info->channel is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: sound/pci/rme9652/hdsp.c:4100 snd_hdsp_channel_info() warn: potential spectre issue 'hdsp->channel_map' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing info->channel before using it to index hdsp->channel_map Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. Also, notice that I refactored the code a bit in order to get rid of the following checkpatch warning: ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition FILE: sound/pci/rme9652/hdsp.c:4103: if ((mapped_channel = hdsp->channel_map[info->channel]) < 0) [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> |
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Makefile | ||
hdsp.c | ||
hdspm.c | ||
rme9652.c |