This allows the LSM to distinguish between syslog functions originating from /proc/kmsg access and direct syscalls. By default, the commoncaps will now no longer require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read an opened /proc/kmsg file descriptor. For example the kernel syslog reader can now drop privileges after opening /proc/kmsg, instead of staying privileged with CAP_SYS_ADMIN. MAC systems that implement security_syslog have unchanged behavior. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
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.. | ||
integrity/ima | ||
keys | ||
selinux | ||
smack | ||
tomoyo | ||
Kconfig | ||
Makefile | ||
capability.c | ||
commoncap.c | ||
device_cgroup.c | ||
inode.c | ||
lsm_audit.c | ||
min_addr.c | ||
security.c |