Andy Lutomirski 0161028b7c perf/core: Change the default paranoia level to 2 ... Allowing unprivileged kernel profiling lets any user dump follow kernel control flow and dump kernel registers. This most likely allows trivial kASLR bypassing, and it may allow other mischief as well. (Off the top of my head, the PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR output during /dev/urandom reads could be quite interesting.) Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>		2016-05-09 17:57:12 -07:00
..
callchain.c	perf: generalize perf_callchain	2016-02-20 00:21:44 -05:00
core.c	perf/core: Change the default paranoia level to 2	2016-05-09 17:57:12 -07:00
hw_breakpoint.c	perf: Collapse and fix event_function_call() users	2016-01-21 18:54:24 +01:00
internal.h	perf: generalize perf_callchain	2016-02-20 00:21:44 -05:00
Makefile
ring_buffer.c	perf/core: Fix Undefined behaviour in rb_alloc()	2016-03-21 09:08:18 +01:00
uprobes.c	mm, fs: get rid of PAGE_CACHE_* and page_cache_{get,release} macros	2016-04-04 10:41:08 -07:00