096fe9eaea
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key type method must be aware that the error code may be there. The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type: keyctl request2 user user "" @u keyctl add user user "a" @u which manifests itself as: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046 PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046 RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82 RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82 R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700 FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82 ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5 ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136 [<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129 [< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730 [<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908 [< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125 [<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60 [<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185 Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX. A similar bug can be tripped by: keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u keyctl add trusted user "a" @u This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that will crashes. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
225 lines
4.9 KiB
C
225 lines
4.9 KiB
C
/* user_defined.c: user defined key type
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
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* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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*/
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/seq_file.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#include <keys/user-type.h>
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#include <asm/uaccess.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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static int logon_vet_description(const char *desc);
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/*
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* user defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an
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* arbitrary blob of data as the payload
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*/
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struct key_type key_type_user = {
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.name = "user",
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.preparse = user_preparse,
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.free_preparse = user_free_preparse,
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.instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
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.update = user_update,
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.revoke = user_revoke,
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.destroy = user_destroy,
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.describe = user_describe,
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.read = user_read,
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};
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_user);
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/*
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* This key type is essentially the same as key_type_user, but it does
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* not define a .read op. This is suitable for storing username and
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* password pairs in the keyring that you do not want to be readable
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* from userspace.
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*/
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struct key_type key_type_logon = {
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.name = "logon",
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.preparse = user_preparse,
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.free_preparse = user_free_preparse,
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.instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
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.update = user_update,
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.revoke = user_revoke,
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.destroy = user_destroy,
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.describe = user_describe,
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.vet_description = logon_vet_description,
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};
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_logon);
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/*
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* Preparse a user defined key payload
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*/
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int user_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
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{
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struct user_key_payload *upayload;
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size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
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if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
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return -EINVAL;
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upayload = kmalloc(sizeof(*upayload) + datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!upayload)
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return -ENOMEM;
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/* attach the data */
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prep->quotalen = datalen;
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prep->payload.data[0] = upayload;
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upayload->datalen = datalen;
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memcpy(upayload->data, prep->data, datalen);
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return 0;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_preparse);
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/*
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* Free a preparse of a user defined key payload
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*/
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void user_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
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{
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kfree(prep->payload.data[0]);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_free_preparse);
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/*
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* update a user defined key
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* - the key's semaphore is write-locked
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*/
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int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
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{
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struct user_key_payload *upayload, *zap;
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size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
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int ret;
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ret = -EINVAL;
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if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
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goto error;
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/* construct a replacement payload */
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ret = -ENOMEM;
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upayload = kmalloc(sizeof(*upayload) + datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!upayload)
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goto error;
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upayload->datalen = datalen;
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memcpy(upayload->data, prep->data, datalen);
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/* check the quota and attach the new data */
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zap = upayload;
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ret = key_payload_reserve(key, datalen);
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if (ret == 0) {
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/* attach the new data, displacing the old */
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if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags))
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zap = key->payload.data[0];
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else
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zap = NULL;
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rcu_assign_keypointer(key, upayload);
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key->expiry = 0;
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}
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if (zap)
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kfree_rcu(zap, rcu);
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error:
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return ret;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_update);
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/*
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* dispose of the links from a revoked keyring
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* - called with the key sem write-locked
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*/
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void user_revoke(struct key *key)
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{
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struct user_key_payload *upayload = key->payload.data[0];
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/* clear the quota */
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key_payload_reserve(key, 0);
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if (upayload) {
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rcu_assign_keypointer(key, NULL);
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kfree_rcu(upayload, rcu);
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}
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(user_revoke);
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/*
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* dispose of the data dangling from the corpse of a user key
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*/
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void user_destroy(struct key *key)
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{
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struct user_key_payload *upayload = key->payload.data[0];
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kfree(upayload);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_destroy);
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/*
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* describe the user key
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*/
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void user_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
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{
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seq_puts(m, key->description);
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if (key_is_instantiated(key))
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seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_describe);
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/*
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* read the key data
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* - the key's semaphore is read-locked
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*/
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long user_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
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{
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const struct user_key_payload *upayload;
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long ret;
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upayload = user_key_payload(key);
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ret = upayload->datalen;
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/* we can return the data as is */
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if (buffer && buflen > 0) {
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if (buflen > upayload->datalen)
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buflen = upayload->datalen;
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if (copy_to_user(buffer, upayload->data, buflen) != 0)
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ret = -EFAULT;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_read);
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/* Vet the description for a "logon" key */
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static int logon_vet_description(const char *desc)
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{
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char *p;
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/* require a "qualified" description string */
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p = strchr(desc, ':');
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if (!p)
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return -EINVAL;
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/* also reject description with ':' as first char */
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if (p == desc)
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return -EINVAL;
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return 0;
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}
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