("keys: add new key-type encrypted")
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>    [v2.6.38+]
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-10-12 15:55:09 +01:00
Kees Cook 1d27e3e225 timer: Remove expires and data arguments from DEFINE_TIMER
Drop the arguments from the macro and adjust all callers with the
following script:

  perl -pi -e 's/DEFINE_TIMER\((.*), 0, 0\);/DEFINE_TIMER($1);/g;' \
    $(git grep DEFINE_TIMER | cut -d: -f1 | sort -u | grep -v timer.h)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> # for m68k parts
Acked-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> # for watchdog parts
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> # for networking parts
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> # for wireless parts
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: Sebastian Reichel <sre@kernel.org>
Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@qca.qualcomm.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: linux1394-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Wim Van Sebroeck <wim@iguana.be>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Ursula Braun <ubraun@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Cc: Harish Patil <harish.patil@cavium.com>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Michael Reed <mdr@sgi.com>
Cc: Manish Chopra <manish.chopra@cavium.com>
Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Mark Gross <mark.gross@intel.com>
Cc: linux-watchdog@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507159627-127660-11-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-10-05 15:01:20 +02:00
Jason A. Donenfeld 428490e38b security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto
This started out as just replacing the use of crypto/rng with
get_random_bytes_wait, so that we wouldn't use bad randomness at boot
time. But, upon looking further, it appears that there were even deeper
underlying cryptographic problems, and that this seems to have been
committed with very little crypto review. So, I rewrote the whole thing,
trying to keep to the conventions introduced by the previous author, to
fix these cryptographic flaws.

It makes no sense to seed crypto/rng at boot time and then keep
using it like this, when in fact there's already get_random_bytes_wait,
which can ensure there's enough entropy and be a much more standard way
of generating keys. Since this sensitive material is being stored
untrusted, using ECB and no authentication is simply not okay at all. I
find it surprising and a bit horrifying that this code even made it past
basic crypto review, which perhaps points to some larger issues. This
patch moves from using AES-ECB to using AES-GCM. Since keys are uniquely
generated each time, we can set the nonce to zero. There was also a race
condition in which the same key would be reused at the same time in
different threads. A mutex fixes this issue now.

So, to summarize, this commit fixes the following vulnerabilities:

  * Low entropy key generation, allowing an attacker to potentially
    guess or predict keys.
  * Unauthenticated encryption, allowing an attacker to modify the
    cipher text in particular ways in order to manipulate the plaintext,
    which is is even more frightening considering the next point.
  * Use of ECB mode, allowing an attacker to trivially swap blocks or
    compare identical plaintext blocks.
  * Key re-use.
  * Faulty memory zeroing.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2017-09-25 23:31:58 +01:00
Jason A. Donenfeld 910801809b security/keys: properly zero out sensitive key material in big_key
Error paths forgot to zero out sensitive material, so this patch changes
some kfrees into a kzfrees.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2017-09-25 23:31:41 +01:00
Eric Biggers e007ce9c59 KEYS: use kmemdup() in request_key_auth_new()
kmemdup() is preferred to kmalloc() followed by memcpy().

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-09-25 15:19:57 +01:00
Eric Biggers 4aa68e07d8 KEYS: restrict /proc/keys by credentials at open time
When checking for permission to view keys whilst reading from
/proc/keys, we should use the credentials with which the /proc/keys file
was opened.  This is because, in a classic type of exploit, it can be
possible to bypass checks for the *current* credentials by passing the
file descriptor to a suid program.

Following commit 34dbbcdbf6 ("Make file credentials available to the
seqfile interfaces") we can finally fix it.  So let's do it.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-09-25 15:19:57 +01:00
Eric Biggers 8f674565d4 KEYS: reset parent each time before searching key_user_tree
In key_user_lookup(), if there is no key_user for the given uid, we drop
key_user_lock, allocate a new key_user, and search the tree again.  But
we failed to set 'parent' to NULL at the beginning of the second search.
If the tree were to be empty for the second search, the insertion would
be done with an invalid 'parent', scribbling over freed memory.

