bc2c6421cb
feature, which allows ext4 directories to support over 2 billion directory entries (assuming ~64 byte file names; in practice, users will run into practical performance limits first.) This feature was originally written by the Lustre team, and credit goes to Artem Blagodarenko from Seagate for getting this feature upstream. The second major major feature allows ext4 to support extended attribute values up to 64k. This feature was also originally from Lustre, and has been enhanced by Tahsin Erdogan from Google with a deduplication feature so that if multiple files have the same xattr value (for example, Windows ACL's stored by Samba), only one copy will be stored on disk for encoding and caching efficiency. We also have the usual set of bug fixes, cleanups, and optimizations. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEzBAABCAAdFiEEK2m5VNv+CHkogTfJ8vlZVpUNgaMFAllhl5AACgkQ8vlZVpUN gaOiNQf+L23sT9KIQmFwQP38vkBVw67Eo7gBfevmk7oqQLiRppT5mmLzW8EWEDxR PVaDQXvSZi18wSCAAcCd1ZqeIZk0P6tst0ufnIT60tGlZdUlwSLyrqvV/30axR2g 6kcnv90ZszrQNx5U8q8bMzNrs1KtyPHFCRzavFsBX11WezNSpWnH2in/uxO+t9Jy F2zlrLUrE2m9AVMH48Dh6LbeaB6pqgr4k3jq1jG4Iqb2h9xgU8OKhs8gL07YS+Qi 5A7s8GIvYQSoZUO9DOOie2f1zhpO0KrhXchyZTJukVQH7TsmFxoSh0vhXnP1Bohu CNLV6dzetDT0VfmPr1WhVe7lhZeeVw== =FFkF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'ext4_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4 Pull ext4 updates from Ted Ts'o: "The first major feature for ext4 this merge window is the largedir feature, which allows ext4 directories to support over 2 billion directory entries (assuming ~64 byte file names; in practice, users will run into practical performance limits first.) This feature was originally written by the Lustre team, and credit goes to Artem Blagodarenko from Seagate for getting this feature upstream. The second major major feature allows ext4 to support extended attribute values up to 64k. This feature was also originally from Lustre, and has been enhanced by Tahsin Erdogan from Google with a deduplication feature so that if multiple files have the same xattr value (for example, Windows ACL's stored by Samba), only one copy will be stored on disk for encoding and caching efficiency. We also have the usual set of bug fixes, cleanups, and optimizations" * tag 'ext4_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4: (47 commits) ext4: fix spelling mistake: "prellocated" -> "preallocated" ext4: fix __ext4_new_inode() journal credits calculation ext4: skip ext4_init_security() and encryption on ea_inodes fs: generic_block_bmap(): initialize all of the fields in the temp bh ext4: change fast symlink test to not rely on i_blocks ext4: require key for truncate(2) of encrypted file ext4: don't bother checking for encryption key in ->mmap() ext4: check return value of kstrtoull correctly in reserved_clusters_store ext4: fix off-by-one fsmap error on 1k block filesystems ext4: return EFSBADCRC if a bad checksum error is found in ext4_find_entry() ext4: return EIO on read error in ext4_find_entry ext4: forbid encrypting root directory ext4: send parallel discards on commit completions ext4: avoid unnecessary stalls in ext4_evict_inode() ext4: add nombcache mount option ext4: strong binding of xattr inode references ext4: eliminate xattr entry e_hash recalculation for removes ext4: reserve space for xattr entries/names quota: add get_inode_usage callback to transfer multi-inode charges ext4: xattr inode deduplication ...
