linux/security/safesetid/lsm.c

278 lines
7.7 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* SafeSetID Linux Security Module
*
* Author: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
*
* Copyright (C) 2018 The Chromium OS Authors.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as
* published by the Free Software Foundation.
*
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SafeSetID: " fmt
#include <linux/hashtable.h>
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
int safesetid_initialized;
#define NUM_BITS 8 /* 128 buckets in hash table */
static DEFINE_HASHTABLE(safesetid_whitelist_hashtable, NUM_BITS);
/*
* Hash table entry to store safesetid policy signifying that 'parent' user
* can setid to 'child' user.
*/
struct entry {
struct hlist_node next;
struct hlist_node dlist; /* for deletion cleanup */
uint64_t parent_kuid;
uint64_t child_kuid;
};
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(safesetid_whitelist_hashtable_spinlock);
static bool check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key(kuid_t parent)
{
struct entry *entry;
rcu_read_lock();
hash_for_each_possible_rcu(safesetid_whitelist_hashtable,
entry, next, __kuid_val(parent)) {
if (entry->parent_kuid == __kuid_val(parent)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return true;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return false;
}
static bool check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key_value(kuid_t parent,
kuid_t child)
{
struct entry *entry;
rcu_read_lock();
hash_for_each_possible_rcu(safesetid_whitelist_hashtable,
entry, next, __kuid_val(parent)) {
if (entry->parent_kuid == __kuid_val(parent) &&
entry->child_kuid == __kuid_val(child)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return true;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return false;
}
static int safesetid_security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap,
unsigned int opts)
{
if (cap == CAP_SETUID &&
check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key(cred->uid)) {
if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_INSETID)) {
/*
* Deny if we're not in a set*uid() syscall to avoid
* giving powers gated by CAP_SETUID that are related
* to functionality other than calling set*uid() (e.g.
* allowing user to set up userns uid mappings).
*/
pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETUID, which is not available to UID %u for operations besides approved set*uid transitions",
__kuid_val(cred->uid));
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int check_uid_transition(kuid_t parent, kuid_t child)
{
if (check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key_value(parent, child))
return 0;
pr_warn("UID transition (%d -> %d) blocked",
__kuid_val(parent),
__kuid_val(child));
/*
* Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
* that could arise from a missing whitelist entry preventing a
* privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
*/
force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
return -EACCES;
}
/*
* Check whether there is either an exception for user under old cred struct to
* set*uid to user under new cred struct, or the UID transition is allowed (by
* Linux set*uid rules) even without CAP_SETUID.
*/
static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
const struct cred *old,
int flags)
{
/* Do nothing if there are no setuid restrictions for this UID. */
if (!check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key(old->uid))
return 0;
switch (flags) {
case LSM_SETID_RE:
/*
* Users for which setuid restrictions exist can only set the
* real UID to the real UID or the effective UID, unless an
* explicit whitelist policy allows the transition.
*/
if (!uid_eq(old->uid, new->uid) &&
!uid_eq(old->euid, new->uid)) {
return check_uid_transition(old->uid, new->uid);
}
/*
* Users for which setuid restrictions exist can only set the
* effective UID to the real UID, the effective UID, or the
* saved set-UID, unless an explicit whitelist policy allows
* the transition.
*/
if (!uid_eq(old->uid, new->euid) &&
!uid_eq(old->euid, new->euid) &&
!uid_eq(old->suid, new->euid)) {
return check_uid_transition(old->euid, new->euid);
}
break;
case LSM_SETID_ID:
/*
* Users for which setuid restrictions exist cannot change the
* real UID or saved set-UID unless an explicit whitelist
* policy allows the transition.
*/
if (!uid_eq(old->uid, new->uid))
return check_uid_transition(old->uid, new->uid);
if (!uid_eq(old->suid, new->suid))
return check_uid_transition(old->suid, new->suid);
break;
case LSM_SETID_RES:
/*
* Users for which setuid restrictions exist cannot change the
* real UID, effective UID, or saved set-UID to anything but
* one of: the current real UID, the current effective UID or
* the current saved set-user-ID unless an explicit whitelist
* policy allows the transition.
*/
if (!uid_eq(new->uid, old->uid) &&
!uid_eq(new->uid, old->euid) &&
!uid_eq(new->uid, old->suid)) {
return check_uid_transition(old->uid, new->uid);
}
if (!uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) &&
!uid_eq(new->euid, old->euid) &&
!uid_eq(new->euid, old->suid)) {
return check_uid_transition(old->euid, new->euid);
}
if (!uid_eq(new->suid, old->uid) &&
!uid_eq(new->suid, old->euid) &&
!uid_eq(new->suid, old->suid)) {
return check_uid_transition(old->suid, new->suid);
}
break;
case LSM_SETID_FS:
/*
* Users for which setuid restrictions exist cannot change the
* filesystem UID to anything but one of: the current real UID,
* the current effective UID or the current saved set-UID
* unless an explicit whitelist policy allows the transition.
*/
if (!uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->uid) &&
!uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->euid) &&
!uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->suid) &&
!uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->fsuid)) {
return check_uid_transition(old->fsuid, new->fsuid);
}
break;
default:
pr_warn("Unknown setid state %d\n", flags);
force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
int add_safesetid_whitelist_entry(kuid_t parent, kuid_t child)
{
struct entry *new;
/* Return if entry already exists */
if (check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key_value(parent, child))
return 0;
new = kzalloc(sizeof(struct entry), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
new->parent_kuid = __kuid_val(parent);
new->child_kuid = __kuid_val(child);
spin_lock(&safesetid_whitelist_hashtable_spinlock);
hash_add_rcu(safesetid_whitelist_hashtable,
&new->next,
__kuid_val(parent));
spin_unlock(&safesetid_whitelist_hashtable_spinlock);
return 0;
}
void flush_safesetid_whitelist_entries(void)
{
struct entry *entry;
struct hlist_node *hlist_node;
unsigned int bkt_loop_cursor;
HLIST_HEAD(free_list);
/*
* Could probably use hash_for_each_rcu here instead, but this should
* be fine as well.
*/
spin_lock(&safesetid_whitelist_hashtable_spinlock);
hash_for_each_safe(safesetid_whitelist_hashtable, bkt_loop_cursor,
hlist_node, entry, next) {
hash_del_rcu(&entry->next);
hlist_add_head(&entry->dlist, &free_list);
}
spin_unlock(&safesetid_whitelist_hashtable_spinlock);
synchronize_rcu();
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(entry, hlist_node, &free_list, dlist) {
hlist_del(&entry->dlist);
kfree(entry);
}
}
static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, safesetid_security_capable)
};
static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
{
security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
/* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
safesetid_initialized = 1;
return 0;
}
DEFINE_LSM(safesetid_security_init) = {
.init = safesetid_security_init,
.name = "safesetid",
};