Fortunately this can't actually happen currently because the tree always
contains at least the root_key_user.  But it still should be fixed to
make the code more robust.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-09-25 15:19:57 +01:00
Eric Biggers 37863c43b2 KEYS: prevent KEYCTL_READ on negative key
Because keyctl_read_key() looks up the key with no permissions
requested, it may find a negatively instantiated key.  If the key is
also possessed, we went ahead and called ->read() on the key.  But the
key payload will actually contain the ->reject_error rather than the
normal payload.  Thus, the kernel oopses trying to read the
user_key_payload from memory address (int)-ENOKEY = 0x00000000ffffff82.

Fortunately the payload data is stored inline, so it shouldn't be
possible to abuse this as an arbitrary memory read primitive...

Reproducer:
    keyctl new_session
    keyctl request2 user desc '' @s
    keyctl read $(keyctl show | awk '/user: desc/ {print $1}')

It causes a crash like the following:
     BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff92
     IP: user_read+0x33/0xa0
     PGD 36a54067 P4D 36a54067 PUD 0
     Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
     CPU: 0 PID: 211 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.14.0-rc1 #337
     Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-20170228_101828-anatol 04/01/2014
     task: ffff90aa3b74c3c0 task.stack: ffff9878c0478000
     RIP: 0010:user_read+0x33/0xa0
     RSP: 0018:ffff9878c047bee8 EFLAGS: 00010246
     RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff90aa3d7da340 RCX: 0000000000000017
     RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffffff82 RDI: ffff90aa3d7da340
     RBP: ffff9878c047bf00 R08: 00000024f95da94f R09: 0000000000000000
     R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
     R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
     FS:  00007f58ece69740(0000) GS:ffff90aa3e200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
     CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
     CR2: 00000000ffffff92 CR3: 0000000036adc001 CR4: 00000000003606f0
     Call Trace:
      keyctl_read_key+0xac/0xe0
      SyS_keyctl+0x99/0x120
      entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
     RIP: 0033:0x7f58ec787bb9
     RSP: 002b:00007ffc8d401678 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000fa
     RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc8d402800 RCX: 00007f58ec787bb9
     RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000174a63ac RDI: 000000000000000b
     RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 00007ffc8d402809 R09: 0000000000000020
     R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffc8d402800
     R13: 00007ffc8d4016e0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
     Code: e5 41 55 49 89 f5 41 54 49 89 d4 53 48 89 fb e8 a4 b4 ad ff 85 c0 74 09 80 3d b9 4c 96 00 00 74 43 48 8b b3 20 01 00 00 4d 85 ed <0f> b7 5e 10 74 29 4d 85 e4 74 24 4c 39 e3 4c 89 e2 4c 89 ef 48
     RIP: user_read+0x33/0xa0 RSP: ffff9878c047bee8
     CR2: 00000000ffffff92

Fixes: 61ea0c0ba9 ("KEYS: Skip key state checks when checking for possession")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[v3.13+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-09-25 15:19:57 +01:00
Eric Biggers 237bbd29f7 KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings
It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user.  For example:

    sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
                           keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
                           sleep 15' &
    sleep 1
    sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
    sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us

This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions.  In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:

    -4: alswrv-----v------------  3000     0 keyring: _uid.4000
    -5: alswrv-----v------------  3000     0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000

Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING.  Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.

Fixes: 69664cf16a ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[v2.6.26+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-09-25 15:19:57 +01:00
Eric Biggers e645016abc KEYS: fix writing past end of user-supplied buffer in keyring_read()
Userspace can call keyctl_read() on a keyring to get the list of IDs of
keys in the keyring.  But if the user-supplied buffer is too small, the
kernel would write the full list anyway --- which will corrupt whatever
userspace memory happened to be past the end of the buffer.  Fix it by
only filling the space that is available.

