linux/net/unix
Eric Dumazet 9915672d41 af_unix: limit unix_tot_inflight
Vegard Nossum found a unix socket OOM was possible, posting an exploit
program.

My analysis is we can eat all LOWMEM memory before unix_gc() being
called from unix_release_sock(). Moreover, the thread blocked in
unix_gc() can consume huge amount of time to perform cleanup because of
huge working set.

One way to handle this is to have a sensible limit on unix_tot_inflight,
tested from wait_for_unix_gc() and to force a call to unix_gc() if this
limit is hit.

This solves the OOM and also reduce overall latencies, and should not
slowdown normal workloads.

Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-11-24 09:15:27 -08:00
..
Kconfig [NET]: move config options out to individual protocols 2005-07-11 21:13:56 -07:00
Makefile Linux-2.6.12-rc2 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
af_unix.c fs: allow for more than 2^31 files 2010-10-26 16:52:15 -07:00
garbage.c af_unix: limit unix_tot_inflight 2010-11-24 09:15:27 -08:00
sysctl_net_unix.c include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h 2010-03-30 22:02:32 +09:00