Eric W. Biederman be0ef855ba net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages ... [ Upstream commit 90f62cf30a ] It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that privileged executable did not intend to do. To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls. Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well. Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>		2014-06-26 15:15:38 -04:00
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af_phonet.c
datagram.c	net: add build-time checks for msg->msg_name size	2014-01-18 23:04:16 -08:00
Kconfig
Makefile
pep-gprs.c
pep.c
pn_dev.c
pn_netlink.c	net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages	2014-06-26 15:15:38 -04:00
socket.c
sysctl.c