267 lines
8.3 KiB
C
267 lines
8.3 KiB
C
/*
|
|
* Encryption policy functions for per-file encryption support.
|
|
*
|
|
* Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
|
|
* Copyright (C) 2015, Motorola Mobility.
|
|
*
|
|
* Written by Michael Halcrow, 2015.
|
|
* Modified by Jaegeuk Kim, 2015.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/random.h>
|
|
#include <linux/string.h>
|
|
#include <linux/mount.h>
|
|
#include "fscrypt_private.h"
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* check whether an encryption policy is consistent with an encryption context
|
|
*/
|
|
static bool is_encryption_context_consistent_with_policy(
|
|
const struct fscrypt_context *ctx,
|
|
const struct fscrypt_policy *policy)
|
|
{
|
|
return memcmp(ctx->master_key_descriptor, policy->master_key_descriptor,
|
|
FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) == 0 &&
|
|
(ctx->flags == policy->flags) &&
|
|
(ctx->contents_encryption_mode ==
|
|
policy->contents_encryption_mode) &&
|
|
(ctx->filenames_encryption_mode ==
|
|
policy->filenames_encryption_mode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int create_encryption_context_from_policy(struct inode *inode,
|
|
const struct fscrypt_policy *policy)
|
|
{
|
|
struct fscrypt_context ctx;
|
|
|
|
ctx.format = FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1;
|
|
memcpy(ctx.master_key_descriptor, policy->master_key_descriptor,
|
|
FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
if (!fscrypt_valid_enc_modes(policy->contents_encryption_mode,
|
|
policy->filenames_encryption_mode))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (policy->flags & ~FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
ctx.contents_encryption_mode = policy->contents_encryption_mode;
|
|
ctx.filenames_encryption_mode = policy->filenames_encryption_mode;
|
|
ctx.flags = policy->flags;
|
|
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ctx.nonce) != FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
|
|
get_random_bytes(ctx.nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
return inode->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx), NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(struct file *filp, const void __user *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct fscrypt_policy policy;
|
|
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
|
|
int ret;
|
|
struct fscrypt_context ctx;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(&policy, arg, sizeof(policy)))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
|
|
return -EACCES;
|
|
|
|
if (policy.version != 0)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
ret = mnt_want_write_file(filp);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
inode_lock(inode);
|
|
|
|
ret = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
|
|
if (ret == -ENODATA) {
|
|
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
|
|
ret = -ENOTDIR;
|
|
else if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->empty_dir(inode))
|
|
ret = -ENOTEMPTY;
|
|
else
|
|
ret = create_encryption_context_from_policy(inode,
|
|
&policy);
|
|
} else if (ret == sizeof(ctx) &&
|
|
is_encryption_context_consistent_with_policy(&ctx,
|
|
&policy)) {
|
|
/* The file already uses the same encryption policy. */
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
} else if (ret >= 0 || ret == -ERANGE) {
|
|
/* The file already uses a different encryption policy. */
|
|
ret = -EEXIST;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
inode_unlock(inode);
|
|
|
|
mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy);
|
|
|
|
int fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(struct file *filp, void __user *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
|
|
struct fscrypt_context ctx;
|
|
struct fscrypt_policy policy;
|
|
int res;
|
|
|
|
if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->is_encrypted(inode))
|
|
return -ENODATA;
|
|
|
|
res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
|
|
if (res < 0 && res != -ERANGE)
|
|
return res;
|
|
if (res != sizeof(ctx))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
if (ctx.format != FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
policy.version = 0;
|
|
policy.contents_encryption_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode;
|
|
policy.filenames_encryption_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode;
|
|
policy.flags = ctx.flags;
|
|
memcpy(policy.master_key_descriptor, ctx.master_key_descriptor,
|
|
FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user(arg, &policy, sizeof(policy)))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* fscrypt_has_permitted_context() - is a file's encryption policy permitted
|
|
* within its directory?
|
|
*
|
|
* @parent: inode for parent directory
|
|
* @child: inode for file being looked up, opened, or linked into @parent
|
|
*
|
|
* Filesystems must call this before permitting access to an inode in a
|
|
* situation where the parent directory is encrypted (either before allowing
|
|
* ->lookup() to succeed, or for a regular file before allowing it to be opened)
|
|
* and before any operation that involves linking an inode into an encrypted
|
|
* directory, including link, rename, and cross rename. It enforces the
|
|
* constraint that within a given encrypted directory tree, all files use the
|
|
* same encryption policy. The pre-access check is needed to detect potentially
|
|
* malicious offline violations of this constraint, while the link and rename
|
|
* checks are needed to prevent online violations of this constraint.
|
|
*
|
|
* Return: 1 if permitted, 0 if forbidden. If forbidden, the caller must fail
|
|
* the filesystem operation with EPERM.
