ipcm->substream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1031 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_poke() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap) sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1075 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_peek() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing ipcm->substream before using it to index emu->fx8010.pcm Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> |
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.. | ||
Makefile | ||
emu10k1.c | ||
emu10k1_callback.c | ||
emu10k1_main.c | ||
emu10k1_patch.c | ||
emu10k1_synth.c | ||
emu10k1_synth_local.h | ||
emu10k1x.c | ||
emufx.c | ||
emumixer.c | ||
emumpu401.c | ||
emupcm.c | ||
emuproc.c | ||
io.c | ||
irq.c | ||
memory.c | ||
p16v.c | ||
p16v.h | ||
p17v.h | ||
timer.c | ||
tina2.h | ||
voice.c |