Eric W. Biederman be0ef855ba net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages ... [ Upstream commit 90f62cf30a ] It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that privileged executable did not intend to do. To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls. Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well. Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>		2014-06-26 15:15:38 -04:00
..
Kconfig	trivial: Kconfig: .ko is normally not included in module names	2009-06-12 18:01:50 +02:00
Makefile	[PATCH] Process Events Connector	2005-11-07 07:53:35 -08:00
cn_proc.c	net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages	2014-06-26 15:15:38 -04:00
cn_queue.c	drivers: connector: fixed coding style issues	2012-07-16 23:23:52 -07:00
connector.c	connector: use 'size' everywhere in cn_netlink_send()	2013-10-02 16:03:50 -04:00