|
|
*/
|
|
int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct fscrypt_operations *cops = parent->i_sb->s_cop;
|
|
const struct fscrypt_info *parent_ci, *child_ci;
|
|
struct fscrypt_context parent_ctx, child_ctx;
|
|
int res;
|
|
|
|
/* No restrictions on file types which are never encrypted */
|
|
if (!S_ISREG(child->i_mode) && !S_ISDIR(child->i_mode) &&
|
|
!S_ISLNK(child->i_mode))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
/* No restrictions if the parent directory is unencrypted */
|
|
if (!cops->is_encrypted(parent))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
/* Encrypted directories must not contain unencrypted files */
|
|
if (!cops->is_encrypted(child))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Both parent and child are encrypted, so verify they use the same
|
|
* encryption policy. Compare the fscrypt_info structs if the keys are
|
|
* available, otherwise retrieve and compare the fscrypt_contexts.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note that the fscrypt_context retrieval will be required frequently
|
|
* when accessing an encrypted directory tree without the key.
|
|
* Performance-wise this is not a big deal because we already don't
|
|
* really optimize for file access without the key (to the extent that
|
|
* such access is even possible), given that any attempted access
|
|
* already causes a fscrypt_context retrieval and keyring search.
|
|
*
|
|
* In any case, if an unexpected error occurs, fall back to "forbidden".
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
res = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(parent);
|
|
if (res)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
res = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(child);
|
|
if (res)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
parent_ci = parent->i_crypt_info;
|
|
child_ci = child->i_crypt_info;
|
|
|
|
if (parent_ci && child_ci) {
|
|
return memcmp(parent_ci->ci_master_key, child_ci->ci_master_key,
|
|
FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) == 0 &&
|
|
(parent_ci->ci_data_mode == child_ci->ci_data_mode) &&
|
|
(parent_ci->ci_filename_mode ==
|
|
child_ci->ci_filename_mode) &&
|
|
(parent_ci->ci_flags == child_ci->ci_flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
res = cops->get_context(parent, &parent_ctx, sizeof(parent_ctx));
|
|
if (res != sizeof(parent_ctx))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
res = cops->get_context(child, &child_ctx, sizeof(child_ctx));
|
|
if (res != sizeof(child_ctx))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return memcmp(parent_ctx.master_key_descriptor,
|
|
child_ctx.master_key_descriptor,
|
|
FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) == 0 &&
|
|
(parent_ctx.contents_encryption_mode ==
|
|
child_ctx.contents_encryption_mode) &&
|
|
(parent_ctx.filenames_encryption_mode ==
|
|
child_ctx.filenames_encryption_mode) &&
|
|
(parent_ctx.flags == child_ctx.flags);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_has_permitted_context);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* fscrypt_inherit_context() - Sets a child context from its parent
|
|
* @parent: Parent inode from which the context is inherited.
|
|
* @child: Child inode that inherits the context from @parent.
|
|
* @fs_data: private data given by FS.
|
|
* @preload: preload child i_crypt_info if true
|
|
*
|
|
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
|
|
*/
|
|
int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child,
|
|
void *fs_data, bool preload)
|
|
{
|
|
struct fscrypt_context ctx;
|
|
struct fscrypt_info *ci;
|
|
int res;
|
|
|
|
res = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(parent);
|
|
if (res < 0)
|
|
return res;
|
|
|
|
ci = parent->i_crypt_info;
|
|
if (ci == NULL)
|
|
return -ENOKEY;
|
|
|
|
ctx.format = FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1;
|
|
ctx.contents_encryption_mode = ci->ci_data_mode;
|
|
ctx.filenames_encryption_mode = ci->ci_filename_mode;
|
|
ctx.flags = ci->ci_flags;
|
|
memcpy(ctx.master_key_descriptor, ci->ci_master_key,
|
|
FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
|
|
get_random_bytes(ctx.nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
|
|
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ctx) != FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE);
|
|
res = parent->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(child, &ctx,
|
|
sizeof(ctx), fs_data);
|
|
if (res)
|
|
return res;
|
|
return preload ? fscrypt_get_encryption_info(child): 0;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_inherit_context);
|