Fixes: b2a4df200d ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[v3.13+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-09-25 15:19:57 +01:00
Eric Biggers 7fc0786d95 KEYS: fix key refcount leak in keyctl_read_key()
In keyctl_read_key(), if key_permission() were to return an error code
other than EACCES, we would leak a the reference to the key.  This can't
actually happen currently because key_permission() can only return an
error code other than EACCES if security_key_permission() does, only
SELinux and Smack implement that hook, and neither can return an error
code other than EACCES.  But it should still be fixed, as it is a bug
waiting to happen.

Fixes: 29db919063 ("[PATCH] Keys: Add LSM hooks for key management [try #3]")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-09-25 15:19:57 +01:00
Eric Biggers 884bee0215 KEYS: fix key refcount leak in keyctl_assume_authority()
In keyctl_assume_authority(), if keyctl_change_reqkey_auth() were to
fail, we would leak the reference to the 'authkey'.  Currently this can
only happen if prepare_creds() fails to allocate memory.  But it still
should be fixed, as it is a more severe bug waiting to happen.

This patch also moves the read of 'authkey->serial' to before the
reference to the authkey is dropped.  Doing the read after dropping the
reference is very fragile because it assumes we still hold another
reference to the key.  (Which we do, in current->cred->request_key_auth,
but there's no reason not to write it in the "obviously correct" way.)

Fixes: d84f4f992c ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-09-25 15:19:57 +01:00
Eric Biggers f7b48cf08f KEYS: don't revoke uninstantiated key in request_key_auth_new()
If key_instantiate_and_link() were to fail (which fortunately isn't
possible currently), the call to key_revoke(authkey) would crash with a
NULL pointer dereference in request_key_auth_revoke() because the key
has not yet been instantiated.

Fix this by removing the call to key_revoke().  key_put() is sufficient,
as it's not possible for an uninstantiated authkey to have been used for
anything yet.

Fixes: b5f545c880 ("[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-09-25 15:19:56 +01:00
Eric Biggers 44d8143340 KEYS: fix cred refcount leak in request_key_auth_new()
In request_key_auth_new(), if key_alloc() or key_instantiate_and_link()
were to fail, we would leak a reference to the 'struct cred'.  Currently
this can only happen if key_alloc() fails to allocate memory.  But it
still should be fixed, as it is a more severe bug waiting to happen.

Fix it by cleaning things up to use a helper function which frees a
'struct request_key_auth' correctly.

Fixes: d84f4f992c ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-09-25 15:03:55 +01:00
Christoph Hellwig e13ec939e9 fs: fix kernel_write prototype
Make the position an in/out argument like all the other read/write
helpers and and make the buf argument a void pointer.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-09-04 19:05:15 -04:00
Christoph Hellwig bdd1d2d3d2 fs: fix kernel_read prototype
Use proper ssize_t and size_t types for the return value and count
argument, move the offset last and make it an in/out argument like
all other read/write helpers, and make the buf argument a void pointer
to get rid of lots of casts in the callers.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-09-04 19:05:15 -04:00
Linus Torvalds e06fdaf40a Now that IPC and other changes have landed, enable manual markings for
randstruct plugin, including the task_struct.
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Merge tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull structure randomization updates from Kees Cook:
 "Now that IPC and other changes have landed, enable manual markings for
  randstruct plugin, including the task_struct.

  This is the rest of what was staged in -next for the gcc-plugins, and
  comes in three patches, largest first:

   - mark "easy" structs with __randomize_layout

   - mark task_struct with an optional anonymous struct to isolate the
     __randomize_layout section

   - mark structs to opt _out_ of automated marking (which will come
     later)

  And, FWIW, this continues to pass allmodconfig (normal and patched to
  enable gcc-plugins) builds of x86_64, i386, arm64, arm, powerpc, and
  s390 for me"

* tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs
  task_struct: Allow randomized layout
  randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization
2017-07-19 08:55:18 -07:00
Eric Biggers 4f9dabfaf8 KEYS: DH: validate __spare field
Syscalls must validate that their reserved arguments are zero and return
EINVAL otherwise.  Otherwise, it will be impossible to actually use them
for anything in the future because existing programs may be passing
garbage in.  This is standard practice when adding new APIs.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-07-14 11:01:38 +10:00